POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
WORLD-ECONOMY, NATION-STATE AND LOCALITY

Colin Flint | Peter J. Taylor
The new and updated seventh edition of Political Geography once again shows itself fit to tackle a frequently and rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. It retains the intellectual clarity, rigour and vision of previous editions based upon its world-systems approach, and is complemented by the perspective of feminist geography. The book successfully integrates the complexity of individuals with the complexity of the world-economy by merging the compatible, but different, research agendas of the co-authors.

This edition explores the importance of states in corporate globalization, challenges to this globalization, and the increasingly influential role of China. It also discusses the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy and the constant tension between the global scale of economic processes and the territorialization of politics in the current context of geopolitical change. The chapters have been updated with new examples – new sections on art and war, intimate geopolitics and geopolitical constructs reflect the vibrancy and diversity of the academic study of the subject. Sections have been updated and added to the material of the previous edition to reflect the role of the so-called Islamic State in global geopolitics. The book offers a framework to help students make their own judgements of how we got where we are today, and what may or should be done about it.

Political Geography remains a core text for students of political geography, geopolitics, international relations and political science, as well as more broadly across human geography and the social sciences.

Colin Flint is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Utah State University, USA.

Peter J. Taylor is Emeritus Professor of Geography at Northumbria University, UK.
We dedicate this book to Immanuel Wallerstein for his imagination, inspiration and friendship
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface to the seventh edition</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tips for reading this book</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prologue: episodes in the life and times of a sub-discipline</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welcome to political geography</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratzel's organism: promoting a new state</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackinder's heartland: saving an old empire and much more</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haushofer's geopolitik: reviving a defeated state</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartshorne's functionalism: creating a moribund backwater</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What political geography did next</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do we move beyond the limitations inherent in political geography's history?</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 A world-systems approach to political geography</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World-systems analysis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions of a historical system</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and politics in the world-economy</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A political geography perspective on the world-economy</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key glossary terms from Chapter 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested reading</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Geopolitics rampant</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical codes and world orders</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turmoil and stability: geopolitical codes, orders and transitions</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary geopolitical transition and new world order</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical geopolitics: representations of the War on Terror</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate geopolitics, feminist scholarship and the interrogation of security</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical constructs: space, time, subjects and structures</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

Elections beyond the core 254
Social movements 262

Chapter summary
Key glossary terms from Chapter 6
Suggested reading
Activities

7 Cities as localities 271
Cities making hegemonies 275
Modern territorial states tame cities 280
Using cities to make political globalizations 284
Citizens and global terrorism 291
Challenges of the twenty-first century 295

Chapter summary
Key glossary terms from Chapter 7
Suggested reading
Activities

8 Place and identity politics 301
Theorizing political action in places 305
Modernity and the politics of identity 310
Identity politics and the institutions of the capitalist world-economy 318
Place–space tensions 330

Chapter summary
Key glossary terms from Chapter 8
Suggested reading
Activities

Epilogue: a political geography framework for understanding our twenty-first-century world 335
The key concepts of our political geography 335
Scale as political product and political arena 336
Networks and the capitalist world-economy 337
The temporal–spatial context of political action 338
Corporate globalization 338
War as a systemic phenomenon 339
Climate change: the ‘ultimate’ place–space tension 340
The final words: welcome to political geography 341

Glossary 343
Bibliography 353
Index 371
The seventh edition appears at a time when commentators and experts are struggling to understand the dramatic changes they are witnessing and find their crystal balls to be full of cloud. The election of Donald Trump to president of the United States and Brexit were both surprises with consequences that can only be conjectured at the moment. The roles of China and Russia in global politics raise fears for some and opportunities for others. Conflicts in the Middle East continue and the emergence of the so-called Islamic State has defined the daily experiences of far too many people. In sum, there are suggestions that the very institutions, practices and assumptions that have defined the actions of countries, businesses, political parties and social movements since the end of the Second World War may be thoroughly revised in the next few years. The pressing challenges of political violence, ecological disaster, economic inequity and exclusionary and fundamentalist attitudes to nationalism and religion dominate the news and media commentary.

Similar to the context of the previous edition, we remain concerned about the state of the world and believe the framework we offer can play a role in helping students (broadly defined) make their own judgements of how we got where we are today and what may/should be done about it. Perhaps more than any edition, this one will struggle with the difficulties of interpreting a world that seems to be changing at a rapid rate. However, the historic basis of our framework and our political economy approach allow us to give particular insights into contemporary changes. Many of these insights may provide disturbing suggestions as to what is on the horizon. However, it is not all bad news. The political geographies of war and difference exist alongside those seeking inter-cultural understanding and reconciliation. In other words, there are political geographies that are attempting to forge a sustainable future.

This edition is the fourth one jointly authored. Our compatible but different research agendas reflect political geography’s consideration of two key processes. On the one hand, Peter Taylor’s research studies the integration of the world-economy through the network practices across time and space (currently referred to as globalization). On the other hand, Colin Flint is studying the geographies of war and peace, especially the projection of military power across the globe and into all aspects of society. Both of these topics are to the fore in this edition.

To explain the many political geographies of our world we believe that a historical approach that connects economic and political processes is the most useful. With that in mind, we base the book upon a body of knowledge known as the world-systems approach. This body of knowledge is the product of the work of many scholars. However, Immanuel Wallerstein has been the driving-force behind the world-systems approach, hence our decision to dedicate the fifth and sixth editions of the book to him. We remain indebted to his vision and intellectual contribution. We explain the world-systems approach in detail, and illustrate its usefulness in explaining and connecting the geography of many different political actions. In addition, we complement the world-systems approach with the perspective of feminist geography. The result is, we hope, an explanation that is able to integrate the complexity of individuals with the complexity of the world-economy.

The seven editions of this book may be categorized thus:

1985 Foundation text, in which a particular theoretical perspective was brought to bear on the subject matter of political geography.
In this edition we have added three new sections to Chapter 2, changed the title and updated the examples. These changes reflect a disturbing resurgence of the use of the word geopolitics by policymakers and commentators. It is sobering to reflect that the term geopolitics was created in the global tensions at the end of the nineteenth century that eventually led to the First World War. The new sections on art and war, intimate geopolitics and geopolitical constructs reflect the vibrancy and diversity of the academic study of geopolitics. In Chapter 3 we also look to the future by considering historical echoes in a discussion of the geopolitical nature of infrastructure. In our discussion of national identity we include a new section on the intersection of religious affiliation with feelings of national belonging or exclusion. The War on Terror continues, and we have updated and added to the previous edition to reflect the role of the so-called Islamic State in global geopolitics. Recent elections have produced surprising results. In Chapter 6 we discuss how the processes of corporate globalization may be causing a new electoral geography. The world-systems approach is a historical social science, but one with contemporary relevance. We hope that the integration of text explaining theory and case studies illuminating the theory’s relevance enhances the book’s usefulness. Though we have changed the ingredients and the cooking-style in this edition we still know, however, that the proof of the pudding is in the eating!

Colin Flint, Logan, UT, USA
Peter Taylor, Tynemouth, England
July 2017
This book contains a number of features designed to help you. The text describes the concepts that we want to introduce to you. These concepts are ideas generated by political geography and world-systems scholars with the intention of explaining events in the world. In addition, we believe that understanding the contemporary world requires consideration of what has happened in the past. Such discussions of the historical foundations of contemporary events are also included in the main text.

Case studies are embedded throughout the book. These are intended to exemplify the concepts we introduce. Mainly, the case studies relate to contemporary issues. Set off from the text of each chapter in a tinted panel are short vignettes, gleaned from the media, to show that the news items you come across every day are manifestations of the political geographies we describe in the text.

Finally, each chapter concludes with suggested activities and further reading. As you will see from the text, political geography, as academic subject and real-world practice, is a dynamic affair. Your actions and understandings will maintain existing political geographies and create new ones. The activities and readings are intended to help you plot a pathway.
Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:

Figure 1.1 from *The Regional Geography of the World-System: External Arena, Periphery, Semi-Periphery and Core*, Nederlandse Geografische Studies, 144 Utrecht: Faculteit Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht (Terlouw, Kees 1992); Figure 2.1 from *Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical Transition*, Pinter, London, Guildford Publications, Inc., New York (Taylor, P. J. 1990) By kind permission of Continuum International Publishing Group; Figure 2.4 from *Captain America* TM (c) 2006 Marvel Characters, Inc. Used with permission; Figure 2.8 from Linda Panetta at www.opticalrealities.org; Tables 3.2 and 3.3 from ‘Industrial convergence, globalization, and the persistence of the North-South divide’ in *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38: 3–31, Transaction Publishers (Arrighi, G., Silver, B. J. and Brewer, B. D. 2003) Copyright 2003 by Transaction Publishers. Reprinted by permission of the publisher; Table 3.4 Copyright 2004 from ‘Gendered globalization’ by S. Roberts in *Mapping Women, Making Politics* (Staeheli, L. A., Kofman, E. and Peake, L. J., eds). Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC; Figure 3.13 reprinted from J. Lepawsky and C. McNabb ‘Mapping international flows of electronic waste’ copyright 2010 with permission from Wiley; Table 4.1 from N. Brenner and N. Theodore (2002) ‘Cities and the geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”’ in *Antipode* 34: 349–79, Blackwell Publishing; Figures 5.1 and 5.2 reprinted from *Political Geography*, vol. 20, Colin Flint, ‘Right-wing resistance to the process of American hegemony’, pp. 763–86, copyright 2001, with permission from Elsevier; Table 5.2 from Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Women in National Parliaments’, 31 May 2010, www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm, accessed 4 June 2010; Figure 8.1 reproduced by kind permission of Colin Flint from an unpublished PhD thesis at the University of Colorado. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 are published with the permission of Alison Williams.

In some instances, we have been unable to trace the owners of copyright material, and we would appreciate any information that would enable us to do so. Thank you to Sandra Mather for her work on Figures 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 3.2, 3.10, 3.11, 3.14 and 5.1; Catherine Miner for her careful reading and thoughtful comments; and Jack Flint for bibliographic work.
Welcome to political geography

The major sub-disciplines of human geography are identified by their preceding adjectives: in alphabetical order these are cultural, economic, political and social geographies. Each has spawned its own suite of textbooks that provide various spatial perspectives on each of these human activities. This all seems neat and simple, as it is intended to be. But our world, especially the world of knowledge, is never neat and tidy because it is made by many different people; usually of an older generation, wealthy, white and male. In particular, political geography is quite different from its sister adjectival geographies. Cultural, economic and social geographies are relatively new kids on the block; by and large they developed in the second half of the twentieth century. But political geography was part of geography from its inception as a university discipline in the late nineteenth century, an age of imperial competition: it is a sub-discipline present at disciplinary creation. Thus, it has a history as long as its discipline and this makes it very different from other parts of human geography.

To a large degree, political geography had its heyday in terms of influence before the other sub-disciplines had started to seriously develop. This is both a good thing and a bad thing. It is the latter because political geography became entwined into the political turmoils that engulfed Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. In short, in its own small way, parts of political geography became implicated in some of the more unsavoury political movements of the times, not least Nazi politics. Thus is political geography’s ‘biography’ profoundly different from all other parts of geography. This can now be treated as a good thing because it highlights the whole contemporary issue of linking geographical knowledge to policy-making. Geography should be relevant, but relevant for whom, to whom?

So, welcome to political geography. If you have read this far it means that you are on the way to choosing to enter the exciting world of this unusual sub-discipline: the small sub-discipline with the big subject-matter – relations between space and power. We have chosen to begin this text briefly with its history because this provides one very important insight. Understanding political geography’s biography enlightens how we approach our studies: past political geographies are now seen as transient; there is no reason to suppose present political geography to be any more stable. You most certainly should not consider that this book provides you with a ‘final state of play’, the last word on political geography! We aspire to produce a political geography for our times, nothing less and nothing more.

Knowing where we have come from is not just a matter of not making the same mistakes again. The experience gained from excavating political geography’s past provides fresh insights into what is possible in political geography and what is not. Revealing the poverty of past ‘political certainties’ and ‘presumed objectivities’ leads us to the question: what sort of political geography knowledge is it possible to produce? There have been three basic answers to this question. In the light of the political geography’s ‘bad experiences’, the simplest answer has been to avoid political controversy and produce political geography consisting of a basic list of only weakly connected topics, a description of things ‘political’ using maps. The dearth of theory in this approach provided a veneer of objectivity or neutrality but the product was a lacklustre sub-discipline. Another answer has been to react to the lack of coherence to produce a more theoretically
informed political geography. This has involved choosing theory from the general toolkit of social science and reinterpreting political geography along new lines. An alternative, third, position has been to build upon the diversity hinted at in the first approach but now developed through more sophisticated conceptions of space and political power. This is achieved by choosing social theory, often called ‘postmodern’, that celebrates variety.

In this text, we follow the middle course described above: a theoretically informed political geography is offered to provide a strong coherence to the subject-matter of political geography. World-systems analysis is the theory chosen to underpin the sub-discipline. This is a pragmatic choice based upon several decades of political geography practice. Put succinctly, we have found this particular theory, because of its specific treatment of time, space and power relations, to be especially relevant to the ongoing concerns of political geography in ‘global times’. In addition, we believe this approach responds to the relevance question most directly. The key concern of world-systems analysis is the well-being of the majority of the world’s population that live in poverty. In political terms, it aspires to be profoundly democratic for global times. The first chapter of the text introduces world-systems analysis as a theoretical framework, setting out the key concepts for interpreting a political geography for today. However, this prime choice of theory does not preclude incorporating important ideas from other approaches that have made political geography such a vibrant, contemporary sub-discipline in recent years. We remain eclectic in our approach but we have decided to use the coherent narrative of world-systems analysis as our starting point. But more about that below, let’s continue with how we get from initial and early ‘dark’ political geographies to today’s more emancipatory offerings. This biography of the sub-discipline is derived largely from Agnew and Muscarà (2012) and Taylor and Van der Wusten (2004), where you can find more details to pursue the subject further. It is, we think you will find, a really fascinating story.

### Ratzel’s organism: promoting a new state

It was in the German university system during the nineteenth century that research was added to traditional teaching functions and new disciplines were thereby created. Geography was a latecomer to this process, with geography departments being widely established only after German unification in 1871. In fact, geography as a discipline was sponsored by the state (Taylor 1985); and in its turn the state became a key research object of geography. This was consolidated by the publication of Friedrich Ratzel’s *Politische Geographie* in 1897, resulting in Ratzel being commonly accepted as the ‘father of political geography’.

Ratzel began his studies as a life sciences student and was deeply affected by the enthusiastic reception of Darwin’s teachings in the German academic world. When he occupied a newly established chair in geography he developed a perspective that was informed by the lessons he drew from Darwin, He wrote *Politische Geographie* late in his life but he was still strongly marked by the evolutionary perspective. At this juncture Germany’s unification in the Second Reich was still fresh and the forces that pushed for great power status were increasingly powerful. Ratzel was among its supporters (Buttmann 1977). Hence the matter of state rivalries was a key political concern of his, which he translated into political geography as the struggle to gain and retain territory.

What sort of theory of the state would you need as a supporter of a dynamic new nation-state? Ratzel found the answer in his Darwinian perspective by drawing on the work of Ernest Haeckel, another German professor, the man who invented ecology. As all living creatures (as species) have to find a niche within the natural environment to survive and prosper, so do nations (as states) in the world political environment. It is the fittest that survive in ecology so it will be the fittest that survive in political geography. The result of this way of thinking is the ‘organic theory of the state’ as a recipe for state expansion.

Ratzel ([1897]1969) set out seven ‘laws of the spatial growth of states’. The crucial ‘law’ is the middle
one: ‘4. The boundary is the peripheral organ of the state, the bearer of its growth as well as its fortification, and takes part in all of the transformations of the organism of the state.’ Basically, he argues that states naturally grow as the culture of the society becomes more ‘advanced’. Therefore, states can never be simply bounded by lines; rather he envisages a world of fluid frontiers. Growing states envelope ‘political valuable locations’ in a system of ‘territorial annexations and amalgamations’. Thus, a state’s territory at any point in time is always only ‘a transitional stage of rest for the fundamentally mobile organism’ (p. 25), until cultural development ends. He sees this as a generic process of ‘land-greed’ in all conquering states throughout history. For his own times, he identifies two contexts for this process. First, in colonial expansion, European states expand at the expense of ‘less-civilized’ peoples as a natural expression of their cultural superiority. Second, in ‘crowded Europe’ where the unifications of Germany and Italy are interpreted as initial small states, Prussia and Piedmont, amalgamating with neighbouring smaller states to become equal with existing large states like France and Austria. In this way, according to Ratzel in the late nineteenth century, the world political map continues to be dynamic to accommodate the rise of new great nations.

It is hard to imagine a ‘scientific’ theory more adapted to a given state’s needs as this one. Newly unified, the German Second Reich was hemmed in by older great states in Europe (Russia, Austria and France) and was a latecomer to colonial expansion: it was only just beginning to carve out its empire beyond Europe. Of course, we know now that this organism metaphor for expansion was a disaster for Germany through defeat in the First World War. Of course, we know now that this organism metaphor for expansion was a disaster for Germany through defeat in the First World War. Subsequently, in the later twentieth century, international peace regimes (for example, through the United Nations) were built on the basis of sovereignty and the inviolability of state boundaries so that the world political map is more stable than transient in the way Ratzel envisaged. Although there has been a great increase in states in the second half of the twentieth century due to, first, the decolonization of Western empires and, second, the break-up of communist states (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), all the resulting new states have kept prior colonial or provincial boundaries. The rare exception was the creation of South Sudan in 2011. In other words, boundaries have been rigorously respected: new states, but not new boundaries, have become the norm. This is the very opposite of Ratzel’s state as organism which is why his theory seems so fearful to us today.

**Mackinder’s heartland:** saving an old empire and much more

Sir Halford Mackinder is generally considered to be the ‘father of British geography’ – he lobbied vigorously for the introduction of geography into British universities in emulation of German universities – and was also a British politician, a Member of Parliament from 1910 to 1918. In both roles, he considered the threats to the British Empire from new rising states: in other words, he was also both a theoretical and practical political geographer, but his concerns were the reverse of Ratzel. Despite Britain having the largest empire ever known, Mackinder thought he had discovered potential, fatal weaknesses in its geography. The ideas he developed around this concern became much more widely discussed than Ratzel’s political geography and their greater longevity made them eventually even more worrying: in the nuclear stand-off that was to be called the Cold War, Mackinder’s early twentieth-century ideas were exhumed in the second half of the twentieth century to justify the Western nuclear arsenal accumulated to compensate for the USSR’s supposed geographical strategic superiority. This is a frightening story of how a simple geographical pattern can travel across completely different political contexts when needs be.

Mackinder (1904; Parker 1982; Kearns 2009) initially proposed a world model of political order based upon the worldwide distribution of land and sea in relation to available transport technology. His global view was centred upon the history of geopolitical competition for control of Eurasia. Mackinder identified a ‘pivot area’ as a ‘natural seat of power’ consisting of central Siberia north of the
central Asian mountains that was out of reach by naval power, in other words, beyond Britain’s military reach, its so-called ‘gunboat diplomacy’. This circumstance had become critical by the early twentieth century because, with the coming of the railways, land-based power could now be fully mobilized. Thus the balance between sea power and land power was moving decisively against the former: incursions by states that dominated the pivot area into zones dominated by naval powers would become relatively easier than incursions from naval powers in the direction of the pivot area. Consequently, the road to world dominance then opens up for the political power that dominates the pivot area (see Figure P.1a). The Russians were the current tenants of that area when he first presented these ideas but in his famous, subsequent revision (Mackinder 1919), he came to fear a German–Russian alliance dominating a slightly larger area he renamed the ‘heartland’. It is this ‘heartland thesis’ that has had a surprising longevity.

Mackinder’s political geography recipe for saving the British Empire was, therefore, simply to prevent a German–Russian land power accommodation. Given that it was originally based on the worldwide extension of railways and did not take airpower into consideration, it is surprising that Mackinder’s thesis should have been considered at all relevant after 1945. But the success of the USSR in the Second World War and its consequent expansion of power encompassed the heartland creating the sort of power structure Mackinder had feared. The emergence of the Cold War provided a new context for Mackinder’s model, originally a guide to the British Empire’s survival, to become a major strategic tool for different ends, ironically just as the British Empire was being dismantled.

The new ends were American, and the US’s concern for maintaining a Cold War balance of power against the USSR. And so, after his death in 1947, Mackinder became a ‘Cold War prophet’ for US military strategic planners. While military infrastructure had moved on from railway mobilization to inter-continental ballistic missiles, a simple geographical pattern remained as a reason for stockpiling ever more nuclear weapons to counter the USSR’s ‘natural seat of power,’ to use Mackinder’s original words. The use of Sir Halford Mackinder’s claims to justify a nuclear arms race support the claim that he has been the most influential geographer of the twentieth century.

### Haushofer’s geopolitik: reviving a defeated state

Leading political geographers such as Mackinder from the UK and Isaiah Bowman from the US were advisors at the Peace Conference of Versailles in 1919 where Germany suffered the confiscation of her colonies along with other economic penalties as losers of the First World War. German geographers were not so well represented at Versailles but they were important in the consequent public debate in Germany. Karl Haushofer, a retired military man, was the leading geographer in the movement to overturn the ‘unfair peace’ as he saw it. From his base in Munich, he established a field of Geopolitics as a body of applied or applicable knowledge aimed at the restoration of Germany’s international position. The main vehicle to this purpose was a specialist journal, Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, which he published between 1924 and 1944. Haushofer recognized Mackinder as a very important influence. The Zeitschrift included proposals and speculations about Germany’s potential friends and foes in Europe inspired by Mackinder’s heartland thesis. Haushofer also related this to lebensraum (literally ‘living space’) derived from Ratzel’s organism model, again justifying territorial expansion in Europe. In addition, he made his distinctive political geography contribution by maintaining and developing a German interest in the colonial world.

The colonial world to which Germany was a latecomer at the end of the nineteenth century was a chaotic jumble of territories. This reflected the history of European imperialism with first Spain and Portugal leading the way followed by France, England and the Dutch. There was no overall structure, just accidents of history based upon state rivalries and conflicts. Surely imperial political geography could be more
rational in its spatial organization? This could be achieved, thought Haushofer, by sweeping away the empires of the old imperialists, notably Britain and France, and reorganizing world-space into new pan-regions. These would be large inter-continental ‘vertical’ zones (north to south) in which one leading state dominated (see Figure P.1b). The archetypal example was the Americas as envisaged by the Monroe Doctrine through which the US claimed a sort of ‘military protectorate’ of the Latin American states as they gained their independence from Spain and Portugal in the nineteenth century. The US did not form new colonies but nonetheless grew to become the de facto leading state of the Americas. In pan-region arguments the Americas were joined by either two or three other pan-regions. These were a Eur-African pan-region dominated by Germany and an Asia-Pacific pan-region dominated by Japan, with, sometimes (depending on political alliances) between these two, a middle Russo-Indian pan-region dominated by the USSR (O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten 1990). The geographical rationale for such pan-regions was that they cut across worldwide ‘horizontal’ (east-west) environmental zones and thereby encompassed the whole range of Earth’s natural resources in each pan-region. The basic
argument was that, since every pan-region could be economically self-sufficient, there would be no resource wars: pan-regions were a recipe for world peace. Of course, the other interpretation was that Germany was buying off the US and Japan, and perhaps the USSR, on their route back to world power status after the disaster of the Treaty of Versailles.

In the event, it was not specifically this mega-imperialist model for which Haushofer’s geopolitik is remembered. Inevitably Haushofer’s ideas became particularly relevant in Hitler’s Third Reich, in particular the concept of lebensraum as Germany (and Japan) territorially expanded in the late 1930s. In the Second World War, Haushofer became widely known, especially in the USA, as ‘Hitler’s geographer’, plotting to overthrow the West (Ó Tuathail 1996). American geographers, notably Bowman, tried to differentiate their ‘scientific’ political geography from Haushofer’s geopolitik. But the damage was done: Haushofer’s legacy to political geography was profound. In the USSR, the very term political geography was banished: as late as 1983, when the International Geographical Union formed an academic grouping of political geographers, to be accepted by all delegates, it had to call itself the ‘Commission on the World Political Map’ (i.e. not ‘on Political Geography’ per se). In the West, language restriction was more limited: it appears to be the fact that no book with the word ‘geopolitics’ in its title appeared between 1945 and 1975 (Hepple 1986). But can there really be a political geography without an international dimension?

Hartshorne’s functionalism: creating a moribund backwater

The answer to the above question is apparently ‘yes’ and the proof can be found in post-Second World War USA, the part of the West where political geography continued to develop. To be sure, there were examples of an American continuity of the very masculine ‘international political geographies’ that we have just encountered. For instance, Van Valkenburg (1939) proposed a cycle theory of the state based upon physical geography models of river valley erosion processes – states were supposed to go through successive stages of youth, adolescence, maturity and old age. These ideas were very reminiscent of Ratzel; of course, in this case, the US was deemed ‘mature’ with European states suffering from old age. And during the Second World War George Renner proposed a very Ratzel-like redrawing of the European map in which small states would be swallowed up by larger ones (both the Netherlands and Belgium were to disappear) in what became the ‘great map scandal’ (Debres 1986). And that is the point: top-down, macho political geography was no longer acceptable in a new world where a United Nations was being built specifically to ensure respect for sovereign boundaries. As noted previously, Mackinder remained relevant as Cold War prophet but otherwise American geographers devised a new, respectable political geography largely bereft of international politics, and sometimes of politics itself. Respectability appeared to come at the expense of throwing the baby out with the bathwater!

Richard Hartshorne was the major figure in the building of this respectable political geography. There is an irony here in that his classic text The Nature of Geography (Hartshorne 1939) was the main transmitter of German geographical ideas into geography as a discipline. Later, in the sub-discipline of political geography his role was the exact opposite, to expunge German ideas. His means of doing this was functionalism. This approach was very popular in 1950s social sciences and provided research agendas for understanding how complicated social units are stable through the way they operate. In 1950 Hartshorne produced just such a research agenda for political geography in the form of a functional approach to studying the state.

Hartshorne’s (1950) unit for study was the territorial state and its spatial integration was deemed to be ‘the primary function of any state’. The success of a state was the result of two sets of forces: centrifugal forces pulled the state apart while centripetal forces kept it together. It is the balance between these forces that determines a state’s long-term viability. For instance, strong ethnic or religious differences can be the vital centrifugal force that destroys a state but this
can be countered by a powerful ‘state-idea’ such as a unifying nationalism that supports territorial integration. In this way Hartshorne provided a simple model for analysing states one at a time in terms of the balance of forces. This approach was subsequently elaborated further as a ‘unified field theory’ by Stephen Jones (1954) that described successful state establishment as a chain of five steps where centripetal forces triumph (if centrifugal forces ‘win’, the chain is broken and the state-making collapses). These early 1950s contributions were to dominate political geography for over two decades and are reproduced in student readers in the 1960s (Jackson 1964; Kaspersion and Minghi 1969), and are influential in textbooks well into the 1970s (Bergman 1975; Muir 1975).

The general problem with functionalism is that there is a conservative bias towards treating the status quo as a given so that conflict is marginalised. Clearly this is a very serious issue for political geography (Burghardt 1969, 1973). Treating states individually ignores the overall structures of power in which states operate. For Hartshorne, there are external relations of states but these are reduced to the boundary and strategic issues facing individual states. Further, he explicitly leaves out ‘vertical’ (social) differences within states to focus on ‘horizontal’ (spatial) differences thereby eliminating most of the domestic politics that occurs in all states across the world. It is for this reason that this early post-Second World War, American-led sub-discipline has been commonly dismissed as ‘apolitical political geography’. Given that students and researchers attracted to studying political geography will likely be interested in politics, the functionalist approach precipitated a crisis for the sub-discipline. Its apolitical tendencies successfully eliminated the unsavoury history from research agendas but at the price of producing a politically sterile subject matter.

The result was that political geography quickly fell behind geography’s other sub-disciplines in both teaching and research. Political geography is conspicuous by its absence in key texts of the ‘new geography’ which emerged in the 1960s: the sub-discipline does not warrant a chapter in the influential Models in Geography (Chorley and Haggett 1967) and is ignored in Peter Haggett’s (1965) classic Location Analysis in Human Geography. Geography was becoming exciting again just when political geography was anything but that: it is hardly surprising therefore, that the leader of the new geography, Brian Berry (1969), famously dismissed the sub-discipline as a ‘moribund backwater’.

What political geography did next

Since it is inconceivable that human geography could develop and prosper without a political sub-discipline, there was, in effect, only one way forward from moribund backwater: up. This took many forms. Initially, although paying lip-service to functionalism, authors wrote textbooks that did find exciting topics that were not too constrained by apolitical prescriptions. But, by eschewing the functional framework, books lost coherence, becoming reduced to listings of different topics without clear links between them. This left the way open to arbitrary uneven growth across topics. For instance, because voting data in areal units are publicly accessible and lend themselves to statistical analysis, geographical study of elections became a major growth area in the new quantitative geography. There were, inevitably, Hartshorne-ian echoes from the past claiming that such research was ‘social geography’ rather than part of political geography (Muir 1975), but this new work was more generally accepted as a political geography contribution to understanding domestic politics within states. The real issue was that the emerging political geography was unbalanced in its treatment of topics, which in turn reflected the sub-discipline’s theoretical poverty. Put simply, without Hartshorne’s functionalism there appeared to be no effective criteria for developing new political geography research agendas.

The key problem for political geography, as clearly articulated by Kevin Cox (1979) and Paul Claval (1984), was the overall lack of coherence. Claval (1984: 8) refers to the sub-discipline developing ‘in a rather chaotic manner’ producing an uncoordinated political geography, described by Cox (1979: vii)
as ‘an assortment of ill-related topics’ rather than the ‘tightly organized body of knowledge to be expected of a sub-discipline’. The introduction of world-systems analysis to political geography was specifically to address this problem (Taylor 1982). As claimed earlier, this particular approach combining concern for time, space and power has proven to be a very effective means of providing coherence to the various topics that come under the aegis of political geography (Flint 2010). Contemporary political geography is a very eclectic affair engaging a broad range of topics through an ever-increasing spectrum of theories (Cox et al. 2007; Agnew et al. 2015). That this is the seventh edition of a textbook first published in 1985 is testimony that a world-systems analysis of political geography is continuing to accomplish a job well done: world-systems political geography is accepted as a key reason that the moribund backwater label has been despatched to history. But it is by no means the only reason.

The long-term revival of political geography is a large subject and this is not the place to deal with it in any detail. When the nature of the revival was becoming quite clear, John Agnew (1987: 2) provided a useful grid through which we are able to summarise on-going trends in the sub-discipline. He identified ‘three types of theoretical viewpoint’ that ‘have emerged within the field in the last 30 years’: spatial-analytic, political-economic and postmodern (the latter interpreted broadly to encompass post-structural and post-colonial). These are arrayed against ‘five main areas into which research in political geography is now conventionally divided’: state spatiality, geopolitics, political movements, identities, and nationalism (including ethnic conflict). The text below relates to this typology of three approaches against the five study areas as follows. First, as regards the study areas, these broadly describe our content: we have one or more chapters devoted to each of them. Second, in terms of approaches, world-systems analysis is firmly located in the political-economic column. But in the original spirit of Agnew we do not treat boundaries between the ‘viewpoints’ as anything but porous. Spatial-analytic evidence and ideas permeate our world-systems analysis and major ‘post-’ writers such as Michel Foucault and Edward Said are impossible to ignore. Their contributions to understanding relations between power and knowledge, and Eurocentrism, permeate political geography thinking to such a degree that they appear embedded within texts even when not specifically quoted or referenced. Especially, the recognition of the pervasiveness of gendered and racialized power relations (Staeheli et al. 2004; Kobayashi and Peake 2000) are forms of politics that need to be addressed by a combination of world-systems theory and other theoretical frameworks. But world-systems analysis remains at the heart of our personal projects and the longevity of this textbook, now over three decades, confirms its continuing utility.

How do we move beyond the limitations inherent in political geography’s history?

Political geography has a history that we are loathe to build upon for fairly obvious reasons. This is why we have introduced world-systems analysis and associated approaches to the sub-discipline. This has enabled us to adhere to seven basic principles that guide our study. The principles and their key concepts are a useful starting point for thinking about how political process and its spatial context are understood.

First, it is necessary to discern the relationship between the material and the rhetorical. Images of the ‘real world’ are created so that actual political change – the continued US presence in Iraq, for example – is seen as ‘empire’ by some and the growing pains of a ‘new world order’ by others. Critical commentators and the politicians making the decisions describe the same events in very different ways. To understand our world, we must examine the actual causes and nature of current events as well as the way they are portrayed or represented. This approach has been labelled critical geopolitics and we incorporate this way of thinking throughout the book.

Second, to understand the development of political geography and understand contemporary events we
must identify the people and institutions (social scientists would say ‘actors’) that are involved, and then evaluate whether their form and roles have changed dramatically. This second path is one of the geographical conceptualizing of politics. To do this we need to reflect on the body of knowledge that political geography has built over the past hundred years or so while also adopting new ideas. How has imperialism, for example, been theorized and described both in the past and by contemporary scholars? What is a state and how has its sovereignty been understood and seen to change over the past decades? Only by being able to conceptualize the actors and identify how they have operated in the past can we evaluate the current situation.

Third, ‘making sense’ of political changes and the way that they are represented requires understanding how certain questions and forms of inquiry are marginalized – or identifying the ‘silences’ of both analysis and rhetoric. Gilmartin and Kofman (2004) highlight three such silences, or ‘blindspots’, in the content of political geography research:

- **Failure to emphasize the persistence of differences in power and wealth.** Despite the persistence of global differences, geopolitics is still focused on state strengths and border issues, for example ‘homeland security’.
- **The emphasis on elites.** A continued focus upon the state to the detriment of other scales and actors. Hence, there is a need to emphasize the everyday and democratize political geography to include the study of marginalized groups and other non-elites.
- **The gendering of geopolitics.** There is a need for a feminist geopolitical approach that focuses upon human security rather than state security.

With these goals as a driving force, feminist geopolitics has become one of the most significant components of contemporary political geography, and we integrate the approach throughout the book. From a feminist perspective, the challenge is to undermine political assumptions and that identify which geographies are the ‘most important’ and are studied to the detriment of other power relations. In their own words:

> It is important that we acknowledge women’s centrality to the day-to-day practice of geopolitics, not just in the documents that tell the stories of geopolitics, but also through their everyday lives that embrace the global.

(Gilmartin and Kofman 2004: 124)

The traditional focus on states has meant an overwhelming concentration upon the elites who control states. If one also acknowledges that it is the ‘powerful’ states of Europe and North America that have gained the most attention, then focusing upon elites means that it is the geography of the power relations of privileged white men that has constituted the core of political geographical knowledge. Clearly certain power relationships have been assumed to be more important; others are marginalized.

Fourth, not only do we need to conceptualize but we must also contextualize. Placing current events and changes in historical and spatial context gives them greater meaning and expands our perspective. Gilmartin and Kofman’s (2004) call to examine ‘differences’ is an example of the need for spatial contextualization: wealth, educational opportunities and freedom of expression and movement, for example, vary according to where one lives. Such disparities are local experiences within a global context. Furthermore, such differences are ‘persistent’. The broad geography of disparity of wealth, opportunity and security between the global north and south has long been a feature of the world political map.

Fifth, another means to contextualize is to place events within the process of the rise and fall of great powers. Competition between states to be the most powerful in the world has been a constant feature of the modern world (Agnew 2003; Wallerstein 2003). Current talk of ‘empire’ can be understood by looking at the process of the United States’ rise to power and the challenges to such power that it is now facing. Comparison with Britain’s similar experience in the nineteenth century illuminates commonalities and differences between the two periods. Yet, referring back to the redefinition of ‘security’ promoted by the
feminist approach we must combine a consideration of the power of states and the pursuit of ‘national security’ with other actors such as multinational businesses, protest groups, families and households.

Sixth, political geography has a tradition of picturing the world as a whole and analysing and evaluating different localities as components of this larger whole (Agnew 2003). As we shall see, the global view was an integral part of political geography’s role in facilitating imperial conquest. Indeed, seeing the world as a whole is part of the modern zeitgeist and not just an academic exercise. The predominance of states, national security and global politics are part of the common understanding of the way the modern world works. Academic analysis of political geography has also defined particular global views.

The latter point is important because, for all its ‘global heritage’ political geography as a sub-discipline has focused its efforts on understanding the modern state and its relations to territory and nation. However, it is important to realize that, while contemporary globalization and the idea of ‘empire’ involve an important ‘rescaling’ of activities, this is by no means the whole story. Concern for the global should not lead to the neglect of other geographical scales, such as local and national. This is the key point for political geography, and it is relationships between different geographical scales that are going to be central to the political geography we develop below. Looking at the scales of the local, the household and the body necessarily requires a study of actors other than states, and of the ‘everyday’ rather than ‘grand events’ (Thrift 2000; Hyndman 2004). However, geographical scales and political actors cannot be studied independently of a theory to inform interpretation and structure the argument. This is where world-systems analysis enters the fray.

Read, learn and enjoy.

What can you do as a political geographer?

The contentious history of political geography may well beg the questions what do political geographers do, or are there career paths for political geographers? The simple answer is yes! We have introduced the idea that many actors make many political geographies. In the remainder of this book you will learn to employ theoretically informed, evidence-based thinking on a wide range of political issues; these are very relevant skills in a rapidly changing world. Hence, there are a variety of careers available. One arena is in government agencies, both those involved in domestic policies (such as planning) and international agencies involved in foreign affairs, intelligence and security. Private companies, especially those involved in international business, require employees who can understand and interpret the dynamic global context of their operations, and benefit from the skills and knowledge of political geographers. The same can be said for non-governmental organizations and think tanks.

More ideas can be found by exploring the career section of the American Association of Geographers (www.aag.org/cs/what_geographers_do) and the Royal Geographical Society (www.rgs.org/NR/exeres/9061DA5B-2D64-4B71-BB97-9CF03D3729C6.htm).
CHAPTER 1

A world-systems approach to political geography

What this chapter covers

Introduction

World-systems analysis
Historical systems
  Systems of change
  Types of change
  The error of developmentalism
The basic elements of the world-economy
  A single world market
  A multiple-state system
  A three-tier structure

Dimensions of a historical system
The spatial structure of the world-economy
  The geographical extent of the system
  The concepts of core and periphery
  The semi-periphery category
The dynamics of the world-economy
  Kondratieff cycles
  ‘Logistic’ waves
A space–time matrix for political geography
Introduction

The Prologue has provided a glimpse of some of the changes political geography has undergone over the past one hundred years or so to become the diverse and exciting intellectual field it is today. Not surprisingly, political geography has been influenced by broader changes in social science. Social science is continually creating, adapting, and revisiting new theories to help us understand the real world. Our approach to political geography is based upon a particular theory called world-systems analysis (Wallerstein 2004). We find this approach useful because of its unique definition of what is meant by ‘society’, a seemingly unproblematic concept but one that deserves much closer interrogation. World-systems analysis requires us to think about society in broad geographical and historical terms, historical social systems, rather than equating society with individual countries. The result is a political geography approach that is able to situate political events (such as tensions between the US and China or discussions about global climate change) in a much broader context. Thus world-systems analysis provides the basic framework of this text but we are by no means exclusive in our adoption of this approach. Although the following chapters are set out in world-systems terms using geographical scales (from global to local), we integrate other useful concepts and ideas where these also contribute usefully to understanding our political geography subject-matter. But now let’s start at the beginning: in this chapter, we introduce the key ingredients of world-systems analysis, with other useful perspectives introduced that help us understand the nature of power.

World-systems analysis

World-systems analysis is about how we conceptualize social change (Wallerstein 2004). Other approaches describe such changes in terms of societies that are equated with countries. Hence most discussion is of British society, US society, Brazilian society, Chinese society and so on. Since there are about two hundred states in the world today, it follows that students of social change would have to deal with approximately two hundred different ‘societies’. This position is accepted by orthodox social science and we may term it the ‘multiple-society assumption’. World-systems analysis rejects this assumption as a valid starting point for understanding the modern world.

Instead of social change occurring country by country, Wallerstein postulates a ‘world-system’ that is currently global in scope. This is the modern world-system, also called the capitalist world-economy – Wallerstein refers to them as two sides of the same coin and we use the terms interchangeably in this book. If we accept this ‘single-society assumption’, it follows that the many ‘societies as countries’ become...
merely parts of a larger whole. Hence a particular social change in one of these countries can be fully understood only within the wider context that is the modern world-system. For instance, the decline of Britain since the late nineteenth century is not merely a ‘British phenomenon’; it is part of a wider world-system process, which we shall term ‘hegemonic decline’. The same long-term view can be applied to contemporary debates about political challenges facing the US, the current hegemonic power. Trying to explain the industrial decline of Britain, the travails of the inland states of the US or indeed the recent rise of China by concentrating on Britain, the US or China alone will produce only a very partial view of the processes that transcend these particular states.

Of course, the world-systems approach is not the first venture to challenge orthodox thinking in the social sciences. In fact, Wallerstein is consciously attempting to bring together two previous challenges. First, he borrows ideas and concepts from the French Annales school of history. These historians deplored the excessive detail of early twentieth-century history, with its emphasis upon political events and especially diplomatic manoeuvres. They argued for a more holistic approach in which the actions of politicians were just one small part in the unfolding history of ordinary people. Different politicians and their diplomacies would come and go, but the everyday pattern of life with its economic and environmental material basis continued. The emphasis was therefore on the economic and social roots of history rather than the political façade emphasized in orthodox writings. This approach is perhaps best summarized by Fernand Braudel’s phrase *longue durée*, which represents the long-term materialist stability underlying political volatility (Wallerstein 1991).

The second challenge that Wallerstein draws upon is the Marxist critique of the development theories in modern social science. The growth of social science after the Second World War coincided with a growth of new states out of the former European colonies. It was the application of modern social science to the problems of these new states that more than anything else exposed its severe limitations. In 1967, Frank published a cataclysmic critique of social scientific notions of ‘modernization’ in these new states that showed ideas developed in the more prosperous parts of the world could not be transferred to poorer areas without wholly distorting the analysis. Frank’s main point was the identification of the

---

**The Annales school and the view from below**

World systems analysis is based on the principles of the Annales school of thought, a school of French historians linked to the journal *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale*, founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in 1929. The school advocated ‘total history’ as a synthesizing discipline to counter the separation of inquiry in disciplines. Most notable was the call for the study of *la longue durée*, or long-term structures and processes, rather than the traditional historical focus on ‘big events’ and ‘great men’.

The ideas of the Annales school are an essential foundation for a political geography approach for the following reasons:

- The focus on the big picture offers a global view of structures and processes.
- The focus on everyday experience and cultural change means that the structures and processes are identified as the products of social action, and not preordained or immutable.
- The focus on everyday experiences means that the view of political geography is ‘from below’ or democratized. Non-elites are seen as important actors.
- In combination, political actions of individuals, groups, and states are placed within the context of large structures and seen to maintain and challenge those structures.

‘development of underdevelopment’ by which he meant that the poorer countries of the world are impoverished to enable a few countries to get richer. Whereas Western Europe, Japan and the US may have experienced development, most of the remainder of the world became relatively poorer as part of the same process of development. Most countries experienced the development of underdevelopment for the benefit of a few countries. This latter phrase encapsulates the main point of this school, namely that for the new states it is not a matter of ‘catching up’ but rather one of changing the whole process of development at the global scale (Wallerstein 1991).

The world-systems approach attempts to combine selectively critical elements of Braudel's materialist history with Frank's development critique, as well as adding several new features, to develop a comprehensive historical social science. As Goldfrank (1979) puts it, Wallerstein is explicitly ‘bringing history back in’ to social science. And, we might add, with the development of Frank’s ideas he is also ‘bringing geography back in’ to social science: Wallerstein (1991) himself refers to ‘TimeSpace realities’ as his sphere of interest. Quite simply there is more to understanding the contemporary globalization of the world we live in than can be derived from study of the ‘advanced’ countries of the world in the early twenty-first century, however rigorous or scholarly the conduct of such study is.

Historical systems

Modern social science is the culmination of a tradition that attempts to develop general laws for all times and places. A well-known example of this tradition is the attempt to equate the decline of the British Empire with the decline of the Roman Empire nearly two millennia earlier. Similarly, assumptions are often made that ‘human nature’ is universal, so that motives identified today in ‘advanced’ countries can be transferred to other periods and cultures. The important point is to specify the scope of generalizations. Wallerstein uses the concept of historical systems to define the limits of his generalizations.

Historical systems are Wallerstein’s ‘societies’. They are systematic in that they consist of interlocking parts that constitute a single whole, but they are also historical in the sense that they are created, develop over a period of time and then reach their demise. Although Wallerstein recognizes only one such system in existence today, the modern world-system, there have been innumerable historical systems in the past.

Systems of change

Although every historical system is unique, Wallerstein argues that they can be classified into three major types of entity. Such entities are defined by their mode of production, which Wallerstein broadly conceives as the organization of the material basis of a society. This is a much broader concept than the orthodox Marxist definition in that it includes not only the way in which productive tasks are divided up but also decisions concerning the quantities of goods to be produced, their consumption and/or accumulation, and the resulting distribution of goods. Using this broad definition, Wallerstein identifies just three basic ways in which the material base of societies has been organized (for a more complex world-systems interpretation of historical systems, see the work of Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) and Taylor (2013: 45–56)). These three modes of production are each associated with a type of entity or system of change.

A mini-system is the entity based upon the reciprocal–lineage mode of production. This is the original mode of production based upon very
limited specialization of tasks. Production is by hunting, gathering or rudimentary agriculture; exchange is reciprocal between producers and the main organizational principle is age and gender. Mini-systems are small extended families or kin groups that are essentially local in geographical range and exist for just a few generations before destruction or fissure. There have been countless such mini-systems, but none has survived to the present for all have been taken over and incorporated into larger world-systems. By ‘world’, Wallerstein does not mean ‘global’ but merely systems larger than the local day-to-day activities of particular members. Two types of world-system are identified by mode of production.

A world-empire is the entity based upon the redistributive–tributary mode of production. World-empires have appeared in many political forms, but they all share the same mode of production. This consists of a large group of agricultural producers whose technology is advanced enough to generate a surplus of production beyond their immediate needs. This surplus is sufficient to allow the development of specialized non-agricultural producers such as artisans and administrators. Whereas exchange between agricultural producers and artisans is reciprocal, the distinguishing feature of these systems is the appropriation of part of the surplus to the administrators, who form a military–bureaucratic ruling class. Such tribute is channelled upwards to produce large-scale material inequality not found in mini-systems. This redistribution may be maintained in either a unitary political structure such as the Roman Empire or a fragmented structure such as feudal Europe. Despite such political contrasts, Wallerstein argues that all such ‘civilizations’, from the Bronze Age to the recent past, have the same material basis to their societies: they are all world-empires. These are less numerous than mini-systems, but nevertheless there have been dozens of such entities since the Neolithic Revolution.

A world-economy is the entity based upon the capitalist mode of production. The criterion for production is profitability, and the basic drive of the system is accumulation of the surplus as capital. There is no overarching political structure. Competition between different units of production is ultimately controlled by the cold hand of the market, so the basic rule is accumulate or perish. In this system, the efficient prosper and destroy the less efficient by undercutting their prices in the market. This mode of production defines a world-economy.

Historically, such entities have been extremely fragile and have been incorporated and subjugated to world-empires before they could develop into capital-expanding systems. The great exception is the European world-economy that emerged after 1450 and survived to take over the whole world. A key date in its survival is 1557, when both the Spanish–Austrian Habsburgs and their great rivals the French Valois dynasty went bankrupt in their attempts to dominate the nascent world-economy (Wallerstein 1974: 124). It was the actions of ‘international bankers’ rather than a military defeat that led to the demise of these early modern attempts to produce a unified European world-empire (and therefore stifle the incipient modern world-system at birth). Clearly by 1557 the European world-economy had arrived and was surviving early vulnerability on its way to becoming the only historical example of a fully developed world-economy. As it expanded, it eliminated all remaining mini-systems and world-empires to become truly global by about 1900 (Figure 1.1).
Types of change

Now that we have the full array of types of entity within world-systems analysis we can identify the basic forms that social change can take. It is worth reiterating the key point, that it is these entities that are the objects of change; they are the ‘societies’ of this historical social perspective. Within this framework there are four fundamental types of change.

The first two types of change are different means of transformation from one mode of production to another. This can occur as an internal process, where one system evolves into another. For instance, mini-systems have begotten world-empires in certain advantageous circumstances in both the Old and New Worlds. Similarly, one type of system may be the predecessor of another. We may term this process transition. The most famous example is the transition from feudalism (a world-empire) to capitalism (a world-economy) in Europe in the period after 1450 (the beginning of the capitalist world-economy).

Transformation, the second type of change, as an external process occurs as incorporation. As world-empires expanded they conquered and incorporated former mini-systems. These defeated populations were reorganized to become part of a new mode of production providing tribute to their conquerors. Similarly, the expanding world-economy has incorporated mini-systems and world-empires whose populations become part of this new system (Figure 1.1). All peoples of the continents beyond Europe have experienced this transformation over the past five hundred years.

Discontinuities are the third type of change. Discontinuity occurs between different entities at approximately the same location where both entities share the same mode of production. The system breaks down and a new one is constituted in its place. For world-empires, the sequence of Chinese states is the classic example. The periods between these separate world-empires are anarchic, with some reversal to mini-systems, and are commonly referred to as Dark Ages. Another famous example is that which occurred in Western Europe between the collapse of the Roman Empire and the rise of feudal Europe.

Continuities, the final type of change, occur within systems. Despite the popular image of ‘timeless’ traditional cultures, all entities are dynamic and continually changing. Such changes are of two basic types – linear and cyclical. All world-empires have displayed a large cyclical pattern of ‘rise and fall’ as they expanded into adjacent mini-systems until bureaucratic–military costs led to diminishing returns resulting in contraction. In the world-economy, linear trends and cycles of growth and stagnation form an integral part of our analysis. They are described in some detail below.

The error of developmentalism

We have now clarified the way in which world-systems analysis treats social change. In what follows we concentrate on one particular system, the capitalist world-economy, whose expansion has eliminated all other systems – hence our ‘one-society assumption’ for studying contemporary social change. The importance of this assumption for our analysis cannot be overemphasized. It is best illustrated by the error of developmentalism to which orthodox social science is prone (Taylor 1989, 1992a).

Modern social science has devised many ‘stage models’ of development, all of which involve a linear sequence of stages through which ‘societies’ (= countries) are expected to travel. The basic method is to use a historical interpretation of how rich countries became rich as a futuristic speculation of how poor countries can become rich in their turn (Figure 1.2). The most famous example is Rostow’s stages of economic growth, which generalize British economic history into a ladder of five stages from ‘traditional society’ at the bottom to ‘the age of high mass consumption’ at the top. Rostow uses this model to locate different countries on different rungs of his ladder. ‘Advanced’ (= rich) countries are at the top, whereas the states of the ‘third world’ are on the lower rungs. This way of conceptualizing the world has been very popular in geography, where stage models are applied to a wide range of phenomena such as demographic change and transport networks. All assume that poor states can follow a path of development essentially the same as that pursued by the current ‘advanced’ states. This completely misses
out the overall context in which development occurs. When Britain was at the bottom of Rostow’s ladder, there was no ‘high mass consumption’ going on at the top.

These developmental models of social change expose the weaknesses of the multiple-society assumption. If social change can be adequately understood on a country-by-country basis then the location of other countries on the ladder does not matter: each society is an autonomous object of change moving along the same trajectory but starting at different dates and moving at different speeds. World-systems analysis totally refutes this model of the contemporary world. The fact that some countries are rich and others are poor is not merely a matter of timing along some universal pathway to affluence. Rather, rich and poor are part of one system and they are experiencing different processes within that system: Frank’s development and development of underdevelopment. Hence the most important fact concerning those countries at the bottom of Rostow’s ladder today is that there are countries enjoying the advantage of being above them at the top of the ladder.

Perhaps more than anything else, world-systems analysis is a challenge to developmentalism: the simplistic world of an international ladder is superseded by the sophisticated concept of the capitalist world-economy.

**Figure 1.2 Developmentalism.**

Now that we have set the study of our world into the overall world-systems framework, we can summarize the basic elements of our historical system, which will underlie all our subsequent analyses. Wallerstein identifies three such basic elements.

**A single world market**

The world-economy consists of a single world market, which is capitalist. This means that production is for exchange rather than use: producers do not consume what they produce but exchange it on the market for the best price they can get. These products are known as commodities, whose value is determined by the market. Since the price of any commodity is not fixed there is economic competition between producers. In this competition, the more efficient producers can undercut the prices of other producers to increase their share of the market and to eliminate rivals. In this way, the world market determines in the long run the quantity, type and location of production. The concrete result of this process has been uneven economic development across the world. Contemporary globalization is the latest, and in some ways the most developed, expression of the world market.

**A multiple-state system**

In contrast to one economic market, there have always been a number of political states in the world-economy. This is part of the definition of the system, since if one state came to control the whole system the world market would become politically controlled, competition would be eliminated and the system would transform into a world-empire. Hence the inter-state system is a necessary element of the world-economy. Nevertheless, single states are able to distort the market in the interests of their national capitalist group within their own boundaries, and powerful states can distort the market well beyond their boundaries for a short time. Some interpretations of globalization, for instance, see it as an ‘Americanization’, a robust expression of US power to stem its relative economic decline over the past couple of decades. The rhetoric of President Trump
and the goals of ‘Brexit’ (Britain leaving the European Union) suggest a move to re-establish the control of governments over trade and immigration. This is the very stuff of ‘international politics’, or ‘international political economy’ as it is increasingly being called. The concrete result of this process is a competitive state system in which a variety of ‘balance of power’ situations may prevail. Today the balance of power established after the Second World War is coming under increasing pressure as the commitment of the US to global institutions may be questioned and China and Russia are trying to establish their own global agendas.

A three-tier structure
This third essential element is also ‘political’ in nature but is subtler than the previous one. Wallerstein argues that the exploitative processes that work through the world-economy always operate in a three-tier format. This is because in any situation of inequality three tiers of interaction are more stable than two tiers of confrontation. Those at the top will always manoeuvre for the ‘creation’ of a three-tier structure, whereas those at the bottom will emphasize the two tiers of ‘them and us’. The continuing existence of the world-economy is therefore due in part to the success of the ruling groups in sustaining three-tier patterns throughout various fields of conflict. An obvious example is the existence of ‘centre’ parties or factions between right and left positions in many democratic political systems. The most general case is the rise of the ‘middle class’ between capital and labour since the mid-nineteenth century. Hence, from a world-systems viewpoint, the polarization tendency of contemporary globalization is inherently unstable in the medium term since it is eroding the middle classes. In other contexts, the acceptance of ‘middle’ ethnic groups helps ruling groups to maintain stability and control in plural societies. The official recognition of Indians and ‘coloureds’ (mixed-race people) between the black and white peoples of apartheid South Africa was just such an attempt to protect a dominant class by supporting a middle ‘racial buffer’. Geographically, the most interesting example is Wallerstein’s concept of the ‘semi-periphery’, which separates the extremes of material well-being in the modern world-economy that Wallerstein terms the core and the periphery. We define these terms in the next section.

Summary
Political geography and the basic elements of the capitalist world-economy
- A single world market is the material basis for our global view.
- The multiple-state system contextualizes state politics as one scale of activity in a broader structure.
- The three-tier structure is the material basis for analysing the ‘persistent differences’ in wealth and power.

Dimensions of a historical system
If we are bringing history back into political geography, the question obviously arises as to ‘what history?’ Several recent studies have shared our concern for the neglect of history in geography and have attempted to rectify the situation by presenting brief résumés of world history over the past few hundred years in the opening chapter of their work. The dangers and pitfalls of such writing are obvious: how can such a task be adequately achieved in just a few pages of text? The answer is that we must be highly selective. The selection of episodes to be covered will be directly determined by the purpose of the ‘history’. This is nothing new of course; it is true of all history. It is just that the exigencies are so severe for our purpose here.

We are fortunate that our problem has been made manageable by the publication of The Times Complete History of the World (Overy 2015), a hugely impressive Times Atlas. Applying Wallerstein’s world-systems approach to any subject assumes a level of general historical knowledge that is probably an unreasonable expectation of most students. It is well worth a trip to the library to browse through this historical atlas.
and obtain a sense of the movement of world history. This is recommended to all readers of this book.

Of course, this atlas does not itself employ a world-systems approach. It is divided into seven sections in the following chronological order:

1. The world of early man
2. The first civilizations
3. The classical civilizations of Eurasia
4. The world of divided regions (approximately AD 600–1500)
5. The world of the emerging West (AD 1500–1800)
6. The age of European dominance (nineteenth century AD)
7. The age of global civilization (twentieth century AD).

The product is explicitly global in intent and avoids the Eurocentric basis of many earlier attempts at world history. Nevertheless, it does bear the mark of traditional historiography with its impress of progress from Stone Age to global civilization. The seven sectors could be termed Stone Age, Bronze Age, classical Iron Age, Dark Ages, age of exploration, nineteenth-century age of trade and imperialism, and twentieth-century age of global society and world wars, with not too much distortion of the flow of ideas. A world-systems interpretation would portray the pre-1450 changes as the waxing and waning of world-empires into and out of zones of mini-systems. The post-1450 dynamics would be interpreted as the gradual replacement of world-empires and mini-systems by the geographical expansion of the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 1980a; Chase-Dunn and Anderson 2005; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

One of the advantages of adopting the world-systems approach is that it enables us to be much more explicit in the theory behind our history. The purpose of this section is to construct just such a historical framework for our political geography that does not simply reflect the weak sense of progress to be found in the other texts referred to at the beginning of this discussion. In place of a linear reconstruction of history, we shall emphasize the ups and downs of the world-economy. Furthermore, our approach is geographic. The movements of history will have differential effects on different parts of the world-economy. The way in which we present these ideas is as a space–time matrix of the world-economy. This is an extremely poor relation to Overy’s (2015) *Times Atlas*, but it does provide a succinct description of the major events relevant to our political geography.

The matrix that we generate is not an arbitrary, artificial creation. We are trying to describe the concrete historical entity of the world-economy. Both dimensions of the matrix are calibrated in terms of the system properties of the world-economy. Neither space nor time is treated as in any sense separate from the world-economy. They are not space–time containers through which the world-economy ‘travels’. Rather, they are both interpreted as the product of social relations. The time dimension is described as a social product of the dynamics of the world-economy. The space dimension is described as a social product of the structure of the world-economy. Our space–time matrix is a simple model that combines the dynamics and structure to provide a framework for political geography.

**The spatial structure of the world-economy**

It is unfortunate that the term ‘spatial structure’ usually conjures up a static picture of an unchanging pattern. Thus we have to emphasize that the spatial structure we are dealing with here is part and parcel of the same processes that generate the dynamics of the system. Spatial structure and temporal cycle are two sides of the same mechanisms that produce a single space–time framework. Space and time are separated here for pedagogical reasons so that in what follows it must always be remembered that the spatial structures we describe are essentially dynamic.

**The geographical extent of the system**

Our first task is to consider the geographical expansion of the world-economy. We have mentioned that it emerged as a European world-economy after 1450 and covered the globe by about 1900 but have not indicated how this varying size is defined.
Basically, all entities are defined in concrete terms by the geographical extent of their division of labour. This is the division of the productive and other tasks that are necessary for the operation of the system. Hence some distribution and trade are a necessary element of the system, whereas other trade is merely ephemeral, and has little relevance beyond those directly participating in it. For instance, luxury trade between the Roman and Chinese Empires was ephemeral, and we would not suggest they be combined to form a single ‘Eurasian’ system because of this trade. In Wallerstein’s terminology, China is part of Rome’s external arena and vice versa.

Using these criteria, Wallerstein delimits the initial European world-system as consisting of Western Europe, eastern Europe and those parts of South and Central America under Iberian control. The rest of the world was an external arena. This included the ring of Portuguese ports around the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which were concerned with trade in luxury goods. The development of this Portuguese trade had minimal effects in Asia (they merely replaced Arab and other traders) and in Europe. In contrast, Spanish activity in America – especially bullion exports – was fundamentally important in forming the world-economy. For Wallerstein, therefore, Spain was much more important than Portugal in the origins of the world-economy, despite the latter’s more global pattern of possessions.

From this period on, the European world-economy expanded by incorporating the remainder of the world roughly in the order Caribbean, North America, India, east Asia, Australia, Africa and finally the Pacific Islands. These incorporations took several forms. The simplest was plunder. This could be only a short-term process, to be supplemented by more productive activities involving new settlement. This sequence occurred in Latin America. Elsewhere, aboriginal systems were also destroyed and completely new economies built, as in North America and Australia. Alternatively, existing societies remained intact but they were peripheralized in the sense that their economies were reoriented to serve wider needs within the world-economy. This could be achieved through political control as in India or indirectly through ‘opening up’ an area to market forces, as in China. The end result of these various incorporation procedures was the eventual elimination of the external arena (refer back to Figure 1.1).

The concepts of core and periphery

The concept of peripheralization implies that these new areas did not join the world-economy as ‘equal partners’ with existing members but that they joined on unfavourable terms. They were, in fact, joining a particular part of the world-economy that we term the periphery. It is now commonplace to define the modern world in terms of core (meaning the rich parts of the world in North America, Western Europe and Pacific Asia) and periphery (meaning the poor lands of the ‘third world’). Although the ‘rise’ of Japan to core status was quite dramatic in the twentieth century, this core-periphery pattern is often treated as a static, almost natural, phenomenon. The world-economy use of the terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ is entirely different. Both refer to complex processes and not directly to areas, regions or states. The latter become core-like only because of a predominance of core processes operating in that particular area, region or state. Similarly, peripheral areas, regions or states are defined as those where peripheral processes dominate. This is not a trivial semantic point but relates directly to the way in which the spatial structure is modelled. Space itself can be neither core nor periphery in nature. Rather, there are core and periphery processes that structure space so that at any point in time one or other of the two processes predominates. Since these processes do not act randomly but generate uneven economic development, broad zones of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ are found. Such zones exhibit some stability – parts of Europe have always been in the core – but also show dramatic changes over the lifetime of the world-economy, notably in the rise of extra-European areas, first the United States and then Japan.

How does Wallerstein define these two basic processes? Like all core-periphery models, there is an implication that ‘the core exploits and the periphery is exploited’. But this cannot occur as zones exploiting one another; it occurs through the different processes operating in different zones. Core and periphery processes are opposite types of complex production
relations. In simple terms, core processes consist of relations that incorporate relatively high wages, advanced technology and a diversified production mix, whereas periphery processes involve low wages, more rudimentary technology and a simple production mix. These are general characteristics, the exact nature of which changes constantly with the evolution of the world-economy. It is important to understand that these processes are not determined by the particular product being produced. Frank (1978) provides two good examples to illustrate this. In the late nineteenth century, India was organized to provide the Lancashire textile industry with cotton and Australia to provide the Yorkshire textile industry with wool. Both were producing raw materials for the textile industry in the core, so their economic function within the world-economy was broadly similar. Nevertheless, the social relations embodied in these two productions were very different, with one being an imposed peripheral process and the other a transplanted core process. The outcomes for these two countries have clearly depended on these social relations and not the particular type of product. Frank’s other example of similar products leading to contrasting outcomes due to production relations is the contrast between the tropical hardwood production of central Africa and the softwood production of North America and Scandinavia. The former combines expensive wood and cheap labour, the latter cheap wood and expensive labour.

The semi-periphery category
Core and periphery do not exhaust Wallerstein’s concepts for structuring space. Although these processes occur in distinct zones to produce relatively clear-cut contrasts across the world-economy, not all zones are easily designated as primarily core or periphery in nature. One of the most original elements of Wallerstein’s approach is his concept of the semi-periphery. This is neither core nor periphery but combines particular mixtures of both processes. Notice that there are no semi-peripheral processes. Rather, the term ‘semi-periphery’ can be applied directly to areas, regions or states when they do not exhibit a predominance of either core or peripheral processes. This means that the overall social relations operating in such zones involve exploiting peripheral areas, while the semi-periphery itself suffers exploitation by the core.

The semi-periphery is interesting because it is the dynamic category within the world-economy. Much restructuring of space consists of states rising and sinking through the semi-periphery. Opportunities for change occur during recessions, but these are only limited opportunities – not all the semi-periphery can evolve to become core. Political processes are very important here in the selection of success and failure in the world-economy. Wallerstein actually considers the semi-periphery’s role to be more political than economic. It is the crucial middle zone in the spatial manifestation of his three-tier characterization of the world-economy. For this reason, it figures prominently in much of our subsequent discussions.

The dynamics of the world-economy
One reason for current interest in the global scale of analysis is the fact that the whole world seems to be teetering on the verge of a dramatic change in global economic conditions. Terms such as ‘trade wars’ and ‘depression’ are back in vogue rather than being historical topics. ‘Globalization’ was once seen as an unstoppable juggernaut, apparently changing the way the world worked forever. Now we are looking back to the 1930s to try and understand emerging policies. Two points are clear from the current context. First, economic and political changes are not the problem of any single state; rather, they are part of worldwide dynamics. Second, different parts of the world experience global dynamics differently. Globalization had a polarizing effect. The level of inequality within countries and across the globe is a moral tragedy and an increasing concern for policymakers. Globalization has been a classic example of ‘growth with poverty.’ The re-emergence of populist politics across the globe is a response to such inequities. Such was the case in the 1930s.

Whatever the lasting impact of Brexit, Trumpism or new authoritarian populisms (e.g. Putin in Russia, Erdogan in Turkey or Duterte in the Philippines) it is
clear that it would not be the first time the ‘world’ has experienced conflicts and concerns generated by fluctuation between global boom and global bust. The great post-war boom in the two decades after the Second World War followed the Great Depression of the 1930s. As we go back in time such events are less clear, but economic historians also identify economic depressions in the late Victorian era and before 1850 – the famous ‘hungry forties’ – each followed by periods of relative growth and prosperity. It is but a short step from these simple observations to the idea that the world-economy has developed in a cyclical manner. The first person to propose such a scheme was a Russian economist, Nikolai Kondratieff, and today such fifty-year cycles are named after him.

**Kondratieff cycles**

Kondratieff cycles consist of two phases, one of growth (A) and one of stagnation (B). It is generally agreed that the following four cycles have occurred (exact dates vary):

I 1780/90 — A — 1810/17 — B — 1844/51
II 1844/51 — A — 1870/75 — B — 1890/96
III 1890/96 — A — 1914/20 — B — 1940/45
V 2000/2003 — A — ?

The annual World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, brings together the most prominent and wealthy business people managing the world’s major countries and many of the world’s political leaders. The meeting encapsulates our political economy approach to understanding the world: Dynamic political geographies are the outcome of the interaction between economics and politics. The day before the 2017 meeting, its participants gathered in luxury, the charity group Oxfam published their own regular attempt to show the harsh reality facing the majority of the world’s population. Oxfam identified a ‘beyond grotesque’ statistic: the world’s eight richest people (all men) controlled the same wealth as the poorest 50 per cent of humanity. The report found that in the past two years the richest 1 per cent owned more wealth than the rest of the world’s population. The WEF’s own analysis paints a picture of increasing economic distress: Between 2008 and 2013 median income in 26 of the richest countries fell by 2.4 per cent. Such staggering levels of inequality gave the WEF concern that the previous decades of globalization would be challenged.

A variety of political developments suggest that the WEF may be right. A *Wall Street Journal* article identified a ‘wave of outsiders’ that had come to political power with promises to challenge globalization. President Donald Trump, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the National Front in France had disrupted business as usual in the richer countries. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte was using foul-mouthed language to disparage other world leaders while conducting a war on drug dealers that had killed about 6,000 people by January 2017. His populist promises included devolving power and pay rises to soldiers, police officers and teachers. President Duterte seemed willing to break traditional ties with the US and make connections with China and Russia instead.

The twin trends of global inequality, the desire of business leaders for unhindered trade and capital flows, and the popularity of politicians challenging established global conditions are manifestations of the constant features of the capitalist world-economy: a global market and a core-periphery hierarchy. The return of populism is an example of the cyclical dynamics of the system and the tension between territorial states and a global economy.


---

The ‘beyond grotesque’ nature of the world-economy

The annual World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, brings together the most prominent and wealthy business people managing the world’s major countries and many of the world’s political leaders. The meeting encapsulates our political economy approach to understanding the world: Dynamic political geographies are the outcome of the interaction between economics and politics. The day before the 2017 meeting, its participants gathered in luxury, the charity group Oxfam published their own regular attempt to show the harsh reality facing the majority of the world’s population. Oxfam identified a ‘beyond grotesque’ statistic: the world’s eight richest people (all men) controlled the same wealth as the poorest 50 per cent of humanity. The report found that in the past two years the richest 1 per cent owned more wealth than the rest of the world’s population. The WEF’s own analysis paints a picture of increasing economic distress: Between 2008 and 2013 median income in 26 of the richest countries fell by 2.4 per cent. Such staggering levels of inequality gave the WEF concern that the previous decades of globalization would be challenged.

A variety of political developments suggest that the WEF may be right. A *Wall Street Journal* article identified a ‘wave of outsiders’ that had come to political power with promises to challenge globalization. President Donald Trump, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the National Front in France had disrupted business as usual in the richer countries. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte was using foul-mouthed language to disparage other world leaders while conducting a war on drug dealers that had killed about 6,000 people by January 2017. His populist promises included devolving power and pay rises to soldiers, police officers and teachers. President Duterte seemed willing to break traditional ties with the US and make connections with China and Russia instead.

The twin trends of global inequality, the desire of business leaders for unhindered trade and capital flows, and the popularity of politicians challenging established global conditions are manifestations of the constant features of the capitalist world-economy: a global market and a core-periphery hierarchy. The return of populism is an example of the cyclical dynamics of the system and the tension between territorial states and a global economy.

These cycles have been identified in time-series data for a wide range of economic phenomena, including industrial and agricultural production and trade statistics for many countries (Goldstein 1988; Papenhausen 2008; Montgomery 2007 and 2011). Most scholars agree that Kondratieff IV ended around 2000/2003. The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 is interpreted as an economic ‘correction’ while the new A phase was already gaining momentum (Montgomery 2011: 8). Montgomery (2011) argues that since the global financial crisis there is evidence of economic growth that is patchy – in terms of sectors and geography – but is laying the groundwork for sustained growth. The processes commonly labelled as ‘globalization’ were features of Kondratieff IVA and IVB. World-wide pro-market ‘neo-liberalism’ was constructed in phase IVB, culminating in the end of the Cold War, and ‘flowered’ in phase VA after the demise of the USSR removed any viable political alternative. Economic growth and opportunity in countries such as India and China were a part of B-phase restructuring that was occurring while US and European countries struggled. The tensions and contradictions came to a head in 2000/2003 and attempts to restart the global economy were somewhat evident but came to an abrupt and disastrous end with the credit crunch of 2008. The good news is that if the model is correct we should be in a period of global economic growth. The emphasis is upon the word global. Our approach requires us to acknowledge that aggregate global growth will mean mixed fortunes for different countries depending upon their position in the capitalist world-economy.

Whereas historical identification of these cycles is broadly agreed upon, ideas concerning the causes of their existence are much more debatable. They are certainly associated with technological change, and the A-phases can be easily related to major periods of the adoption of technological innovations. This is illustrated in Figure 1.3, where the growth (A) and stagnation (B) phases are depicted schematically, with selected leading economic sectors shown for each A-phase. For instance, the first A-phase coincides with the original Industrial Revolution, with its steam engines and cotton industry. Subsequent ‘new industrial revolutions’ also fit the pattern well, consisting of railways and steel (IIA), chemicals (oil) and electricity (IIIA), and aerospace and electronics (IVA). The technological driving force behind VA is debated. Some see further automation of computer technology and is application in MBNRIC sectors (med-bio-nano-robo-info-cognitive) as the cutting edge (Grinin and Grinin 2015). Others see a technological approach to a holistic sense of health and well-being driving a cluster of innovations (Nefiodow and Nefiodow 2015), while for Montgomery (2011) economic growth will be driven by personalized consumption in art and design.

Of course, technology itself cannot explain anything. Why did these technical adoptions occur as ‘bundles’ of innovations and not on a more regular, linear basis? The world-systems answer is that this cyclical pattern is intrinsic to our historical system as a result of the operation of the capitalist mode of production. Contradictions in the organization of the material base mean that simple linear cumulative growth is impossible, and intermittent phases of stagnation are necessary. Let us briefly consider this argument.

A basic feature of the capitalist mode of production is the lack of any overall central control, political or otherwise. The market relies on competition to order the system, and competition implies multiple decentralized decision making. Such entrepreneurs make decisions for their own short-term advantage. In good times, A-phases, it is in the interest of all entrepreneurs to invest in production (new technology) since prospects for profits are good. With no central planning of investment, however, such short-term decision making will inevitably lead to overproduction and the cessation of the A-phase. Conversely, in B-phases prospects for profits are poor and there will be underinvestment in production. This is rational for each individual entrepreneur but irrational for the system as a whole. This contradiction is usually referred to as the anarchy of production and will produce cycles of investment. After extracting as much profit as possible out of a particular set of production processes based on one bundle of technologies in an A-phase, the B-phase becomes necessary to reorganize production to generate new
conditions for expansion based on a new bundle of technological innovations. Phases of stagnation therefore have their positive side as periods of restructuring when the system is prepared for the next ‘leap forward’. Hence the ups and downs of the world-economy as described by Kondratieff waves.

The replacement of old bundles of technology with new ones involves political decisions and competition. B-phases are the period when once cutting-edge industries are relocated to areas of lower-wage employment – as witnessed by deindustrialization in the US and Western Europe during the 1980s and the growth of India’s technology sector since the mid-1990s. Peripheralized industries, such as manufacturing, are replaced by new innovations and industries that will drive production in the subsequent A-phase. Economic changes and political battles are entwined: For example, the relative role of coal energy versus solar and wind energy are political issues in both the US and China. New thriving sectors (such as robotics or new types of global business services) are introduced while industries that were previously at the heart of the core of the world-economy (such as steel production) lose their status as ‘innovations’ and move towards the periphery. However, it is not enough merely to reduce the costs of existing industries and create new products. A new A-phase requires increased consumer demand within the world-economy.

Political struggles within and between countries represent a scramble to capture core processes within state borders. This occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union as former Soviet satellite countries in Central and Eastern Europe became, or continue to try to become, part of ‘Europe’. The growth of high consumption classes in China and India are also evidence of this process. But if each B-phase increased the number of people enjoying core-like employment and consumption, then the core-periphery hierarchy would eventually disappear. To compensate for this
increase in the number of people consuming at core levels, past B-phases have seen an expansion in the boundaries of the world-economy as new populations and territories were peripheralized. Downward pressures on wages, benefits and government programmes in countries within all three tiers of the hierarchy are evidence of this process. Now that the entire globe is covered by the capitalist world-economy, those workers in the periphery bear the burden of intensified exploitation in order to balance the system.

Kondratieff cycles are important to political geography because they help to generate cycles of political behaviour. This link is directly developed in electoral geography (Chapter 6) and local political geographies (Chapter 7), but cyclical patterns pervade our analyses. In Chapter 2, the rhythms of the Kondratieff waves are related to longer cycles of the rise and fall of hegemonic states and their changing economic policies. In Chapter 3, we see how the historical rhythms of formal and informal imperialism follow economic cycles. Such identification of political cycles, regular repetitions of history, has become common among political commentators. For instance, the political sentiments of those supporting the election of Donald Trump to president of the US have been interpreted as a reaction to deindustrialization and the promotion of globalization by elites (Hochschild 2016). Part of this political reaction, encouraged by Candidate Trump’s rhetoric, was the definition of an ‘unfair’ economic playing field now that China has become a key player. We interpret this sense of threat to established livelihoods as the geographic economic shifts of the capitalist world-economy driven by Kondratieff waves. What we show in this book is that the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy provide a political geography framework for explaining such political actions.

There is a lot more that could be said about the generation of these cycles; the basic geography of the expansion and restructuring is listed in Figure 1.3, for instance. This ‘uneven development’ is itself related to political processes both as inputs to the mechanisms and as outputs in terms of differential state powers. The main point to make here is to emphasize that the economic mechanisms do not operate in isolation, and we shall consider the broader political economy context in the next chapter. For the time being it is sufficient for us to accept that the nature of the world-economy produces cyclical growth that can be described adequately by Kondratieff waves. This will provide the main part of the metric for the time dimension for our matrix.

‘Logistic’ waves

What about before 1780? We have indicated that the world-economy emerged after 1450, but we have as yet no metric for this early period. Of course, as we go back in time data sources become less plentiful and less reliable, leading to much less consensus on the dynamics of the early world-economy. Some researchers, including Braudel, claim to have found Kondratieff waves before 1780, but such hypotheses for this earlier period do not command the same general support as the sequence reported above. There is, however, more support for longer waves of up to three hundred years, which have been referred to as ‘logistics’. Just like Kondratieff waves, these longer cycles have A- and B-phases. Two logistics of particular interest to world-systems analysis are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{c.1050—A—c.1250—B—c.1450} \\
\text{c.1450—A—c.1600—B—c.1750}
\end{align*}
\]

The dates are much less certain than for the Kondratieff waves, but there does seem to be enough evidence in terms of land-use and demographic data to support the idea of two very long waves over this general time span.

It will have been noticed that these logistics take us back beyond the beginning of the world-economy. The first logistic is of interest, however, because it encompasses the material rise and decline of feudal Europe, the immediate predecessor of the world-economy. There is a massive literature on the transition from this feudalism to the capitalist mode of production that is beyond the scope of this text. Wallerstein’s (1974) explanation, however, is relevant since it relates to this first logistic wave and the emergence of the world-economy. The B-phase of
the first logistic reflects a real decline in production, as indexed by the contraction of agriculture throughout Europe. This is the so-called crisis of feudalism. B-phases terminate when a solution to a crisis is generated. In this case, the solution was nothing less than the development of a new mode of production. This emerged gradually out of European exploration and plunder in the Americas, the development of new trade patterns, particularly the Baltic trade, and technological advances in agricultural production. The result was, according to Wallerstein, a new entity or system: the European world-economy based upon agricultural capitalism. This system itself generates a logistic wave of expansion in its emergence in the ‘long sixteenth century’ followed by stagnation in the ‘crisis’ of the seventeenth century. However, Wallerstein emphasizes the fact that this second B-phase in agricultural capitalism is different in kind from the B-phase of late feudalism. Unlike the real decline that occurred in feudal Europe, the world-economy B-phase is more one of stagnation. This involved the reordering of the materialist base so that some groups and areas gained while others lost. There was no general decline like the crisis of feudalism but rather a consolidation of the system into a new pattern. In this sense, the second logistic B-phase is more like the B-phase of the later Kondratieff waves.

Just as there is a dispute over whether Kondratieff waves extend back before 1780 there is a similar disagreement about whether logistic waves can be extended forward to the present. If either set of cycles is extended then we come across the thorny problem of how they relate to one another. For the purposes of our matrix we will avoid this problem by just using the waves generally accepted in the literature and described above. Our time metric for the world-economy therefore consists of ten units, A- and B-phases for the logistic wave after c.1450 and four A- and B-phases in the Kondratieff waves. These two different treatments of time may be thought of as relating to agricultural capitalism and industrial capitalism as consecutive production forms of the world-economy.

A space-time matrix for political geography

With the identification of Kondratieff VA, the above discussion produces a $11 \times 3$ matrix involving ten phases of growth and stagnation and three types of spatial zone. In Table 1.1 this framework is used to portray those features of the evolving world-economy that are necessary for an understanding of our political geography. This table should be read and referred to as necessary for subsequent chapters. The historical events in this table are manifestations of the processes that are discussed in depth in the following chapters. In Chapter 2, the geopolitical theories that we discuss reflect the politics of intra-core competition in Kondratieff’s waves III and IV. Chapter 3 describes the formation of empires and the maintenance of core-periphery relationships throughout the history of the world-economy. The remaining chapters discuss different expressions of political and economic restructuring within states. For example, Chapter 6 interprets the third world politics of coup and counter-coup as an issue of peripheralization. Table 1.1 is largely self-explanatory, but a brief commentary will illustrate the ways in which this information will be related to our discussion.

The establishment of the world-economy as a system operating from Eastern Europe to the New World involved the development of both Atlantic trade and the Baltic trade. The former was initiated from Iberia but gradually came to be controlled financially from the incipient core of north-west Europe on which the Baltic trade was based. Once this core had become established, Iberia was relegated to a ‘conveyor belt’ for the transfer of surplus from its colonies to the core. It is during the logistic B-phase that the basic elements of the world-economy identified above become consolidated. First, there is a single world-market organized and controlled from north-west Europe. Second, a multiple-state system emerges epitomized by the initiation of ‘international law’ to regulate relations between states. Third, a three-tier spatial structure clearly emerges and can be identified in the new division of labour for agricultural production: ‘free’ wage labour developing
Table 1.1 A space–time information matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kondratieff wave</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Semi-periphery</th>
<th>Periphery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Initial geographical expansion based on Iberia but economic advances based on north-west Europe</td>
<td>Relative decline of cities of central and Mediterranean Europe</td>
<td>Iberian empires in New World; second ‘feudalism’ in Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Consolidation of north-west European dominance, first Dutch and then French–English rivalry</td>
<td>Declining areas now include Iberia and joined by rising groups in Sweden, Prussia and north-east US</td>
<td>Retrenchment in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Rise of Caribbean sugar. French defeat in India and Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondratieff wave I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Industrial Revolution in Britain, ‘national’ revolution in France. Defeat of France</td>
<td>Relative decline of whole semi-periphery Establishment of US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Consolidation of British economic leadership. Origins of socialism in Britain and France</td>
<td>Beginning of selective rise in North America and central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondratieff wave II</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Britain as the ‘workshop of the world’ in an era of free trade</td>
<td>Reorganization of semi-periphery: civil war in US, unification of Germany and Italy, entry of Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Decline of Britain relative to US and Germany. Emergence of the Socialist Second International</td>
<td>Decline of Russia and Mediterranean Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondratieff wave III</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Consolidation of German and US economic leadership. Arms race</td>
<td>Entry of Japan and Dominion states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Defeat of Germany, British Empire saved. US economic leadership confirmed</td>
<td>Socialist victory in Russia – establishment of Soviet Union. Entry of Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondratieff Wave V</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>East coast of China as new core region; cities of India as global cities; US political divisions; questions of EU unity; Japan redefines global role</td>
<td>Political change and internal differentiation in India and China; Question of role of central and east European states in the EU; Tensions within Brazil, Russia and South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in the north-west European core; partially free ‘sharecropping’ arrangements in the Mediterranean semi-periphery; and, in the periphery, two different forms of coerced labour: slavery in the New World and the so-called second feudalism in Eastern Europe. Despite massive changes in the world-economy since this time, these three essential features have remained and are just as important today as they were in the seventeenth century.

Following the consolidation of the world-economy, it has grown economically and geographically in fits and starts as described by the four Kondratieff waves. Some degree of symmetry in these changes can be identified from Table 1.1 by
designating British and American ‘centuries’. These relate to the rise of these two states, the defeat of their rivals (France and Germany, respectively), their dominance of the world-economy (including their promotion of free trade) and finally their decline with new rivalries emerging (including the rise of protectionism and/or imperialism). We consider such patterns in some detail in the next chapter.

In order to illustrate the rest of the matrix, let us highlight the route of today’s major states through this matrix. Britain became part of the core by the time of the logistic B-phase, when it restructured its state in its civil war. It has maintained that position despite relative decline since the second Kondratieff B-phase. France’s early position is similar to Britain’s, but defeat in the periphery and relative decline in the logistic B-phase led to a restructuring of the French state in its revolution. However, subsequent defeat during the first Kondratieff wave led to a second relative decline, but this time within the core. The United States and Germany (Prussia) have had much more volatile histories. Both carved out semi-peripheral positions in the logistic B-phase, but their positions were unstable. In the US, peripheralization was prevented by the War of Independence. This victory was consolidated by the civil war in the second Kondratieff A-phase, when Southern cotton became part of an American periphery (rather than part of a British periphery) in a restructured American state. From this point onwards, the United States prospered to become the major power of the twentieth century. Initially, its major rival was Germany, which also restructured its state in the second Kondratieff A-phase under Prussian leadership. But subsequent economic prowess was set back in the third Kondratieff wave by military defeat. Today, Germany is again a major economic challenger of the United States in the core. Japan was seen as a major economic challenger at the beginning of the Kondratieff IV B-phase. It entered the world-economy only in the second Kondratieff wave and also restructured its state and suffered military setbacks but has now finally come through towards economic leadership. It faces challenges in reorganizing its domestic politics and foreign policy as it wrestles with the emergence of new economic innovations and practices and the assertion of Chinese power in the western Pacific. Russia, on the other hand, entered the world-economy earlier but declined in the second Kondratieff wave. This was halted by a reorganization of the Russian state as the Soviet Union, which emerged as a major military power but remained economically semi-peripheral. It continues to try and assert political influence while relying on a semi-peripheral resource economy. Finally, China entered the world-economy in the periphery at the end of the first Kondratieff wave and rose to semi-peripheral status with reorganizations of the state in the third and fourth Kondratieff A-phases. Reorganization as the People’s Republic of China was successful, and in the current period of restructuring it has manoeuvred to become an economic power based on core processes and activities (such as finance) rather than using its base in agricultural production to ascend through peripheral processes. However, the country contains a mix of core and peripheral processes that produce domestic political challenges as it continues to project economic and political influence across a greater geographic extent of the world-economy.

This description emphasizes the role of state reorganization in the rise of states to core or semi-peripheral position and their maintenance of that status. Contemporary globalization represents another example of acute state reorganization, which we deal with in some detail in Chapter 4. But we should not imply that a state merely needs to reorder its political apparatus to enjoy world-economy success. By only describing the success stories – today’s major states – we omit the far greater number of failures: while Germany and the United States were reorganizing in the second Kondratieff A-phase so too was the Ottoman Empire, but to much less effect. In fact, political reorganization has become a way of life in many semi-peripheral states as lack of success in the world-economy brings forth pressure for change again and again. Such a world of winners and losers requires the consideration of power and politics in the modern world-system.
I

Power

The value of a political geography approach that adopts world-systems analysis is the insights it offers into the spatiality of power. Politics is an integral component of Wallerstein’s approach, despite claims to the contrary (Zolberg 1981). Our framework has a materialist foundation, the capitalist world-economy, but that does not mean that politics is ignored or devalued. In the section on basic elements of the world-economy above, two of the three characteristics described were pre-eminently political in nature: the multi-state system and the three-tier structure. In addition, as we shall see, the construction of geographical scale is a politics of both resistance to and maintenance of the world-economy. It is the purpose of this final section of our introductory chapter to develop the argument concerning politics in the world-economy in order to expand our political geography perspective on the world-economy.

Authority and the Iranian nuclear deal

In 2010, the United States and other countries reacted strongly against Iran’s announcement that it had entered the ‘club’ of nuclear powers by successfully enriching uranium, an essential step in the ability to make a nuclear weapon. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) formalizes the right of all countries to develop nuclear technology for peaceful domestic use. However, the Treaty prohibits development and trade facilitating nuclear weapons proliferation. Iran claimed that it was developing nuclear technology for domestic purposes. Iran is a party to the treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States believed that Iran was on the pathway to developing a nuclear weapon. The power to inspect and evaluate nuclear operations within a sovereign territory is inscribed to the IAEA. The Security Council has the inscribed capability to make resolutions in response. During the administration of President Obama, a diplomatic arrangement was made to reduce the uranium enrichment capabilities of Iran and hence limit its nuclear capacity to domestic, rather than military, goals.

During his campaign to be president of the United States, Donald Trump aggressively attacked the ‘deal’ made with Iran. Amongst other criticisms, the question of whether the resolutions could be enforced was raised. Enforcement requires power as a resource, and in practice the agreement of the United States to utilize its military capabilities to ensure enforcement. It also requires the United States to gain consensus from other powers, whether for sanctions or military force. China and Russia, both members of the UN Security Council with the power of veto, are opposed to sanctions and many other countries, including traditional allies of the United States, support the arrangement.

Identify the different forms of power that this issue exemplifies and consider how they relate to each other.

For more information about Iran’s nuclear programme visit the website of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, www.thebulletin.org.
Types of power

Political geography is the study of the spatiality of power, but what is power? Allen (2003) distinguishes three expressions of power that are different but operate together. First is power as an inscribed capacity: power is possessed inherently by individuals, groups and other institutions depending on their relative position to other individuals, groups and institutions. A policeman has an inherent power given his office, the International Atomic Energy Agency has authority to inspect and evaluate nuclear installation in Iran, and refer the country to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which could, in turn, use its inscribed power to make a resolution authorizing military action (see Box above, Authority and the Iranian nuclear deal).

Military action requires consideration of the second conception of power: power is a resource, the capacity to mobilize power to certain ends. The United States had the diplomatic power to force the question of Iran’s nuclear capabilities on to the United Nation’s agenda. Other members of the UN Security Council (France, China and Russia) have some diplomatic power to block or amend US proposals. Of course, the possession of military technology and manpower to attack and occupy another country is an example of power as resource.

The language in the previous paragraph is deliberately gendered: ‘policeman’ and ‘manpower’. The casual use of such terms is an example of the third conception of power: power as strategies, practices and techniques. The French philosopher Michel Foucault stimulated analysis of power in the form of discourse or knowledge that facilitated behaviour that was desired by the powerful, without the powerful seemingly acting. The resource of government was complemented by the techniques of governance. Foucault argues that ‘experts’ are given authority to create ‘knowledge’ which then becomes ‘common sense’ and normative behaviour. For example, firms and local governments are constantly told they must be ‘competitive’ in the face of globalization. The discourse of competitiveness becomes taken for granted, or common sense in other words, and catalyses actions such as reduction of labour rights and tax breaks for corporations. In another example, and by referring back to the previous paragraph, patriarchal societies are maintained by ‘knowledge’ of women’s capabilities and roles that promote their marginalization and by reducing access to tasks that are usually deemed masculine. The practice of patriarchy creates gender inequalities in terms of who hold positions of authority, or inscribed power, and hence who controls powerful resources.

The relative size of US military spending

In 2015, US military spending amounted to US$596 billion, up from US$294.4 in 2000, but a 2.4 per cent decrease from the previous year. US expenditures had peaked in 2010. It is hard to visualize that amount of money, but it buys an awful lot of military hardware and maintains hundreds of thousands of military personnel. But it is easier to consider the military might of the United States through a number of comparisons:

- The US military spending accounted for 36 per cent of the global total.
- The US military spending was roughly three times larger than the Chinese budget, the second largest spender.
- It roughly equalled the combined spending of the next eight countries.
- The US military budget was about 60 times as large as the spending of Iran (US$10.03 billion).
- The two potential ‘enemies’, Russia and China, together spent US$281 billion, under a half of the US military budget, up from a total of $101 billion and a sixth of the US figure since 2010 given a relative decline in US spending and an increase in China’s.

Power geometry

Not only do these different conceptualizations of power complement each other; they also operate in relation to other actors (individuals, groups, and so on). Power is exercised by one entity over another. It is then helpful to think of power geometry, the manner in which individuals are positioned within networks and structures of power, or in other words how they relate to each other (Massey 1993).

There are three ways in which power geometry can be conceptualized geographically. The first is territorially. Inscribed power is often limited by the scope of recognized jurisdiction, and this is especially the case for states. States are sovereign, but this is understood to be over a specific territory. However, state sovereignty was constructed over time, and processes of globalization have altered and eroded the practice of sovereignty. Referring to power as strategy and practice, places are particular pieces of territory within which norms of behaviour are defined. Homosexuals perceive it safe and ‘appropriate’ to be ‘out’ in some places but not others, for example (Heibel 2004; Sumartojo 2004). Businesses are actively seeking market share in particular territories, trying to weaken their competitors by muscling out other products. In the United States, PepsiCo and Coca-Cola often sign contracts with universities so that their products are sold exclusively on campus. Power relations are different in different territories: power is exercised by controlling territory, and different territories interact in power relationships. In this book our discussion of geopolitics, imperialism, states, nations and local politics are all examinations of territory and power.
The second is through networks. Modern political geography operated under the assumption that the compartmentalization of the world into different territorial units – states – was the be all and end all of inquiry. This assumption followed the multi-state assumption of social science. Interaction in the world was seen as bloc against bloc in the case of inter-state war, or as country with country in the case of international trade. Study of the international meant analysing interaction between states. However, this was always an inadequate conceptualization, and within the context of globalization, emphasis has turned instead to transnationalism: a study of networks that transcend state territory.

There are two major ways in which the study of networks has entered human geographical studies: through Castells’ (1996) concept of a ‘network society’, and through actor–network theory. The former aspires to be a new theory of society for an ‘informational age’ that has now replaced the ‘industrial age’. In other words, information and knowledge are the key commodities of today’s world-economy and these are organized through multiple networks. This has led to a change in the nature of social space, the spatial form that we construct in our everyday activities making a living. Historically, this spatial form has been a ‘space of places’, a congeries of different locales. Politically, the classic example is the world political map of countries: nation-states as homelands and territories constitute a space of places. However, the combining of two high-tech industries – computers and communications – in the 1970s has provided opportunities to transcend places and create ‘spaces of flows’. Politically, this is the transnationalism that many global thinkers argue is eroding, or even eliminating, the power of states. The prime example is global financial markets that were once controlled by states and that now operate beyond states. At the individual level, the internet best represents the space of flows today. For Castells, our contemporary world is dominated by spaces of flows at the expense of spaces of places. This has implications for the core-periphery concepts we introduced above: we will address this highly contentious position on several occasions as we develop our political geography.

### China’s great firewall: networks and territory

In January 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping impressed the delegates of the World Economic Forum, and pro-globalization commentators and policymakers across the globe with a speech that likened protectionism as ‘locking oneself in a dark room’. It seemed that a Chinese communist had become the world’s leading spokesman for free market capitalist principles that are the basis for globalization. Not long afterwards sceptics could point to a very different set of Chinese policies with a different geographic expression. The Washington Post reported a Chinese announcement of a ‘new, year-long crackdown on “unauthorized Internet connections.”’ That means another fortification of the Great Firewall that largely keeps China’s Internet users in a “room” of their own—and hurts U.S. companies along the way.

The Great Firewall is an expression of China’s belief in ‘internet sovereignty’, or the right and ability of a county to control a national ‘portion’ of the internet. The political geographic vision of Xi Jinping is very territorial, that there is a piece of the globe that can be controlled by a government. The internet operates through a different political geographic vision, one of flows across and through different spaces enabled by a network that lacks centralized control. The tension between flows of ideas and governments wanting to control their own spaces has been a constant of world history. The internet may give an overwhelming advantage to those who create and control flows.

The second theoretical contribution to the study of networks is actor–network theory (Serres and Latour 1995). This rather complex theory is an uneasy collection of a number of contributions. In essence, the world is seen as a combination of diverse and multiple networks of associations. It is the nature of the links and what travels through them that is the focus of study rather than the nodes themselves: what flows rather than the source and terminus of the flow is seen as vital. The actors in the network are constituted by the nature of the flow. This appears somewhat temporary and contingent, but the traffic through the network is quite durable (money, consumer goods and so forth) and gives a degree of permanency to the network. Power rests in those whose task it is to maintain the network; power is the control of flow or mobility. Some institutions and people have inscribed authority to control flows through control of particular resources (money trading for example), but it is the nature of the flow that holds the disciplining power to form practice; for example, immigration authorities control the flow of migrants, but in the act of migrating people will attempt to gain limited power by adopting particular behaviours as strategies to be allowed to move and adapt to a new geographical setting.

In a related topical focus, transnationalism has challenged binary understandings of the world. Most important are the binaries of foreign/domestic and developed/undeveloped (or core/periphery in world-systems terminology). A feminist geopolitics (Gilmartin and Kofman 2004; Hyndman 2004) has emphasized mobility (or the lack of it) as a measure of power. In addition, feminists call for the study of people in particular places and within particular power relations to show the way that people challenge and also adapt to structures of national citizenship, patriarchy, racial grouping, and so on. From a world-systems perspective, the study of the flows between world cities has done the most to disrupt the standard view of the territorial geography of nation-states (Taylor 2005, 2007). In addition, the world-systems approach to scale may incorporate the feminist approach to view the local scale as the arena of contest within the overarching structure of the world-economy.

The politics of geographical scale

We turn now to the third geographical expression of power geometry: geographical scale. Geographical scale is the main organizing framework for the book and so we will spend more time outlining its usage.

A political geography perspective on the modern world-system is a meaningful project only if it produces something that other perspectives cannot provide. We have hinted above that this is indeed the case; here we attempt an explicit justification. The gist of our argument is that the use of geographical scale as an organizing frame provides a particularly fruitful arrangement of ideas. Specifically, our world-systems political geography framework provides a set of insights into the operation of the world-economy that has not been shown so clearly elsewhere (Flint and Shelley 1996). Such an assertion requires some initial justification. We do this in two ways: first, in terms of a crucial contemporary practical political problem; and second, as a theoretical contribution to our world-systems political geography.

Scope as geographical scale: where democracy is no solution

One way of interpreting geographical scale within politics is to consider the scope of a conflict. By scope we mean who is brought in on each side – we develop this idea further later in this chapter. For the moment, imagine a state that is the weaker party in a political conflict. Given that it will likely lose, it will endeavour to change the scope of the politics. For instance, the Vietnamese in the 1960s attempted to mobilize ‘international opinion’ on their side and were successful to the extent that there were anti-American demonstrations across the world. Similarly, the anti-apartheid movement was very successful in turning South African domestic politics into an international issue in the 1980s. South Sudan became an independent country in 2011 because, in general, the international community supported its formation. Listing such well-known examples should not blind us to the fact that converting the scope of a conflict in this way is actually quite exceptional. The Paris Agreement of 2016 within the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change was successful because national governments agreed on an international plan of action to counter global climate change. The resiliency of the agreement will be tested if one country, the United States, decides to go back on its commitments. We might say that the norm is for the losing side in a dispute to fail to widen the scope. An important reason for this failure can be found in our politically divided world. One key role of state boundaries is to prevent politics overrunning into a global scale of conflict at the whim of every loser. But these state boundaries can themselves be contested politically, and there is no clearer case than the upheavals in the Middle East, some of them ongoing, following the Arab Spring.

The Syrian civil war illustrates the problem of creating new sovereign state borders. Such a process would be unproblematic if the various national groups formed neat, compact and contiguous spatial units that could be easily enclosed by new boundaries. But cultural and political geography are never that simple; rather, various ethnic nation groups are typically spatially inter-mingled. For instance, the Kurds are to be found in sizeable numbers beyond Syria. This means that any recognition of a Kurdish state entity in Syria would raise similar issues in neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, which has a long history of suppressing Kurdish nationalism.

Figure 1.4 illustrates schematically such a situation, with two groups intermingled in one part of the country. Should this be one country or two? Surely we should let the people say what political structures should prevail. Let us explore such an exercise in democracy. Assuming that both national groups have been fully mobilized by their respective political elites; we can assume that in a vote at the scale of the original state the unionists in our diagram would win. Most people (that is, the majority national group) do not want their country broken up. ‘Foul play!’ say the minority, because in the north-west there is a local majority for secession. If the original vote stands, the losers may well take up arms to fight for their ‘national independence’. Would such action be anti-democratic? Alternatively, they might be able to marshal international support to get the UN to sponsor elections held just in the north-west. If this were the case, we can assume that the erstwhile separatists would win and proclaim their independence as a result of a democratic decision of the people. But in doing so they have created a new minority, those who had been part of the majority in the old federation but now find themselves in a state run by their old enemy. If the original unionist solution is abandoned, they in their turn will demand independence for their lands in the new north-west state. Just as surely, the new state will not allow yet another election to divide its newly acquired sovereign territory. So, with democracy denied, the only recourse for the newly constructed minority is to resort to arms to win their national independence. Furthermore, these new separatists will be able to draw on the support of their fellow ethnic nationals across the new state boundary.

The above nightmare scenario shows that democracy as a means of solving political disputes is as dependent on the scope of the conflict as any other attempt at resolution. All three solutions to the conflict – unionist, first division, second division – can be legitimated by the democratic will of the people. The question is ‘which people?’, and in cases of territorial sovereignty this must be a matter of geographical scale. Hence any ‘democratic solution’ is not determined by the voting but by the pre-election geographical decision on the scope of the election: we know the result of the election once we have fixed the boundaries. This is not mere ‘fiddling the boundaries’ for partisan advantage, for there is no absolutely correct answer to the question of who should vote. In
the end, the answer can only be a political decision mediated through the relative power of the participants. But the idea of bringing democracy into the conflict was to prevent the power politics of the elites determining the outcome. We have to conclude sadly that there is no democratic solution in a situation where different geographical scales produce different patterns of national winners and losers.

In recent history, minority national populations have been produced from what had been the majority. For instance, Serbs, who had been a majority in the original Yugoslavia, are now a minority in Bosnia, and Russians likewise in Ukraine and the Baltic states. The major losers in this change of scale of politics are these new minorities. It is here that we can expect the most militant nationalism, and it is unsurprising that President Putin has attempted to influence politics in the Baltic states and enabled the annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine in the name of Russian ‘minority rights’. Questions of Brexit could catalyse the re-emergence of such politics in the United Kingdom. If that were to be the case, who should vote in a referendum to decide whether Northern Ireland joins with the Irish Republic? The scale chosen – all of Ireland, the northern province only – would undoubtedly determine the result. And it is in Northern Ireland that the nationalist cause has most militant support; the nationalist Catholic community is a classic minority that would be a majority. There are no democratic solutions to any of the above because the scope is part of the politics, with choice of geographical scale itself defining victory. As well as illustrating the salience of political geography to understanding the politics of our world today, this example also justifies our choice of geographical scale as the organizing principle for world-systems political geography.

Ideology separating experience from reality

Globalization is a ‘fundamentally geographical process labelled with a geographical term’ (Storper 1997: 27). However, most studies have treated the geography of globalization as unproblematic. In particular, the basic scale property of globalization has been taken for granted. This is in keeping with the social science tradition, which sees space as merely an inert backdrop to processes of change. Hence the global is treated as a pre-given geographical scale into which modern society and economy have grown. Not surprisingly, such an approach can easily lead to a neglect of other scales of activity, with the global appearing to be almost ‘natural’. In contrast, contemporary human geography considers all spaces and places as socially constructed, the results of conflicts and accommodations that produce a geographical landscape. Geographical scale, in particular, is politically constructed (Delaney and Leitner 1997). The argument about democracy and boundaries in the previous section shows why this is so. Thus contemporary globalization does not represent a scale of activity waiting to be fulfilled; it is part of the construction of a new multiscalar human geography.

It is perhaps not surprising that it has been political geographers, in particular, who first saw (in the 1970s) the potential of geographical scale as the main organizing frame for their studies. Instead of the current singular bias of globalization studies, these political geographies employed a three-scale analysis: international or global, national or state level, and an intra-national, usually urban metropolitan, scale. Although this framework represented a consensus of opinion, it was particularly disappointing that this position was reached with no articulation of theory to justify a trilogy of geographical scales (Taylor 1982). Two questions immediately arise: ‘Why just three scales?’ and ‘Why these particular three scales?’ Recognition of the three scales has been implicit in many social science studies beyond political geography (Taylor 1981). It represents a particular way of viewing the world that is subtly state-centric. The scales pivot around the basic unit of the state – hence the international, national and intra-national terminology. Such a position can lead to a separation in the study of geographical scales that destroys the fundamental holism of the modern world-system. Obviously, a critical political geography cannot just accept this triple-scale organization as given: the framework must explain why these scales exist and how they relate one to another.
Why three scales? This is not immediately obvious. It is relatively easy to identify many more than three geographical scales in our modern lives. Neil Smith (1993), for instance, argues cogently for a hierarchy of seven basic scales: body, home, community, urban, region, nation and global. Of course, it is easy to add to this; for instance, international relations scholars identify another ‘regional’ scale between nation-state and the global (Western Europe, south-east Asia, and so on). At the other extreme, globalization studies, even when they go beyond their single scale, seem only to see two scales – the local in contrast to the global – for which they have been criticized (Swyngedouw 1997: 159). Environmentalists have been particularly prone to this limited perspective with their famous slogan, ‘think global, act local’. Swyngedouw (ibid.) interprets globalization as a ‘rescaling’ of political economy that moves in two directions away from an institutional concentration of power on the state: upwards to global arenas and downwards to local arenas. With the state remaining in the middle, this represents a construction of a triple-scale organization as pioneered by political geographers but with a theoretical justification. Here we treat the three scales in a more general manner to transcend contemporary globalization by analysing them as integral to the long-term operation of the modern world-system.

From a world-systems perspective, political geographers’ triple-scale organization immediately brings to mind Wallerstein’s three-tier structure of conflict control (Taylor 1982). We have already come across his geographical example of core/semi-periphery/periphery. We can term this a horizontal three-tier geographical structure. The triple-scale model can then be interpreted as a vertical three-tier geographical structure. The role of all three-tier structures is the promotion of a middle category to separate conflicting interests. In our model, therefore, the nation-state as the pivot becomes the broker between global and local scales. Given that a major political geography aspect of its brokering is to act as a simple buffer, we will treat this arrangement as a classic example of ideology separating experience from reality. The three scales, therefore, can be viewed as representing a national scale of ideology, a local scale of experience and a global scale of reality. This is illustrated schematically in Figure 1.5, where it is compared with Wallerstein’s original horizontal geographical structure.

Let us consider this interpretation in more detail. The scale of experience is the scale at which we live our daily lives. It encompasses all our basic needs, including employment, shelter and consumption of basic commodities. For most people living in the core countries this consists of a daily urban ‘system’; for

![Figure 1.5](image-url)
most people elsewhere it consists of a local rural community. However, the scale of experience is not neatly bounded. The day-to-day activities that we all engage in are not sustained locally, but through connections across multiple localities. Because we live in a world-system, the arena that affects our lives is much larger than our local community, whether urban or rural. In the current world-economy, the crucial events that structure our lives occur at a global scale. This is the ultimate scale of accumulation, where the world market defines values that ultimately impinge on our local communities. But this is not a direct effect; the world market is filtered through particular aggregations of local communities that are nation-states. For every community, the precise effects of these global processes can be reduced or enhanced by the politics of the nation-state in which it is located. Such manipulation can be at the expense of other communities within the state or at the expense of communities in other states. But the very stuff of Politics (with a capital P) in this framework is the way the politics of governments and states attempt to create a filter between world-economy and local community.

But why talk of ‘ideology’ and ‘reality’ in this context? The notion of scale of experience seems unexceptional enough, but in what sense are the other scales related to ideology and reality? In this model we have very specific meanings for these terms. By ‘reality’ we are referring to the holistic reality that is the concrete world-economy, which incorporates the other scales. It is, in this sense, the totality of the system. Hence ultimate explanations within the system must be traced back to this ‘whole’. It is the scale that ‘really matters’. In our materialist argument, the accumulation that is the motor of the whole system operates through the world market at this global scale. In contrast, ideology is a partial view of the system that distorts reality into a false and limited picture. In our model, the reality of the world-system is filtered through nation-centred ideologies to provide a set of contrasting and often conflicting world views. We argue below that such nation-centred thinking has become pervasive in modern politics. This has the effect of diverting political protest away from the key processes at the scale of reality by ensuring that they stop short at the scale of ideology – the nation-state. It is in this sense that we have a geographical model of ideology separating experience from reality. This situation has been summed up well by Nelund (1978: 278):

> The national world picture does not provide us with a language which we can use in our daily life to deal with our concerns. It is a mental burden, and even more it takes us in wrong directions by placing our true concerns beyond our reach, involving us in institutional efforts to reach the issue which we ourselves have displaced.

Local employment, weapons of war, and the global economy: an example of the three-scales approach

Scunthorpe is an industrial town in northern England, with a tradition of steel manufacturing. Over the past years the British steel industry has faced competition from overseas, employment in the steel industry has declined, and the local plant has faced temporary shutdowns and the threat of permanent closure. Hence, announcements of new employment opportunities are important to the community. The 38 employees of GWF Engineering are certainly grateful for a new contract to manufacture the carbon fibre to be used in the construction of the new Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. In this case, national defence policy, and agreement between European countries, provides the context within which a small company in a particular locality is able to maintain its workforce. The politics of defence procurement represents a political solution that is seen to be situated at the state scale, so that there is no challenge to the processes of accumulation at the global scale that have put the steel plant in a precarious position.

This ‘national world picture’ negates the holism of the modern world-system, keeping most politics away from the scale of the world-economy.

Contemporary globalization represents a classic operation of this scale politics. New state elites are using the global as a threat to redesign national and local politics, and their successes in this new politics show just how limited political resistances to global changes remain. The way politics is legitimated may alter, but the state remains as a buffer between the nationally divided class of direct producers and global capital.

Finally, we must stress that this model does not posit three processes operating at three scales but just one process that is manifest at three scales. In general, this process takes the following form: the needs of accumulation are experienced locally (for example, closure of a hospital) and justified nationally (for example, to promote national efficiency) for ultimate benefits organized globally (for example, by multinational corporations paying less tax). This is a single process in which ideology separates experience from reality. There is but one system: the capitalist world-economy.

### Power and politics in the world-economy

The position we take in interpreting political events in the world-economy is based upon the analysis of Chase-Dunn (1981, 1982, 1989). As we have seen, the capitalist mode of production involves the extraction of economic surplus for accumulation within the world-economy. This surplus is expropriated in two related ways. The distinguishing feature of our system is the expropriation via the market, but the traditional expropriation method of world-empires is not entirely eliminated. The use of political and military power to obtain surplus is the second method of expropriation. Of course, this second method cannot dominate the system or else the system would be transformed into...
a new mode of production. But neither should it be undervalued as a process in the world-economy. Military power and other forms of violence have enabled forms of accumulation throughout the history of the capitalist world-economy: From the initial Spanish plunder of the New World to today’s support of multinational corporate interests by the ‘home’ country. The important point is that these two methods of expropriation should not be interpreted as two separate processes – or ‘two logics’ as Chase-Dunn (1981) terms them – one political and the other economic. In our framework, they are but two aspects of the same overall political economy logic. Chase-Dunn (1982: 25) puts the argument as follows:

The interdependence of political military power and competitive advantage in production in the capitalist world-economy reveals that the logic of the accumulation process includes the logic of state building and geopolitics.

This position has been endorsed and expanded upon by Burch (1994: 52), who sees the ‘distinguishing feature of the modern world’ as being ‘the intimate, inextricable singularity of capitalism and the states system’. Recent discussions of ‘geoeconomics’ are contemporary insights in to this long-standing approach (Mercille 2008; Cowen and Smith 2009). In other words, political processes lie at the heart of the capitalist world-economy, and they operate in conjunction with economic processes to create an unequal world that is organized as a world political map of states.

The argument so far has equated politics with activities surrounding states. While state-centred politics are crucial to an understanding of the world-economy, they do not constitute the sum of political activities. If we equate politics with use of power then we soon appreciate that political processes do not begin and end with states: all social institutions have their politics.

The nature of power: individuals and institutions

We have previously discussed different types of power; here we consider its operation in the modern world-system. For this practice of power, the scope of activities is also brought back into the argument and further elaborated. We can begin by considering power at its most simple level. Consider two individuals, A and B, who are in conflict over the future outcome of an event. Let us suppose that A’s interests are served by outcome X and B’s by outcome Y. Then simply by observing which outcome occurs we would infer the power ranking of A and B. For instance, if X occurs we can assert that A is more powerful than B. When we inquire why A was able to defeat B, we would expect to find that in some sense A possessed more resources than B. If this were a schoolyard quarrel, we might find that A packed the harder punch.

This model provides us with an elementary feel for the nature of power but only that. The world of politics does not consist of millions and millions of conflicts between unequal pairs of individuals. Potential losers have never been naive enough to let such a world evolve. Let us return to our simple example to show how we can move beyond pairwise conflict. Consider conflict occurring in a schoolyard again. The two fighters will inevitably attract a crowd. B, as we have seen, is losing. What should she or he do? The answer is simple: before defeat occurs she or he must widen the scope of the conflict by inviting the crowd to participate. By changing the scope of the conflict B is changing the balance of power. If B’s gang is stronger than A’s then it is now in the interests of the latter to widen the scope further – say by bringing in the school authorities to stamp out gang warfare.

This model of power resolution is derived from Schattschneider (1960), who argues generally that the outcome of any conflict will not depend on the relative power of the competing interests but will be determined by the eventual scope of the conflict. Hence it follows that the most important strategy in politics is to define the scope of any conflict. Furthermore, the following basic point now becomes explicit: since every increase in scope changes the balance of power, weaker interests should always be pushing to widen the scope of their conflicts. Historically, this has been illustrated by two opposing political strategies: on the left, collectivist politics are...
preached; on the right, a much more individualistic approach is favoured. Two important political conflicts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries show how this has operated in practice (Taylor 1984). First, the extension of electoral suffrage has gradually increased the scope of national politics, culminating in universal suffrage. This has changed the policies of parties and the practices of governments as politicians have had to respond to the needs of their new clients. Second, the rise of trade unions is an explicit means of widening the scope of industrial conflicts beyond the unequal contest of employer versus individual employee. The basic union strategy of broadening the scope of conflicts has been resisted by employers trying to keep disputes ‘local’, originally by having trade unions outlawed and subsequently by legal constraints on the scope of their activities. The history of both democratic politics and trade unionism is at heart a matter of changing the scope of conflicts.

The corollary of Schattschneider’s ideas is that this ‘politics from below’ will eventually extend conflicts to a global scale. Such ‘internationalism’ has a hallowed place in left-wing politics and traces its origins to Marx’s ‘First International’ of 1862. In the late twentieth century, it was noticeable that the poorer countries of the world made most use of the United Nations. But all such internationalism has either come to nothing or has been relatively ineffectual. In fact, globalization can be interpreted as a historical reversal of the politics of scale: today it is capital political interests on a global scale through its neo-liberal rhetoric and practice that is calling the tune (Martin and Schumann 1997: 6–7). However, the scope of most politics is decidedly not global, because a vast array of institutions has been created between the individual and the ultimate scope of politics at the global scale. The main theme of this book is about understanding how the scope of conflicts has been limited. What are the key institutions in this process?

Out of the multitude of institutions that exist, Wallerstein (1984a) identifies four that are crucial to the operation of the world-economy. First, there are the states, where formal power in the world-economy lies. States are responsible for the laws that define the practices of all other institutions. We have previously described the importance of this institution, and much of the remainder of this book is devoted to developing themes concerning the power of states.

Second, there are the peoples, groupings of individuals who have cultural affinities. There is no single acceptable name for this category of institution. Where a cultural group controls a state they may be defined as a nation. Where they constitute a minority within a state they are sometimes referred to literally as ‘minorities’ or as ethnic groups. Such minorities may aspire to be a nation with their own state, such as the Kurds in Syria and Turkey or the Basques in Spain. To complicate matters, there are some multi-state nations such as the Arab nation. Despite the complexity of this category of institution, the importance of ‘peoples’ cannot be doubted in modern politics.

The third category of institution is perhaps less complex but no less controversial than ‘peoples’. The world’s population can be divided into strata based upon economic criteria, which we will term classes. Wallerstein follows Marxist practice here and defines classes in terms of location within the system’s mode of production. Since the latter is currently global, it follows that in world-systems analysis classes are defined as global strata.

At the other end of the scale are the households, Wallerstein’s fourth key institution. These are defined not by kin or cohabitation but in terms of the pooling of income. They are, therefore, small groups of individuals who come together to face an often hostile world. The basic behaviour of such a group is the operation of a budget that combines resources and allocates expenditure. Wallerstein considers such households to be the ‘atoms’ of his system, the basic building block of the other institutions. Hence everybody is first of all a member of a household; that household is subject to the laws of a particular state; it will have cultural affinities with a certain ‘people’; and it will be economically located within a specific class.

Wallerstein (1984a) considers these four institutions, as he defines them, to be unique to the capitalist world-economy. They interact one upon another in many ways, forever creating and recreating the temporal and spatial patterns described in the last
section. Households are important, for instance, in maintaining the cultural definitions of ‘peoples’, while ‘peoples’ fundamentally influence both the boundaries of states and the nature of class conflicts. This is Wallerstein’s ‘institutional vortex’, which underlies the whole operation of our modern world-system.

Institutions both facilitate and constrain the behaviour of individuals by laws, rules, customs and norms. What is and what is not possible will vary with the power of particular institutions. For each category of institution, the distribution of power will vary both within and between institutions. For instance, we can ask both who controls a particular state and what the power of that state is within the inter-state system. In this way, we can identify hierarchies of power within and between all four institutions. We illustrate this below by concentrating on particular aspects of informal power distributions.

**Power within households**

Income pooling may be reduced to daily, weekly or monthly budgets, but it entails a continuity that is generational in nature. Households are frequently changing as some members die and others are born, but they typically show a constancy that allows for the reproduction cycle: it is within households that the next generation is reared. This assumes a pattern of gender relations within households. In the capitalist world-economy, the particular form that gender relations take is known as patriarchy, the domination of women by men.

The notion of income pooling does not, of course, assure equality of access to the resources of a household. The arrangement of work in many different kinds of household across the world provides men with the access to cash and therefore markets, leaving women with ‘domestic chores’. In core countries, this has generally led to a devaluing of many women’s contributions to the household as ‘merely housework’. In peripheral countries, this has often led to the devaluing of food production as ‘women’s work’ relative to male-controlled cash crop production.

This constitutes a very good example of how the scope of a politics has sustained a particular hierarchy of power. In the case of households, we are entering the private world of the family: what goes on between ‘man and wife’ is not in the public domain. This narrow scope has led to condoning, or at least ignoring, the most naked form of power – physical violence. ‘Outsiders’, both public officials and neighbours, have been loath to interfere even in the most extreme cases. To the degree that women are confined to the private world of the family they are condemned to political impotence. There are no trade unions for either housewives or food crop producers.

The patriarchy found within households permeates all levels of the world-economy. Where women do enter waged work they typically get paid less and are less well represented as we move to higher levels of any occupational ladder. Women are under-represented in all legislatures throughout the world. This gender inequality is even more marked in the executive branch of government in all types of regime – liberal democracies, old communist states, military dictatorships, traditional monarchies and so on.

**Power between ‘peoples’**

‘Peoples’ reflect the diversity within humanity that has always existed. In the world-economy, this human variety has been used to create specific sets of ‘peoples’ to justify material and political inequalities. Three types of ‘people’ have been produced – races, nations and ethnic groups – and each relates to one basic feature of the world-economy.

Race is a product of the expansion of the modern world-system. With the incorporation of non-European zones into the world-economy, the non-European peoples that survived were added to the periphery. In this way, race came to be expressed directly in the division of labour as a white core and a non-white periphery. Until the dismantling of apartheid, the South African government recognized this power hierarchy when it designated visiting Japanese businessmen as ‘honorary whites’ in their apartheid system. More generally, the ideology of racism has legitimated worldwide inequalities throughout the history of the world-economy.

‘Nation’ as a concept rose to express competition between states. It legitimates the whole political superstructure of the world-economy that is the inter-state system: every state aspires to be a ‘nation-state’.
By justifying the political fragmentation of the world, nations play a key role in perpetuating inequalities between countries. The associated ideology, nationalism, was the most powerful political force in the twentieth century with millions of young people willingly sacrificing their lives for their country and its people.

Ethnic groups are always a minority within a country. All multi-ethnic states contain a hierarchy of groups, with different occupations associated with different groups. Where the ethnic groups are immigrants, this ‘ethnization’ of occupations legitimizes the practical inequalities within the state. In contrast, the inequalities suffered by non-immigrant ethnic groups can produce an alternative minority nationalism to challenge the state.

The concept of ‘peoples’ covers a difficult and complex mixture of cultural phenomena. We have only scratched at the surface of this complexity here. Nevertheless, it has been shown that peoples are implicated in hierarchies of power from the global scale to the neighbourhood. They remain key institutions both for the legitimization of inequalities and for political resistance. Under contemporary conditions of globalization their salience has increased as groups emphasize their particularities in response to tendencies towards cultural homogenization. We deal with these issues in detail in Chapter 5.

Power and class

All analyses of power and class start with Marx. At the heart of his analysis of capitalism there is a fundamental conflict between capital and labour. In class terms, the bourgeoisie owns the means of production and buys the labour power of the proletariat. In this way, the whole production process is controlled by the former at the expense of the latter. Hence this power hierarchy and the resulting class conflict are central to all Marxist political analyses.

Wallerstein accepts the centrality of class conflict in his capitalist world-economy. However, since his definition of mode of production is broader than Marx’s, it follows that Wallerstein’s identification of classes diverges from that of orthodox Marxism. For instance, Wallerstein’s strata of labour are termed direct producers and include all who are immediate creators of commodities – both wage earners and non-wage producers. Hence the proletariat wage earners are joined by peasant producers, sharecroppers and many other exploited forms of labour, including the female and child labour often hidden within households.

On the other side of the class conflict are the controllers of production, who may or may not be ‘capitalists’ as owners of capital in the original Marxist sense. For instance, the typical form of capital in the late twentieth century is the multinational corporation. The executive elite who control these corporations need not be major shareholders; certainly their power within the organization does not depend on their shareholding. Although formally employees of the corporations it would be disingenuous not to recognize the very real power that this group of people command. They combine with another group of controllers, senior state officials, who also command large amounts of capital, to produce the ‘new bourgeoisie’ of the past 50 years or so. First recognized by Galbraith (1958), these have become especially important with economic globalization: Sklair (2002: 98–105) identifies a transnational capitalist class.

Marx recognized the existence of a middle class between proletariat and bourgeoisie but predicted that this intermediate class would decline in size and importance as the fundamental conflict between capital and labour developed. In fact, this has not happened in the core countries of the world-economy. Instead we have had the ‘rise of the middle classes’ as white-collar occupations have grown and have numerically overtaken blue-collar workers. This large intermediate stratum combines a wide range of occupations with seemingly little connection. Wallerstein interprets persons with these occupations as the cadres of the world-economy. As capitalist production and organization have become more complex there has arisen an increasing need for cadres to run the system and make sure that it operates as smoothly as possible. Originally, such cadres merely supervised the direct producers on behalf of the capitalist controllers. Today, a vast array of occupations is required for the smooth running of the system. These include the older professions,
such as lawyers and accountants, and many new positions, such as middle managers within corporations and bureaucrats within state organizations. The end result is a massive middle stratum of cadres between controllers and direct producers. Wright (1997: 15–22) provides a useful classification of class locations by adding ‘authority’ to ‘means of production’ to differentiate middle-class ‘controllers’ in the transnational capitalist class from cadres who have much less authority or expertise. The cadres create a classic example of Wallerstein’s three-tier structure facilitating the stability of the world-economy.

As previously noted, since classes are defined in terms of mode of production it follows that in the world-economy today classes are global in scope. We shall term them ‘objective’ classes since they are derived logically from the analysis. In terms of actual political practice, however, classes have most commonly defined themselves on a state-by-state basis. These subjective ‘national classes’ are only parts of our larger objective ‘global classes’. That is to say, the scope of most class actions has been restricted to less than their complete geographical range. But not all classes have been equally ‘national’ in scope. While the proletariat have had the internationalist rhetoric, it is the capitalists and the controllers who have been the more effective international actors – in world-systems analysis it is emphasized that capitalist subjective class actions have always been the closest to their objective class interests. At the present time, this is demonstrated by economic globalization, where corporations, guided by the transnational capitalist class, move their production units around to reduce labour costs. The direct producers have no organized strategy to combat the controllers’ ability to create new global geographical divisions of labour. The state is clearly implicated in these key constraints on the scope of conflicts in a globalizing world, and this lies at the heart of the political geography that we develop in this book.

**Politics and the state**

The state is the locus of formal politics. Most people’s image of the operation of power and politics comprises activities associated with the state and its government. In this taken-for-granted world the state is the arena of politics. Typically, therefore, many political studies have limited their analyses to states and governments. But this is to equate power and politics in our society with just the formal operation of state politics. Our previous discussion of other institutions has indicated the poverty of such an approach. There is no a priori reason why we should not be equally concerned with questions of power in other institutions, such as households. Marxists, of course, would point to the centrality of classes in any consideration of power.

The way forward from this position is not to debate the relative importance of the different institutions, since it is impossible to deal seriously with any one of them separately. As previously noted, they are interrelated in so many complex ways that Wallerstein (1984a) refers to them as ‘the institutional vortex’. Treating them separately as we have done so far can be justified only on pedagogical grounds. In reality, power in the modern world-system operates through numerous combinations of the institutions. From this perspective, one study has enumerated no less than 14 different types of politics – see Chapter 8. This implies that there are at least 14 different political geographies we should study. We cannot pretend to do justice to such a range of politics in this book, so there is a need to justify the particular bias in what follows.

Most political geography, like other political study, has been state-centric in orientation. That is to say, it has treated the state as its basic unit for analysis. From a world-systems perspective, the state remains a key institution but is no longer itself the locus of social change. We wish to avoid the state-centric constraints but in no way want to imply that the state is not an important component of our study. In short, the state must be located in a context that maintains its importance but without simultaneously relegating the other institutions. This is what we have attempted to achieve in Figure 1.6, which sets out one of the many relationships that exist between the four key institutions.

Starting with the households: these are the basic social reproducers of the system whereby individuals are socialized into their social positions. In Figure 1.6, we emphasize the transmission of cultural identities...
that reproduce ‘peoples’, in particular the nations of the world. These nations then relate to the other two institutions in quite contrary ways. For classes, as we have already noted, their global objective status is compromised by subjective organization as national classes. The crucial relation is therefore one of divide. In the case of states, on the other hand, nation and state have been mutually supportive as ‘nation-states’. This modern legitimation has become so strong that in our everyday language state and nation are often used interchangeably. However, ‘nation’ is a cultural grouping and ‘state is the territorial unit of government and sovereignty. The term ‘nation-state’ implies a perfect overlap between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ when that is rarely the case. Most countries, or the mislabelled ‘nation-states’, are multi-national entities and the geography of most ‘nations’ crosses international boundaries. Hence, it is not nations that compete at the Olympic Games but states. The concept of the nation-state confuses the very important distinction between these two institutions (remember nations are cultural groupings, states are political apparatuses); our purpose in this book is not so much simply to correct this common misconception but to understand how it came about. Hence the particular bias in this political study is towards state and nation but without the neglect of the other institutions that can ensue from a simple state-centric approach.

Our bias can be justified on geographical grounds. As we shall see in the following chapters, as social institutions both state and nation are unique in their relationship to space. They not only occupy space, as any social institution must, but they also claim particular association with designated places. It makes no sense to have a nation without a ‘historical homeland’, and states do not exist except through possession of their ‘sovereign territory’. In other words, the spatial location of state and nation is intrinsically part of their being. It follows that political geography should focus on the bias highlighted in Figure 1.6 as our particular window on the modern world-system. We develop this argument further in the final section of this chapter; in the meantime, we continue our exploration of the nature of power relations through the familiar activities of states.

Figure 1.6 Key institutional linkages.

Summary

Political geography and the institutions of the capitalist world-economy

How do the institutions of the capitalist world-economy provide a framework for pursuing political geographic inquiry?

- They help us conceptualize the arenas and goals of politics: the struggle to control and manipulate institutions as well as the politics of restricting the scope of particular issues to within institutions.
- The institutions both frame and are maintained by everyday activity. For example, the patriarchal household delimits the role of women and is constructed by such constrained roles.
- Political activity is contextualized (a) within the scope of institutions and (b) within the way that institutions relate to each other.
- Contextualizing everyday activity within institutions illustrates the way that the ‘higher’ scales of the state and the global are constituted by the activities at the scale of the household and ‘peoples’.
- ‘Difference’ may be mapped and understood by analysing how institutions vary in form and function across time and space.
A political geography perspective on the world-economy

Power is mediated through institutions in particular places. Institutions and places are expressions of the three types of power we discussed earlier: inscribed, resource and strategy (Allen 2003). In addition, our focus on geographical scale emphasizes that political actions must be contextualized within broader dynamics. In combination we frame political geography as multiscalar, territorial and networked to complete the power-geometry.

To recap, we have introduced:

- one unit of analysis: the capitalist world-economy;
- three types of power: inscribed, resource and strategy;
- three geographical scales: local, nation-state and world-economy;
- four institutions: households, states, ‘peoples’ and classes;
- three silences we hope to assist in breaking: difference, statism and gendered analysis;
- a seven-point framework for a political geography adopting the world-systems approach.

In combination we offer a conceptualization that contextualizes politics in a geographical framework of a global structure, and intertwines the material with the discursive. We also wish to provide coherence, a way to negotiate all of these different considerations. Our strategy is to refer predominately to the world-systems framework while emphasizing geographical scale. In doing so, we will continually refer to the different forms of power, the four institutions and the means by which we can provide our particular insights into the silences.

World-economy, nation-state and locality

The model of three geographical scales represents our particular organization of political geography summarized by the subtitle of this book: world-economy, nation-state and locality. Hence, we follow the established political geography pattern of using three scales of analysis but treat them in a more analytical manner than other studies have done. Even though each of the following chapters concentrates largely on activities at one of the three scales, they do not constitute separate studies of each scale. For instance, imperialism is a concept associated with the global scale, but we argue that it cannot be understood without consideration of forces operating within states. Alternatively, political parties operate at the national scale, but we argue that they cannot be understood without consideration of the global scale. In every chapter, discussion ranges across scales depending on the particular requirements for explanation.

Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to geopolitics and imperialism, respectively. In both chapters we define a framework of political cycles in presenting a dynamic model of politics in the world-economy. After developing a historical analysis, we discuss the War on Terror and contemporary discussion of ‘empire’. The analysis is framed through a world-systems perspective, but we integrate the work of feminist geographers and other scholars to complement and extend our theoretical perspective.

In Chapters 4 and 5 we deal with the classic trilogy of political geography: territory, state and nation. We develop ideas on the state as a mechanism of control and the nation as a vehicle for political consensus. Reinterpretations and new ideas from our world-system logic involve the spatial structure of the state, a theory of states in the world-economy, a materialist theory of nationalism and the representation of gender roles in national identity, and the politics of citizenship.

Chapter 6 begins at the same scale in its treatment of elections and democracy. We employ world-systems logic to interpret elections and the operation of parties in all parts of the world. We argue that electoral geography must develop its theoretical complexity to match the growth in the output of empirical studies. Especially, questions regarding the global geography of liberal democracy as well as the mismatch between the geography of voting and
the behaviour of political and economic elites must be considered. The chapter also discusses another form of politics, social movements and how they are more suited to transcending the scale of the state.

In Chapters 7 and 8 we consider the local scale as the localities we experience in our everyday lives. In Chapter 7 we consider a particular type of locality, the world city. We address the geography of world cities, particularly their relationship with sovereign states and the tension between geographies of flows and territory. The chapter moves our discussion of political geography beyond a state-centric view to consider the new networks of global politics. In Chapter 8 we move from space to place considerations, so our localities become more ‘lived in’. Here we explore a politics of identities in places and the idea of the emergence of a new politics of identities through the key institutions of the modern world-system. In a short concluding chapter we integrate the structures and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy with the concerns of agency, identity and hybridism championed by feminist geographers.

The final product is a political geography that attempts to rethink our studies in world-systems terms. There is some new wine in old bottles but also some old wine in new bottles. Although none of this wine is as yet sufficiently matured, it is hoped that it will not taste too bitter for the discerning reader.
Suggested reading


Activities

1. Recently there has been discussion of existing and proposed trade agreements such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as the economic integration of the European Union. Consider media stories about one of these agreements, or something similar, and discuss how the three scales of political geography are engaged or not. Can you identify experience, ideology and reality as we define them?

2. Consider a news broadcast on the television or the website of the BBC, CNN or a major newspaper. Identify stories that exemplify the three different forms of power discussed in the chapter: capacity, resource and practice. For one of the stories, think about the way one form of power requires the exercise of another form of power. Does considering different types of power lead to consideration of other geographical scales?

3. Select one leading newspaper in your country (non-tabloid) and inspect recent copies (or the newspaper’s website). Try to classify news items in terms of our three geographical scales. In fact, the stories are likely to be local, national and foreign, with the latter focusing on one country rather than worldwide. This shows the continuing salience of states in the way the world is framed. Nevertheless, search out ‘global stories’. Consider ways in which the stories differ across scales. Do the stories exemplify the way we have interpreted the scales – local as concerned with immediate work and life; national and foreign suggesting ‘us’ together, and ‘them’ as different or threatening; worldwide on just economic and environmental issues? Are there stories that cut across scales?
CHAPTER 2

Geopolitics rampant

What this chapter covers

Geopolitical codes and world orders
- Cycles of international politics
- Cycles of world hegemony
- British and American centuries: the paired Kondratieff model
- The geopolitics of the hegemonic cycle
- Cycles and geopolitical world orders

Turmoil and stability: geopolitical codes, orders and transitions
- The Cold War as a geopolitical transition and world order

Contemporary geopolitical transition and new world order
- The structural geography of the War on Terror
- China as an emerging institutional power
- New political geographies of war: networks and volume

Critical geopolitics: representations of the War on Terror
- Captain America: defender of Hegemony
- Art and war: disruptions of geopolitical assumptions

Intimate geopolitics, feminist scholarship and the interrogation of security

Geopolitical constructs: space, time, subjects and structures
Geopolitics is currently rampant in two very different senses. On the one hand, it is a term used by political commentators to describe a world that is, apparently, increasingly ‘risky’ and potentially on a pathway to global war (Kagan 2017). In these discourses geopolitics is a poorly, or even non, defined term that implies a sense of permanence and inevitability. For example, the geographic features of the Middle East, such as its oil reserves, are unchanging. Such a geopolitical reality produces tensions between countries we should not expect to ever diminish. The implicit belief in this form of geopolitics is that state competition is a zero-sum game. For example, the ‘rise’ of China can only mean diminishing United States influence (Kaplan 2014; Vuving 2017). These contemporary uses of ‘geopolitics’ echo the classical geopolitics that was dominant in the decades prior to the two world wars. It is new wine in old bottles and we should be wary of its intoxicating effect.

Robert Kaplan (2012, 2014) is a dominant voice in this broadcast of geopolitics and the deterministic role of geography. It is a non-theoretical approach that sees geography as a ‘kind of vector that it is easier to flow with than against’ (Dittmer 2013). In other words, the spectre of environmental and historical determinism remains in a way that ‘prioritize[s] the static quality of geography while offering a possibility of transcending it, especially through knowledge of the terrain. However, Kaplan never precisely explains how geography can be transcended, or under what circumstances it is futile to try’ (Dittmer 2013). In other words, in these understandings of geopolitics geography, to some degree, determines political actions.

On the other hand, geopolitics is rampant as a topic of academic inquiry that is critical of the assumptions of classical geopolitics and its contemporary expressions of militarism and multiple forms of violence (Pain and Staeheli 2014). The geography of Robert Kaplan and similar authors is prior to, and determines, political actions and rests on the constraining impact of a physical geography, such as mountains and oceans. In contrast, the vibrancy of contemporary political geography sees a human geography in a complex and dynamic way in which spaces, scales and places are made by political actions and, in turn, frame political activity. Neither geography nor politics is prior to the other. Neither determines the other. We live in a contested world in which politics and geography are fluid and mutually constitutive; they interact and make each other in an ongoing process of geopolitical change. Geopolitics is rampant because voices echoing classical geopolitical stances are gaining strength, as are different political geographic perspectives to challenge their assumptions and goals.

As described in the Prologue, geopolitics has played an important role in the history of political geography at the beginning of modern geography. In the 1890s and the following decade, the state-centred strategic calculations of geopoliticians situated political geography as an essential tool of modern state building, imperialism and ‘great power’ competition. Almost one hundred years later, in the 1980s, a new ‘critical geopolitics’ connected political geography to more recent developments of human geography. Under the broad influence of postmodernism, geography had taken a ‘cultural turn’ in which landscapes, media and everyday behaviour were deconstructed and read to uncover power relations. Whereas in the ‘old geopolitics’, geographers aimed at informing the actual practices and behaviour of states, in critical geopolitics, geographers analysed the geopolitical actions of states, usually disapprovingly. Recently, a third period has emerged, led by a feminist geopolitics that ‘democratizes’ the notion of geopolitics by forcing us to consider the ‘everyday’ and the ‘ordinary’. We think scholars of the Annales school would approve.

In the Prologue we discussed the historical role of geopolitics in the intellectual development of political geography and the practice of individual geographers who advanced their careers by informing actual statecraft. In this chapter, we focus upon contemporary geopolitics through an application of our space-time approach with two aims and beliefs. First, contemporary events – such as questions over the role and future of NATO – can only be understood by placing them in historical context. Second, a full understanding of geopolitical actions requires a scalar approach; the ‘everyday’ can be understood by situating it within structures that require consideration of the nation-state and the capitalist world-economy.
Geopolitical codes and world orders

The practical geopolitical reasoning behind foreign policy produces what Gaddis (1982) calls geopolitical codes. These are operational codes consisting of a set of political geography assumptions that underlie development of a country’s relations with other countries. Such a code will have to incorporate a definition of a state’s interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a planned response to such threats and a justification for that response. There will be as many geopolitical codes as there are states.

Geopolitical codes are closely related to what Henrikson (1980) calls ‘image-plans’. Such operational codes involve evaluation of places beyond the state’s boundaries in terms of their strategic importance and as potential threats. Geopolitical codes are not just state-centric, they also involve a particular single state’s view of the world. They are by definition, therefore, highly biased pictures of

Chapter framework

The chapter is framed around four of the seven ideas we introduced at the end of the Prologue:

- The practice of geopolitics requires both actual actions and the representation of those actions, with critical geopolitics focused upon the latter.
- Geopolitics certainly was, and largely still is, seen as the study of elites and the actions of states; new insights stem from breaking this particular ‘silence’.
- World-systems analysis is effective in understanding the temporal context (in terms of the rise and fall of hegemonic powers) for the creation of particular geopolitical theories and their adoption by states as geopolitical codes.
- A consideration of geographical scale situates the everyday within broader structures and shows how everyday actions challenge existing structures.

Typing for Goebbels: everyday actions within global geopolitics

In January 2017, Brunhilde Pomsel, who served as secretary for Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, died aged 106. She had recently spoken about her role working for one of the most reviled figures in Adolf Hitler’s regime. Hired for her typing skills, Frau Pomsel spent her workdays altering official statistics. The number of German soldiers killed in the war was reduced and the number of reported rapes of German women by Soviet soldiers increased. Frau Pomsel claimed that ‘I didn’t do anything other than type in Goebbels’ office’ and believed that she did no more than follow a national trend of using the rise of the Nazi party as a means to a secure and well-paid job.

Of course, Frau Pomsel also had a life outside her workplace. Her sweetheart, Gottfried Kirchbach, was Jewish and had fled to Amsterdam to try and forge a new life for both of them. But Herr Kirchbach believed the Nazis knew of Pomsel’s frequent visits, putting them both in danger. She stopped travelling to Amsterdam and never saw him again. She also aborted their child because it was diagnosed with a serious lung disorder.

Frau Pomsel lived and loved in unusual circumstances. She was assistant to a man who played a key role in shaping the world. Her life was dramatic while also being situated within circumstances similar to many, then and now.

Think back to the nature of power and the institutions of the world-economy discussed in Chapter 1. What forms of power and what institutions are involved in the account of Brunhilde Pomsel’s life? Think of her daily tasks as well as the impact made by the Nazi party within Germany and across the world.

the world. Nevertheless, we must come to terms with them and understand them as the basic building blocks of a higher scale: geopolitical world orders.

Geopolitical codes operate at three levels: local, regional, and global. The local-level code involves evaluation of neighbouring states. Governments of all countries, however small, must have such a code. Regional-level codes are required for states that aspire to project their power beyond their immediate neighbours. The governments of all regional powers and potential regional powers need to map out such codes. Finally, a few states will have global policies and their governments will have appropriate worldwide geopolitical codes. Hence, all countries have local codes, many countries have regional codes and a few countries have global codes.

Some simple examples will help to fix these ideas. Bartlett gives a very clear example of one major power’s three levels of concern in the First World War. For Germany, ‘the war is one of defence against France, prevention against Russia but a struggle for world supremacy with Britain’ (Bartlett 1984: 89). Sometimes a regional code will be in conflict with a local code. The best example of this is the traditional local hostility between Greece and Turkey, which contrasts with their sharing a similar regional code set by membership of NATO. In fact, treaties are a good indicator of codes, especially at the regional level. The change-round of Australia and New Zealand from being part of Britain’s global code to having their own regional (Pacific) code is marked by the establishment of the ANZUS pact just after the end of the Second World War. Australian and New Zealand troops fought in Europe in both world wars, but it is unlikely that they will do so again – Europe is now beyond their geopolitical codes.

Although every code will be unique to its particular country, such practical reasoning is not conducted in a vacuum. In creating its geopolitical code a country must take into account the geopolitical codes of other countries. In fact, there has always been a hierarchy of influence within the inter-state system whereby the more powerful impose ideas and assumptions on the less powerful. In particular, the ‘great powers’ have had an excessive influence on the geopolitical codes of other members of the system, so much so that within any one historical period most geopolitical codes tend to fit together to form a single overall dominant pattern. These are geopolitical world orders.

Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) draw on Robert Cox’s (1981) concept of world orders and his method of historical structures. The latter is a framework of action combining three interacting forces: material capability, ideas, and institutions. The application of this model to world orders can be illustrated by the case of the Cold War, where because the United States had the material capability to dominate the post-Second World War scene, it advanced liberal political and economic ideas and helped to found institutions such as the United Nations to provide stability to the new world order. For Cox, such world orders combine social, political and economic structures. The Cold War is the political structure of this particular world order. Cox associates his world orders with the hegemony of one state, which imposes and then protects its world order. Hence, statements by President Trump apparently devaluing NATO and other institutions formed after the Second World War could have impacts far beyond the time and space of one presidential administration to reach global and historic dimensions. In short, our specific concern for geopolitical world orders cannot be meaningfully separated from a more general concern for the rise and fall of great powers over the history of the world-economy. We must tackle this topic before we attempt to define particular geopolitical world orders.

Summary

Geopolitical codes:

- are the content and assumptions behind the foreign policy decisions of states;
- occur at three geographical scales;
- combine to form a global pattern of politics we have called a geopolitical world order.
Cycles of international politics

The history of the inter-state system can be characterized by the rise and fall of just a few major powers. Some researchers have identified a sort of ‘system within a system’ covering just these major powers. Levy’s (1983) ‘great power system’, for instance, includes only 13 states since 1495 and no more than seven at any one time. At the moment, domestic politics and foreign policy dynamics are focused upon the absolute and relative rise and decline of one’s own country or others. President Trump’s slogan and promise to ‘Make America Great Again’ is clearly a nod to a seemingly lost great power status. Chinese leaders define a new era of ‘multipolarity’ that simultaneously declares the great power status of the US to be over and the creation of a new world order in which China is one of a handful of ‘equal’ great powers. Hence, understanding ‘decline’ is both topical and relevant, but can we learn from history? Many commentators are obviously saying yes, but the problem with the common answers is that they fail to depart significantly from the ‘high politics’ of events and the focus is placed on leaders and their decisions rather than the structural context in which decisions are made. There is no sense of Braudel’s *longue durée* in most commentary. We can rectify this limitation through world-systems analysis (Taylor 1996).

Most studies of the rise and decline of major powers have developed cyclical models of change. Goldstein (1988) described more than a dozen such analyses. We focus upon the world-systems analysis identification of just three hegemonic cycles within the history of the capitalist world-economy.

Cycles of world hegemony

In world-systems analysis, hegemony in the inter-state system is a rare phenomenon. It has occurred just three times: Dutch hegemony in the mid-seventeenth century, British hegemony in the mid-nineteenth century and US hegemony in the mid-twentieth century. Such hegemonies encompass dominance in economic, political and ideological spheres of activity, but they are firmly based upon the development of an economic supremacy. This has involved three stages. First, the hegemonic state has gained primacy in production efficiency over its rivals. Second, this has enabled its merchants to build a commercial advantage. Third, the bankers of the state have been able to achieve a financial dominance of the world-economy. When production, commercial and financial activities in one state are more efficient than in all rival states, then that state is hegemonic. Such states have been able to dominate the inter-state system, not by threatening some imperium but by balancing forces in such a way as to prevent any rival coalition forming and growing large enough to threaten the hegemonic state’s political leadership. Furthermore, the hegemonic states have propagated liberal ideas that have been widely accepted throughout the world-system. Hence hegemonic states are much more than world political leaders, they also have a great impact upon economic and social trends.

The rise and establishment of a hegemonic state has been followed by its gradual decline. The very openness of the hegemonic state’s liberalism enables rivals to copy the technical advances and emulate the production efficiencies. Soon the hegemonic state’s lead over its rivals declines, first in production and subsequently in commerce and finance. In practice, the two instances of decline have been cushioned to some degree by an alliance between the old declining and the new rising hegemonic state – the Dutch initially became Britain’s junior partners, a role that Britain took with respect to the United States after 1945. This may both smooth the transfer of leadership and help to legitimate the new situation.

The rise and decline of hegemonic states defines a hegemonic cycle. Wallerstein (1984b following Gordon 1980) has tentatively related such cycles to three logistic waves of the world-economy. Such cycles involve long-term world market control of investments that sustain the existence of hegemonic power. These investments are both political and economic and produce a system-wide infrastructure. For instance, system-wide transport, communication and financial networks are a necessary requirement for hegemony. There is also a need for diplomatic networks and a pattern of military bases around the
world. In this way, each hegemonic state has built up a hegemonic infrastructure through which it has dominated the system. In each case, world wars of approximately 30 years’ duration culminated in confirming hegemony and restructuring the interstate system. Hence the Thirty Years War ending in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 marks the coming of the Dutch hegemonic system, the Revolutionary/ Napoleonic Wars ending in the Congress of Vienna of 1815 mark the coming of the British hegemonic system, and the twentieth century’s two world wars ending in the setting up of the United Nations in 1945 mark the coming of US hegemony.

The competition between states for hegemonic status is, in practice, a messier and less clear-cut process than the basic framework of the model first suggests. This can be illustrated by showing how the concept of world hegemony denotes much more than a single state dominating world politics. The defeat of the Soviet Union, for example, was due to much more than US military rivalry and threat. Long before its demise, American culture was dominating the black market in Eastern Europe in the form of such common consumer items as rock’n’ roll records and denim jeans. The consumer culture that the United States has promoted in the twentieth century is integral to American hegemony and, however powerful the Soviet Union might have been politically, it never found an answer to the American ‘good life’ exported to Western Europeans but denied to Eastern Europeans. World hegemons, the Dutch and the British as well as the Americans, are creators of new modern worlds (Taylor 1996, 1998). As well as the ‘Americanization’ of society in the twentieth century, there was the industrialization of society emanating from nineteenth-century Britain and the creation of mercantile society derived from Dutch practices. In each case, the hegemon provides the image of a future world that other countries try to emulate. As the ‘most modern of the modern’, the world hege- mon thus defines the future of other states and those that resist risk failing to ‘catch up’, or, worse, risk ‘falling behind’. That is why, by the time it collapsed, the Soviet Union looked so ‘old fashioned’, almost a nineteenth-century society in the way it emphasized territorial industrialization in an increasingly globalizing world.

World hegemons are thus much more important than a ‘world power’. They are political leaders to be sure, but they are equally economic, social and cultural leaders, as we have just shown. In terms of political geography, this complex amalgam of power is particularly important in the way that hegemons have used it to define political norms. In the words of the original hegemony theorist, Antonio Gramsci, hegemonic power involves defining the ‘ruling ideas’ of society. At the scale of the modern world-system, this means inventing and promoting liberalisms. Thus, all three hegemons have been champions of liberalism in their own distinctive ways. We tell that story in the next chapter as we relate world hegemony to cycles of colonization and decolonization.

Summary

In this section we have introduced a world-systems approach to the rise and fall of great powers and, in so doing, introduced the concept of hegemonic power. We shall use cycles of hegemonic power to:

- situate geopolitical codes;
- situate academic geopolitical theories.

British and American centuries: the paired Kondratieff model

In this section we consider the application of a Kondratieff model to the periods surrounding British and US hegemony. This is important. First, it links the rise and fall of hegemony to the basic material processes of the world-economy as reflected in Kondratieff cycles. Second, it is a necessary addition to the hegemony model, since it brings the other world powers into the model. Finally, it shows that political mechanisms are an integral part of the overall restructuring of the world-economy that occurs within these cycles.

Refer back to Figure 1.3 and note how each Kondratieff A-phase was launched by a new lead
sector, a technological innovation that drove a global economic boom and ushered in dramatic societal change. Note too that these innovations were ‘captured’ within particular territories. For example, in Kondratieff IIIA, at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany and the United States were competing to be the leading economy with the new technologies. At the time, both countries were debating their economic relationships with the rest of the world; simply, there was a tension between protectionist policies that would help nurture new industries and secure older ones from competition and voices for open markets to allow for the new innovations to be sold in the world-economy. War mingled with geoeconomics too. The ‘total war’ attitude of the two world wars required national economic mobilization. Furthermore, the bombing campaigns of the Second World War flattened much of the industrial base of Britain, Germany and Japan and left the United States as sole economic power. After the Second World War the United States was in a position to call for ‘free trade’, or the unhindered movement and sale of the products of the lead sector across the world-economy. As we shall see, such an attempt was partially challenged by the Soviet Union.

Figure 1.3 also posits that we are at the beginning of a new Kondratieff wave A-phase. The B-phase of the Kondratieff IV wave was defined by the processes of globalization, itself a form of geopolitics. Many scholars have argued that globalization has undermined the notion of ‘national economies’. Instead, the multinational firm is organized transnationally and states are in competition to secure parts of global investment. This ‘market access’ model is seen as integrating localities located in different states and preventing the identification of anything that could be called a ‘French firm’ or ‘American company’. The ‘capturing’ of technological innovation, production and profits within a state is, apparently, old hat. And yet, in 2017 politics across the globe was dominated by calls by some parties and politicians for greater protectionism, withdrawal from established trade deals and ‘taking back’ control of borders. All of a sudden globalization did not seem like an unstoppable trend.

The cyclical approach of world-systems theory helps us explain why the attitude of states towards economic flows may wax and wane between promotion and protection. Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994) *longue durée* study of the rise and fall of hegemonic powers identifies a phase he calls ‘financialization’. Production is the economic base of the hegemonic cycle, as seen in Figure 1.3. Although the hegemonic state is the initial main producer of the technological innovation it soon faces competition from other countries that emulate, and improve upon, the product and the production process. In Kondratieff IV, Japan soon became the leading producer of cars and trucks, eclipsing what were seen as the older design and poorer quality of American vehicles. In combination, the hegemonic state and its emulators flood the world-economy with products and an economic crisis of oversupply ensues. In the past, Arrighi argues, the capitalist world-economy responded by seeking new investment opportunities, which became manifest in increased flows of capital investment. Transnational capital investment (identified as a key element of globalization) is, according to Arrighi, a part of the hegemonic cycle. Arguably, ‘globalization’ is what we have called the most recent phase of transnational capital investment.

The implication of Arrighi’s approach is that states may in the future reassert their control over economic flows. Following this scenario, it is conceivable that a new round of protection within states could support the ‘national’ economic development that is the foundation of a hegemonic state. On the other hand, scholars such as Manuel Castells (1996) and John Agnew (2005) lean towards a conclusion that we have crossed a threshold and that transnational economic integration is here to stay and at such levels that hegemonic powers are a thing of the past as national economies have been eroded. The outcome is a matter of ongoing and future political geography. The actions of multinational firms, politicians and people, the latter in their roles as consumers, citizens, migrants and so forth, will determine the interplay between states and capital. The tense politics of 2017, with some countries, or politicians within some countries...
advocating for the benefits of trade and investment while others seeming to be reasserting control of global economic flows, suggests that we are in a moment of flux that is to be expected as we move from a Kondratieff IVB to VA. Such a transition will be geopolitical because it inevitably involves winners and losers.

The geopolitics of the hegemonic cycle

Now that we have conceptualized the dynamics of geopolitical world orders, we can contextualize the construction of geopolitical codes. We begin by discussing political decisions over the form of economic interaction with other states in the world-

---

**Global arms trade, national industrial policy**

The global arms trade is big business. It accounted for $80 billion of activity in 2015. The United States was the chief exporter, accounting for about half of the total. The other major exporters were France, Russia and China, followed by Sweden, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Great Britain and Israel. The recipients were predominately Middle Eastern countries: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Israel. South Korea and Pakistan were also significant importers.

Armaments are just one bundle of commodities flowing through the trade networks of the capitalist world-economy. However, the arms trade is different from other forms of economic exchange. Weapons deals are means by which powerful countries form geopolitical relations with allies. The arms trade is one component of the geopolitical codes of exporting and importing countries.

An alternative way to look at the arms trade is by focusing on companies rather than countries. In 2015, the top 100 arms companies in the world sold $370.7 billion of military equipment. US companies dominated the top ten, though sales by Western European countries had increased by 6.6 per cent from 2014 to reach a total of $95.7 billion. Russian firms sold $36.4 billion worth of military equipment in 2015.

The combination of geopolitical calculations and big business means that it is not surprising that supporting the arms industry is a form of national industrial strategy.

A 2016 report for the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) noted the ‘huge overall level of government support, protection, and direct and indirect subsidy that the arms industry as a whole receives’. In particular the report concludes that for the United Kingdom subsidies and other forms of government support are part of industrial policy. The British government provides around GBP104–GBP142 million in subsidies annually for arms exports, including lobbying, export credits and research and development, and some protection from corruption investigations related to export deals.

The global arms trade illustrates a number of concepts within our political geography. States are important actors within the capitalist world-economy and their actions are best seen through a political-economy lens. States are not the only key actors; in this case the actions of companies and states are closely related. A geopolitical code consists of military, political and economic relations. Our multiscalar approach connects the reality of a global arms trade to local experiences through the scale of ideology, the state. The unequal three-tier hierarchy of the state allows us to conceptualize the very different local experiences at different ends of the arms trade: gainful employment within the core processes of weapons R&D and victims of the weapons usage in countries within the periphery.

economy, and then situate the Cold War, the War on Terror and more recent events within our model.

Political activity has always been an integral part of the world-economy. State policies are important processes in the changes observed in the world-economy. Since they are neither independent processes nor mere reflections of economic necessities ('economism') it follows that there is some choice available. If there were no choice, there would be no need for public institutions such as the state. Public agencies have the role of distorting market forces in favour of those private groups controlling the agency. There has never been a 'pure' world-economy, even in periods when free trade has dominated. The power of a public agency and hence its ability to organize the market depends upon the strength of its backers and their material resources. Strong states may promote a 'free' market, while less strong states may favour explicit distortion of the market through protectionism, for instance. In this way, states can act as a medium through which a first set of production processes (upon which the world-economy operates) is translated into a second set of distribution processes and patterns. Since these intermediate processes tend to favour the already strong, it follows that political activity will often increase the economic polarization of the market (that is, helping the core at the expense of the periphery).

The power of a state to organize the market to its own ends is not just a property of that state’s resources. The fact that we are dealing with a world-economy and not a world-empire (that is, there is a multiplicity of states) means that relative positions are more important than measures of absolute power. These state positions are relative not only to other states but also to the gross availability of material resources within the world-economy. The cyclical nature of material growth means that opportunities for operating various state policies vary systematically over time. This is not just a matter of different economic environments being suited to alternative state strategies. At any particular conjunction, specifically successful policies can only work for a limited number of agencies. Quite simply, a success for any one state lessens opportunities for other states. There will always be constraints in terms of the total world resources available for redistribution via state activities. Given the ‘correct’ policies, it is not possible for all semi-peripheral and peripheral states to become core-like. Although this is not a zero-sum game in a static sense, since the available production is always changing in a cyclical fashion, we do have here a sort of ‘dynamic zero-sum game’. If state activity is an integral part of the operation of the world-economy, we should be able to model it within our temporal and spatial framework. Just such a model has been proposed by Wallerstein and his associates (Research Working Group 1979). They postulate political activity occurring over a time period covering two Kondratieff waves.

The rise and fall of hegemonic power relates to ‘paired Kondratieffs’ as follows. If we start with a first growth phase, A1, we find geopolitical rivalry as core states compete for succession to leadership. With hindsight, however, we can see that new technological advances are concentrated in one country, so increased production efficiency gives this state a long-term advantage. A1 is associated with the stage of ascending hegemony. In B1, overall decline of the world-economy leaves fewer opportunities for expansion, but the ascending power now attains commercial supremacy and is able to protect its interests better than its rivals are able to protect theirs. By this stage, it is clear which state is to be the hegemonic power. B1 is associated with the stage of hegemonic victory. With renewed growth of the world-economy we reach A2, the stage of hegemonic maturity. By this time, the financial centre of the world-economy has moved to the hegemonic state, which is now supreme in production, commerce and finance (that is, ‘true’ or ‘high’ hegemony). Since the hegemonic power can compete successfully with all its rivals, it now favours ‘opening’ the world-economy. These are periods of free trade. Finally, declining hegemony occurs during B2, when production efficiency is no longer sufficient to dominate rivals. This results in acute competition as new powers try to obtain a larger share of a declining market. These are periods of protectionism and formal imperialism as each rival attempts to preserve its own portion of the periphery.
According to Wallerstein’s research group, the four Kondratieff cycles from the Industrial Revolution can be interpreted as two ‘paired Kondratieffs’ (Table 2.1). The first pair, covering the nineteenth century, correspond to the rise and fall of British hegemony, and the second pair describe a similar sequence of events for the United States in the twentieth century. There is no need to consider this table in great detail, except to note how several familiar episodes fit neatly into the model.

In terms of our discussion of state involvement in the operation of the world-economy, phases A₂ and B₂ are particularly important. In A₂, the hegemonic power imposes policies of open trade on the system to reap the rewards of its own efficiency. In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain proclaimed ‘free trade’ backed up by gunboats, and a century later a new world policeman, this time with aircraft carriers, was going through the whole process of liberalizing trade once again. These policies certainly contributed to the massive growth of the world-economy in the A₂ phases and were imposed through a mixture of negotiation, bargaining and bullying. Options for non-hegemonic powers were highly constrained and they largely went along with the hegemonic leadership.

All this changes with the onset of the B₂ phase, however. As production efficiencies spread, economic leadership deserts the hegemonic power. These are key periods because of the opportunities that declining hegemon provides for other core and semi-peripheral states. The imposition of free trade is no longer taken for granted as various states work out new strategies for the new circumstances. In the late nineteenth century, Britain entered the B-phase as hegemonic power and came out behind Germany and the United States in terms of production efficiency. B₂ phases are clearly fundamental periods of restructuring in the world-economy in which geopolitical processes play an important role.

The geopolitics of the current moment is much harder to discern. World-systems analysis is a historical rather than a predictive framework. One point that is very important to remember as we try to use our theory to understand contemporary changes is that a new period of hegemony is not inevitable. If the model is correct and the US is at the end of its cycle of hegemony, then we may well be facing a period of multi-polarity (a number of relatively equal powers) rather than an emerging hegemonic power. The model is not deterministic. Rather, countries have the ability to create their own geopolitical codes,

Table 2.1 A dynamic model of hegemony and rivalry: Paired Kondratieff waves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A₁ Ascending hegemony</th>
<th>1790/98</th>
<th>Rivalry with France (Napoleonic Wars)</th>
<th>1890/96</th>
<th>Rivalry with Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Productive efficiency: Industrial Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B₁ Hegemonic victory</td>
<td>1815/25</td>
<td>Commercial victory in Latin America and control of India: workshop of the world</td>
<td>1913/20</td>
<td>Commercial victory in the final collapse of British free-trade system and decisive military defeat of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₂ Hegemonic maturity</td>
<td>1844/51</td>
<td>Era of free trade: London becomes financial centre of the world-economy</td>
<td>1940/45</td>
<td>Liberal-economic system of Bretton Woods based upon the US dollar: New York new financial centre of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B₂ Declining hegemony</td>
<td>1870/85</td>
<td>Classical age of imperialism as European powers and United States rival Britain. ‘New’ industrial revolution emerging outside Britain</td>
<td>1967/73</td>
<td>Reversal to protectionist practices to counteract Japan and European rivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1890/96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
but they do so within the structural constraints defined by our space-time matrix. The geopolitical element of that matrix is geopolitical world orders.

Cycles and geopolitical world orders

Geopolitical world orders are the aggregation of all geopolitical codes in the system. For the past two hundred years or so they have been defined by the dynamics of world hegemonic cycles. (Hence we continue to concentrate on just the final two hegemonies here, the Dutch cycle being quite different in terms of order.) Following Cox (1981), we have already associated world orders with periods of high hegemony such as the United States and the Cold War. The hegemonic periods of both Britain and the United States are times of relative international stability, and this fact has led to a general hypothesis relating hegemony to world order (Rapkin 1990). However, by geopolitical world order we mean more than these particular periods of stability. Our world orders are a given distribution of power across the world that most political elites in most countries abide by and operate accordingly. This includes hegemonic stable periods to be sure, but there is an order of sorts between the certainties of a hegemonic world. In such times, international anarchy has not prevailed; rather, the great powers of the day have accommodated to one another’s needs in quite predictable ways; such as the cooperation between the great European powers to gain colonial influence in Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. Hence geopolitical world orders transcend the special case of hegemony. Whether multi-polarity is emerging, and if so whether it would have its own form of great

Are you my friend? US popular perceptions of allies and threats

A sequence of polls by YouGov provides insights into public perceptions of US enemies and allies. The polls ask people in the US whether a country is a friend or a threat using a five-point scale: ally, friendly, not sure, unfriendly or enemy. In the 2017 poll the countries at either end of the scale were unsurprising. Australia, Canada and Britain were seen as the top allies. North Korea, Iran and Syria were ranked as the greatest threats. Russia was also seen as a threat, ranking 138th out of 144 countries.

The poll also noted interesting differences in rankings based on the political affiliation and race of the respondent. Doug Rivers, the chief scientist behind the poll, is quoted as saying: ‘Americans tend to think that countries populated by people of their own race are allies of the United States. For example, African-Americans rate Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone as allies, while white Americans consider these countries to be somewhat unfriendly. Similarly, Latinos, but not whites, considered El Salvador to be an ally. European countries are rated more friendly by whites than by either African-Americans or Latinos’.

The role of political affiliation was evident in the cases of Israel (seen more favourably by Republicans) and Cuba (with Democrats holding a more favourable opinion). Russia was seen negatively by Republicans, but more so by Democrats.

Comparing survey results over time most opinions stay pretty much the same. Notable changes the Philippines (seen less favourably in 2014 than 2017), Cuba (seen more positively over time), and Russia (viewed by Republicans more favourably in 2017 than 2014).

Does the paired Kondratieff model help explain the rankings and the changes in the perceived threat of some countries? Is it adequate to think of a country having a geopolitical code (or thinking in the singular) when we can see evidence of differences framed by race and political affiliation?

power ‘management’ is open to question at the time of writing.

Table 2.2 shows four geopolitical world orders alongside the paired Kondratieff and hegemonic cycles for Britain and the United States. Each world order emerges in a rapid change around following a period of disintegration of the previous world order. These very fluid times are called geopolitical transitions: the old world and its certainties are ‘turned upside down’ and what was ‘impossible’ becomes ‘normal’ in the new order. In other words, they separate distinctly separate political worlds.

This will become clear as we describe the geopolitical world orders in Table 2.2.

According to Hinsley (1982), the modern international system only begins with the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which brought to an end the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. What he means by this is that the political elites of Europe made a conscious effort to define a trans-state political system that would curtail the opportunities for states to disrupt the peace. This was a new departure and it produced a relatively stable distribution of power, that is to say the first geopolitical world order.

### Table 2.2 Paired Kondratieff waves and geopolitical world orders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kondratieff cycles</th>
<th>Hegemonic cycles</th>
<th>Geopolitical world orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1790/98 A-phase</td>
<td>BRITISH HEGEMONIC CYCLE Ascending hegemony (grand alliance)</td>
<td>(Napoleonic Wars as French resistance to Britain’s ascending hegemony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815/25 B-phase</td>
<td>Hegemonic victory (balance of power through Concert of Europe)</td>
<td>Disintegration WORLD ORDER OF HEGEMONY AND CONCERT Transition (1813–15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844/51 A-phase</td>
<td>Hegemonic maturity (‘high’ hegemony: free-trade era)</td>
<td>(Balance of power in Europe leaves Britain with a free hand to dominate rest of the world)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870/75 B-phase</td>
<td>Declining hegemony (age of imperialism, new mercantilism)</td>
<td>Disintegration WORLD ORDER OF RIVALRY AND CONCERT Transition (1866–71) (Germany dominates Europe, Britain still greatest world power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890/96 A-phase</td>
<td>AMERICAN HEGEMONIC CYCLE Ascending hegemony (a world power beyond the Americas)</td>
<td>Disintegration WORLD ORDER OF THE BRITISH SUCCESSION Transition (1904–07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913/20 B-phase</td>
<td>Hegemonic victory (not taken up: global power vacuum)</td>
<td>(Germany and United States overtake Britain as world powers; two world wars settle the succession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/45 A-phase</td>
<td>Hegemonic maturity (undisputed leader of the ‘free world’)</td>
<td>Disintegration COLD WAR WORLD ORDER Transition (1944–46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/73 B-phase</td>
<td>Declining hegemony (Japanese and European rivalry)</td>
<td>(US hegemony challenged by the ideological alternative offered by the Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In geographical terms, the order consisted of two zones. The Concert of Europe operated as an irregular meeting of the great powers to regulate political disputes across Europe. In the rest of the world there was to be no such regulation. Such a world order was directly complementary to Britain’s rising hegemony. It set up the mechanism for Britain to keep a balance of power in Europe so that it could not be challenged by Napoleon’s continental empire. Equally importantly, it gave Britain a free hand to operate in the rest of the world, where it was now dominant. Hence in Table 2.2 we have termed this the ‘world order of hegemony and concert’. This order lasted until the great transformations of the 1860s, in which political reorganizations across the world – in the United States (civil war), Italy (unification), Russia (modernization), Ottoman Empire (modernization), Japan (modernization) and above all Germany (unification) – showed that the international system was out of hegemonic control. This is the phase of disintegration.

The first geopolitical transition occurred in 1870–71 with the German defeat of France, the subsequent quelling of the Paris Commune and the declaration of the German Empire. The latter was now the dominant continental power, so the British balance-of-power policy in Europe was in shreds. Suddenly a new world order was in place with two major centres of power, London and Berlin. But the ‘long peace’ instituted at Vienna in 1815 continued in this ‘world order of rivalry and concert’. Basically, Germany was concerned to consolidate its position in Europe, and Britain had the same purpose in the rest of the world, so stability was maintained despite the rivalry. But this world order was relatively short-lived and disintegrated in the 1890s. In Europe, the alliance between France and Russia in 1894 began the threat to Germany on two fronts. In the rest of the world, European dominance was under threat for the first time with the emergence of both the United States and Japan as potential major powers. Rivalry was becoming stronger than concert and the world order could not survive.

By the end of the century, while the British Empire remained the greatest political power, British hegemony was clearly over. Britain revised its foreign policy and constructed a new world order. The transition took place in the early years of the twentieth century. The first key step was to end British ‘splendid isolation’ by the naval agreement with Japan in 1901, but the crucial change was the alliances with France and Russia in 1904 and 1907, respectively, which consolidated an anti-German front in Europe. This could hardly be more different from the traditional British policy of non-entanglement in Europe by playing one country off against another. Furthermore, Britain chose its two traditional enemies, France and Russia, as allies – what Langhorne (1981: 85, 93) calls two ‘impossible agreements’. But that is the nature of a geopolitical transition: the impossible becomes possible. The pattern of power rivalries set up at the beginning of the century lasted until the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. With hindsight, we can interpret this as the ‘world order of the British succession’. Although precipitated by British attempts to maintain its political dominance, the two world wars of this era can be seen as the United States preventing Germany taking Britain’s place and culminating in the United States’ ‘succeeding’ to Britain’s mantle in 1945. For more details on this world order, see Taylor (1993a).

World-systems analysis is very useful in interpreting the hegemonic cycles and world orders of the past. But without the availability of hindsight, it is difficult to similarly frame the present and immediate future. At the beginning of 2017 the world was faced with a number of uncertainties. It is fair to say that the election of President Trump brought immediacy to some of the expectations of our model of hegemonic cycles and world orders. The Cold War was a period of hegemonic maturity and relative geopolitical certainty. After a period of decline and the end of the Cold War order we are now in a context where the major powers face uncertainty. New geopolitical codes are being constructed as countries react to a global context in which the nature of the geopolitical order is in the making. The aggregation of these new geopolitical codes, in the process of being defined and implemented, will construct the new geopolitical world order.
Summary

In the previous sections we have identified Kondratieff waves as the driving force behind the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. In doing so we have:

- situated the political decisions of hegemonic states and hegemonic challengers within the temporal dynamic of Kondratieff waves;
- emphasized the connection between economic and political processes.

Case study

BIC: the geopolitics of globalization

Brazil, India and China have emerged as important global powers in the wake of economic restructuring and growth. They have been seen as interacting together in international arenas (such as the World Trade Organization) to challenge the power of the United States (Harris 2005). Their rise has led to the identification of the potential for a bloc of states that will challenge the economic assumptions of globalization and neoliberalism, or the Washington Consensus (Harris 2005). These potential blocs have been named BIC (Brazil, India and China), or perhaps BRIC (to include Russia) and even BRICS (with South Africa).

However, the world-systems approach offers another explanation. The changes in the national economies of Brazil, India and China are a reflection of economic restructuring at the scale of the capitalist world-economy. BIC is a manifestation of states attempting to negotiate changes in the capitalist world-economy to their advantage. Harris (2005) interprets BIC from the standard social science lens of equating country with society, the multiple society assumption we challenged in Chapter 1. The world-systems approach identifies BIC through its single-society political economy perspective as states trying to improve their relative position within the core-periphery hierarchy. Such a strategy requires a mixture of competition and cooperation.

Especially, within the context of globalization, the attempt to capture core processes requires deals with transnational companies at the expense of competing states.

In this case study, we concentrate upon the changes in India. Before we begin, refer back to Figure 1.3 to review the economic rhythm of the capitalist world-economy. Each phase of economic growth was founded upon an economic innovation and B-phase restructuring set the geographical landscape for which states would capture new industries and core processes and which ones peripheral processes. With that framework in mind, let us outline the recent changes in India.

In the past decade or so India has experienced sustained economic growth that made it the world’s third largest economy, when using a measure called purchasing power parity (PPP), behind the United States and China. The growth rate of India’s economy is expected to remain one of the highest in the world. In 2014, India accounted for 6.8 per cent of world GDP using PPP as the measure. However, in other terms its role in the world-economy seems limited. In 2013 it accounted for just 2.5 per cent of world imports and received less than 1 per cent of the world’s total foreign direct investments and was an even smaller player in terms of its own outward investment. Despite its much smaller role in the world-economy, India’s growth rates are projected to be higher than China’s in the coming years.

India’s economic growth will be driven by demographic changes. By 2030 India will overtake China as the world’s most populous country. Importantly, this growth will mean that India will have about one billion people of working age, a larger amount of people than the combined working cohorts of the euro area, the United States and Indonesia. With all this demographic and economic growth it would seem India’s future is nothing but rosy.

The world-systems perspective suggests that there will be challenges to India’s economic future that the country will have to negotiate through a geopolitical code that combines economic and...
Geopolitics rampant

Dr Ruth Kattumuri of the London School of Economics has identified a number of political, economic and social imperatives that India must face. The degree to which India’s economic growth is inclusive, or whether internal disparities of wealth and opportunity are enhanced or reduced, is a major concern. In other words, aggregate economic growth may not erase differences create by the operation of core and periphery processes within India. In addition, economic growth must be environmentally sustainable. Cities in India experience horrific air pollution at certain times of the year. Flooding is also an issue. India’s strategy for economic growth must take these issues in to consideration within a context of international agreements regarding climate change and carbon emissions.

These and other internal issues must be considered within the context of India’s foreign relations, or its geopolitical code. The fraught relations with India’s neighbour Pakistan (both nuclear powers) continue, though fluctuate between dialog and tensions along the border. The disagreement between the two countries is focused upon the disputed territory of Kashmir and both countries accuse the other of sponsoring terrorist attacks. India is also concerned about the continuing unstable situation in Afghanistan and the resurgence of the Taliban.

India is also a regional power, believing that it has a ‘natural’ role to play in the Indian Ocean region. However, its presumed hegemony in the region has recently come in to question with the growing presence of China and the development of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). China’s footprint within the Indian Ocean region can be seen in its construction and control of ports in Myanmar and in Pakistan, increasing investment and trade with the Maldives, plus visits by a Chinese military submarine to Sri Lanka. All of a sudden India’s assumed projection of power and influence in the Indian Ocean region has been questioned. There is also a relational aspect to India’s geopolitical code towards Central Asia. China has invested heavily in the region to secure access to energy reserves. India has not felt the need for such a direct presence as it does not feel it is so vulnerable to United States control of energy supply lines. India is relatively close to the Middle East, while China is aware that oil tankers supplying its market must travel through the South China Sea and other channels where the US Navy is dominant.

Talk of BIC, BICS or BRICS is the language of developmentalism we discussed in Chapter 1. Such an approach will see the economic growth of a country like India, which is undoubtedly impressive, as a function of its ability to harness internal changes and overcome domestic challenges. The world-systems approach requires a different interpretation. It sees economic growth within the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy and hence a limited or constrained pathway to economic growth. The trajectory may be beneficial to some Indians, those in the high-tech sector for example, that are part of contemporary core processes. However, other parts of the Indian economy are likely to remain firmly within the operation of periphery processes.

The other advantage of the world-systems perspective is that it is a political economy framework. Hence, economic development must be understood within actions that other approaches would compartmentalize as ‘geopolitical’. Economic growth is only one part of the equation. Energy supply and export markets are a function of influence and presence in Central Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Politics in the form of diplomatic and military competition is connected to economic policies and the calculations that make up India’s geopolitical code are necessarily relational. It is impossible for India to define its own geopolitical code without balancing economics and politics and the actions of China, the United States, Pakistan, Sri Lanka etc.

Turmoil and stability: geopolitical codes, orders and transitions

Most of the time the geopolitical codes of most countries are quiet stable. The stability of countries' codes maintains an existing geopolitical world order. In turn, the stability of the geopolitical world order does not produce a changing context that demands a country change its code. Hence, our paired Kondratieff model of hegemony shows more periods of stability (order) than turmoil (transition). The second half of the twentieth century was marked by the Cold War geopolitical order. Since the 1990s parts, but not all, of that order have disappeared and been replaced by new geopolitical imperatives. To help us understand the current geopolitical context and its combination of old relations and brand-new ones, we will briefly review the geopolitical transition that led to the Cold War geopolitical world order before trying to understand contemporary dynamics.

The Cold War as a geopolitical transition and world order

There is no doubt that in 1945 by any reasonable criteria the United States could claim to be hegemonic. Germany, Japan and Italy were defeated, France had been occupied, Russia was devastated and Britain was bankrupt. In contrast, America's economy had expanded during the war. By 1945, the United States was responsible for over 50 per cent of world production. It would seem the US hegemony was even more impressive than the two previous hegemonies. And yet, in geopolitical terms, US hegemony was in no sense as successful as Britain’s a century before. US hegemony has been ‘spoiled’ by the existence of a major ideological and military challenger, the Soviet Union. Whereas Britain’s balance-of-power policy involved staying on the outside and diplomatically manipulating the other great powers, the United States was an integral part of the new balance-of-power situation and became continually involved in a massive and dangerous arms race. The Cold War was not what we should have expected of a hegemonic geopolitical world order. How did this come about?

The short period after the Second World War is a classic example of a geopolitical transition. If we take the world situation on each side of the transition, we soon appreciate the immensity of the change that took place. This is symbolized by two world events only a decade apart and both occurring in German cities. In 1938 in Munich, Britain and Germany negotiated to stave off a world war. In 1948 in Berlin, the United States and Soviet Union confronted each other in what many believed would lead to another world war. In only a decade everything had changed – new leaders, new challengers and a new geopolitical world order.

In 1945 the geopolitical situation was very fluid. The Big Three victors had very different priorities. The United States had clear economic priorities to open up the world for American business. Britain had political priorities to remain a major power. Although it had effectively mortgaged its future in loans to win the war, it remained the largest empire in the history of the world. The Soviet Union’s priority was clearly to safeguard its western flank in eastern Europe, through which it had been invaded twice in 20 years. At first, these various interests seemed to be compatible with one another in the goodwill generated by war victory. This was summarized in President Roosevelt’s vision of one world and symbolized by the creation of the United Nations. In this idealistic conception of the world, the divisive power politics of the past was banished and replaced by a world of friendship and cooperation.

What went wrong? Figure 2.1 shows the bilateral relations between the victorious allies at the end of the Second World War and the different ways in which the ‘Big Three’ might be converted into a bipolar world: an anti-hegemonic axis against the United States, an anti-imperial axis against Britain, and an anti-communist axis against the Soviet Union. A major reason why an anti-communist front was formed between Britain and the United States can be found in Britain’s strategic weakness relative to the other two. Both the United States and Soviet Union were clearly superpowers of continental proportions. Britain, on the other hand, was a small island with a
scattered empire whose loyalty could no longer be relied upon. It is not surprising, therefore, that the main priority of British politicians at this time was the devising of policies to maintain Britain in the top rank alongside the United States and Soviet Union. And it was soon appreciated that this would require outside financial aid. The British economy was in such dire straits that bankruptcy could be avoided only by negotiating an emergency loan, for which the United States was the only source. The loan that was successfully negotiated in December 1945 had commercial and financial strings attached to it. In simple terms, the British Empire was being prised open for American business. Despite the support of the latter, the agreement was very difficult to sell to the American public. Why should they foot the bill to prop up the British Empire? In the event, the agreement passed through Congress in the wake of the first post-war bout of anti-communism in the United States. Hence Britain was supported not because it was necessary for US business; rather, it was supported as a bulwark against the threat of expanding communism. According to Kolk and Kolk (1973), US foreign policy moved from negotiation to crusade.

Not unnaturally, Britain encouraged and supported the new crusade. The Soviet Union became isolated and Britain moved into a position of chief ally of the hegemonic power. From Britain’s perspective, this represented a major diplomatic success: the United States had finally come to recognize its hegemonic responsibilities. Britain played a leading role in 1948 in operating the Marshall Plan, giving US aid to Western Europe. Then in the next year Britain again played the leading role in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A new world order was created under US leadership, with Britain having a ‘special relationship’ as the trusted deputy while leaving the Soviet Union out in the cold. In short, Britain had solved, at least for the time being, its post-war crisis of power. It is not surprising, therefore, that some authorities have concluded that the Cold War was in reality a ‘secondary effect’ of Britain’s prime objective to remain a first-rank power (Ryan 1982).

The geopolitical transition after the Second World War created the Cold War geopolitical world order. How do we interpret this geopolitical world order in world-systems analysis? Basically, the Cold War is a political structure based upon two contrary relations between the superpowers: opposition and dependence (Cox 1986). Most theories of the Cold War emphasize one relation at the expense of the other. We shall try to achieve a better balance between the two.

Theories of opposition are generally concerned to apportion blame, building upon the ‘orthodox’ and ‘revisionist’ schools in the making of the Cold War literature. Hence the Cold War is either the result of the Soviet threat (epitomized by the ‘domino theory’) or an outcome of US imperialism. In either case, the world is viewed as facing a climactic conflict between two opposing world views: communism and capitalism. These alternative ways of life based upon completely different values are incompatible. In Halliday’s (1983) terms this is the ‘Great Contest’, which may be seen as an ideological battle or, more fundamentally, as global class conflict.

This view of the Cold War interprets the geopolitical world order in the terms set out by the adversaries. It is quite literally the cold warriors’ version of the Cold War. The world is divided into just three types of place: ‘ours’, ‘theirs’ and various disputed spaces. The conflict is unbridgeable; the end result is either a communist or a capitalist world.
A world-systems interpretation of the Soviet Union
We have seen that the traditional approaches to geopolitics treat the Soviet Union as a land power threat to the traditional dominance of sea powers. To balance the picture, we start our discussion by giving the Soviet view of its world position. In contrast to the expansionary motives assumed in Western strategy, the Soviet Union interpreted its position as essentially defensive. This viewpoint is based upon two invasions since its inception in 1917: first, US and Western European support for White Russians in the civil war of 1918–21 and, second, the German invasion of 1941–44. Hence the Soviet Union saw itself as the protector of the socialist world surrounded by hostile capitalism. One country’s containment was indeed another country’s expansion.

For our argument here, the most relevant part of the Soviet model was the notion of two world-systems operating contemporaneously: a capitalist one and a socialist one. This notion stemmed from Stalin’s attempt to build socialism in one country between the world wars. It was expanded with the institution of Comecon after the Second World War as a ‘cooperative division of labour’ in Eastern Europe, in contrast to the capitalist competitive division of labour in the West. An attempt has been made by Szymanski (1982) to integrate this orthodox Marxist position into Wallerstein’s framework. He claims that there were indeed two separate world systems and economic transactions between them constituted luxury trade rather than essential trade. In this sense, the two systems coexisted in the way that other contemporaneous systems (Roman and Chinese world-empires, for instance) had done before. This conception of two separate economic systems that compete politically was, of course, the mirror image of American geopolitics. We shall show that both positions provide less insight than a world-systems interpretation of a single world-economy.

Charles Levinson (1980) has provided a wealth of evidence to expose what he terms ‘the ideological façade’ of both US and Soviet geopolitics. The following selection of some of the information he compiled during the Cold War will give an indication of the basis of his argument.

He shows that the 40 largest multinational corporations all had cooperative agreements with one or more of the eight Eastern European states with communist regimes – 34 of them with the Soviet Union itself. He lists 151 corporations from 15 countries that had offices in Moscow. There were 108 multinational corporations from 13 countries operating in Bucharest alone. In the other direction, Levinson found 170 acknowledged multinational joint ventures by the Soviet Union in nineteen Western countries. It is therefore not surprising that by 1977 one-third of Soviet imports and one-quarter of Soviet exports were with Western countries. Levinson’s conclusion is that although it was international politics that made the news, it was these crucial economic transactions that steered international politics. Hence, détente followed trade and not vice versa. This is what Levinson calls the ‘overworld’ of economic dealings, which resulted in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe becoming inexorably integrated into the world-economy. The process is epitomized by the PepsiCo Inc.’s deal to sell its cola drink in Russia and to market vodka in the West – hence the title of Levinson’s book, Vodka Cola.

Frank (1977) has provided further evidence for the same process, which he terms trans-ideological enterprise. He charts the massive rise in East–West trade during the Cold War and discusses the various bartering arrangements and other agreements that made this growth possible. The motives for all this activity were very traditional. For the corporations, there was an extension of the geographical range of their profit making. This was particularly important after 1970 at a time of worldwide recession. The Eastern European states provided a source of relatively cheap, yet skilled, disciplined and healthy labour. And there was the vast raw material potential of the Soviet Union. For the latter, the motive was equally straightforward. Cooperation with Western corporations was the only solution to a technology lag that the Soviet Union suffered in the wake of the rise of electronic industries in the West. Increasing integration into the world-economy was the price the Soviet Union had to pay for keeping up with its ideological competitors.
Wallerstein interprets all this evidence as placing the Soviet Union and its East European allies in the semi-periphery. Frank (1977) shows that the Soviet Union lay in an intermediate position between ‘West’ and ‘South’. For instance, East–South trade was used to pay for East–West trade in numerous multilateral arrangements. In short, the Soviet Union exploited the South but was itself exploited by the West in terms of trade arrangements. (This process of unequal exchange in trade is explained in Chapter 3 under ‘informal imperialism’.) This places the Soviet regime economically on a par with other non-socialist semi peripheral countries of the period such as Brazil or Iran. Although it can be argued that within Comecon trade was not capitalistic – prices were not set by the world market – trade was still influenced by world market prices. Furthermore, production was for exchange and production planning was grossly distorted by the world-economy as a whole through its aggressive interstate system promoting militarization. With our single political economy logic the situation of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Cold War cannot be interpreted as anything other than an integral part of the world-economy.

If the Soviet Union represented an example of an aggressive upward-moving semi-peripheral state, where does this leave its socialist rhetoric? According to Brucan (1981), communist Eastern Europe provided a model for development rather than for socialism. From the very beginning, with Lenin’s New Economic Policy of 1921, the essence of Soviet policy has been to ‘catch up’ and this involved all-out mobilization of national potential. The original heavy industry ‘import substitution’ phase of protectionism or autarky gave way to the export orientation in the 1970s, which Frank and Levinson have charted (Koves 1981). In fact, the original ideology of the revolution had to be developed to invent the intermediate state of ‘socialism’ between capitalism and communism to cover the period when the Soviet Union was ‘developing the forces of production’. All this seems very much like mercantilism in new clothing (Frank 1977; Chase-Dunn 1982; Wallerstein 1982). The United States, Germany and Japan have in their turn been aggressive, upwardly mobile, semi peripheral states which have used political means (trade protectionism, state investment in infrastructure and other support) to improve their competitive position in the world-economy. Soviet ‘socialism’ seems to have been a classic case of a modern semi-periphery strategy.

But the Soviet Union was always more than just another rising semi-peripheral state. The establishment of the Soviet state in 1917 was the culmination of a revolutionary movement whose internationalism was stemmed but which nevertheless represented an ideological challenge to the capitalism of the world-economy. With the revolution initially limited to Russia, Stalin had no option but to build ‘socialism in one country’, in other words to catch up before the new state was destroyed by its enemies. From this point onwards, the logic of the world-system placed the Soviet Union in a ‘Catch 22’ situation. In order to survive, the state needed to compete with other states, but this competition involved playing the world-economy game by capitalist rules. This came to a head in the 1980s. There have always been policy conflicts within the Soviet bloc between fundamentalists, who emphasize their socialist credentials, and the technocrats, who emphasize efficiency. In times of recession we can expect this ‘red versus expert’ conflict to be resolved in the latter’s favour and this happened throughout the communist world in the 1980s. In China, it led to economic liberalization but political repression after 1989. In the Soviet Union, the resolution of this conflict under President Gorbachev produced attempts at both economic reforms (perestroika, meaning ‘restructuring’) and political reforms (glasnost, meaning ‘openness’), which had effects far beyond the Soviet Union. By signalling his intention not to support unpopular communist governments in eastern Europe, Gorbachev precipitated the revolutions of 1989 that ended the Cold War. This shows the particular nature of the Soviet Union as semi-peripheral state and superpower. Other semi-peripheral states suffered severe economic difficulties in the 1980s (symbolized by debt crises), just as the Soviet Union suffered, but only the latter, through tackling its problems, brought a world order to an end.
We should, of course, always be wary of those who set the political agenda. We know from Schattschneider that agenda setting can never be a neutral process. There is nothing natural or inevitable about the Cold War. It is a particular world order that favours some issues at the expense of others. We must ask ourselves, therefore, what issues are organized off the political agenda by the Cold War. Presumably these are matters that are not the prime concern of either superpower. In short, they are dependent on each other in maintaining a world order that highlights their superpower politics.

In this sort of argument, the Cold War acts as a diversion from alternative politics. Such diversions have been identified at three geographical scales. At the domestic level for each superpower, the Cold War has been instrumental in mobilizing their populations behind the state in its confrontation with its enemy. It has enabled narrow definitions of loyalty to be used to marginalize alternative politics within each country. In the United States, the main example is the anti-communist hysteria of the early 1950s led by Senator Joseph McCarthy. This produced a consensus on US foreign policy that was maintained for a generation before the Vietnam debacle fractured public opinion. In the Soviet Union, the Cold War allowed the persecution and marginalizing of various ‘dissident’ groups.

Beyond their own countries the Cold War enabled both superpowers to maintain a firm control on their allies. Each superpower led a bloc of countries whose foreign policy options were severely curtailed. The most naked examples of the constraints were to be found in Eastern Europe and Latin America. In the former, the Soviet Union intervened militarily to prevent liberal or revisionist regimes appearing and in the latter the United States intervened to stop radical or socialist regimes appearing. In fact, one of the most remarkable features of the Cold War was the success of both superpowers in maintaining bloc cohesion for so long.

Finally, beyond the blocs the Cold War can be interpreted as deflecting attention from the North–South issue of massive global material inequalities. We have already discussed this briefly in Chapter 1 in terms of the decline of the United Nations as a major actor in the world-economy as its focus has moved away from East–West issues towards North–South issues. Hence the Cold War as Great Contest is in reality the Cold War as ‘Great Conspiracy’. In this interpretation, US hegemony was not ‘spoiled’ at all by the Cold War; rather, the latter constituted a great power ‘concert’ not unlike the world order of British hegemony a century earlier.

There is no doubt that the superpowers used the Cold War to bolster their own positions (Wallerstein 1984a). In concentrating on the military sphere of world politics the United States temporarily side-stepped its economic difficulties and re-established its leadership. There is no doubt that the United States remained number one in the West as a political power in the 1980s. In this sense, the United States used the Soviet Union in its competition with rival friendly states, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union represented a genuine challenge to the United States, both militarily and ideologically. It was the Soviet Union that made the Cold War geopolitical world order so unusual. The role of the Soviet Union in the world-economy was a completely novel one – it combined a semi-peripheral economy with a superpower political status. We cannot possibly understand the Cold War without coming to terms with this mammoth mismatch between economics and politics.

Summary

In this section we have:

- described the process of geopolitical transition at the end of the Second World War;
- interpreted the Cold War geopolitical world order using world-systems analysis;
- used these examples to show how geopolitical codes are the product and the basis of geopolitical transitions and world orders.
The end of the Cold War has been interpreted in many ways. But although the interpretations are diverse they share a common belief that the world was facing something new, a transition from the Cold War geopolitical world order. Using our paired Kondratieff model we would expect challenges to the United States as hegemonic power at the time that al-Qaeda began to conduct attacks on US targets. It is also expected that a state, or set of states, would challenge United States hegemony. Discussion of the ‘rise of China’ should be interpreted within our structural and cyclical model. Yet there is more to the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy than cyclical change. In addition, there are linear changes over time, some of which are catalysed by hegemonic powers. One such linear change is an increased integration of the world-economy. The degree of integration has provoked the identification of a qualitatively new form of social organization in the capitalist world-economy that falls under the broad title of ‘globalization’. Some have claimed that as a result of globalization it is more accurate to say we live in a ‘network society’ instead of a world of states (Castells 1996).

It is clear that states are still an integral part of the capitalist world-economy and key geopolitical actors. Hence, we must conceptualize the geopolitical code of China within our model. However, networks, such as those of al-Qaeda and ISIS, and states interact so that the form of the geopolitical transition is likely to be a function of three different processes and actors. In no order of preference or importance they are:

- the continuation of states as territorially based actors in competition with one another;
- transnational actors, both economic and civil society, who propel a greater integration between states and undermine state sovereignty;
- movements resisting both the processes of ‘globalization’ (or integration) and the power of the state.

The structural geography of the War on Terror

The fact that the nature of the geopolitical world order and the particular form of threat to the United States had changed dramatically became clear on 11 September 2001. Al-Qaeda had been targeting of the United States for a number of years and conducted terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (1998), US military personnel in Saudi Arabia (1995 and 1996), and the battleship USS Cole in Yemen (2000). However, the magnitude of the September 11 attacks and their location in the US ‘homeland’ marked a change in the global geopolitical landscape. Since then the world has been at war. The United States declared the War on Terrorism and later changed the representation to the War on Terror. It has resulted in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, domestic political debate in the United States and its allies over the form of the military reaction, terrorist attacks in Spain and Britain, and the establishment of new US bases in Eastern Europe and central Asia – just recently the geopolitical domain of the Soviet Union. Ominously, the conflict has been seen as geographically and historically expansive, or the ‘everywhere war’ (Gregory 2011a) and the ‘long war’ (Harvey 2005; Morrissey 2017). The War on Terror has emerged as an overarching strategy that has included the ongoing US military presence in the Afghanistan and Iraq, involvement in civil war in Yemen, the construction of a new US military command to address threats emanating from African countries (AFRICOM), and the geopolitics of border control and monitoring of immigrants (Kundnani 2014).

It is not only the military strategy of the United States that has evolved since September 2001. Internal tensions within al-Qaeda, as well as the success of the United States and allies to disrupt the terrorist network led to a new expression of the War on Terror. The rise of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) as the new threat to the United States displayed a number of inter-related geographies. First, a particular territorial goal was defined as the formation of a new ‘caliphate’, or the geographic expression of a
new political entity refuting the ideology of the West. Not conceived as a state within a world of multiple states, ‘caliphate’ provided a territorial base but not territorial sovereignty because it recognized no political boundaries. Second, a relatively small, but still significant, number of citizens of European countries who identified with the cause of radical Islam left their countries and travelled to fight for the Islamic State. Third, people ‘inspired’ by the Islamic State’s rhetoric and actions, and mobilized through the internet, committed terrorist atrocities in European countries, such as the coordinated series of shootings in Paris in November 2015 that killed 130 and wounded 368 people, as well as in Sydney Australia in December 2014, and the United States – including the June 2016 attack in an Orlando nightclub that killed 49 and wounded 53.

The strength of the world-systems approach is that it allows us to conceptualize the timing and meaning of the challenge against the United States inspired by al-Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s interpretations of radical Islam. We can contextualize the campaign within the temporal dynamics of hegemonic cycles and the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy. Rather than focusing on the details of the conflict – such as the transition from al-Qaeda as the dominant threat to the rise of ISIS – we are able to situate the challenge of radical Islam and the response of the United States within the space-time matrix that contextualized global politics.

The demonization of the United States, and the West in general, by violent radical Islamist groups highlights the role of the core-periphery structure in contemporary conflict. Johan Galtung (1979) posited the core-periphery divide as the line of future conflict in his world classes model. Disparities in wealth and opportunity were identified as the basis for a conflict between the rich and poor at a global scale. Taylor (1992b) resurrected Galtung’s world classes model and gave it a new basis that foresaw the rise of al-Qaeda. Taylor’s third-worldist position emphasizes the rise of Islam as a world political force. The mobilizing potential of Islam was briefly revealed in the Gulf War, where support for Iraq was widespread among the Muslim population of the world although most Muslim states supported the UN position. Since then, the intensity and breadth of Muslim political mobilization has risen, with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State the high-profile and violent manifestations. Of course, Taylor’s argument and the existence of al-Qaeda and ISIS do not mean that there is a homogeneous Islamic geopolitical bloc. The majority of Muslims renounce terrorist violence. However, it is clear that Islam has the potential to replace the now-defunct Marxism–Leninism as the spearhead of the political mobilization of the periphery.

The world-systems approach emphasizes the role of hegemonic decline and the core-periphery structure in the current geopolitical transition. The United States, in its role as hegemonic power, has been challenged by the rhetoric and actions of radical Islamist groups and it attempted to redefine and reinvigorate its global role through the self-constructed War on Terror. The difference between the current situation and previous analogous phases defined by the paired Kondratieff model is that the challenge to the hegemonic power is not another strong state – strong through the dominance of core processes within its borders – but non-state geopolitical actors (al-Qaeda and ISIS), which are based in the peripheral regions of the capitalist world-economy. The challenge to the hegemonic state by a non-state actor raises another question about the process of hegemony: How are other states challenging the hegemonic power? With that question in mind we turn to the role of institutions in the capitalist world-economy and the recent activity of China.

**China as an emerging institutional power**

Traditional approaches to geopolitics usually identify power in a limited way: as capacity. Our political economy approach to global politics illustrates how a concentration on capacity, especially military capacity, is inadequate. Instead, power should also be seen as the ability to conduct certain strategies, practices and techniques. One important example of this form of power is the construction of institutions that manage the functions of the capitalist world-economy to one’s advantage. Controlling institutions enables a country to set the agenda of what is
‘common sense’ policy. You may want to revisit our discussions of types of power and the nature of power in Chapter 1 to refresh your memory. The ability to use institutions to set the agenda of politics, what is seen as being open for discussion and what is seen to be as ‘extreme’, is one way that powerful actors have maintained the structure of the capitalist world-economy (Schattschneider 1960). Throughout the history of the modern world system hegemonic states have been dominant agenda setters (Taylor 1996, 1998). If the current moment is one of hegemonic decline and challenge we would expect to see once dominant and ‘taken for granted’ institutions being challenged.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States entered the period of hegemonic maturity. To secure its status and role the United States created the Bretton Woods liberal-economic system that ushered in a period of global free trade, though limited by the alternative political economy of the Soviet Union (see Table 2.1). The Bretton Woods system was institutionalized through the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These two institutions were designed to manage the world-economy in a way that promoted an open global system that benefitted the dominant economic position of the United States. Our framework sees hegemony as a process and hence we would expect that these institutions do not retain their dominance forever. Instead, in the past the creation of new institutions, led by different countries, has been a part of hegemonic decline and challenge. Current developments suggest that we are in a moment of the United States hegemonic cycle in which new institutions are gaining global prominence.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was established in January 2016. According to its website the AIIB’s purpose is to be:

a new multilateral financial institution founded to bring countries together to address the daunting infrastructure needs across Asia. Through our investments, we strive to promote interconnectivity and economic development in the region through the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors. We believe that the development and improvement of productive infrastructure encourages economic growth, promotes employment, enables business activity and contributes to poverty reduction by providing improved access to basic services, including reliable electricity supply, efficient transport systems, clean water supply, access to sanitation services, and modern telecommunications.

The mission of the AIIB echoes the goals of the institutions established by the United States after the Second World War. The website of the World Bank defines its history and contemporary task as shifting from ‘facilitator of post-war reconstruction and development to the present-day mandate of worldwide poverty alleviation in close coordination’. The other key Bretton Woods economic institution, the International Monetary Fund, also recognized its roots within the context of the end of the Second World War and sees its ‘primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other. The Fund’s mandate was updated in 2012 to include all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that bear on global stability’.

The AIIB, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund seem to share ostensibly philanthropic goals of promoting a functional and healthy world-economy, a system in which all states can grow. The world-systems interpretation does not deny that this is the intention of these institutions, rather it identifies them as means of exercising power within different geopolitical contexts by different states. The assessment by Forbes magazine that the AIIB had a very successful first year, also recognizes the politics behind the bank’s activity:

When the AIIB was announced, critics feared that it would be used to advance China’s national interests while lowering environmental and human rights standards. Happily, this has not occurred, in part because cooperation with multilateral institutions has helped to inoculate the development bank against criticism in these areas. Rather, through the AIIB, China has been able to advance its economic interests using soft power.

(Hsu 2017)
In other words, China is playing the same game we expect emerging hegemonic states to play in similar historical contexts. It is building multilateral organizations to advance its own economic and political fortunes.

In addition, China is promoting free trade in the Asia-Pacific region through the construction of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The ability of China to establish trade relations across the region was seemingly enabled by President Trump’s determination to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The apparent withdrawal of the United States as a leader of multinational free trade arrangements could enable China to increase its role as promoter of trade integration on the region. Though it may be wrong to talk of a battle between TPP and RCEP, the ability of China to develop free-trade agreements as another form of gaining influence and even acting as the leader within the region should not be ignored. One interpretation notes:

In basic terms, RCEP is part of the efforts of Asian countries to explore avenues of collaborative regional governance. RCEP should be seen as the extension of an integrated ASEAN community, and it provides a platform for the region to act as a group and collaboratively to play a pivotal role in the global economy. ASEAN stays at the core of this process and takes the role of a functional hub. (Chen 2016)

Chinese institution building in Eurasia is not limited to trade and investment. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was established in 2001 as a means to enable security cooperation between China, Russia and Central Asian states. The Council of Foreign Relations, itself a bastion of mainstream United States foreign policy agenda setting since its establishment in 1921 as the United States was assuming its hegemonic role, describes the SCO as:

Originally formed as a confidence-building forum to demilitarize borders, the organization’s goals and agenda have since broadened to include increased military and counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing. The SCO has also intensified its focus on regional economic initiatives like the recently announced integration of the China-led Silk Road Economic Belt and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. While some experts say the organization has emerged as an anti-U.S. bulwark in Central Asia, others believe frictions among its members effectively preclude a strong, unified SCO. (Albert 2015)

The last sentence acknowledges the current geopolitical situation. We are in a state of flux in which countries may develop their own geopolitical codes to a large extent. We do not know whether China, United States, Russia and other less powerful states will make decisions that usher in new institutions that prop up United States hegemony, further increase the power and role of China, or facilitate a multipower world.

Our historic model allows us to situate institution building as a form of geopolitics within the paired Kondratieff model of hegemony. The construction of new institutions, and the apparent decline of the influence of institutions, made in the period of United States hegemonic maturity in some parts of the world could well be a manifestation of hegemonic decline and challenge. It is too early to foresee the ultimate course of these developments and their consequences for geopolitical competition. However, any reduction in the ability of the United States to institutionalize a set of rules and procedures for the capitalist world-economy, and the relative ability of another state to set the agenda, is a form of power and politics that would be indicative of the twilight of United States hegemony.

Hegemony is a process that involves a multifaceted understanding of the nature of power. Simply, geopolitics is more than war. However, war is a significant constant in the geopolitics of the capitalist world-economy. As cyclical processes and secular trends interact with changing technology the mode of conflict changes too. To understand contemporary war we must consider two important political geographies: the geography of networks and the geopolitics of volume.
New political geographies of war: networks and volume

Our space-time perspective allows us to situate the geopolitical codes of different countries within the dynamics of inter-state competition that has, over the past two hundred years or so, been driven by the rise and fall of Great Britain and the United States as hegemonic powers. An additional factor in the construction of geopolitical codes is the way that new technology changes the ability to use and control space. States and non-state actors may take advantage of new technology to create new political geographies of war. Or states may have to create defensive mechanisms as new spaces are opened up as potential threats. Geographers have recently focused on two forms of space that have been brought to the fore by new technologies: networks and volume.

The War on Terror has played its part in the invigoration of the discussion of networks in geography and other social sciences. Researchers at the RAND organization in the United States, long related to the military establishment, disseminated the term ‘netwar’ to describe the new challenges facing the country. The term was originally coined to highlight the potential for states as well as terrorist or criminal groups to exploit the interconnectivity of computer networks: computer-hacking and the destruction of information technology infrastructure to cripple the military capability and economic activity of a state. The concept of netwar was quickly translated into the War on Terror. Al-Qaeda was portrayed as a global terrorist network, despite the fact that scholars found it hard to identify an organization with any such coherence. Netwar is defined as the use of network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy and technology to engage in conflict (Arquilla et al. 1999; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Hoffman 2001; Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001). The identification of netwar parallels calls by political geographers to study the flows of information, people
and goods across the globe (Ó Tuathail 2000; Hyndman 2004).

However, in the study of terrorism as netwar attention must also be given to the nodes that constitute the network. Nodes are categorized by their function: organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological and social (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Also of importance is the likely degree of permanence of the node and its degree of connectivity. Of interest to counter-terrorism is the hypothesis that nodes with more connections would require greater permanence (Flint 2003). For example, the node that is a suicide bomber, or a cell of bombers, is connected to only a few other cells in order to maintain the security of whole network if they were to be captured and is, by definition, temporary. By way of contrast, key decision makers in terrorist networks would require connections to subordinates that have a degree of permanence, in terms of their roles and geographic location.

But the network of the terrorist organization is not the only political geography that must be considered. The nodes must be located somewhere and the contextual setting and connectivity of the various nodes in a terrorist network is crucial. Netwar is not separate from the political geography of territorial nation-states, but takes place over the existing terrain of territorial nation-states. Terrorist nodes are located with regard to their function. For example, Osama bin Laden, as the central node of al-Qaeda, was found in a part of territory Pakistan where it was very hard for the US armed forces to find him. On the other hand, bombers must be near their targets and therefore, most likely in situations where counter-terrorist organizations have greater access and power (Flint 2003). The rise of ISIS as a terrorist threat has further complicated the situation for counter-terrorist agencies. Rather than being members of ‘cells’ within an organized network, recent attacks have been conducted by individuals or small groups ‘inspired’ by ISIS propaganda that can be readily accessed on the internet. The connection to any established network is weak or non-existent, and the ‘net’ is the amorphous and uncontrollable internet with its flow of ideas and motivations, and not a terrorist network as once understood.

The layering of networks and states has an implication for the legitimacy of the War on Terror. Security forces are still state organizations restricted by the territorial jurisdictions of nation-states. However, to counter terrorist networks, nation-states must enter the sovereign territory of other states. Such actions risk being cavalier with other people’s sovereignty and require a large military presence to cover all the territory where nodes of the terrorist network may be located. In sum, the ‘global reach’ of the United States in its War on Terror is easily perceived as invasion and occupation. The implication is that countering terrorist networks through territorial occupation is the very expression of hegemonic force and power to which terrorists and their supporters are reacting in the first place. It is, arguably, counter-productive counter-terrorism.

The intersection of territory and networks has also come to the fore in the issue of cyberwar, the initial focus of RAND’s netwar. The ability of a state, or a non-state actor, to penetrate the sovereign space of a country and steal its secrets, or control its vital infrastructure has become a central security concern for states. In February 2017, the British media reported on the founding of a new agency to combat cyberwarfare, the National Cyber Security Centre. It was claimed that Britain was experiencing about 200 cases a day of ‘attacks’ on government departments and members of the public (Grierson 2017). The new threat of ‘hacking’ as a weapon of war had been highlighted in the latter quarter of 2016 with allegations that Russia had influenced the US presidential election through cyber-attacks. Databases belonging to both the Democrat and Republican parties were hacked with, it is believed, the support and approval of Russia. European countries, including France and Italy, raised the same concerns. In addition to seizing information that could be used to influence the political processes of another state, hacking may also lead to chaos and even casualties within another country as energy systems, transport networks, and hospitals become vulnerable as the ‘internet of things’ provides a window in to what were seen as ‘domestic’ spaces.

Another way of thinking of space that is relevant for contemporary conflicts is to consider ‘volume’
Hegemonic decline is characterized as a phase of political disorder; it is the obverse of the relative peace that comes when hegemony is attained. The new politics of upheaval may take several forms, many of them violent, most notably the world wars. The latter inter-state conflicts pit the strong against the strong, but what of the weak? Terrorism is a weapon that is used in certain circumstances by non-state actors disputing the claim of states to sole legitimate use of violence. Such ‘private’ political coercion has been undertaken at all geographical scales from the local through the national to the international. Here the focus is on international terrorism.

Is international terrorism cyclical? Several world-systems analysts have tried to show this to be the case. The basic model is that international terrorism originates in failing countries of the semi-peripheral zone. During hegemonic decline, the semi-periphery is a zone of new political possibilities but not all semi-peripheral states can take advantage of the opportunity. Thus during Britain’s hegemonic decline the opportunity to rise in the inter-state system was grasped by the United States and Germany. In the semi-periphery of Eastern and Southern Europe, however, this was not the case. Despite political moves towards ‘modernization’ in the Russia Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, Spain and the Ottoman Empire, these parts of Europe did not break into the core of the world-economy before 1914 (the three empires disintegrated as a result of the 1914–18 war). It is through political disillusionment towards these failing states that Islamism has developed as a threat to these regimes. Assassinations (for example, of the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat) and bombings (for example in Saudi Arabia) in this region have spread beyond the semi-periphery to Western Europe (France, Spain, Britain) and the United States. The Islamist with a bomb in a bag has become the figure of fear in a reign of international terror since 1979. If there is to be another world war, most commentators agree that the trigger will come from the Middle East.

However, as with all historical parallels we have to be careful not to over-interpret. Attempts to apply this model to the first hegemonic cycle are less successful – the ‘Terror’ of the failing French state in 1792 preceding the Napoleonic world war is not a good fit, and in earlier periods the distinction between ‘private’ and state coercion was less clear-cut. But as with applying all structural models to political process, there is the vital question of contingency. In this case, the decision of the United States after the Second World War to support the creation of the state of Israel in the semi-peripheral Middle East, the ensuing Israeli–Arab wars and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are all obviously critical to Islamist popular disillusionment. Here there is no parallel whatsoever with the rise of anarchist.
Figure 2.2 Global pattern of terrorist activity, 1998-2006.
Source: Flint and Radil (2009).

Figure 2.3 Distribution of terrorist activity across the core, semi-periphery and periphery of the world-economy.
Source: Flint and Taylor (2009).
rather than ‘area’ (Elden 2013). The territory that is secured by states and other geopolitical actors often has the dimensions of height and depth as well as length and width. One obvious way to think about this is the role of air power in conflicts. Since the development of strategic bombing, especially in the Second World War and the Cold War geopolitics of nuclear deterrence, the ability to control airspace has become a crucial part of power projection. After the Second World War, and with the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed strategic bombers, there was an argument that geopolitics would be dominated by air-space has become a crucial part of power projection. After the Second World War, and with the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed strategic bombers, there was an argument that geopolitics would be dominated by air power (de Seversky 1942). Drone surveillance and their use as lethal weapons, is the newest form of the geopolitics of airspace (Gregory 2011b). The ability to be in the air over a piece of territory enables the observation and control of certain populations, and even the ability to kill them. If we think of territory as something that may protect us, which is the basis of the idea of sovereignty, then the geopolitics of volume introduces the counterpoint, a sense of vulnerability (Elden 2013). Territory may be controlled to a certain extent, but volume less so. Controlling air space may protect the territory of some, but allow for the projection of lethal force upon others.

The need to consider ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Graham 2016) extends underground as well as in to the sky. This is event in the geopolitics of the Israel–Palestine conflict, as well as the border politics between Mexico and the United States. The Israeli blockade of Gaza construction and destruction of tunnels promoted tunnels as a means for the Palestinians to bring in food, medicine and fuel. Of course, the Israelis also recognized, and were concerned about, the flow of weapons. The role of the subterranean in this conflict complicated peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Israel demanded that they would maintain control of underground resources. The goal was deemed a ‘new form of subterranean sovereignty, which erodes the basics of national sovereignty’ (Weizman 2002: 7). In other words, even if the Palestinians were able to control an ‘area’ they could define as their own they would not possess control of ‘volume’ as airspace and the subterranean would remain under Israeli control.

Volume in geopolitics is not necessarily new. Mining between the trenches was an important element of the carnage of the First World War. The development of submarine warfare provided the element of depth to the control of the oceans that created the crucial arena of the ‘Battle of the Atlantic’ in the Second World War. In the age of nuclear weapons, submarines added the ocean depths as a dimension in the deployment of nuclear arsenals, along with the subterranean strategic advantage of missile silos. The contemporary geopolitics of volume is complicated by the intersection of technology under...
the control of the most powerful states (such as satellites and inter-continental ballistic missiles) and a democratization of the geopolitical control of volume through tunnel building and the increasing availability of drones. Geography, in terms of creating and controlling new forms of space, and technology are both dynamic. Human beings never seem to tire of forming new intersections between space and technology that enable warfare and, thus, are an ever-changing component of geopolitical codes.

Geopoliticians such as Sir Halford Mackinder and Friedrich Ratzel theorized the political construction of spaces: imperial blocs and *lebensraum*. The War on Terror constructs its own spaces too: terrorist networks, networks of US military bases and the proposed caliphate of ISIS. But geopolitics, old and contemporary, is also a matter of representing political space, or imagining certain parts of the world in a manner that justifies foreign policy. Scholars who investigate such representations are identified as practitioners of critical geopolitics.

Critical geopolitics is part of the post-structural turn in human geography. As such, these political geographers are suspicious of any general framework for ordering knowledge, including the world-systems analysis we use here. They do not see their research as creating a new school of thought but rather it is represented as a loose ‘constellation’ of ideas (Dalby and Ó Tuathail 1996: 451–2), ‘parasitical’ on other knowledge creation by making tactical interventions in other work rather than indulging in any broad strategic thinking of their own (Ó Tuathail 1996: 59). Of course, such perennial critics are indispensable for any discipline, and there is no reason why we should not turn the tables and use their fresh insights to inform our world-systems political geography.

Part of the contested construction of the next world order will be a battle over how geographical space is represented. The question of representation is at the heart of critical geopolitics and relates directly to what we have previously referred to as the construction of geopolitical codes. Critical geopolitics aims to interrogate the implicit and explicit meanings that are given to places in order to justify geopolitical actions. For example, the debate in 1990 and 1991 within the United States over whether or not troops should be sent to Bosnia entailed the manipulation of two competing images (Ó Tuathail 1996: 196–213). First, the Bush administration, which was opposed to sending US troops, conjured up the image of Bosnia as a ‘quagmire’ or ‘swamp’. This representation was intended to awaken images of Vietnam to generate support for a policy that would not endanger US troops. On the other hand, proponents of military intervention referred to the genocide in Bosnia as a ‘holocaust’ to stimulate images of the Nazis’ atrocities against the Jews. Both sides were drawing competing images of a little known part of the world to influence and determine international political and military policy. This is a classic example of the fluidity of a geopolitical transition in which a new geopolitical code was being constructed. (During the Cold War, few people had even heard of Bosnia; it was an uncontested part of a communist country; no more needed to be said.) The importance of the critical geopolitical research is to show explicitly that the very construction of the images used in foreign policy making is itself a key geopolitical act.

Critical geopolitics entwines a number of intellectual strands to illustrate the importance of space in geopolitics. As well as the importance of representations of space, spatial practices and the importance of

---

**Summary**

In this section we have emphasized two aspects of the current geopolitical transition:

- the actions of non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, can also be understood within the concept of geopolitical codes;
- the metageographical context of geopolitics may be changing, with a growing emphasis upon networks and volume rather than states and area.

---

**Critical geopolitics: representations of the War on Terror**

Critical geopolitics is part of the post-structural turn in human geography. As such, these political geographers are suspicious of any general framework for ordering knowledge, including the world-systems analysis we use here. They do not see their research as...
a spatial Other are also seen as components of the way the geography of the world is constructed (Ó Tuathail 1996). Spatial practices refer to the often unquestioned ways in which particular institutions and scales constrain political activity. For example, the dominance of the state in both political practice and intellectual inquiry has inhibited the exploration of alternative politics at both the global and local scales (Walker 1993). The logic of the critical geopolitics position is not to privilege states but to examine the geopolitical actions of social movements, environmental politics and gender as well. The spatial Other refers to Edward Said’s (1979) classic Orientalism, in which dark images of foreign cultures are painted to make one’s own appear in a better light. One of the early studies of critical geopolitics, for example, employed this way of thinking to categorize the Cold War with the Soviet Union as the United States’ Other (Dalby 1990). The approach informs the politics of ‘us’ by showing how it defines its nemesis. Criticism of ISIS, for example, does more than demonize the organization and legitimate military action against them, it also reflects a discourse that promotes an uncritical view of Western democracy.

Captain America: defender of hegemony

Al-Qaeda was a challenge to the universal pretensions of the United States as hegemonic power. Following the world classes idea of Johan Galtung, al-Qaeda used the rhetoric of material deprivation and cultural oppression to justify its actions. To counter this rhetoric and to represent its military actions as just, the United States represented its own actions as being in the name of the good of all humanity – the ultimate expression of the liberal universal geopolitical code of the hegemonic power (Flint and Falah 2004). It attempted to portray its actions as something other than national self-interest, or actions that critiques could paint as the construction of ‘empire’. It did so by changing the geographical scale of the rhetoric. It eschewed the language of states and instead concentrated upon human rights – a scale that was simultaneously individual and universal (Flint and Falah 2004).

It is not just the language of press statements and political speeches that is a crucial component of the representation of geopolitical actions. As hegemonic power, the United States must address global public opinion when justifying its actions, including military invasion. It must also gain the support of the American public. Although public support for President George W. Bush and the War on Terror waned through 2005 and 2006, what is of more importance is the general common-sense understanding held by the American public that its country has particular rights and responsibilities in the inter-state system. In other words, although political debate occurs over whether the United States should have invaded Iraq (there was practically no dissent in Congress) and what it should do in the face of insurgency, the general belief that the United States should undertake political and military interventions was not even questioned. It has become an assumed part of the US national identity, what E. P. Thompson (1985) called ‘hegemonic nationalism’.

Such ideas are constructed and maintained through popular culture: films, books, songs, TV series and so on. One avenue is cartoon books and one obvious character is Captain America (Dittmer 2005). Captain America first appeared in 1940, prior to the United States’ entry into the Second World War. Interestingly, the character is a citizen who is too physically weak to become a regular soldier but volunteers for a dangerous scientific experiment. He is injected with a serum that transforms his physique into the epitome of athleticism. In other words, Captain America, a representation of the nation itself, is transformed through the application of the science and industry of the military–industrial complex. The nature of his mission also transmits a national myth: he only acts violently to defend the nation. The actions of Captain America are not an aggressive usage of his extraordinary strength (Dittmer 2005). Captain America comic books went through a number of manifestations reflecting different periods of, and challenges to, US hegemony: Second World War hero as the United States assumes its global role; ‘Captain America . . . Commie Smasher!’ at the beginning of the Cold War; and his reinvention in 1964 since when he has fought issues such as poverty,
racism and pollution (Dittmer 2005). Significantly, in the wake of public discomfort with the Vietnam War, Captain America battled for ‘American values’ mainly within the borders of the United States. But then came the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and Captain America had a new mission.

Dittmer’s (2005) critical geopolitical analysis of Captain America reveals a continued focus upon battles within the United States. However, the geopolitical context has changed and the values that Captain America now defends are shown to be Christian–American in the face of the threat of Islamic fundamentalist violence. The scene is Centerville, a geographical landscape that represents the socio-political ideal of ‘Middle America’. It is Easter Sunday morning and most of the town’s inhabitants are at the church, portrayed in such a way as to show how Christian values are a part of the social landscape (Figure 2.4). The church congregation is attacked by Islamic terrorists and the story unfolds through a dialogue that pits American values (as the epitome of Christian values) against Muslim ones. Captain America is fighting the Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington’s (1993) representation of the new form of global conflict.

The imagery used reveals the different representations of the two religions. Outside, the church sign says ‘Easter Service: All Are Welcome’ (Dittmer 2005: 639, quoting Rieber and Cassaday 2002a: 3), expressing the ‘openness and tolerance of Christianity’ (Dittmer 2005: 639). On the other hand, Islam is portrayed as irrational, intolerant and violent. One of the terrorists in the story refers to a woman as a ‘whore with a painted mouth’ (Dittmer 2005: 639, quoting Rieber and Cassaday 2002a: 8), and another declares, ‘Death is peace for me’ (ibid.). The nation that Captain America, the ordinary guy empowered by the United States military and scientific might, must defend is represented as a tolerant Christian nation, and the new enemy is Islam.

However, the story is not as clear as that. In a controversial stance, the storyline took a nuanced, even overtly critical, attitude towards the overseas military interventions of the United States. Fictional Centerville is the location of a bomb manufacturing plant, and one of the terrorists, al-Tariq, links that to the fate of the captive congregation: ‘Some of you are asking your God why you will die today. Some of you know – those of you who work at the bomb manufacturing facility at the edge of this peaceful town. Today you learn what it means to sow the wind and reap the whirlwind’ (Dittmer 2005: 640, quoting Rieber and Cassaday 2002b: 1). In a conversation between al-Tariq and Captain America, the hero learns that the children fighting with the terrorist have prosthetic limbs; they are the casualties of American bombs. It forces Captain America to reflect: ‘Are we hated because we’re free – free and prosperous and good? Or does the light we see cast shadows that we don’t – where monsters like this al-Tariq can plant the seeds of hate?’ (Dittmer 2005: 639, quoting Rieber and Cassaday 2002b: 15).

Although it is al-Tariq who is labelled the monster, and not the US military machine, the violence of US military actions is questioned. Although American values are to be defended, it is the ‘homeland’ and its

Figure 2.4 Centerville, USA. Venue for Captain America’s battle with Islamic terrorists.
Source: © 2006 Marvel Characters, Inc. Used with permission.
values that must be saved. In this story Captain America raises the morality and efficacy of military actions in other sovereign spaces. The ability of cartoons to disrupt the way we think about geopolitics is a specific example of a broader issue; how art is an integral part of geopolitics, both as a means to justify what states do (Debrix 2006) and as a means of resistance (Ingram 2009).

**Art and war: disruptions of geopolitical assumptions**

Art is part of our everyday lives, whether we encounter it just by walking by a billboard displaying an advertisement or by seeking it out by attending an exhibit at a gallery. Artists produce art within the spaces of their own experiences, or the scale of place we introduced in Chapter 1. In that sense, they serve as commentaries ‘by people as part of their situated and embodied experience of power projection, capitalist globalization, spectacular and covert political violence, rebordering and new strategies of surveillance and security’ (Ingram 2009: 262). Some artists have an explicit agenda to make the public think about, and perhaps challenge, the political geography within which they live. The purpose of such art is to break through people’s idea of ‘common sense’, or what is the political norm. Instead, art may provoke questioning of dominant uses of space and the power relations that are in operation.

From our discussion of the geopolitics of volume, we know that control of airspace is an essential part of contemporary warfare. Since at least the time of the Second World War, when the destruction of cities became a very pressing part of the modern imagination, air power has been one topic of artistic depiction (Adey 2010). Hence, critical artists have the goal and the ability to disrupt conventional thinking by portraying air power in unconventional and thought-provoking ways. Alison Williams’s (2014) discussion of the work of British artist Fiona Banner provides a good illustration. The beginning point is the ‘common-sense’ frames of reference of air power that are taken for granted. Aircraft fly, they zoom, they quickly go from air space to airspace crossing political boundaries that are on the ground below but create no impediment to flight. In other words, military aircraft are vehicles of geopolitical power projection. This is the dominant frame of reference (Butler 2010) for how we understand air power and why it is cultivated as a form of national geopolitical pride (Adey 2010).

In contrast, the sculptural work of Fiona Banner disrupted these implicit understandings. Her 2010 displays in Tate Britain used real fighter jets (Harriers and Jaguars), and created a sense of disruption by defining them as art rather than ‘heroic’ exhibits in national or military museums. In Figure 2.5 we see how the Harrier was placed nose-down and adorned with subtle ‘feathering’ that changed the viewer’s perception of the war-machine into something other than a highly manoeuvrable piece of war machinery (Williams 2014). The Jaguar is presented as a highly polished object that reflects back the viewer’s image (see Figure 2.6). The intention was to remove any separation between subject and object. Members of the public saw themselves in the war machine.

![Figure 2.5 Fiona Banner’s ‘Harrier’](image_url)

Source: Alison Williams.
This visual connection dissolved a separation between objects and actions of war that, for the British viewing public, took place in other parts of the world. Instead, ‘we are unable to escape our role in [the plane’s] materialisation, we are intimately engaged in constructing and performing the disruption of its form and function’ (Williams 2014: 18).

Captain America and disruptive art exhibits of warplanes are both illustrations of the role of representations in popular culture in justifying and challenging the geopolitical practices of states. At the centre of the representations is a geopolitical imagination of the propriety of certain geopolitical actions, namely the dubious morality of intervening in the sovereign airspaces and dropping bombs (Flint and Falah 2004). The United States is facing a geopolitical challenge in the form of terrorism, portrayed as netwar. Its response, the War on Terror, is a practice of global military intervention. Popular culture and art have questioned the moral basis of such activity. In turn, the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama justified their activity in a way common to all hegemonic powers: the duty to disseminate the benefits of liberalism across the globe (Taylor 1998).

**Summary**

In this section we have shown:
- the important role of representation in geopolitics;
- thereby illustrating that geopolitics is as much a matter of everyday popular actions as it is the behaviour of state elites or academics.
Critical geopolitics plays an essential role in contemporary political geography. It facilitates the ability to 'unpack' policy statements and academic theories to see their role in maintaining power relations. The state-centric, white and male voice of geopolitics is made transparent. However, critical geopolitics has been critiqued itself. Feminist scholars have advanced a feminist geopolitics that challenges critical geopolitics, and other frameworks including the world-systems approach, in three ways. First, the content of critical geopolitics is critiqued for remaining state-centric: the focus is still upon ‘old white guys’ speaking for the government. Second, geography is reconceptualized from hierarchies and clearly delineated spaces to an approach that sees multiple spaces as intertwined in complex ways (Dowler et al. 2014). Third, the practice of critical geopolitics is seen as stopping at academic critique, rather than doing something. In other words, no normative geopolitical agenda is promoted.

Feminist geopolitics has played a vital role in challenging the way we think about the world in general, and geopolitics in particular. Feminist scholarship has posed fundamental questions of what is geopolitics and how we conceptualize geography. The topic of intimate geopolitics has forced us to question the nature of violence and how we understand political geography. Intimate geopolitics does not start with traditional notions of geopolitical violence, perhaps best summarized as ‘war’, and identifying its impact upon intimate spaces, such as the home and the body. Instead, the spatial relations of the intimate and the inter-state or global are seen as a complex set of spatial relations that cannot be seen as a top-down hierarchy from the global to the body (Pain and Staeheli 2014). Rather than having a particular scale as a starting point (whether downwards from the global or upwards from the body), the intimate is seen as existing within all social relations at multiple interlocked scales and spaces. Hence, geopolitics is not primary; it does not come first and then have an impact upon the home and bodies. Violence is a social relation that is embedded in, and runs through, multiple spaces in a myriad of directions. ‘Geopolitics is exposed as already created by and consisting of relations and practices of intimacy: the already-thereness of the intimate as foundational to and within other realms’ (Pain and Staeheli 2014: 345).

Hierarchical views of the world, such as the three scales and the three-tier hierarchy that we introduced in Chapter 1, are challenged by feminist geopolitics. Instead, particular ways of visualizing the world are useful when addressing particular questions (Dowler et al. 2014). The outcome is not to give a particular scale or set of processes a determining, or even dominating, role in understanding what violence is and why it happens. Intimate geopolitics that occurs in multiple spaces illustrates multiple and reinforcing forms of violence. The result is a set of connected spaces of violence and politics. For example, domestic violence and war are expressions of networks of violence that are ‘motivated by a wish to exert control . . . and map onto broader power structures in society, especially those of patriarchy, class, racism, and heterosexism’ (Pain 2015: 65). Gender relations link forms of violence as ‘a kind of fuse, long which violence runs. They run through every field (home city, nation-state and international relations) and every moment (protest, law enforcement, militarization), adding to the explosive charge of violence in them’ (Cockburn 2004: 44, quoted in Pain 2015: 66).

Feminist geopoliticians do not present a single well-defined agenda (see Koopman 2006 for a clear discussion of the difficulties of academics speaking of the political goals of others). However, the feminist approach involves an understanding that academics are themselves activists and that research and teaching is, in part, a political act. Much feminist scholarship is participatory research that attempts to publicize and understand ‘the voices of others and the political project of facilitating the empowerment of others through the research process’ (Sharp 2004: 97).
Concentration on ‘others’ incorporates many other actors into the analysis of geopolitics. It extends the topic beyond the state. For example, Jennifer Hyndman’s (2000, 2004, 2017) research on refugees explores the geopolitics of mobility. In the process, the intersection of racist and sexist practices with state institutions and borders are highlighted. The family, the cultural norms of child care and other manifestations of gendered divisions of labour, the fear of travelling into particular regions and places because of sexist and racist violence, and the way movement is inhibited or facilitated by wealth, are all seen as components of geopolitics. Feminist geopolitics requires a change in the conceptualization of security by switching the scale of analysis. The proposed move is from national security to human security, in a manner that gives voice to people (especially the marginalized) and broadens the processes and structures of geopolitics beyond states to include access to food, water, land, education and health care, for example, and protection from violence motivated by sexism and racism.

The world-systems approach to geopolitics contextualizes political activity within the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. Research topics have, to date, been focused upon the geopolitical codes of states within the broader system. Feminist geopolitics is a catalyst for political geographers to consider how the structure and institutions (introduced in the previous chapter)
of the capitalist world-economy interact to create varying contexts of human security for different groups. Both the world-systems approach and feminist geopolitics advocate a political agenda of emancipation. It will be interesting to see whether the methodology and subject matter of feminist geopolitics can and will be integrated with the historical and structural account provided by the world-systems approach.

Despite their seemingly different approaches and goals, one common tie between a world-systems approach and feminist geopolitics is an interest in the way that everyday life is structured or shaped by institutions. Certainly, world-systems analysis casts a more long-term and global scale eye to the creation and maintenance of institutions than a feminist approach. However, the construction of behaviour in particular places, our scale of experience, that keeps the institutions of the capitalist world-economy functioning and protected from threats or challenges that offer alternative ways of organizing society is an area of common ground. Feminists are interested in the local manifestation of institutional arrangements that maintain power relations and marginalize particular social groups. World-systems analysis is interested in the stability of institutions that maintain capitalist accumulation. States are one such key institution.

Recent discussion of the term ‘securitization’ is a helpful way to see the potential common interest between the two approaches. Securitization refers to the ways in which a variety of social relations and processes (such as immigration, political protest and organization, or specific lifestyle choices) are framed as being potential security threats and hence require some sort of violent intervention from the state (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009). Securitization illustrates the many ways in which states use their power (in all the meanings of power defined in Chapter 1) to identify threats and maintain power relations that reinforce established institutions and group identities. Migration control and the criminalizing of certain protest behaviours are good examples of this trend. On the one hand, these politics are illustrated well

Figure 2.7 Demonstration at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Source: Linda Panetta (www.soawne.org).
by the feminists’ aim of giving voice to marginalized groups in local contexts. On the other hand, the systemic role of the institutions and power relations may be interpreted through world-systems analysis.

It is unlikely that the serious study of geopolitics can ever return to the taken-for-granted world of power politics from which it emerged. After the Cold War, the general state custom of separating political relations from economic relations, always adhered to more in the theory than the practice, has finally disintegrated. State security services are now expected to pay at least as much attention to ‘geo经济学’ as to geopolitics. This was presaged in political geography by the introduction of political economy perspectives as, for instance, in the first edition of this book. But currently it is the adherents to critical and feminist geopolitics who, more than any other research group, are interrogating the assumed worlds of formal and practical geopolitical reasoning.

Possibly the most valuable contribution of critical and feminist geopolitics is to point the way forward for how political geography copes with globalization and ‘empire’. The various trans-state positions of globalization undermine the state-centric assumptions of a century of geopolitics, whether British, German, American or from any other political base. In terms of geographical globalization, this can be represented as a ‘de-territorialization’ of world politics (Ó Tuathail 1996). Critical geopolitics puts us on the alert for crude ‘re-territorializations’ that try to reconstruct simple stable representations in a fluid world of massive social change. But new simple spatial imagery (such as the ‘Axis of Evil’) is at odds with the material changes that are globalization. Feminist geopolitics catalyses a questioning of accepted notions of ‘security’ during a time of war. In the face of military invasions and occupations in the name of counter-terrorism and national security, feminist geopolitics asks whether that is the sole or most appropriate form of security: security from what and for whom? It is our contention that the valuable contributions of critical and feminist geopolitics complement the world-systems approach. The latter offers a temporal and structural contextualization of political actions, while the former point to the agency and struggles of geopolitical actors within those contexts.

Summary
In this section we have introduced feminist geopolitics and:
• illustrated its role in challenging established lines of inquiry;
• introduced the topic of ‘intimate geopolitics’;
• described how feminist geopolitics disrupts hierarchical conceptualizations of political geography;
• suggested ways in which feminist geopolitics and the world-systems approach may complement each other.

Geopolitical constructs: space, time, subjects and structures

The subject of geopolitics is rampant. Political geographers have re-embraced the subject matter that was at the centre of the formation of the discipline of geography in the late nineteenth century. Thankfully, a lot has changed since then. Contemporary academic geopolitics is a mixture of a variety of theoretical approaches and topics. In this chapter we have led with our own world-systems perspective to situate geopolitical codes within the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. The process of hegemony is essential to understanding our contemporary context and what it means for the likelihood of war and peace. In addition, we have discussed critical geopolitics to highlight the importance of geopolitical representations in framing how we see the world, whether we are maintaining or challenging ‘common sense’. The previous section introduced feminist geopolitics and intimate geopolitics to explore the connectivity between many different spaces in which politics, especially violent politics, are entwined through the thread of gender relations.

We can simply embrace the eclectic nature of contemporary academic geopolitics. Alternatively, we can try and connect the different themes and approaches discussed in this chapter. The term geographical constructs is one way to make these
connections (Flint 2016). Feminist geopolitics draws our attention to the way individuals are political subjects, performing different roles to either maintain or challenge existing politics. Structural perspectives, like our world-systems approach, emphasize the ability of enduring structures to set rules and norms of behaviour that frame political activity. The term ‘geopolitical constructs’ recognizes the power of political agency and ‘the stability of settings that limit or frame agency’ (Flint 2016: 33). In other words, the bigger picture of the paired-Kondratieff model of hegemony and the intimate geopolitics of domestic violence are connected through semi-permanent entities and sets of relations that are called geopolitical constructs. In his analysis of a key engineering project in the Second World War, Flint (2016) focuses upon three inter-related geopolitical constructs: 1) The good geopolitical subject is a term used to describe how people were socialized in to performing duties that enabled the prosecution of war; 2) institutional arrangements of state and business, or the bureau-
## Key glossary terms from Chapter 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Inter-state system</th>
<th>Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annales school of history</td>
<td>Empire</td>
<td>Intimate geopolitics</td>
<td>Protectionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>‘Empire’</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autarky</td>
<td>First World War</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Right-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power bloc</td>
<td>Free trade</td>
<td>Konradieff waves (cycles)</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>Lebensraum</td>
<td>Securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist world-economy</td>
<td>Geopolitical code</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Semi-periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Geopolitical constructs</td>
<td>Longue durée</td>
<td>Socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classes</td>
<td>Geopolitical transition</td>
<td>Mercantilism</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Geopolitical world order geopolitics</td>
<td>Monroe Doctrine</td>
<td>Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comecon</td>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>Multinational corporations</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Napoleon Wars</td>
<td>Superpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Heartland–rimland thesis</td>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Thirty Years War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>Nation-state</td>
<td>Treaty of Tordesillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Neo-conservative opposition</td>
<td>Treaty of Versailles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Truman Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Détente</td>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>Pan-region</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domino theory</td>
<td>Informal imperialism</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>World-economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>World-empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World-system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World-systems analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Suggested reading


Enloe, C. (1990) *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Seminal feminist text on international politics that was the foundation for feminist geopolitics.


Activities

1. The United States government is well established on the internet. Some relevant sites are listed below. Use the sites to find recent policy documents or press releases and then interpret them through the lens of the paired Kondratieff model. In what way do the policies speak of active engagement with the rest of the world, in terms of free trade, investment, immigration or military action? On the other hand, in what way do the policies emphasize territorial security and sovereignty?

   - www.whitehouse.gov The White House
   - www.commerce.gov Department of Commerce
   - www.commerce.gov Department of Defense
   - www.state.gov State Department
   - www.dhs.gov Department of Homeland Security

2. Consider the representation of geopolitical events in cinema films currently on release. Who or what is the threat? What was the nationality and gender of the ‘hero’? Reading between the lines, did the storyline imply particular foreign policy actions or inactions by the United States or other countries?

3. Refer to the webpage of the US Department of Defense, the British Ministry of Defence or the defence department of another country and read its discussion of an ongoing mission. Then consider the same situation from the perspective of feminist geopolitics. What ‘silences’ in the official commentary does the feminist perspective help to illuminate?
What this chapter covers

A world-systems interpretation of imperialism

Informal imperialism: dominance without empire

Formal imperialism: the creation of empires

The two cycles of formal imperialism
- The cumulative number of colonies
- Establishment: creation, reorganization and transfer
- Decolonization: geographical contagion and contrasting ideologies

The geography of formal imperialism
- Core: the imperial states
- Periphery: the political arenas
- The economics of formal imperialism

Hegemony and the British Empire
- Imperial geopolitical codes
- The imperial ideology

The international relations of informal imperialism
- Free trade and the hegemonic state
- Protectionism and the semi-periphery
- The dilemma for the periphery

Informal imperialism as a structural relation
- The rise of social imperialism
- The key mechanism: unequal exchange
- Technological shift and the persistence of global inequality
- Households in informal imperialism under American hegemony
- Gender, globalization and scale

‘Empire’ and infrastructure in the twenty-first century

One logic of contemporary imperialism
Imperialism is an obvious combination of political and geographical characteristics. Yet the topic of imperialism has been a neglected theme in political geography, except in the sense that, as discussed in the Prologue, early political geographers were themselves practising imperialists! This neglect was not just a problem of political geography, but more to do with the nature of modern social science as a whole. It relates directly to what is referred to as the poverty of disciplines. The term ‘imperialism’ is a classic political economy concept that cannot be properly defined in either political or economic categories alone (Barratt Brown 1974: 19). Hence the neglect of imperialism spread far beyond political geography. One of the most cogent criticisms of the whole ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ schools of modern social science, for instance, is that they seem to conveniently ‘forget’ or at least ‘ignore’ the contribution of imperialism to the modern world situation.

**Terrorism and oil in Nigeria**

In March 2010, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) set off two car bombs outside a government building in Warri, killing two people and injuring six. In October 2010 two bombs exploded in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, killing 12 and injuring 17, with the president nearby. The attacks were interpreted as an attempt to disrupt talks between MEND and the Nigerian government. These incidents were not the first such attack. MEND had claimed responsibility for car bombings in 2006 that targeted an army barracks, an oil refinery and a state governor’s office. MEND has also been responsible for a number of hostage situations involving workers in the oil industry, and fought openly with government troops. The Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria is rich in oil, producing 2.5 million barrels a day, though attacks on pipelines and other production facilities had, in early 2006, cut production by 20 per cent.

On 30 May 2014, MEND signed a ceasefire agreement with the Nigerian government. Despite attacks by a new group called the ‘Niger Delta Avengers’, MEND have maintained the ceasefire, stating that they believe the current president, Muhammadu Buhari, must be given time to bring stability to a country that was ‘run aground by the ill-fated, corrupt and visionless immediate past administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan which pauperized the Nigerian people to the alarming degree we all experience today’.

MEND’s claims are simple. They want a greater share of the wealth generated by the oil industry. The local population is impoverished. In the words of Macon Hawkins, an American oil-worker taken hostage in 2006, ‘they’re dirt poor – poor as field mice’. The wealth generated by oil extraction in the region has bypassed the local population. It benefits workers hired from foreign countries and the profits flow through the national government and into the coffers of international oil companies.

A MEND statement describes their belief in ‘one strong united Nigerian federation where the principles and ideals of Resource Control; True Federalism; Rule of Law/Respect for Human Rights; Democracy; Free Enterprise and a Vibrant Civil Society are well entrenched in the grundnorm and put to practice’. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta believes it is fighting against an imperial relationship that extracts resources from ‘their’ land but allows the profits to flow into bank accounts outside of Nigeria and even Africa. There is clearly a differential in the ability to profit from Nigerian oil and it is one means by which differences in wealth and life opportunities are manifest in today’s world. But should such a situation be identified as an expression of imperialism? Consider how and why your response to this question changed, or not, after reading this chapter.


The geographical extent of historical European political control in the periphery is shown in Figure 3.1. All areas that were at some time under core control are shown and can be seen to include almost all the periphery. The major exception is China, but even here the leading core states delimited their ‘spheres of influence’. In geographical terms, the result of this political control was a world organized as one huge functional region for the benefit of the core states. This has been, and, we shall argue, remains, the dominant spatial organization into the twenty-first century. And yet, until recently, this subject was considered so unimportant that it was largely left to historians to debate it outside the social sciences.

In our world-systems approach, imperialism is much more than a problem of history. The constant and necessary core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy requires imperialism to be a continual political project. However, the dynamism of the capitalist world-economy means that the form of imperialism will change in relation to cyclical and linear trends: ‘bringing history back in’ means opening up the issues of imperialism once again. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the word ‘empire’ reappeared with a vengeance. Now it is almost impossible not to see the word when perusing the current affairs section of the bookshop. But we must remain careful when engaging with its current usage. In this chapter, we place imperialism in the core-periphery relationship and relate it to the current actions of the United States as declining hegemonic power: the military expeditions that have generated the renewed focus on ‘empire’.

Our discussion of imperialisms will emphasize the material construction of functionalist spaces of formal empire, and conceptualize imperialism within the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. We order, or conceptualize, an understanding of imperialism by mapping periods of growth in relation to the dynamic model of hegemony and rivalry presented in the previous chapter. These descriptions are divided into two sections, the first dealing with formal imperialism and the second with informal imperialism. Both imperialisms are characterized by the dominance relation between core and periphery. The distinction between them being that the former involves political control of peripheral territory in addition to economic exploitation.

From this discussion we can consider the construction of localities in the periphery with regard to the role they played in a global imperial system. Clearly, this requires seeing the connection of global and local processes as the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy are manifested in local spaces and social relations. In the final section of the chapter,
Curiously, one of the easiest ways to discern past formal and informal imperialisms in today's world is to look at which sports are popular in which countries.

The contemporary world geography of sport has a direct link to past patterns of imperialisms as cultural dominations. Although sports and pastimes were a mainstay of traditional rural life, the urbanization consequent upon industrialization in the nineteenth century changed the nature and character of sports. In the second half of the nineteenth century sports became major events for urban spectators, adding excitement to hard lives in difficult times. Initially focusing on betting to fund sport (horse-racing, road-running, boat-racing, boxing), towards the end of the century there was the widespread development of team games paid for by attracting spectators to dedicated club stadia. National organizations were formed with their leagues and cup competitions leading to popular rivalries between clubs from different cities.

But which sports would catch on in which countries? By the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a real smorgasbord of different games available with, for instance, English cricket tourists stopping off in New York for a game on their way to Canada while professional baseball was beginning in England. But we know these early initiatives were not to bear fruit as major sports in the United States, Canada and England. Why? Basically, the world geography of sport evolved through four main zones:

- In old British colonies – the formal British Empire – English political elites diffused the game of cricket. Today cricket remains a major sport in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh), Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), southern Africa (South Africa and Zimbabwe) and English-speaking West Indies as well as in the sport’s country of origin, England.

- In the ‘informal empire’ – countries with strong trading links to Britain – British economic elites introduced football (soccer), sometimes founding football clubs. Today, this is the most global of sports but all World Cup winners have been countries that come from three of Britain’s nineteenth-century prime trading zones, and who still provide the leading contenders: South America (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay), Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal), Western Europe (France, Germany, the Netherlands) as well as England, the sport’s country of origin.

- In the late nineteenth century direct British influence, both political and economic, was least in the United States, resulting in neither cricket nor soccer gaining a foothold against home-grown sports, notably baseball and grid iron football. US professional sports spread to Canada in the twentieth century so that it became the only part of the old British Empire/Commonwealth not to have either cricket or soccer as a major sport. In the early twentieth century there were debates about whether Canada was more influenced by Britain or America: sport has provided the answer.

- In other parts of the world that Britain was unable to dominate in the late nineteenth century, the sports menu remained open to US influence in the twentieth century. This resulted in baseball diffusing to more than just Canada: it became a major sport in Spanish-speaking West Indies, Central America and parts of Pacific Asia, notably Japan. In some of these countries baseball vies with soccer as the national sport.

Like so many other popular cultural practices, contemporary world geographies of sport have been shaped through activities of Britain and the United States during their hegemonic cycles.
A world-systems interpretation of imperialism

Imperialism is a relationship of dominance that has existed throughout the history of the capitalist world-economy. However, the form of imperialist activity has varied with the political opportunities afforded to states during the uneven growth of the world-economy. Formal imperialism is part of an unfolding logic interacting with periods of hegemony when informal imperialism is prominent. This pattern is another manifestation of the paired-Kondratieff model of hegemony introduced in the previous chapter. Though imperialism is a relation that has occurred throughout the history of the world-economy we can identify particular phases when different strategies prevailed. Hence the very real differences between mid-nineteenth-century British hegemony and the late nineteenth-century ‘age of imperialism’ are incorporated but without any suggestion of a particular ‘stage’ in a linear sequence. The identification of these phases helps interpret the current claims of US ‘empire’.

The world-systems approach identifies imperialism as a relationship between the core and the periphery of the capitalist world-economy. This relationship is a fundamental feature of the capitalist world-economy. It remains constant throughout the different phases of imperialism. We shall use part of Johan Galtung’s (1971) ‘structural theory of imperialism’ to model a range of sub-relations through which the overarching dominance relation of imperialism operates. In Figure 3.2, we have simplified the argument to basics with just two types of state, core (C) and periphery (P), and two classes in each state, dominant (A) and dominated (B). This produces four groups in the world-economy: core/dominant class (CA), periphery/dominant class (PA), core/dominated class (CB) and periphery/dominated class (PB). From this, we can derive four important relations: collaboration, CA–PA, whereby the dominant classes of both zones combine to organize their joint domination of the periphery; social imperialism, CA–CB, in which the dominated class in the core is ‘bought off’ by welfare policy as the price for social peace ‘at home’; repression, PA–PB, to maintain exploitation of the periphery by coercion as necessary; and division, CB–PB, so that there is a separation of interests between dominated classes, that is, the classic strategy of divide and rule.

One implication of this approach is that it implies a new geography of revolution. Traditional Marxist theory predicted that socialist challenges to capitalism would emerge where capitalism is most advanced, or in world-systems terminology the core of the world-economy. History does not support the theory. The two great twentieth-century socialist revolutions occurred in Russia and China through mobilization of the peasantry rather than workers in the most recent phases of capitalism.

Chapter framework

This chapter addresses the following components of the political geography framework that we introduced in the Prologue:

- The chapter conceptualizes the persistent differences of wealth and opportunity that categorize the capitalist world-economy.
- The concepts of formal and informal imperialism are situated within the temporal context of the rise and fall of great powers.
- The spatial interconnections that facilitate imperialism as political practice are elucidated.
- The experiences of people within localities are understood within the wider whole that is the capitalist world-economy and its core-periphery structure.
- In our discussion of contemporary ‘empire’ we discuss the interaction between the material world and the way it is represented.
advanced industrial activities. Brewer (1980) shows how classical Marxist theories of imperialism reflected a theory of revolution that expected transformation to occur in the core, where the forces of production, and hence the contradictions of capitalism, were most developed. Indeed, in the classical view, penetration of the periphery by core countries could be seen as beneficial, since ‘progressive’ capitalism would free the area from the shackles of feudalism, just as it had done earlier in Europe. On the other hand, dependency theory and the world-systems approach interpret such penetration in a completely different manner, with capitalism in the periphery never having a progressive liberating role but rather being regressive from the beginning – what Frank terms the development of underdevelopment. The so-called progressive elements of capitalism, therefore, are geographically restricted to the transformation from feudalism to capitalism in the core. From the world-systems perspective, this results in a geographical realignment of revolutionary forces in terms of core versus periphery, with the latter becoming a major focus of future revolt and change. This is the political argument of the radical dependency school and is usually termed ‘third-worldist’ because of its geographical emphasis. It is most closely associated with Mao Zedong and his theory of global class struggle.

Another key feature of the world-systems approach to imperialism is related to arguments about the reasons for imperial expansion. Many non-Marxist critics of imperialism, including the classic theorist of the British ‘age of imperialism’ Hobson (1902), for instance, have argued that formal imperialism is uneconomic for the core states concerned, benefiting only that small group directly involved in the imperial ventures. Hobson’s argument rests upon identifying a small section of society (finance capital) as the key promoter of imperialism. The problem with such strict economic evaluations of formal imperialism is that they have emphasized trade and the search for new markets for core production. But, as Wallerstein (1983: 38–39) points out, this explanation does not accord with the historical facts: ‘by and large it was the capitalist world that sought out the products of the external arena and not the other way round’. In fact, non-capitalist societies did not need products from the core states, and such ‘needs’ had to be ‘created’ after political takeovers. Certainly, the search for markets cannot explain the massive imperialist effort on the part of core states over several centuries. Instead, Wallerstein suggests that the search for low-cost workforces is a much better explanation. This switches emphasis from exchange to production. Incorporation of new zones into the periphery invariably led to new production processes based upon the lowest labour costs. In the first instance, therefore, imperial expansion is about extending the division of labour that defines the boundaries of the world-economy. Imperialism, both formal and informal, is the process that created and continues to recreate the periphery.

**Summary**

In this section we have discussed the theoretical foundations of contemporary understandings of imperialism. In so doing we have:

- shown the interrelationship between classes;
- shown the interrelationship between the core and periphery of the world-economy;
- demonstrated how a world-systems approach to imperialism interprets the geography of revolution and the reasons for imperialist expansion.
Formal imperialism: the creation of empires

The formal political control of parts of the periphery has been a feature of the world-economy since its inception. From the early Spanish and Portuguese Empires through to the attempt by Italy in the 1930s to forge an African empire, formal imperialism has been a common strategy of core domination of the periphery. This process must not be confused with the concept of the world-empire as a type of world-system, an entity with its own division of labour. Even the British Empire, on which the sun did not set for over a century, was not a world-empire in our terms but rather a successful core state with a large colonial appendage (i.e. just one political segment of the modern world-system). In this section, we describe the rise and fall of such ‘appendages’ within the framework of the dynamic model of hegemony and rivalry described in Chapter 2. This description is organized into four parts. First, we look at imperialism at the system scale to delineate the overall pattern of the process. Second, we consider the imperialist activities of the core states that created the overall pattern. Third, we turn to the periphery and briefly consider the political arenas where this dominance relation was imposed. Finally, we look at how the two sides of the imperial relation fitted together in a case study of the British Empire.

The two cycles of formal imperialism

If we wish to describe formal imperialism, the first question that arises is how to measure it. Obviously, figures for population, land area or ‘wealth’ under core political control would make ideal indices for monitoring imperialism, but such data are simply not available over the long time period we employ here. Instead, we follow Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) and use the presence of a colonial governor to indicate the imposition of sovereignty of a core state over territory in the periphery. These personages may have many different titles (for example, high commissioner, commandant, chief political resident), but all have jurisdictions signalling core control of particular parts of the periphery. Bergesen and Schoenberg obtain their data from a comprehensive catalogue of colonial governors in 412 colonial jurisdictions compiled by Henige (1970).

We rework the data to portray them in a way that is relevant to our space–time matrix. The metric we have used is a simple 50-year sequence from 1500 to 1800, and a 25-year sequence from 1800 to 1975. This provides for some detail in addition to the long A- and B-phases in the original logistic wave plus an approximation to the A- and B-phases of the subsequent Kondratieff waves. Second, we record more than merely establishment and disestablishment of colonies. From the record of governorships we can also trace reorganizations of existing colonized territory and transfer of sovereignty of territory between core states. Both of these are useful indices in that they are related to phases of stagnation (and hence the need to reorganize) and core rivalry (expressed as capturing rival colonies). In the analyses that follow, the establishment of colonies is divided into three categories: creation of colony, reorganization of territory and transfer of sovereignty.

The cumulative number of colonies

By cumulating the number of colonies created and subtracting the number of decolonizations, the total amount of colonial activity can be found for each time period. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 3.3, which reproduces Bergesen and Schoenberg’s two long waves of colonial expansion and contraction. There is a long first wave peaking at the conclusion of the logistic B-phase and contracting in the A-phase of the first Kondratieff cycle. This largely defines the rise and fall of European empires in the New World of America. The second wave rises through the nineteenth century to peak at the end of the ‘age of imperialism’ and then declines rapidly into the mid-twentieth century. This largely defines the rise and fall of European empires in the Old World of Asia and Africa. Hence the two waves incorporate two geographically distinct phases of imperialism. This simple space–time pattern provides the framework within which we investigate formal imperialism more fully.
Establishment: creation, reorganization and transfer

When governors are imposed on a territory for the first time we refer to the creation of a colony. Since this is one political strategy of restructuring during economic stagnation, we expect colony creation to be associated with B-phases of our waves. This is generally borne out by Figure 3.4. The major exception is the imperialist activities of Spain and Portugal in the original A-phase in the emerging world-economy. This followed the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, when the Pope divided the non-European world between these two leading states. This curtailed the usual rivalry associated with colony creation, and it seems that the world-economy was not yet developed sufficiently to enable informal imperialism to operate outside Europe. With the onset of the seventeenth-century stagnation phase, colonial creation expanded with the entry into the non-European arena of north-west European states. From this first peak of colony creation, the process slows down until a minor increase during the period of British–French rivalry at the end of the logistic B-phase. During the Kondratieff cycles, colony creation goes up and down with the A- and B-phases, but the most notable feature is the ‘age of imperialism’, clearly marked by the late nineteenth-century peak.

Hence we incorporate both the continuity and the discontinuity arguments by viewing colonial activity as a cyclical process.

Reorganization of territory should be particularly sensitive to periods of stagnation. Such periods involve pressures on states to cut back public expenditure. In the time-scale we are dealing with here this is reflected in attempts to make colonies more ‘efficient’. Hence the reorganizations shown in Figure 3.4 are generally associated with B-phases. The major peak here is at the end of the logistic B-phase, when the relative decline of Spain and Portugal meant that their colonies were becoming acute burdens on the state exchequers.

Transfer of sovereignty is a direct measure of interstate rivalry in the periphery. This is mainly a feature of the logistic B-phase, when this type of activity was relatively common. With the onset of the Kondratieff cycles, such ‘capture’ is quite rare and is concentrated into just two periods, both A-phases. What these actually represent is the sharing out of the colonial spoils after two global wars. The first relates to the defeat of France in 1815 and the confirmation of British hegemony. The second relates to the defeat of Germany in 1918 and the confirmation of US hegemony. In both cases, the losing powers were deprived of colonies.

Figure 3.3 The two long waves of colonial expansion and contraction.
Decolonization: geographical contagion and contrasting ideologies

The pattern of decolonization is a much simpler one (Figure 3.5). There have been two major periods of decolonization and these are directly responsible for the troughs in Figure 3.3 and hence generate the two-wave pattern.

Although both peaks occur in A-phases, they do not correspond to equivalent phases in our paired-Kondratieff model: the second A₂ phase of American hegemony is a period of major decolonization, but the first A₂ phase of British hegemony is clearly not such a period. The first decolonization period occurred earlier during an A₁ phase of emerging...
hegemony. This is best interpreted as the conclusion of the agricultural capitalism of the logistic wave. The decolonization involved the termination of Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America; by this time, the colonizing powers had long since declined to semi-peripheral status. For the competing core-powers in this period of emerging British hegemony there were obvious advantages to freeing these anachronistic colonies. This was particularly recognized by George Canning, the British foreign secretary, in his oft-quoted statement of 1824 that a free South America would be ‘ours’ (that is, British). This decolonization set the conditions for British ‘informal imperialism’ in Latin America in the mid-nineteenth century, which is discussed in the next section.

One feature of the decolonization process is its geographical contagion. Decolonization is not a random process but is spatially clustered at different periods. The decolonization of the Americas, for instance, did not affect existing colonies in the Old World. This spatial contagion shows the importance for decolonization of processes operating in the periphery. The American War of Independence served as an example for Latin America in the first decolonization phase; Indian independence led the way for the rest of the periphery in the second decolonization period. At a regional level, political concessions in one colony led to cumulative pressure throughout the region. In this sense, the independence awarded to Nkrumah’s Ghana in 1957 triggered the decolonization of the whole continent in the same way that Simón Bolívar’s Venezuelan revolt of 1820 led the way in Latin America.

One final point may be added to this interpretation. The rhetoric of the colonial revolutionary leaders in the two periods was very different. The ‘freedom’ sought in Latin America was proclaimed in a liberal ideology imitating the American Revolution to the north, whereas a century and a half later the ideology was socialist, mildly at first in India, but much more vociferous in Ghana and culminating in many wars of national liberation. It is for this reason that the first decolonization (Latin America) was more easily realigned in the world-economy under British liberal leadership than the second decolonization, with its numerous challenges to American liberal leadership. In broad terms, we can note that the first decolonization period is a liberal revolution at the end of agricultural capitalism, whereas the second period encompasses socialist-inspired revolutions at the end of industrial capitalism, which have been much more anti-systemic in nature.

The geography of formal imperialism

Imperialism is a dominance relation between core and periphery. Our discussion so far has stayed at the system level and we have not investigated the geography of this relation, that is, we have not asked who was ‘dominating’ whom where. We answer this question below by dealing first with the core and then with the periphery.

Core: the imperial states

Who were these colonizing states? In fact they have been surprisingly few in number. In the whole history of the world-economy there have been just 13 formal imperialist states and only five of these can be said to be major colonizers. Figure 3.6 shows the colonial activity of these states in graphs that use the same format as Figure 3.4. Seven graphs are shown: separate ones for Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France and Britain/England; and combined ones for the early and late ‘minor’ colonizing states. The early states consist of the Baltic states of Denmark, Sweden and Brandenburg/Prussia; the ‘latecomers’ are Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. The graphs show the individual patterns of colonial activity of the states that created the total picture we looked at above.

In the logistic A-phase before 1600, all colonial establishment was by Spain and Portugal. The onset of the B-phase brings the Netherlands, France, England and the Baltic states into the fray. This is complemented by a sharp reduction in colony creation by both Spain and Portugal – the location of the core of the world-economy had moved northwards, and this is directly reflected in the new colonial activity. As the B-phase progresses, all of these new states continue their colonial activities but
at a reduced scale except for England/Britain, for which colony capture is as important as, or more important than, colony creation. As we move into the Kondratieff cycles, the Netherlands almost totally ceases establishment of colonies, so that in the mid-nineteenth century all colonial creation is either British or French. In the classical ‘age of imperialism’, these two old-stagers are joined by the five latecomers.

Figure 3.6 enables us to define four periods of colonial activity by imperial states:

1 The first non-competitive era occurs in the logistic A-phase, when only Spain and Portugal are imperial states.

2 The first competitive era occurs in the logistic B-phase, when eight states are involved in imperialist expansion.

3 The second non-competitive era of the mid-nineteenth century coincides with the rise and consolidation of British hegemony. In this period, only two states are involved in imperial expansion: Britain and France.

4 The second competitive era is the ‘age of imperialism’ and coincides with the decline of British hegemony. In this period, eight states are involved in imperial expansion. We shall use this division of core-state activity in our discussion of peripheral arenas.

Figure 3.6 Establishment of colonies by imperial states, 1500–1925.
Periphery: the political arenas

Fifteen separate arenas can be identified in which colonial activity occurred in the periphery. The first arena we can term Iberian America; it includes Spanish and Portuguese possessions in America obtained in the first non-competitive era. The other 14 arenas are shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, which cover the other three periods of colonial activity. The arenas have been allocated to these periods on the basis of when they attracted most attention from imperial states. We shall describe each period and its arenas in turn.

The dominant arena of the first competitive era was the Caribbean (Figure 3.7). This was initially for locational reasons in plundering the Spanish Empire, but subsequently the major role of the ‘greater Caribbean’ (Maryland to north-east Brazil) was plantation agriculture supplying sugar and tobacco to the core. Of secondary importance were the North American colonies that did not develop a staple crop and effectively prevented themselves becoming peripheralized. This was to be the location of the first major peripheral revolt. The other important arena for this period was the African ports that formed the final apex of the infamous Atlantic triangular trade. It is this trade and the surplus value to be derived from it that underlay the colonial competition of this era. The final two arenas were much less important and related to the Indies trade, which Wallerstein doubts was integral to the world-economy until after 1750.

In the second non-competitive era colonial activity was much reduced, but four arenas did emerge as active in the mid-nineteenth century (Figure 3.8). There was no competition between core states within these arenas, which were consequently divided between France and Britain. Although without the authority of the papal bull legitimizing the earlier

![Figure 3.7 Establishment of colonies: arenas of the first competitive era.](image-url)
Spain–Portugal share-out, Britain and France managed to continue some colonial activity while avoiding each other’s ambitions. The Indian Ocean islands (including Madagascar) and Indo-China were ‘conceded’ by Britain as French arenas and the latter left India and Australasia to the British.

This peaceful arrangement was shattered in the next competitive period during a series of ‘scrambles’, the most famous being that for Africa, although similar pre-emptive staking out of claims occurred in the Mediterranean arena and Pacific islands and for Chinese ports (Figure 3.9). With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, there was a final share-out of Arabia after the First World War. The brief takeover of this last arena completes the pattern of formal core control of periphery as depicted by Figure 3.1.

**The economics of formal imperialism**

The pattern of formal imperialism is now clear. In two major cycles over four hundred years a small group of core states took political control in 15 separate arenas covering nearly all the periphery. Why? Academics have focused most of their attention upon the second cycle’s ‘age of imperialism’. This has produced a rather unnecessary debate pitting economic causes against political ones. Foeken (1982) has reviewed these arguments in relation to the partition of Africa and shows that neither set of causes can be sensibly dismissed. What is required is a political economy view of the situation, where complementary aspects of the various theories are brought together to produce a more comprehensive account (ibid.: 140). This would bring analysis of the second cycle into line with that of the first cycle, where it has never been doubted that economics and politics are intertwined in the era of mercantilism.

In world-systems analysis, as we have seen, formal imperialism is interpreted as the political method of creating new economic production zones in the world-economy. From the original production of bullion in the Spanish colonies in the sixteenth century to the production of uranium from Namibia, which became independent only in 1990, formal imperialism has been the prime means of ensuring the transformation of external arenas into the world-economy’s division of labour. The specifics of how...
this was done can be best illustrated by consideration of core-periphery relations, and the geography and the economics of imperialism, within a single empire.

Hegemony and the British Empire

Hegemony implies an open world-economy; empire involves the closing off of part of the world-economy from rivals. Hence, as we have seen, imperial expansion is not associated with hegemonic strategies of dominance. But Britain did not give up its empire on achieving hegemony and in fact continued to extend it, albeit at a slower rate (see Figure 3.6). India, as a venue for colonial economic relations, became the great exception to British foreign policies of the mid-nineteenth century. As Hobsbawm (1987: 148) has noted, India was ‘the only part of the British Empire to which laissez faire never applied. . . . The economic reasons for this were compelling’. India imported 50 per cent of Lancashire cotton textiles and accounted for 50 per cent of Chinese imports in the form of opium; with government charges and debt interest, 40 per cent of Britain’s deficit with the rest of the world was covered by payments from India. No wonder it was called the jewel in the crown! (see case study below).

There was never any overall imperial strategy to produce the particular pattern of lands that ended up coloured pink on the world map. That is why people joked that the empire had been acquired ‘in a fit of absence of mind’ (Morris 1968: 37). But it was much more than that. Although not centrally directed, the empire was created in a series of minor and major conflicts with other European powers and local populations over a period of four hundred years. Hence it was fragmented because it reflected events in the periphery as much as those of the core.

At the end of its hegemonic cycle, for the imperialist politicians in London, geographical fragmentation could be overcome by the new technologies of travel and communications; leading contemporary geographers to discover the concept of ‘time–distance’ to replace simple physical distance (Robertson 1900). In the new analysis, the world was
Case study

‘Islands of development’ in Africa

At the African end of the slave trade the European states secured ‘stations’ on the west African coast (see Figure 3.7), where they exported slaves received from local slave-trading states. Originally, this trade was only a luxury exchange with an external arena. By 1700, however, Wallerstein (1980b) considers it to have become integral to the restructured division of labour occurring during the logistic B-phase. However, as West Africa became integrated into the world-economy, the production of slaves became a relatively inefficient use of this particular sector. Hence British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 reflects long-term economic self-interest underlying the moral issue. Gradual creeping peripheralization of West Africa throughout the nineteenth century is accelerated by the famous ‘scramble for Africa’ in the age of imperialism (Figure 3.9). In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, colonies were being created in Africa at the rate of one a year. This enabled the continent to be fully integrated into the world-economy as a new periphery.

Figure 3.10 Africa south of the Sahara: the imperial economic structure.
shrinking and the far-flung empire was converting into a viable political unit. The steamship, the imperial postal service and the electric telegraph were producing relatively speedy links between all components of the empire. In this new world, it seemed that Britain was in the process of producing a new sort of world state. New institutions like the Imperial Federation League and the United Empire Trade League, supported by political geographers such as Mackinder, were formulating and promoting plans for a British imperial federated state that would be self-sufficient. This was a practical goal that was both feasible and that might become necessary as inter-state rivalries heightened. Britain may have lost its hegemonic superiority, but here was a chance to create an alternative way of maintaining world dominance. For Britain’s imperial politicians, the strategic defensive problems of such a fragmented world state were immense. This was Mackinder’s major concern, as described in the Prologue. Imperial
geopolitical codes were required to make sense of this problem.

**Imperial geopolitical codes**

Britain’s haphazard creation of an empire had required a whole series of local geopolitical codes. In every arena, local British military and civilian officials had to compete with other European states and come to terms with local populations. After the defeat of, or accommodation with, the former, strategies of control had to be devised for the latter. This meant the identification of collaborators. The basic British strategy was divide and rule. It was at this time that British governors throughout the world ‘officially’

---

**Case study**

**Where the sun never set**

Although there have been five major imperialist states in the modern world-system, one stands out as pre-eminent (see Figure 3.6). By the late nineteenth century, the British Empire was not only viewed as the most powerful state in the world; it was widely regarded as the greatest empire the world had ever known. One-quarter of the world’s lands and population were formally controlled from London (Figure 3.11). The empire reached its widest extent after the First World War, when it took over former German colonies and Ottoman territories as mandates from the League of Nations. But they merely represented some late spoils of military victory. The empire reached its true zenith at the end of Queen Victoria’s reign. As ‘queen-empress’, she was a symbol of Britain ‘winning the nineteenth century’. The celebration of the Queen’s diamond jubilee in 1897 centred on a great imperial pageant through the streets of London, and this is usually taken as the occasion that marks the high point of British imperialism (Morris 1968). Within two years, Britain was embroiled in the Boer War and British self-confidence in its right to rule over so much of the world began its long decline.

Although there is nothing typical about British imperialism in relation to other imperialisms, we describe it in this section as our case study of formal imperialism because it contributed so much to the making of our modern world. We deal with three themes: the relation of the empire to British hegemony, the geopolitical codes that were created for empire and the ideology that attempted to hold the whole structure together.

---

**Figure 3.11** The British Empire in 1897 and its extension in 1933.
recognized various cultural groups in order to play one off against another. Official designation in administrative documents such as the census turned these groups into political strata competing for the favours of the empire. Quite literally, the British Empire was the great creator of ‘peoples’ throughout the world. The legacy of this policy remains with us today in such political rivalries as Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in India, Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, Indians and indigenous Fijians in Fiji, Jews and Palestinians in Israel/Palestine and Chinese and Malays in Malaya, plus numerous ethnic rivalries in the former British colonies of Africa.

Divide and rule could help to keep control of particular colonies or protectorates, but it did not help in global strategy required to defend the empire as a whole. As a sea empire, Britain’s strategy was based on its navy. In the nineteenth century, government policy operated a two-to-one rule whereby the Royal Navy was kept twice as large as the combined fleet of its two main rivals. Furthermore, the Royal Navy was the only navy with truly global range, based upon coaling stations on islands and key ports at intervals of 3,000 miles or less on all the major shipping routes. The route to India was the ‘main street’ of the empire. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1871 the new route to India through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea became vital to British interests. The canal was viewed as the ‘jugular’ of the empire – hence the need to oust France from Egypt and take over the government of Egypt.

Even more important than rivalry with France in the Mediterranean was the threat from Russia to the north-west of India. At the same time as Britain had been expanding its position in India, Russia had been expanding its land empire into central Asia, inevitably provoking a clash of interests between the two powers. The result was the ‘Great Game’ of the nineteenth century, not full-blown war but a mixture of intrigue and threats between Russia and Britain in a zone extending from Turkey through Iran to Afghanistan and the north-west frontier of India. It was this Great Game that Mackinder extended to become the heartland theory described in the Prologue and that the United States finally inherited as containment in the ‘real’ Cold War.

The imperial ideology

Finally, it must be emphasized that the supposed unity of the British Empire was based on an ideology of racial supremacy. All Britons, both high and low, could be proud to be members of the country with the greatest ever empire. They were an ‘imperial people’ with a ‘civilizing mission’ for the world. It is here that we can find the ultimate contradiction of formal empire, which was to signal its end within a couple of generations of its zenith.

Basically, Britain’s imperial ideology incorporated two incompatible principles. First, there was the ‘imperial philosophy of equality’ (Huttenback 1976: 21), sometimes known as ‘the High Victorian concept of fair play’ (Morris 1968: 516). In theory, all the peoples of the colonies were subjects of the Queen and therefore enjoyed the Queen’s justice irrespective of colour or creed. But alongside this principle was a second principle of racial superiority – Cecil Rhodes’s ‘visionary project’ of ‘the world supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon peoples’ (Bowle 1974: 359). These two principles clashed most acutely where coloured immigrant labour came into contact with white labour in the settler colonies. This was especially an issue in the self-governing colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa who wanted to keep out cheap (non-white) workers from other parts of the Empire. In response, the colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain advised adoption of what had come to be known as the ‘Natal formula’ (Huttenback 1976: 141). This involved the use of a European language test to qualify for entry to a colony. Since all immigrants were liable to take the same test, it preserved the first principle of equality while enacting the second principle of racial discrimination.

Imperialism’s claim to the high moral ground – the European ‘civilizing mission’ – and Britain’s particular reputation for fair play were disputed and soundly defeated in the twentieth century. Imperialism became unfashionable and doomed. Political freedom still had to be won, by physical resistance in many colonies, but after 1945 no European power, not even Britain, could stem the flood tide of independence. In the new world of US hegemony and the Cold War, there was no room for an anachronism such as the British Empire.
Empire is not a thing of the past. The global process of decolonization that occurred after the Second World War brought an end to a period of formal imperialism and marked the beginning of a new period of informal imperialism. Decolonization provided formal independence for colonies from a single imperial state, but it has not provided independence from the imperial system as a whole (Buchanan 1972: 57). In world-systems terms, what we have is a change of strategy by core states from formal to informal imperialism. This is not a new phenomenon. In our model of hegemonies and rivalries the former were associated with informal imperialism. Hence, we expect the rise of each hegemonic power to lead to a period of informal imperialism. The period of American hegemony has been no different (ibid.).

There have been only three hegemonic powers in the history of the world-economy and each is associated with one of the three classic examples of informal imperialism. First, in the mid-seventeenth century Dutch hegemony was based, in large part, on the Baltic trade, whereby Eastern Europe remained politically independent while becoming peripheralized. Dutch merchants dominated the trade, but there was no Dutch political control – an early example of informal imperialism. Second, in the mid-nineteenth century Britain employed the ‘imperialism of free trade’, when Latin America became known as Britain’s ‘informal empire’. Finally, in the mid-twentieth century American hegemony has been associated with decolonization, to be replaced by neo-colonialism – political independence of the periphery tempered by economic dependence.

Informal imperialism is a much more subtle political strategy than formal imperialism. For this reason, it is much less amenable to the descriptive, cataloguing approach employed in the previous section. To understand informal imperialism we develop our argument in two stages. In the first place, we show that informal imperialism is no less ‘political’ despite its emphasis on ‘economic’ processes. This involves a discussion of trade policy not as a part of economic theory but as alternative state policies within different sectors of the world-economy. But political intervention in the world market cannot change the structural constraints of the world-economy. In the final part of the chapter, we describe the basic mechanism of unequal exchange that generates and maintains uneven development throughout the world.

The international relations of informal imperialism

World-systems analysis is a political economy approach. To understand the politics of contemporary informal imperialism we have to understand how the capitalist world-economy works in a way that constantly violates the assumptions of classical economics that continues to be used as explanations of how the world works.

The mainstream of economic thought traces its origins back to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, written in 1776. This book criticized the policy of mercantilism as generally practised at that time and instead advocated a policy of laissez-faire. Ever since Smith, free trade has been a basic principle of orthodox economics. In the early nineteenth century, David Ricardo added the idea of comparative advantage to the theory. This claimed that, with each state specializing in what it could best produce, free trade would generate an international trade

---

**Summary**

In this section we have:

- introduced the concept formal imperialism;
- related the rise and fall of formal imperialism to economic cycles;
- related the practice of formal imperialism to hegemonic cycles;
- shown that the practice of formal imperialism demands a related representation of state behaviour to justify such actions.
equilibrium to everyone’s mutual advantage. Free trade was therefore the best policy for all states and any political interference in the flow of commodities into or out of a country was not in the interests either of that particular country or of the system as a whole.

There are two related paradoxes in this orthodox economics. The first is that it simply does not work in practice. In the three cases that we have identified as informal imperialism, the peripheral states did not gain from the openness of their national economies – Eastern Europe still lags behind Western Europe; Latin America is still a collection of peripheral or semi-peripheral states; and Africa and most of Asia are part of a ‘South’ periphery in which mass poverty has shown little sign of abating in recent decades. As we shall see, states that have ‘caught up’ have employed very different policies. This leads on to the second paradox concerning free trade, which is that most politicians in most countries at most times have realized that it does not work. Although they have not always had theoretical arguments to back up their less than orthodox economics, most politicians have found that the interests of the groups they represent are best served by some political influence on trade rather than simply leaving it all to the ‘hidden hand’ of the market. We could ask: who is right – ‘economic theorists’ or ‘practical politicians’? The answer is that they both are – sometimes. It all depends on the world-economy location of the state in question. In Table 3.1, different trade policies are related to different zones of the world-economy through the three hegemonic cycles that we described in Chapter 2. Today, support for populist parties in the United States and Europe are a challenge, in varying forms, to the economic orthodoxy that underpinned American hegemony and produced corporate globalization. We are in a political moment when it is not clear if the orthodoxy or the challenge will prevail. However, our model of hegemony predicts that the political contest between free-trade orthodoxy and counter-policies is to be expected. To place today’s politics of informal imperialism in historical context we know turn to a discussion of the history of trade policies for each zone of the capitalist world-economy.

Free trade and the hegemonic state

We can interpret the orthodox economic advocacy of free trade as a reflection of the structural advantage of core powers, in particular hegemonic core powers, in the world-economy. Hence, we would expect to trace such ideas back beyond Adam Smith to the original Dutch hegemony. Not surprisingly, the first great trading state of the modern world-system was concerned for freedom of the seas and this was expressed in the work of the Dutch political writer Hugo Grotius. He wrote his *Mare Liberum*, which became the classic statement in international law justifying Dutch claims to sail wherever there was trade to be had, in 1609. As the most efficient producers of commodities, hegemonic core states promote ‘economic freedom’ in the knowledge that their producers can beat other producers in any open competition: the market favours efficient producers and the efficient producers are concentrated in the hegemonic state by definition. In such a situation, it is in the interests of the rising hegemonic power to present free trade as ‘natural’ and political control as ‘interference’. Hence, from Grotius through Adam Smith to modern economics, economic freedoms are presented as universally valid theory masking the self-interest of the economically strong (see Table 3.1). But there is nothing natural about free trade, the world market or any other socially constructed institution. ‘All organisation is bias’ is Schattschneider’s (1960) point, as we have discussed in Chapter 1, and orthodox economics represents a classic case of attempting to organize non-hegemonic interests off the political agenda. The question we ask of any institution, however, is: what is the organization of bias in this institution? (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 952). In the case of the world market, it is clear that the bias is in favour of core states, and hegemonic core states in particular. The whole history of the world-economy is testimony to this fact. The purpose of inter-state politics is either to maintain this bias or to attempt to change it. The former political strategy is the free-trade one, which is associated with informal imperialism. This is neither more nor less ‘political’ than protectionism, mercantilism or formal imperialism, which attempt to change the status quo. The former is political non-
decision making, the latter political decision making in Bachrach and Baratz’s terms. Of course, politics is so much easier when the system is on your side.

Protectionism and the semi-periphery

The practical politicians, who have generally failed to adhere to the orthodox prescriptions for trade, have not been without their economic champions. The most famous is the mid-nineteenth-century German economist Friedrich List. The world-systems approach is much closer to his analysis than Adam Smith’s. For List, there was no ‘naturally’ best trade policy; rather, tariffs were a matter of ‘time, place and degree of development’ (Isaacs 1948: 307). List even admitted that had he been an Englishman he would have probably not doubted the principles of Adam Smith (Frank 1978: 98). But List realized that free trade was not a good policy for the infant industries of his own country, Germany. Hence, he advocated a customs union – the famous Zollverein – with a tariff around the German states under Prussian leadership. List rationalized his unorthodox position by arguing that there are three stages of development, each of which requires different policies. For the least advanced countries, free trade was sensible to promote agriculture. At a certain stage, however, such policy must give way to protectionism to promote industry. Finally, when the latter policy has succeeded in advancing the country to ‘wealth and power’, then free trade is necessary to maintain supremacy (Isaacs 1948). In world-systems terms, List’s theory can be translated into policies for periphery, semi-periphery and core countries, respectively. Since the Germany of his time was semi-peripheral, he advocated protectionism. In fact, we can identify protectionism or, more generally, mercantilism as the strategy of the semi-periphery. Both modern champions of free trade – Britain and the United States – were major advocates of mercantilist policies before their hegemonic period: England against the Dutch, the United States against Britain (see Table 3.1). In fact, the early classic mercantilist tract is by an Englishman, Thomas Mun, in 1623, who advocated mercantilist measures to protect England from the superior Dutch economy (Wilson 1958). Similarly, US Secretary of State Alexander Hamilton’s famous ‘Report on the Subject of Manufactures’ in 1791 remains a classic statement on the need to develop a semi-peripheral strategy as defined here (Frank 1978: 98–9), although the policy was not consistently pursued until after the pro-tariff Republican Party won the presidency with Abraham Lincoln in 1861. In the mid-twentieth century, Soviet autarky – ‘socialism in one country’ – and subsequent controlled trade can best be interpreted as an anti-core development strategy, as we argued in the previous chapter. And the ‘hidden protectionism’ of post-Second World War Japan has been an ongoing issue of contention with the United States today.

The dilemma for the periphery

Friedrich List advocated free trade as the tariff policy of the periphery. In fact, there have been and continue to be disputes within peripheral countries on the best

---

**Table 3.1 Trade policies through three hegemonic cycles.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Core: ‘universal’ theory</th>
<th>Semi-periphery: political strategy</th>
<th>Periphery: dilemma and conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Grotius’s <em>Mare Liberum</em></td>
<td>England: Mun’s mercantilism</td>
<td>Eastern Europe: landowners vs burghers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France: Colbertism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>Smith’s laissez-faire</td>
<td>Germany: List’s protectionism</td>
<td>Latin America: ‘European party’ vs ‘American party’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ricardo’s comparative advantage</td>
<td>United States: Republican tariff Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Modern economics</td>
<td>Soviet Union: Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’</td>
<td>Africa and Asia: ‘capitalism’ vs ‘socialism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>orthodoxy’s free enterprise</td>
<td>Japan: ‘hidden protectionism’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Geography of imperialisms*
policy. Gunder Frank has described this for mid-nineteenth-century Latin America as a contest between the ‘American’ party and the ‘European’ party. The former wanted protection of local production and represented the local industrialists. The latter were liberals who favoured free trade and were supported by landed interests, who wished to export their products to the core and receive back better and cheaper industrial goods than could be produced locally. Generally speaking, the ‘European party’ won the political contest and free trade triumphed. It is in this sense that Frank talks of local capital in allegiance with metropolitan capital underdeveloping their own country. This is the collaboration relation in informal imperialism epitomized by nineteenth-century Latin American liberals. In contrast, in the United States the ‘American party’ (notably pro-tariff Republicans) was triumphant and the country did not become underdeveloped.

Frank’s political choices for Latin America in the second half of the nineteenth century can be identified in the two other classic cases of informal imperialism (see Table 3.1). His terminology is no longer appropriate – we shall rename his positions peripheral strategy (the European party) and semi-peripheral strategy (the American party). In Eastern Europe, the Counter-Reformation represents the triumph of Catholic landed interests over local burgher interests. In our new terms, the landed interests of Eastern Europe adopted a peripheral strategy and opened up their economy to the Dutch.

The current pattern of informal imperialism provides modern political leaders in the periphery with the same basic choice. In any particular state, which strategy is adopted will vary with the internal balance of political forces and their relation to core interests. This has been somewhat obscured, however, by the same ideological facade that confuses the geopolitics previously described. In post-colonial Africa, for instance, states referred to themselves in terms of the self-ascribed ideology of their governments Young (1982). The two most common categories were ‘populist socialism’ and ‘African capitalism’. In our framework, these represent semi-peripheral and peripheral strategies, respectively.

In Latin America, Venezuela embarked on a project of ‘socialism’ under the leadership of President Hugo Chavez. Revenues from the countries oil exports were designed to fund programs aimed at benefiting the poor and redistributing wealth. These policies were strongly resisted by the United States and other international actors. Since the death of President Chavez in 2013, the country has experienced economic hardship amidst allegations of government corruption and human rights violations. An alternative story can be found in Vietnam, a country that has moved from being the focal point of the challenge to American hegemony in the Vietnam War to a country that has adopted polices akin to what we have called the peripheral strategy. Since the late 1980s the country has adopted polices of offering tax breaks and low tariffs to attract investment by multinational corporations. As a result, its economy has been growing at a rate above six per cent. However, whether this growth will be sustainable and allow Vietnam to create an economy with a mix of core and periphery processes is open to question. In our core-periphery model it is possible that Vietnam can improve its position in the world-economy, but only through subtle movement to more semi-peripheral approaches. And in any case there is no certainty of success: in the three-tier hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy there will always be limited opportunity for movement due to the prevalence of systemic structural relations.

Informal imperialism as a structural relation

Our general argument can be summarized as saying that core states, especially hegemonic core states, have a structural advantage in the world-economy. By ‘structural’, we mean that the advantage is built into the whole operation of the world-economy. This is more than a mere cumulative advantage – the system relies on this inequality as part of its functioning. Hence there are no solutions to overcoming world inequalities within the world-economy, but there are state strategies that can aid one state at the expense of the others. Wallerstein (1979) uses Tawney’s tadpole philosophy to illustrate this. Although a few tadpoles
will survive to become adult frogs, most will perish not because of their individual failings but because they are part of an ecology that limits the total number of frogs. Similarly, if all countries adopt ‘perfect’ policies for their own economic advance, such as Vietnam, this does not mean that all will rise to membership of the core. To have a core you need a periphery, and without both there would be no world-economy. In this situation, it is easier to maintain a core position than to rise upwards.

But what is the mechanism that maintains the core-periphery structure? The exact process has changed over the history of the world-economy and here we will concentrate upon the period of industrial capitalism. Our discussion is based loosely on Emmanuel’s (1972) concept of unequal exchange, in which we shall emphasize the political process. Emmanuel’s work is an attempt to explain the massive modern inequalities of the world-economy. Whereas before the mid-nineteenth century wages for direct producers were not very different across the various sectors of the world-economy, wage differences became very large (Figure 3.12). Why this change in the intensity of the core-periphery structure? The answer to this question provides us with the basic mechanism of informal imperialism.

The rise of social imperialism

Emmanuel’s starting point is the concept of a labour market. The rise of the world-economy initially produced ‘free’ labour in the core countries, where men and women were able to work for whom they pleased. But this freedom was a very hollow one when there were insufficient jobs or when wages were set by employers. In fact, ‘free’ labourers were no better off than their predecessors in feudal Europe and their lack of security might mean that they were worse off. The labour market operated initially on an individual basis, with the result that the more powerful party to the agreements – the employer – could force the lowest wages on the worker. In this situation, subsistence wages were the norm, with wage levels reflecting the price of bread, which would constitute up to half of a household’s expenditure. The purpose of wages was to sustain and reproduce the worker and no more. In classical economics, subsistence wages were just as ‘natural’ as free trade but, unlike the latter, this part of our economics heritage has not remained orthodox, at least in the core countries. Quite simply, economists were not able to keep wage levels off the political agenda.

Wages could rise above subsistence levels under certain circumstances. For instance, relative scarcity of labour would tip the balance of negotiations in favour of labour. Hence in the mid-nineteenth century the highest wages were not in the European core but in the new settler colonies – notably Australia – with their labour shortages. Marx also mentioned a ‘historical and moral element’ beyond the market, and it is this idea that Emmanuel develops. Marx had used this concept to cover such things as differences in climate and in consumption habits that lead to different levels of subsistence wage. Emmanuel adds a political dimension: where workers combine, they can negotiate from a position of strength in the labour market and obtain more than subsistence wages. This was recognized by politicians, who legislated against unions – in Britain through the Combination Acts of the early nineteenth century. Thompson (1968) argues that after 1832 in England a working-class politics emerged to challenge the state. Although initially unsuccessful, in the mid-nineteenth-century period of economic growth, unions consolidated their position and made economic gains for their members. Subsistence wages were no longer ‘natural’; the issue of wage level was negotiable. Although originally restricted to skilled workmen – Lenin’s labour aristocracy – unionism gradually spread to other workers. With the extension of the voting franchise, governments began to make further concessions to workers, culminating in the establishment of the
welfare state in the mid-twentieth century. This process was also going along in different ways but essentially the same direction in other countries, but only in core countries. Political pressure to increase the well-being of the dominated class has been successful only in core and a few semi-peripheral countries. The end result has been a high-wage core and a low-wage periphery, reflecting both the ‘social imperialism’ and ‘division’ relations described previously (see Figure 3.2).

Stagnating wages and challenges to organized labour in core countries in the past few years pose questions about how this historical process will play out in a new Kondratieff A-phase. It is most likely that workers in some sectors of the economy in core countries will no longer be guaranteed established protections as what were core industries become peripheralized. For example, it is likely that manufacturing jobs in the United States and Western Europe will continue to be lost to countries like Vietnam. These country-by-country dynamics occur within, and re-create, the structural inequalities of the three-tier hierarchy. We now turn to the key mechanism that maintains the core-periphery structure.

The key mechanism: unequal exchange
Modern massive material inequalities at the world scale reflect relatively successful political pressure from the dominated class in the core and the lack of any such success in the periphery. But how does this contrast help to maintain the current structure of core and periphery? This is where unequal exchange comes in. Every transaction between core and periphery is priced in a world market that incorporates these inequalities into its operation. Hence peripheral goods are ‘cheap’ and core goods are ‘expensive’. When a German consumer buys Ghanaian cocoa, low Ghanaian wages are incorporated into the price. When a Ghanaian consumer buys a German car, high German wages are incorporated into the price. This is not just a matter of different technology levels, although these are interwoven with unequal exchange; the essential difference is in social relations at each location – the relative strength of the German worker compared with his or her Ghanaian equivalent. This has long been understood: In 1966, for instance, it was estimated that the peripheral countries’ trade of US$35 billion would have been ‘worth’ US$57 billion if produced under high-wage conditions (Frank 1978: 107). The shortfall of US$22 billion is the result of unequal exchange. Needless to say, this was very much greater than all aid programmes put together. It is the difference between social imperialism and subsistence wages.

We have now reached the crux of our argument. The interweaving of class conflict at a state scale and the core-periphery conflict at the global scale through the process of unequal exchange produces the uneven development so characteristic of our world. And the beauty of this process is that it goes on day after day unrevealed. Unlike free trade and subsistence wages, which have been victims of political action, the world market remains off the political agenda. It cannot be otherwise in a world divided into many states where each has its own separate politics. Unequal exchange is an integrated mixture of inter-state and intra-state issues that conventional international politics cannot deal with. The world market appears to be based upon the impersonal forces of supply and demand, which determine prices. The only issues that arise are the terms of trade or the balance of prices between core and periphery goods. The fact that these terms do not reflect the hidden hand of the market but are defined by centuries of imperialism producing global differentials in labour costs is conveniently forgotten. This non-decision making represents a major political achievement of the dominant interests of the modern world-economy.

Technological shift and the persistence of global inequality
The core-periphery hierarchy has been a constant feature of the capitalist world-economy. However, that does not mean that it lacks dynamism. Indeed, it is expected that as new industries are created in the world-economy they will replace the previous innovations as the most profitable. To maintain the profitability of the former lead-sector industries, production costs must be reduced. One method of doing this is to reduce labour costs. In world-systems
language, these older industries will be in the economic sphere of peripheral processes and their low wages. Often, such a transition will entail a geographical move too. And then scholars in the developmentalist school argue that the consequent industrialization of countries is evidence of development or progress. However, world-systems analysis focuses more upon the maintenance of relative economic position within the core-periphery structure. Industrialization by a process of gaining industries that are less profitable than newly emerging industries is unlikely to close the gap between rich and poor zones of the world-economy. What is necessary is a focus upon wealth rather than industry.

We utilize research by Arrighi et al. (2003) to show how this process works. Table 3.2 shows the geographical shifts in the manufacturing industry from 1960. The numbers represent a region’s share of manufacturing in relation to the ‘first world’, or those countries of the world where core processes predominate. All the regions of the ‘third world’ (or countries where peripheral processes predominate) have increased their relative share of manufacturing. Notably, in 1998 Latin America, east Asia and China had surpassed the first world as sites for manufacturing industry. In the first world, all regions except Japan had decreased the proportion of the manufacturing industry in their economy.

Table 3.3 tells a very different story. The wealth of the same regions is represented as a share of the first world’s wealth. Instead of wealth becoming more equitable as manufacturing industry moved from first to third world, disparities actually increased. The disparity with the first world grew in all of the third world regions except east Asia and China. Notably, in the first world, the relative wealth of North America and Western Europe declined as Japan’s rose.

A developmentalist approach would point to the way that individual countries are increasing the share of manufacturing industry within their economies as a whole. This is the assumption that the meaningful unit of analysis is the country. In contrast, the world-systems perspective understands shifts in the geography of global manufacturing as a feature of the system as a whole, the capitalist world-economy. It is not so much the role of manufacturing in a particular country, but the type of industrial activity – defined by whether it is an expression of contemporary core or periphery processes. Table 3.4 compares the value added by manufacturing processes for a selection of countries. It shows that economies such as the United States and Germany are involved in manufacturing

### Table 3.2 Region’s manufacturing GDP as a percentage of first world GDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia and north Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia (excl. China and Japan)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third world</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First world</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arrighi et al. (2003).
activities that add a lot of value through the process, an expression of core activities. The opposite is true for countries such as Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo where little value is added during manufacturing processes sited within their borders.

The overall core-periphery structure of the world-economy remains constant. The temporal dynamism of the system produces what on the surface are dramatic changes – the industrialization of Asia for example. The structural approach does not deny the widespread impact that such change will have on the politics and sociology of particular countries, the environmental impacts and the improvements in material well-being for many people. However, it is also important to note that the world-system as a whole does not become more equitable as a result of such industrial shifts. The core-periphery structure and the range of inequities it entails endures.

### Households in informal imperialism under American hegemony

The main economic agents of today’s informal imperialism are the large corporations that produce and trade across several states. These have been the major economic feature of US hegemony and the decline of that hegemony has been marked by first, a rise of western European and Japanese corporations, and, second, a rise from other regions and countries too. The relationship between these economic enterprises and the states they operate in is a very important issue, which we deal with in some detail in Chapter 4. Here we concentrate on the way in which informal imperialism operates below the scale of the state and corporation. Individuals organize their lives

### Table 3.3 Region’s per capita GNP as a percentage of first world’s per capita GNP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia and north Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia (excl. China and Japan)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third world</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First world</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arrighi et al. (2003).

### Table 3.4 Value added in manufacturing industries, 2014 (measured in 2010 US dollars).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.88 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>764.98 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>224.08 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>340.97 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>277.79 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>229.96 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>52.02 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>26.89 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>21.50 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Dem Rep.</td>
<td>5.42 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2.42 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informal imperialism is a set of political and economic relations that maintain the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy. As new innovations and forms of economic activity have come and gone over the *longue durée* of the capitalist world-economy the structural nature of core-periphery relations have been a constant. In the current context of high-tech industry as being one of a cluster of new innovations we can reflect on one aspect of the geography of this industry: we throw away a lot of computers and other electronic goods; where do they go?

It is estimated that in 2006 Canada alone disposed of over 140,000 tonnes of obsolete electronic equipment, the equivalent of 1 billion iPhones (Lepawsky and McNabb 2010). Somewhere between 20 and 50 million tonnes of e-waste are generated each year, and increasing at a rate much larger than other forms of waste (Lepawsky and McNabb 2010). One end of this chain is core level consumption that allows many people in a country such as Canada to purchase all sorts of electronic equipment. The other end of the chain is a number of massive waste dumps where old and obsolete economic equipment is thrown away. The people, often young children, who sort through this waste and try to sell parts of it (such as copper) for recycling are one example of contemporary periphery processes: a hazardous and very low-paid job for a very low income in which the product (waste to recycled element) adds a very low amount of value.

Yet to see this process on a broad scale of core-periphery misses the complex geography of the disposal and trade of e-waste. One could assume that the geography of e-waste trade would simply be one of core countries exporting their waste to peripheral countries. Instead, the geography of e-waste trade reflects the broader pattern of global trade. Europe, the Americas and Asia are the three largest trading areas, and the vast majority of the trade is *internal* to those regions (Lepawsky and McNabb 2010). In fact, in 2001 Africa exported its e-waste to Korea and Spain (see Figure 3.13). This more complex geography is the result of the capitalist world-economy being able to add value (to varying degrees) to almost everything:-

---

**Figure 3.13** The geography of the e-waste trade.
through households and the question arises as to how this institution relates to informal imperialism. In fact, households are integral to the operation of unequal exchange.

For unequal exchange to occur, we require two zones where direct producers obtain very different levels of remuneration for their labours. We have already considered how high-wage and low-wage zones come about, but why do they still exist? What are the mechanisms that enable core and periphery to be reproduced in the day-to-day activities of individuals? The answer is that in each zone different types of household have been created to accommodate different levels of resources. In this way, the households become part of the structure through which imperialism continues.

Wallerstein (1983) has introduced the concepts of proletarian and semi-proletarian households to describe the different institutions in core and periphery. Proletarian households derive most of their income from waged work. They evolved out of the social imperialism and welfare state developments in the core states in the first half of the twentieth century. As the direct producers obtained higher wages, a new form of household, centred upon the nuclear family, was created. Older forms of household covering a larger extended family could be displaced when a single wage became large enough to maintain the immediate family of the wage earner. In the ideal form of this new household, the husband becomes the sole ‘breadwinner’, the wife becomes a ‘housewife’ and the children are full-time at school. This produces a patriarchy where women are relegated to the private sphere of the home, so their work is unwaged and largely unrecognized. This leaves men with their wages as the providers of all necessary items from outside the household. Their role as head of household is therefore predictable and almost seems ‘natural’.

This household form expanded with US hegemony. The 1947 General Motors–Auto Workers Union deal is usually seen as symbolic because the corporation conceded the high wages to sustain the new proletarian household. The suburban way of life for direct producers was born and J. K. Galbraith (1958) announced that we had now entered a new sort of society, the ‘affluent society’ no less. As the Kondratieff boom spread to Europe after 1950, so too did the affluent society and its associated consumerism. But this is only the first part of only half the story.

Meanwhile, in the periphery economic changes were reinforcing a very different form of household. These are termed semi-proletarian because wages constitute only a minority of household income. In this low-wage zone, it is not possible for one person to be the sole breadwinner. Hence other members of the household have to contribute various forms of income for their survival. An example will help to clarify the situation. In the spatial division of labour
we have described in Africa (see Figure 3.10), for instance, households straddle the different geographical zones, producing a distinct sexual division of labour. The different zones provide contrasting opportunities for men and women. In the ‘islands’ producing commodities for the world-economy, for instance, male migrants who originate from the subsistence zone carry out much of the labour. These direct producers provide the main wage component of a household income. The other members of the household remain in the subsistence zone, where most of the labour is female and unwaged. This form of patriarchy is superficially similar to that described for the proletarian household, with the man controlling the cash, but in this case the cash is much less important to the household. Money from the migrants is necessary for payment of taxes and buying a few items in the market, but the bulk of a household’s day-to-day needs are produced within the household. It is this subsistence activity that enables low wages to be paid to the migrant males. In effect, the women of the subsistence zone are subsidizing the male labour of the world-economy production zones.

Such migrant-labour households have been common throughout the periphery, but they constitute just one of several semi-proletarian household types. Their common feature is that they transfer reproduction costs away from the production costs for the world market. Hence necessary activities, such as rearing children for the next generation of labour and the looking after of the previous generation of labour after their working lives, are not costed in the pricing of commodities originating from the periphery to the same degree as for commodities from the core. Hence buyers of core goods in the periphery pay a price that contributes to the welfare of direct producers in the core, while buyers of periphery goods in the core do not make the same contribution to the welfare of direct producers in the periphery. Thus patriarchy has been moulded in different contexts to generate unequal exchange.

There have been important changes in recent years that have modified the simple pattern of household structures we have just described. In the core, the ‘ideal’ proletarian household based upon one wage has been severely eroded by the massive increase of women in the labour force. The patriarchy represented by the notion of a male breadwinner has been undermined by the ideas generated by the women’s movement from the late 1950s onwards. Simultaneously, the spread of mass-production techniques created a need for additional labour that women could supply. Hence proletarian households in the core have become even more ‘proletarian’ as they typically rely on more than one wage to maintain their standard of life. This has meant even higher levels of commodity consumption by core households, which has contributed to the maintenance of the vast material differences between core and periphery. Never doubt that the ubiquitous suburban shopping malls of the rich countries are political symbols of the continuing world victory of the core.

Meanwhile, in parts of the periphery new developments have also been occurring, involving bringing more women into the waged workforce. As discussed previously, since the 1960s there has been appreciable growth of industrial production outside the core (Table 3.2). This is sometimes referred to as the new international division of labour. In south-east Asia, for instance, a massive electronics industry has grown up employing large numbers of women. Interpretation of this industrial growth has been confused by a popular assumption that industry is a property of core countries, leaving the periphery to produce agricultural goods and raw materials, as we dismissed earlier (Arrighi et al. 2003). If this assumption is accepted, then the new international division of labour represents a genuine deperipheralization process. But we have already disposed of the ‘industry equals core’ argument. In world-systems analysis, core production processes involve relatively high-wage, high-technology activities irrespective of the commodity produced. Throughout its hegemony and beyond, the US has been the major agricultural exporter on the world market, for example. The important point is how the production is organized – the social relations of production – not what happens to be produced. Hence peripheral production processes are compatible with industrial activity where the latter is relatively low wage and low technology. Electronics
components production can be either core-like or periphery-like, depending upon the social relations of production. In south-east Asia, the components are produced in a periphery production process that uses the patriarchy of the region in a new way. A workforce of young women has been created whose gender subordination is translated into ‘docile, subservient and cheap’ labour (Momsen and Townsend 1987: 79). Hence the increased proletarianization of households is not resulting in appreciable increases in the affluence of the households. The low wages ensure that, despite industrialization of the periphery, unequal exchange continues unabated.

**Gender, globalization and scale**

Globalization is a term that seems to imply blanket coverage of the world, processes leading to homogenization. This has been expressed, in terms of finance, as ‘the end of geography’ (O’Brien 1992). Michael Storper (1997: 27), however, sees it as ‘quite curious that a fundamentally geographical process labelled with a geographical term – ‘globalization’ – is analysed as a set of resource flows largely without considering their interactions with the territoriality of economic development’. We are at one with this position. Quite simply: ‘Higher systemic integration has not replaced core/periphery structures or core rivalry’ (Marshall 1996: 886). Hence the question becomes not whether globalization has replaced imperialism but how does imperialism operate under conditions of globalization? It might be much more complex than earlier spatial structures, but even researchers who doubt the continuing salience of core-periphery concepts nevertheless fall back on just such analysis in their comparative studies (Castells 1996: 108).

The identification of households as an arena of politics is a key conceptual tool that achieves two related tasks. Households are a particular construction of geographical scale that is simultaneously local and global. The gender relations that are evident in semi-proletarian households are everyday manifestations of gender roles that are proscribed and resisted. At the same time, they play a functional role in maintaining inequalities in wage levels that is an essential component of the core-periphery hierarchy.

A feminist approach to globalization and North–South differences is effective in showing how women have usually been excluded from analyses of globalization through a variety of binary frameworks (Table 3.5). In sum, these frameworks separate the global from the local and relegate women to the latter. The twin consequences of these dichotomies are that women are conceptualized as passive victims on the margins of theoretical understandings of the capitalist world-economy and also ‘bit players’ in the grand and abstract processes of global finance and economic restructuring (Roberts 2004).

However, the gendered relations within the semi-proletarian household clearly show the importance of women in the sphere of production and how women’s labour is an integral component of the structure of the world-economy. ‘Local’ and ‘global’ are not oppositions, but rather a nexus of activity. In combination, such activity creates and maintains the capitalist world-economy requiring a hybrid combination of production and consumption, and formal and informal labour that shows the essential nature of gendered roles in all activity, rather than

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy/market</td>
<td>Culture/nonmarket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Ethnography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal sector</td>
<td>Informal sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>Micro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason/logic</td>
<td>Affect/emotion/belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent/action</td>
<td>Victim/passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Everyday life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Particular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

activities that can be marginalized through binary distinctions (Roberts 2004).

Roberts (2004) explores how the contemporary neo-liberal rhetoric and practices of globalization aim to construct gender roles in a particular way. Neo-liberalism, as the contemporary expression of informal imperialism, requires creating particular gender roles in the periphery. In Chapters 1 and 2 we identified the current period of globalization as a moment on the cyclical dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. Roberts takes a different approach and sees globalization as a label for a new form of economics known as neo-liberalism: ‘the bundle of discourses and social practices that in large part animate the dynamics of the contemporary global economy’ (Roberts 2004: 135). Neo-liberalism opens markets by reducing or eradicating barriers to trade and finance erected by states, the World Trade Organization being the key site of agency. Neo-liberalism also extends the economic scope of markets by privatizing what were once communal assets such as water and land.

To undertake neo-liberal projects dominant representations of the world are offered that fall under the broad rubric of ‘development’ and ‘progress’. Both are constant ideological elements of the capitalist world-economy. Following the feminists’ identification of the local and the global as part of a continuum, the struggle of marginalized groups is a central component of world-systems analysis as the nature of political change is seen to emanate from the periphery of the capitalist world-economy rather than from the core (Amin et al. 1990). This view is in contrast to orthodox Marxism that identifies the most industrialized parts of the world as the venues for socialist revolution. Instead, the world-systems approach views the material exploitation of the periphery (as profits flow to the core) and its marginalization through racist structures and representations as generating an opposition to the ideology of capitalist ‘development’ that may provoke new post-capitalist politics and society. Although the efficacy and likelihood of such actions may be debated, the world-systems view of the world echoes the post-structural belief that change emerges from the margins of society (Cope 2004).

The world-systems approach identifies the power relationships within the capitalist world-economy and so helps situate or conceptualize the ‘Anglo gaze’ of social science. However, its structural approach can also be identified as a hegemonic white-male Anglocentric perspective. The balance is for the world-systems approach to give temporal and spatial context the voices of those marginalized within the capitalist world-economy without forcing their words into a pre-established theoretical framework. We acknowledge the theoretical tensions between post-colonial studies and the world-systems approach, but think they are ‘creative tensions’. A broad geographical and temporal framework is, we believe, a productive complement to attempts to give voice to political alternatives and insights voiced by those marginalized within the capitalist world-economy.
neo-liberalism identifies women as objects in four ways that simultaneously promote certain gender roles within the much larger neo-liberal project (Roberts 2004: 135):

- Women are seen as individual market actors rather than as a group.
- Women are seen as ‘human capital’ to be ‘developed’ through education and training.
- Women are seen as political subjects with human rights.
- Women are seen as ‘social capital’ active in civil society, especially non-governmental organizations.

In general, these four ways of trying to define women relate to the drive to maximize profit in a moment of global economic restructuring. From our discussion of ‘islands of development’ in colonial Africa to present-day neo-liberalism we can see that the household is a key site of the politics of imperialism. Women are essential actors in the processes of imperialism, but, as we shall see in the next section, have been active in a politics of resisting imperialism.

### ‘Empire’ and infrastructure in the twenty-first century

With the War on Terror ‘empire’ made a comeback. After being dispatched to history as a positive politics in the wake of the First World War, the changing geopolitical code of the United States ushered in two competing polemical usages of the word ‘empire’. Some neo-conservative commentators in the United States embraced the term ‘empire’, seeing it as the current form of an unquestioned right and duty of the United States to do good in the world (Boot 2002; Ignatieff 2003). At the same time the negative connotation was also pushed: critics of the War on Terror noted the disapproving baggage that is attached to the word ‘empire’ and used it to paint the foreign policy of President George W. Bush in colours that evoked images of racist colonial officers and military expeditions to pacify swathes of territory and their indigenous populations, all in the name of economic exploitation (Johnson 2004; Boggs 2005).

Both usages were careless in their conceptualization of what imperialism actually has been and is. However, in a parallel development, social scientists thought about ‘empire’ in a more systematic manner. Political scientist Joseph Nye focused on the role of ‘soft power’ in the projection of US influence across the globe. Soft power, ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ (Nye 2004: 256), is the geopolitical role played by a country’s culture and political ideals. It is not just a matter of rhetoric. The power of the United States should be judged by its policies and actions and Nye (2004) lamented that coercion, or ‘hard power’, is the dominant form of US presence in the world, resulting in increasing anti-Americanism and declining appreciation of American cultural products.

The term ‘empire’ has increased in popularity because of the military dominance of the United States, its declaration of the War on Terror, the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US forces in those countries. The manifestation of coercive power is clear and present. Nye (2004) argues that the form of

---

**Summary**

In this section we have:

- introduced the concept informal imperialism;
- related the practice of informal imperialism to the actions of the hegemonic power;
- related the practice of informal imperialism to the maintenance of the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy;
- situated political decisions made in the core and periphery to the dynamics of informal imperialism and the persistent core-periphery structure;
- illustrated how informal imperialism is constructed by, and partially determines the actions of, households;
- shown the role of the feminist perspective in understanding the practice of informal imperialism.
intervention is overly militaristic and is counter-productive. In other words, ‘empire’ is primarily a matter of military conquest rather than creating a set of countries with the political and cultural values of the United States and who show allegiance to the dominant power. Related work emphasizes the militaristic stance of the United States and its reliance upon coercive power (see, for example, Bacevich 2002; Johnson 2004; Klare 2004; Boggs 2005). In this body of work the United States is identified as resorting to a militaristic foreign policy in the face of increasing resistance to its authority abroad. However, and agreeing with Nye (2004), we argue that military power is not a sign of strength, but a sign that its hegemonic ability to set the global agenda is waning (Boulding 1990). Such a drift into military expeditions makes sense from our cyclical world-systems approach. We saw that Britain’s hegemonic decline was related to increasing military expeditions abroad and the need for a greater colonial presence.

Our cyclical model of hegemony and its periods of formal and informal imperialism leads us to expect developments in the world that run counter to the increased militarism of United States’ geopolitical code. Our historical model allows us to look to the past to think about the present and the future. In 1921 the American political geographer Isaiah Bowman wrote what became an important textbook, provocatively entitled The New World. His goal was to make Americans aware of their position and growing role in the world (Smith 2003). This is the opening paragraph of the fourth edition of his book:

> With a rapidly increasing rate of farm production in the United States and an even more rapid growth of city population bent on increasing industrial output and trade, the foreign commerce of the United States has grown to striking proportions. The process, though not new, has been greatly hastened in recent years. Since the beginning of the World War [One] the United States has increased its foreign investments fourfold, doubled its foreign commerce, and become the creditor of sixteen European nations. It was hardly an accident that the reparation problem was at least partly solved by the adoption of a plan of American origin.

(Bowman 1928: iii)

In our interpretation of the geopolitical codes of hegemonic powers, this is exactly what we would expect an American geographer to be saying at that moment in the paired-Kondratieff model of hegemony. The essence of Bowman’s statement is that the United States economy has become so large that it requires free-trade with the rest of the world to sustain its growth. Furthermore, such interaction with the rest of the world is seen as benefitting the whole world and not just satisfying the self-interest of the United States (Smith 2003). One more thing, the quote conveys the belief that such advancement of United States interests, and its increasing role and presence in other countries, can be achieved solely through economic activity and not military intervention. In other words, at this moment in the hegemonic cycle Bowman believed economic influence and Nye’s (2004) ‘soft power’ could advance United States interests. There was no need, at least rhetorically, to think of the type of militaristic policies that scholars such as Bacevich (2002) and Johnson (2004) think the United States is practising now, at the opposite end of the hegemonic cycle.

The strength of our cyclical model is that we can interpret contemporary behaviour through the same lens and make historical comparisons. In the contemporary context, another state in a similar economic situation would be likely to attempt similar policies with a global scope to those conducted by the United States about a hundred years ago. Our model situates political behaviour and does not determine it. However, it does lead to expectations of the type of politics we should see that helps interpret the actions of states. The economic growth of China is the most obvious comparison. Our cyclical perspective creates an expectation that the same vision of global infrastructure connections and trade driven by domestic economic changes that Bowman identified are occurring again, but as a part of China’s geopolitical code. The space-time context of the capitalist world-economy is one in which a more militaristic policy of the declining hegemonic power occurs at the same time as a strategy of informal imperialism by a state increasing its role in the world.

China has initiated a bold plan to create a new infrastructure network across Eurasia, that it has
called ‘One Belt, One Road’ or OBOR (Figure 3.14). The plan consists of two major and connected networks: the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). The MSRI and the SREB are referred to by Chinese policymakers as a return to China’s history and the ancient Silk Road that used ocean and land routes to establish trade across Eurasia and into the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and on to Europe (Blanchard and Flint 2017).

The OBOR stretches across China from its east coast manufacturing sites, such as those near the cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou, through its western region and across Central Asia to reach Europe. One of the goals of OBOR is to make sure the country is integrated and that all regions are part of China’s economic growth (Summers 2016). This goal is driven by a concern that China’s economic growth is in a situation of over-capacity; its recent dramatic economic growth cannot be sustained solely by domestic consumption. Instead, it must further promote its export economy (Zhang 2017). Such was Bowman’s concern for the economy of the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The MSRI route runs through the South China Sea, through the Malacca Straits and into the Indian Ocean, where it branches to reach the east coast countries of Africa (such as Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania) or the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The two routes complement each other so that, for example, new land routes connect ports on the east coast of Africa to inland states. The MSRI will link in to many land-based transportation corridors such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the already existing United Nations Economic and Social Commission Trans-Asia Railway, the Mekong River Development initiative, the China-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the multilateral Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program. The ever-expanding nature of the MSRI was evident in the April 2015 announcement that it will be extended to the South Pacific (Blanchard and Flint 2017).

The OBOR project consists of a multitude of hard infrastructure projects such as high-speed railways, highways, air and sea ports, power grids, oil and natural gas pipelines and telecommunication.

![Figure 3.14 China’s One Belt, One Road infrastructure project.](image-url)
networks (Blanchard and Flint 2017). These forms of transportation networks will connect large industrial parks and special economic zones. Investment in these infrastructure projects will require, and catalyse, investments in economic activities such as shipping, tourism, information technology and alternative energy (Blanchard and Flint 2017).

The OBOR project, as a combination of many regional and smaller projects, is an example of a vast infrastructure project designed to project the economic power of China across the globe (Ye 2015). It will require the development of soft infrastructure such as free trade agreements, financial institutions, aid accords to build the infrastructure, and other agreements that enable investment and an increasing number of greater cargo, passenger flights (Blanchard and Flint 2017). The connections and influence that these agreements will establish across Eurasia can be seen as a form of soft power (Nye 2004).

The MSRI and the SREB have important geopolitical implications (Lushenko and Hardy 2016). Brewster (2017) points out that in combination the two schemes will transform the established geopolitical realties of the Indian Ocean region and Central Asia. Prior to the land linkages being constructed from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, especially the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, naval control of the Indian Ocean did not translate into control of central Eurasia because of the barrier of the Himalayas. Linking Central Asia and the Indian Ocean would lead to new geopolitical calculations. It is exactly this new scenario that means India must revamp its geopolitical code in a way that takes advantage of the economic opportunities gained through greater ties with China that the OBOR produces, while also calculating security concerns (Palit 2017).

The OBOR is a central component of China’s geopolitical code. It builds upon the country’s economic strengths (its manufacturing output and capital) to address its needs (the problem of domestic over-capacity). In the process, it hopes to balance growth within China to bind the country together while expanding opportunities for economic connections across Eurasia, into Africa, and Europe. Inevitably, its political and military presence will grow along with these economic opportunities. China, with its history of being the victim of formal imperialism, refutes any suggestions that it is acting in an imperial or hegemonic fashion. Instead, the OBOR is represented as a ‘win-win’ opportunity that will benefit all countries involved (Blanchard 2017). Yet this is the language of developmentalism that we began the chapter with. Such sentiments also echo Bowman’s claims of acting for the good of humanity in his outlook at the beginning of the American century.

Time will tell whether the OBOR is successful or not, and whether any success ushers in a new form of economic relations that do not reinforce the structural relations of imperialism identified by Galtung (1971) that we believe are an integral part of the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy. Can the OBOR be truly transformative? Or will it create a new pattern of economic exchange, but one that still promotes unequal exchange and the structural relations of imperialism?

One logic of contemporary imperialism

Reading different sections of the same newspaper can produce a very different understanding of contemporary global dynamics. The business section can emphasize trade relations and the mutual benefit of economic interaction for countries. The coverage of global politics can emphasize tensions and potential conflicts. This is clearly the case for ongoing relations between the United States and China. Either the processes of global capital are portrayed or the tensions between the countries are evoked to raise questions about future war. In our view, such analyses are inadequate because they focus on either a political (security) logic, or an economic logic: processes of geopolitics and imperialism are separated. Instead, we employ the one logic of political economy to see the imperialism and geopolitics as inter-related aspects of competition within the capitalist world-economy.

Hegemonic powers and rising powers are especially interesting cases to explore the one logic. The United States, as hegemonic power, faces the
particular challenge of operating in an extra-territorial manner that requires relatively porous borders. On the other hand, the United States is still a state and must use its borders to provide security to its citizens. The tension between extra-territoriality and territorial sovereignty is a ‘hegemonic dilemma’ (Flint 2004). The tension became clear in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The ‘hegemonic dilemma’ remains central to the political debate within the United States as the ‘benefits’ of free trade and other aspects of what is called ‘globalization’ are seen in opposition to a sense of ‘economic nationalism’ and restrictions upon immigration. The same political arguments are occurring in Europe, Australia and South Africa. However, it is the hegemonic power, with its role of promoting a liberal agenda of free trade, which faces the greatest struggle in balancing the dilemma between porous borders and security.

Rising powers face similar tensions to the ‘hegemonic dilemma’, but in reverse. The country is trying to define the geographic extent of its sovereignty at the same time it is creating transport and economic networks. China’s growing economic presence requires it to build international institutions and change its orientation from an inward looking to an externally oriented economy. Greater porosity of borders, at least in the form of outflows, is part of the process. However, the OBOR project and its emphasis on connectivity is being built at the same time China is raising tensions in the South China Sea through its claims to sovereignty over the ocean and particular islands that are claimed by other countries. China is trying to create a sense of security for its ‘near waters’ that would minimize the ability of the United States to project its power into the western Pacific (Burgess 2016). In the process, China is attempting to redraw the geographic extent of its territorial sovereignty while increasing its interaction with the world through building institutions and infrastructure.

The debates within the United States over the relative porosity of its borders and the level of its military and institutional engagement overseas are an expression of the ‘hegemonic dilemma’ in a particular moment of the hegemonic cycle (Flint 2004). For China its new geopolitical code must also balance economic interaction with an attempt to define the geography of its territorial sovereignty. The integration of economic and political calculations of these two countries can be interpreted as related elements of imperial geopolitical codes; different elements of a political economy logic. Physical military presence, institutions and economic activity have been part of the geopolitical codes of countries that operate within the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy; especially for the powerful, or ‘imperial,’ states. Our cyclical model illustrates that contemporary policies and tensions have more than an echo of British nineteenth-century style formal imperialisms while displaying contemporary manifestations.

Summary
In this section we have:
• introduced the contemporary term ‘empire’;
• situated ‘empire’ within the temporal context of hegemonic cycles;
• emphasized the ‘one logic’ of the world-systems approach.
Chapter summary

In this chapter we have:

• discussed the original theories of imperialism, the Hobson–Lenin paradigm;
• introduced Marxist theories of the state;
• built upon these theories to form a world-systems and political geography explanation of imperialisms;
• introduced the concepts formal and informal imperialism and noted the persistence of core-periphery differences;
• described the cyclical dynamics of formal and informal imperialism;
• situated the politics of imperialism within the cyclical dynamics by discussing trade policy and 'social imperialism';
• introduced the concept of ‘unequal exchange’ to explain the construction and maintenance of core-periphery differences;
• introduced the contemporary term ‘empire’ and situated it within our political economy approach.

In summary, the persistent core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy has been maintained by a number of different practices and beliefs that have been referred to as ‘imperialism’ or ‘empire’. We have shown that it is wrong to view these practices as existing only at the global scale as they are a product of household, intra-state and inter-state politics and the decisions and practices of businesses. Only by considering the interplay of different political actors, at different geographical scales, in different geographical locations, within the temporal context of the paired-Kondratieff model, can imperialisms, past and present, be understood.

Key glossary terms from Chapter 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>administration</td>
<td>error of developmentalism</td>
<td>Kondratieff cycles (waves)</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autarky</td>
<td>feudalism</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>semi-periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism</td>
<td>First World War</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>social imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalist world-economy</td>
<td>formal imperialism</td>
<td>logistic wave</td>
<td>liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society</td>
<td>franchise</td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classes</td>
<td>free trade</td>
<td>militarism</td>
<td>sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>geopolitical code</td>
<td>multinational corporations</td>
<td>space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colonialism</td>
<td>geopolitics</td>
<td>Napoleonic Wars</td>
<td>state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colony</td>
<td>globalization</td>
<td>nation-state</td>
<td>structural power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>government</td>
<td>neo-conservative</td>
<td>territoriality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>heartland–rimland thesis</td>
<td>neo-liberal</td>
<td>third world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>containment</td>
<td>hegemony</td>
<td>non-decision making</td>
<td>transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core</td>
<td>households</td>
<td>partition</td>
<td>Treaty of Tordesillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decolonization</td>
<td>human rights</td>
<td>patriarchy</td>
<td>unequal exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependency</td>
<td>ideology</td>
<td>periphery</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development of underdevelopment</td>
<td>imperialism</td>
<td>power</td>
<td>world-economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite</td>
<td>informal imperialism</td>
<td>practical politics</td>
<td>world-empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empire</td>
<td>inter-state system</td>
<td>protectionism</td>
<td>world market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘empire’</td>
<td></td>
<td>protectorate</td>
<td>world-system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>world-systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Suggested reading


Activities

1. Go to the website www.awid.org and explore the articles and links. Identify at least three concepts we have introduced in Chapters 1 and 3 of this book, for example core and periphery processes, semi-proletarian households, formal and informal imperialism, neo-liberalism. In what way are these concepts engaged by the discussions on this site, and what forms of resistance are identified? (Hint: they will not use the same terminology as us, but are talking about the same issues.)

2. The concept of fair trade has been used to challenge the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy. Type in ‘fair trade’ in an internet search engine or try one of the following sites: www.fairtraderesource.org/ or www.fairtradefederation.org. Can you identify how the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy is addressed by these sites (Hint: they will not use the same terminology as us, but are talking about the same issues.)

3. Go to the website www.militarybases.com. By clicking on the map you can explore the type, size and date of establishment of US military bases, ports, airfields and other facilities across the globe. Plot the location and year of establishment of these bases on a map of the world. Does the historical geography of US bases relate to the cycles of hegemony model, especially the United States’ rise to power and the possible need to impose military order during a period of hegemonic decline?
CHAPTER 4
Territorial states

What this chapter covers

The making of the world political map
- The origin of territorial states: a topological model
  - Europe in 1500
  - Looking in and looking out
  - The two stages in creating territorial states
- Territory and sovereignty
  - Territory: security and opportunity
  - Sovereignty as international capacity
  - Conflicting territorial claims
  - Caliphate: a challenge to the territorial state
- Boundaries and capitals
  - Frontiers and boundaries
  - Capital cities as control centres
  - Dividing up the state
- Federalism and partition
  - Federalism: opportunity and diversity
  - Creating new states by partition

The nature of the states

Looking one way only: theories of the state
- Theories of the state and capitalism
- Feminist understandings of the state
- Seeing the state as negotiated outcome

Looking both ways: theory of the states
- One economy, many states
- State manoeuvrability: deriving a new instrumentalism
- State manoeuvrability and contemporary economic restructuring
- The variety of state forms: a space–time introduction

Territorial states under conditions of globalization
- Cities and states: different morals and different spaces

Riot control troops, Chunju, Republic of Korea, 14 June 1987. Source: © Nathan Benn/Corbis
Human activities are traditionally divided into three spheres: economic, political and socio-cultural. In turn, these activities define the entities that conventional social scientists study: the economy, the state and civil society. In practice, these are interpreted as spatially congruent; for instance, the French economy, the French state and French society are deemed to share identical boundaries, those that limit the sovereign territory of France. But, as was emphasized in Chapter 1, world-systems analysis does not take the conventional position on such matters. Rather than multiple national economies there is one capitalist world-economy; rather than multiple national societies there is one modern world-system.

They are two sides of a single logic of social change that has operated for half a millennium. But politics is different: part of the essence of the modern world-system is that there is no single world state (otherwise it would be transformed into a world-empire). Thus, in Chapter 1 we identified states as one of the key institutions of the modern world-system: the latter’s logic of social change incorporates multiple states or what Wallerstein (1984a) calls the inter-state system. This divided politics is essentially territorial in nature because sovereignty, legitimate political power, is defined as existing within the boundaries of states. It is territorial states that are the subject of this chapter.
The functions of the state are connected to the need to facilitate economic growth within the state’s territory that generates the tax base to support the state itself (Tilly 1990). With money from taxes, the state tends to its territory by providing two types of public goods; these are services available to all its citizens. First, there is the provision of security: a police force and judiciary for internal security, and armed forces for external security. The latter may involve war in the form of invading another state’s territory. Second, there is the provision of infrastructure to enable wealth creation: physical infrastructure and/or its regulation (for example, roads, airspace), and social infrastructure (for example, schools, hospitals) to reproduce a population that can serve as a workforce (Mann 1986).

Additional understanding of the state comes from a feminist perspective. Feminist geographers not only discourage separating civil society and economy, but frown upon separating the state from these, ostensibly, separate spheres as well. As noted above, the state is separated in world-systems analysis for good reason but much can be learned from entwining the political with the economic and social at a practical level. Although analytically distinctive, the state can only operate through and with economic and social processes. Thus, for feminists, ‘the market and civil society involve actors and processes that help constitute the state; the procedures and actors of the state similarly influence the market and civil society’ (Fincher 2004: 50). The important conclusions are that the state is multifaceted and contested, and that a key outcome is the process of differencing (Kobayashi 1997), defined as ‘complex sociospatial processes of empowering and enabling some people and marginalizing and oppressing others on bases of the differences they embody’ (Chouinard 2004: 235). The role of the state in creating differences and the political acts of resisting such state practices makes the state the fluid outcome of interaction between the ‘private’ spaces of the household, the traditional site of unpaid women’s work and the male-dominated ‘public’ sphere. To understand the state is to identify its pervasiveness or prosaic nature (Painter 2006), and to recognize that the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ is a false dualism. Complementing feminist understandings of the state is the strategic relational approach to the state (Jessop 2002) that sees it as a continually negotiated outcome between different institutions; such as state bureaucracies, organizations in civil society (such as churches), as well as corporate interests and unions (Kuus and Agnew 2008).

The state is manifest at various geographical scales, from the central to the local government. The exact form of the state is contingent on local circumstances, but in general the local state is seen to be ‘closer’ to the people than is the central bureaucracy and so helps to legitimate the state. However, the local state has agency too, and can enact policies that challenge the authority of the central state (Kirby 1993). The current form of the state must be understood within the broader context of globalization and the accompanying ideology of neo-liberalism. The result has been the devolution of state power, with greater responsibility for policies and the fostering of economic growth being placed on local governments. Accompanying this movement are new types of local state governance involving the creation of certain business and political behaviours that attempt to attract global investment (Ward 2005).

This introduction only begins to explore the complexity of the political geography of the state. But we have set out some of the tasks that face us in this chapter. First, we discuss how the world political map has been created. This was a major question for traditional political geographers but they tended to take a case-by-case approach to the spatial integration of states. Nevertheless, some of their concepts remain salient. In particular, Hartshorne’s (1950) idea that state integration is the outcome of two sets of contrary forces remains useful: centrifugal forces (for example, unequal development) pull the state apart whereas centripetal forces (such as a strong ‘state idea’ or iconography) help bind it together. We begin by exploring the origins of modern states through the use of a simple topological model of the state. This provides the framework for taking topics from traditional political geography and integrating them into a world-systems analysis of the inter-state system. This is important, because we are concerned with a world of multiple states – notice the title of this chapter is in the plural and not the singular.
However, understanding the creation of the world political map is only a preliminary stage for a world-systems analysis of how states operate in the world-economy. In the subsequent section, we look at more fundamental questions concerning the nature of the states themselves. The recent debates within theories of the state are briefly reviewed as contributions to understanding ‘stateness’, but we conclude that they are deficient in dealing with ‘inter-stateness’ – the structural condition of multiple states. Thus we argue for the need for a world-systems theory of the states, that is, of the inter-state system as a whole.

Given that a large element of the idea of contemporary globalization concerns ‘deterritorialization’, it follows that this literature is often dismissive of the current power of states. It is true that deterritorialization strikes at the very nature of the modern state, but it is not a simple matter of new social forces eliminating old political structures. Those structures are half a millennium old and are, therefore, unlikely to succumb easily to practices with a provenance of just a decade or so. World-systems treatment of inter-stateness points to a direction that does not mean a contemporary demise of the state but its reorientation in new and changing circumstances. The related subjects of citizenship and governance are discussed to illuminate how the state is implicated in the construction of differences as a means to negotiate globalization and maintain power relations of race, gender and class. In our concluding section of this chapter, we build upon the globalization debate through a discussion of the interaction between cities and states to show how our more historically sensitive approach to trans-state processes can put into context over-determined globalization theses on the demise of the state.

**Chapter framework**

The chapter is framed around four of the seven ideas we introduced at the end of the Prologue:

- The construction and maintenance of states is an essential *material* political geographical practice.
- The state is an entity and process that requires *conceptualization* in order to be understood.
- The growth and form of the state is *contextualized* in time and space.
- We identify the state as key political institution within the *wider whole* of the capitalist world-economy.

---

**The making of the world political map**

Probably the most familiar map of all is the one showing the territories of the states across the world. This world political map is the simple geographical expression of the inter-state system. The minimum requirement for any political geography is to understand this map. And yet the map itself is misleading, since it gives an impression of stability that is completely false. This may account in part for the surprise that many people have felt at the upheavals in the world political map since the East European revolutions of 1989. The addition of new states to the map in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is by no means unprecedented in the history of the inter-state system, however. We had become too accustomed to our current world map in the Cold War atmosphere before 1989. The simple fact is that any world political map, including today’s, provides only a snapshot of states at one point in time; the reality is that this pattern is forever changing. The world political map must be interpreted as a series of patterns that have changed drastically in the past and that will doubtless experience equally major changes in the future. Our concern is to understand how the world political map became the pattern we see today. This is both an empirical–historical question and a conceptual–theoretical question, and our answers will accordingly mix these two approaches.
The origin of territorial states: a topological model

It is sometimes hard for us to imagine a political world that is not organized through states. States are part of our taken-for-granted world and we hardly ever query their existence. States can even appear to be natural phenomena, which Jackson (1990: 7) blames on the world political map:

When schoolchildren are repeatedly shown a political map of the world . . . they can easily end up regarding [states] in the same light as the physical features such as rivers or mountain ranges which sometimes delimit their international boundaries. . . . Far from being natural entities, modern sovereign states are entirely historical artifacts the oldest of which have been in existence in their present shape and alignment only for the past three or four centuries.

Jackson’s reference to the history of modern states leads the way to counter their ascribed naturalness. Obviously, by describing a recent period when states such as the ones we experience did not exist we undermine their claim to be the only way in which politics can be organized. Furthermore, by investigating the emergence of the modern state we obtain some insights into its essential nature.

Europe in 1500

In 1500, Europe possessed a cultural homogeneity but was politically highly decentralized. As western Christendom under the leadership of the papacy, Europe consisted of a single civilization. But the Church’s secular power was quite limited, so that, politically, Europe constituted a very unusual world-empire. There was a nominal empire that claimed the Roman Empire’s heritage, the German ‘Holy Roman Empire’, but its authority extended to only a small part of Europe and even there its power was circumscribed. Europe was a complex mixture of hierarchies and territories through which power was organized.

Geographically, this complexity encompassed a variety of scales. First, there were the universal pretensions of the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, which, although failing to provide a centralized empire, did help to maintain a singular and distinct European political world. Second, and in contrast, there was an excessive localism, with scores of small political authorities scattered across Europe – orders of knights, cities, bishoprics, duchies – all independent for most practical purposes. Third, and loosely tying the localism to the universalism, there were myriad hierarchical linkages as the legacy of feudal Europe. Complexity is hardly an adequate description: Tilly (1975: 24) has estimated that there were 1,500 independent political units in Europe at this time.

How did our world of sovereign territorial states emerge from this situation? Certainly, we should not assume that it was inevitable that power would eventually concentrate at a single geographical scale between universalism and localism. Looking at the world from the vantage point of 1500, Tilly believes that there were five possible alternative futures for Europe: two of localism – continued decentralized feudal arrangements or a new decentralized trading network of cities; two of universalism – a Christian theocratic federation or a politically centralized empire; and the pattern of ‘medium-sized’ states that finally emerged. With hindsight, we can see that the last was to be most compatible with both the economic changes occurring with the emergence of capitalism and the military revolution that was changing the nature of warfare at that time.

Looking in and looking out

One of the features of the complexity of European politics in 1500 was that territories having allegiance to the same sovereign were usually spatially separated. In what Luard (1986) calls the ‘age of dynasties’ (1400–1559), territories were accumulated by families through a combination of war, marriage and inheritance. This process could lead to successful claims on territory by a family across all parts of Europe. For instance, the most successful family of the period, the Habsburg, accumulated territories in Spain, Austria, Italy and Burgundy to produce a ‘realm’ that is the geographical antithesis of the modern European state. It is only at the end of this period, according to Luard, that territorial claims began to focus on accumulating land to produce compact and contiguous states. For instance, in 1559
England gave up the French channel port of Calais and claims to other French territory. What does it mean to produce a world of such compact and contiguous states? At its most elementary, it produces a topology where each state is defined in terms of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. Hence the fundamental nature of the state consists of two relations, what we may term looking inwards and looking outwards. The former case concerns the state’s relations with its civil society, the social and economic activities that exist within its territory. The latter case has to do with the state’s relations with the rest of the inter-state system of which it is part. In much political analysis, these two relations are treated separately: state–civil society is the domain of political science; and state–state relations are the responsibility of the discipline of international relations. And this mirrors the popular view that divides politics into domestic and foreign policy. But it is the same state that operates in both spheres, looking inwards and outwards simultaneously. For our political geography, based as it is on articulating political relations across different geographical scales, this topological model of the state is the key starting point for understanding the states.

**The two stages in creating territorial states**

State apparatuses for dealing with domestic and external relations did not evolve at the same time. Strayer (1970) describes a situation where domestic political institutions preceded external ones by about three hundred years. His argument is that the medieval victory of the papacy over the Holy Roman Empire produced a power vacuum that the papacy could not fill. Hence across Europe in the thirteenth century political power accrued to middle-range kingdoms to fill the gap. These kingdoms, some of which have survived (Portugal, France, England) and some of which have not (Navarre, Naples, Burgundy), created only institutions to deal with internal affairs. They were really concerned with large-scale estate management, and the first permanent institutions were the high court and the treasury. Because of this narrow focus, Strayer terms them ‘law states’. This form of political organization was to survive the crisis of feudalism after 1350 and was ‘available’, as we have seen, alongside other political entities as Europe began to construct the modern world after 1500.

It is the existence of these law states before the modern world-system was in existence that allows some modern states to claim a continuity back to the medieval period. But this is misleading since only part of the essential nature of the modern state was created before 1500. Why were there no state institutions for the conduct of foreign affairs? The answer is simple: the concept of foreign affairs had no meaning in the chaotic political geography of the times. In any case, wars and dynastic marriages were family matters requiring the creation of no specialist arm of the state. This situation was slow to change, even during the sixteenth century with the emergence of more compact state territories. For instance, the state with the most advanced apparatus at this time was France, but even here creation of separate institutions for foreign affairs was slow. During the sixteenth century, the need for dealing with foreign matters was recognized, but this was made an added responsibility of the existing state apparatus. The arrangement was that there were four secretaries of state, each responsible for the internal security of a section of France but who in addition dealt with relations with foreign countries bordering on, or closest to, each section (Strayer 1970: 103). By the seventeenth century, France and other countries had evolved a state apparatus that included institutions to deal with external as well as internal relations. Unlike in the medieval period, there now existed an inter-state system, and all states had to compete as territorial entities to survive by looking both inwards and outwards. This was a new world politics premised on territory and sovereignty that we tend to take so much for granted today (Elden 2009). In the remainder of this section we look in more detail at the political processes operating within this inter-state system.

**Territory and sovereignty**

Jean Gottmann (1973: 16) has described the origins of the concept of territory. It derives from the Latin
and was originally applied to a city’s surrounding district over which it had jurisdiction. Its initial application was to city-states in the classical world and it reappeared to describe the jurisdictions of medieval Italian cities. It was never applied to the whole Roman Empire or to medieval Christendom, with their universal pretensions. ‘Territory’ implies a division of political power. In modern usage, its application to cities has become obsolete; it is now applied to modern states. A territory is the land belonging to a ruler of state. This meaning has been traced back to 1494, approximately to the birth of the world-economy.

The modern meaning of territory is closely tied up with the legal concept of sovereignty. In fact, this is a way in which it can be distinguished from the original city-scale definition. Sovereignty implies that there is one final and absolute authority in a political community (Hinsley 1966: 26). This concept was not evolved in the classical Greek world – city territories were not sovereign. Instead, Hinsley traces the concept back to the Roman Empire and the emperor’s imperium over the empire. This is a personal political domination with no explicit territorial link given the empire’s universal claims. It is this concept that was passed on to medieval Europe in Roman Law and is retained in modern language when a king or queen is referred to as the sovereign of a country. But medieval Europe under feudalism was a hierarchical system of power and authority, not a territorial one. The relations of lord and subject were personal ones of protection and service and were not territorially based. It is the bringing together of territory and sovereignty that provides the legal basis of the modern inter-state system. This emerged in the century after 1494 and was finalized by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. This is usually interpreted as the first treaty defining modern international law. It recognized that each state was sovereign in its own territory: that is, outside interference in the internal affairs of a country was the first offence of international law. The result was a formal recognition of a Europe parcelled up into three hundred sovereign units. This was the original territorial basis of the modern inter-state system – the first modern ‘world political map’.

 Territory: security and opportunity

This first mosaic of sovereign territories was a direct outcome of the strife resulting from the religious wars in Europe in the wake of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The crucial political issue of the day was order and stability, or rather the lack of it, and the territorial state emerged as the solution to the problem of security (Herz 1957). The legal concept of sovereignty was backed up by a ‘hard shell’ of defences that made it relatively impenetrable to foreign armies, so that it became the ultimate unit of protection. Herz provides a technical explanation for this development: the gunpowder revolution in warfare, which made individual city ramparts obsolete. The original ‘hard shell’ of the walled city was replaced by the sovereign state and new defences based upon much larger resources. Such new warfare required a firm territorial basis, not the personal hierarchy of the medieval period.

Herz’s explanation is a good one in that it incorporates an important dimension in the origins of modern state formation. But it is only a partial explanation. Tilly (1975) introduces other factors in the ‘survival’ of these states and the inter-state system. Security provides a stability in which a territory’s resources can be mobilized more completely. The territorial state is associated with the rise of absolute monarchs in Europe with their centralized bureaucracies, taxation and large armies. In a world-systems perspective, however, we need to go beyond these ‘political’ factors. We follow Gottmann (1973) in identifying two basic functions of the territorial state: security and opportunity. The former relates to the origins of the inter-state system, the latter to the emerging world market.

The rise of a world-economy provided different opportunities for entrepreneurs in different locations. In the early world-economy described by Wallerstein (1974, 1980a), the major groups contesting for advantage in the new world market were the agricultural landed interests on the one hand and the urban merchants on the other. According to Dennis Smith (1978), this conflict is directly related to the rise of the modern state, with the landed aristocracy giving up its medieval rights in return for the sovereign’s support against the new rising urban
class. But this initial alliance between landed interests and the new managers of the state apparatus soon had to give way to a more flexible ‘politics’. In a competitive state system, security requires more than recognition of sovereignty. It requires keeping up with neighbouring states in economic terms. Hence the emergence of mercantilism, which we have discussed briefly in previous chapters. Mercantilism was simply the transfer of the commercial policies of the trading city to the territorial state (Isaacs 1948: 47–48). The scale of territorial restrictions on trade was enhanced to become a major arm of state making.

The rise of a mercantilist world in the seventeenth century relates directly to Dutch hegemony. The Dutch state that emerged from the rebellion against the Habsburgs in the late sixteenth century was a collection of trading cities with a landward territorial buffer against attack. It was an unusual state of its time, therefore, because it was largely run by merchants for merchants. In short, it ruthlessly employed economic measures to enhance wealth accrual in its territory. In contemporary parlance, it pursued policies of economic development. It was the first territorial state to do so. As such, it offered an alternative raison d’état focusing on economics rather than the traditional raison d’état emphasizing politics, war and the glory of the king (Boogman 1978). The success of the Dutch state meant that the modern world-system was consolidated as a world-economy when other states saw the necessity for an economic policy that was more than large-scale estate management. The result of this retaliation against Dutch hegemony was mercantilism, as Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows (Wilson 1958).

### The failure of the territorial state?

In the 1990s a new term entered the geopolitical lexicon: ‘failed states’. The term was used to denote states that lacked the infrastructural capacity either to constrain and guide social life or to utilize the potential assets within the state. In other words, the state could not maintain social order and economic production. They were identified by the US government and scholars and journalists as a security threat. The ‘threat’ stemmed from their inability to monopolize violence within their borders and their inability to exploit resources for export. The states were located in the periphery of the world-economy and so were unable to fulfil their function as zones of cheap production. Instead, there was, according to journalist Robert Kaplan, a ‘coming anarchy’ (1994). The ‘threat’ of the states was soon translated into the sphere of national security as the term was morphed into the classification of ‘rogue states’. A rogue state was identified as a state displaying one or more of the following traits: 1) an authoritarian regime violating human rights, 2) sponsoring terrorism; 3) and developing and trading weapons of mass destruction. In general, a ‘rogue state’ was one that did not follow the norms of international security, but the label was attached to those countries that were challenging US power (Klare 1995).

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, failed states were identified as a new form of threat, the ‘terrorist haven’. The combination of ‘failed state’ and ‘rogue state’ as a security threat has become clear in the case of Somalia. As civil war rages between different factions there is no stable or even identifiable government and no provision of public services. The lack of internal security has facilitated Somalia being used as a base for criminal gangs committing acts of piracy; a severe disruption to global trade. Somalia illustrates the connection between the idea of ‘failure’ and ‘rogue’ as well as illustrating the systemic need for states with shared norms.

Historical understandings of sovereignty, territory and international norms were the foundation for the rhetoric behind ‘failed’ and ‘rogue states’. The Westphalian system was built upon a dominant understanding of security: internal control of social groups and a regulated form of international diplomacy and conflict. ‘Failed states’ force us to question whether the imposition of the Westphalian system on the periphery of the world-economy is still generally possible. ‘Rogue states’ force questions about the legitimacy of the norms of behaviour that are promoted by the United States and United Nations.
Mercantilism was based on the premise that each state had to grab as much of the world market as it could by building its industry and commerce at the expense of other states. The power of the state ultimately depended on the success of its mercantilism. The exact nature of different states’ policies in the world market reflected the balance of power between the landed and merchant interests. The former succeeded overwhelmingly in Eastern Europe to produce its peripheralization, leaving the Dutch to dominate the Baltic trade; in the rest of Europe the balance varied, with anti-Dutch merchants generally most successful in England, although France developed very strong mercantilist policies for a short period under Colbert (Colbertism) after 1661 (see Table 3.1). In all cases, this new concern for economic policy above the scale of cities was the product of the territorial state and the competitive inter-state system. Security and order, opportunity and mercantilism were all premised on the territorial state.

**Sovereignty as international capacity**

Territory is the platform for engaging in international relations; sovereignty provides the legitimization. Quite simply: ‘Sovereignty is the ground rule of inter-state relations in that it identifies the territorial entities who are eligible to participate in the game’ (James 1984: 2). Hence not all territories are sovereign states.

Prior to the twentieth century, when there were still regions outside the world-economy, political entities of the external arena were not recognized as having any political rights. The Iroquois in North America, the Zulus in southern Africa and the Marathas of central India were all equally unrecognized as legitimate actors in the inter-state system. This had the effect of making their territories available for incorporation into expanding sovereign states. Small and Singer (1982) call the resulting wars ‘extra-systemic’. Such formal imperialism was therefore a legitimate activity in international law since it violated no recognized sovereignties.

Today, as in the past, it is not possible to become sovereign just by declaring yourself thus. Sovereignty is never a matter for a single state; it is an inter-state arrangement because sovereignty can exist only for ‘states who reciprocally recognise each other’s legitimate existence within the framework and norms of the inter-state system’ (Wallerstein 1984a: 175). Hence the Bantustans declared independent by South Africa as part of the apartheid policy were recognized by no other states as sovereign and were therefore never part of the inter-state system. Similarly, the republic set up in the northern half of Cyprus following the Turkish invasion of 1974 has obtained no recognition beyond Turkey. Since 1945, recognition of sovereignty has usually been confirmed by acceptance into membership of the United Nations. Hence the very first task of the new post-colonial states of Africa and Asia was to apply to join the UN to prove their entry on to the world stage. This process of recognition has been repeated by the new states formed from the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In short, sovereignty gives territories an international capacity in the world-economy.

James (1984) points out that territorial sovereignty is a feature of the modern state system that distinguishes it from previous political systems. For Wallerstein (1984a: 33), this is vital:

> It is the fact that states in the capitalist world-economy exist within a framework of our inter-state system that is the *differentia specifica* of the modern state, distinguishing it from other bureaucratic polities.

Hence the historical continuities that are sometimes traced between modern states and medieval polities (Portugal, France and England are the main examples) are misleading at best and confusing at worst: as we have seen, these were originally only ‘law states’ with just ‘internal’ sovereignty. In legal terms, fourteenth-century Portugal was not a sovereign state operating in a system of sovereign states, and neither was England or France. They operated a different politics under different rules in a different world-system. Reciprocated sovereignty is found only in the capitalist world-economy.

**Conflicting territorial claims**

The operation of the twin principles of territory and sovereignty as the basis of international law has an important corollary: states have become the ‘collective individuals’ around which laws are framed.
Hence the ‘rights of states’ have priority over the interests of other institutions. This is enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which upholds the territorial integrity of member states and outlaws intervention in their domestic affairs (Burghardt 1973: 227). This produces a further corollary: international law is conservative in nature, preserving as it does the status quo in the inter-state system. But we have already noted that stability has not been the norm for the world political map. Changes occur when political claims for territory override legal conservatism. How are they justified?

Burghardt reviews several types of political claim and concludes that just three have had any major influence on the make-up of the world political map. Ranked in order, they are effective control, territorial integrity, and historical and cultural claims.

Effective control as a criterion for accepting a state’s right to a territory is used to legitimate armed conquest. In the international sphere as in national courts, ‘possession is nine-tenths of the law’. For all the idealism of the United Nations and other world bodies, power politics still lies at the root of international relations. Hence nobody today disputes India’s incorporation of Goa into its territory after the successful invasion of the Portuguese colony in 1962. Sovereignty is normally accepted once effective control of a territory is demonstrated. This was the principle that was applied for the partition of Africa among European powers after the Berlin Conference in 1884.

Territorial integrity can be used to challenge the right of a state that has effective control over a territory. Geographical claims can be at any scale. The most famous is the US concept of ‘manifest destiny’, which justified ocean-to-ocean expansion of the United States (Burghardt 1973: 236). Most claims are much more modest. Currently, the most well-known is the Spanish claim to Gibraltar. Despite British effective control and the wishes of the Gibraltarians to keep their link with Britain, the United Nations voted in 1968 for the transfer of Gibraltar to Spain. The fact that Gibraltar was part of the Iberian peninsula provided the basis for the territorial integrity claim (ibid.).

Historical and cultural claims are much more varied in nature, but they can be summarized as two main types. Historical claims relate to priority or past possession of the land. The former was reduced to nothing more than ‘discovery’ by European explorers in the partition of Africa. (The priority of occupation by those in the external arena was not recognized, of course – they had no sovereignty.) Murphy (1990) describes in detail the basis for claims based upon restitution of ‘lost’ lands. Cultural claims have usually been associated with national claims to territory under the heading of ‘national self-determination’. We deal with the problems surrounding this concept in Chapter 5. One interesting example of historical priority counteracting cultural patterns is worthy of mention here, however. With few exceptions, today’s independent African states have the same boundaries as the colonial territories they superseded, which took little or no account of indigenous African cultural patterns. Despite this, the boundaries of Africa drawn by European powers after 1884 have largely survived intact. This is a good illustration of the conservatism inherent in the inter-state system succeeding in blocking change in the pattern of the world political map. Generally, the new states do not support the division of another state because it would be likely to lead to questioning the integrity of their own inherited territory. Hence, when Biafra attempted to secede from Nigeria in the civil war of 1969–71, it obtained little or no political support from other African states. Today, most African boundaries are older than European boundaries.

The use made by politicians of these various claims to territory has varied over time. For example, the Versailles Treaty of 1919 is usually interpreted as the apogee of national self-determination. Murphy (1990: 534) argues that since 1945 there has been what he terms ‘the ascendancy of the historical justification’. This is the same principle of restitution as relates to private property. Murphy traces this equation of property and territory back to the earliest formulations of international law in the seventeenth century and argues that it has become particularly relevant since the United Nations outlawed all but ‘defensive wars’. The restitution argument can be used to justify war as ‘defensive’, as Iraq showed in its attacks on
both Iran and Kuwait. Murphy agrees that the historical justifications that territory-seeking politicians make are likely to be masks for other motives but show, nonetheless, that the historical argument does influence the geographical pattern of such claims.

African boundaries and Iraqi aggression both exemplify the basic conclusion of this discussion: the making of the world political map has been ultimately the result of power politics. It is a map of the changing pattern of winners and losers. Territory provides a platform, sovereignty a justification, but neither is an adequate defence for a state against a successful action of power politics by a rival bent on its elimination from the world stage.

Before we leave the issue of competing territorial claims, mention must be made of the important question of sovereignty over the seas. In 1982, the United Nations produced a new Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed by 159 countries but not by the United States. For a discussion of the political geography of this law, reference can be made to Glassner (1986) and Blake (1987).

Caliphate: a challenge to the territorial state

In Chapter 1 we introduced the state as one of the key institutions of the capitalist world-economy. The state, or more precisely the existence of many states, is the institution that makes the current historical social system a world-economy, rather than another form of social system. This suggests that political actors challenging the system will also challenge the existence of the territorial state. This is what we are seeing through the declaration of ISIS (the so-called Islamic State or Daesh) that they had formed a caliphate.

ISIS developed a strong presence in Syria’s civil war using Raqqa as its capital city and came to wider international attention in 2014 when it captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. Such political straddling of an international border is not unusual for an insurgent movement; military manoeuvrability exploiting separation of different sovereign states’ armies provides an important strategic advantage. But this example is profoundly different. ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi speaking in his new base in Mosul declared a new caliphate.

From a political geography perspective, a ‘caliphate’ is the Islamic concept that describes a world-empire. Historically there have been four major Islamic caliphates, the last one, the Ottoman Empire, being absorbed into the modern world-system in the nineteenth century before being formally dissolved in 1924. Its successor state, Turkey, became a new sovereign state within the inter-state system: it joined the League of Nations, predecessor of the United Nations, in 1932. In contrast, caliphates as world-empires do not recognise separate sovereign states. The caliphate is the sole legitimate sovereignty and therefore there can be no reciprocated sovereignty with others. Thus war-making by ISIS is not about making territorial claims. Making a worldwide claim, it thereby eschews all political boundaries; its outer bounds are a frontier merely defined by its current military capabilities. Thus, by declaring a new caliphate al-Baghdadi is not just erasing the Syria-Iraq border, his claim eradicates all sovereign boundaries. In his own words, Islamic State is ‘a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and the black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers . . . Syria is not for Syrians, and Iraq is not for Iraqis. The Earth is Allah’s’ (Cockburn 2015: xi).

The sense that Islamic State is much more than the creation of another modern state is reflected in its ability to attract many thousands of volunteer fighters and supporters from numerous countries across the world confirming its worldwide credentials. Although most foreign fighters are from other Middle East and North African countries, recruits from numerous European countries run into several hundreds in each case. Initially ISIS’s military success was spectacular but it has subsequently been pushed back with defeats resulting in the loss of both Mosul and Raqqa. But, of course, caliphate was never a simple territorial concept and therefore can survive as an idea and practice. The consequent political geography has three dimensions. First, ISIS retains groups of adherents in conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa; second, the military dispersal of foreign fighters returning home creates a worldwide ISIS diaspora; and, third, it maintains a sophisticated internet
presence to continue recruiting worldwide. The result is an ongoing challenge to the security imperative of all states in new, perhaps unique, ways: a frontier everywhere? Resulting jihadi atrocities are never threats to particular states; they are premised on the delegitimation of all states. The target is the modern world-system.

Boundaries and capitals

If territory and sovereignty are the two most important concepts for understanding the world political map, boundary lines and capital cities are the two artefacts that most demand our attention. For most of the history of the world-economy, states were rarely experienced by most of their subjects. Day-to-day activities continued with little or no interference by the state. Boundaries and capitals represent the two major exceptions to this rule. Boundaries and capitals are associated with the growth of two new important forms of behaviour and eventually led to two distinctive types of political landscape.

The two forms of behaviour are smuggling and diplomacy. The political map provided opportunities for entrepreneurs in their continual search for profit. Buying cheap and selling dear could now be achieved by avoiding customs duties when entering territories. Contraband was a major aspect of capitalism from the very beginning of the world-economy and was an extension of the traditional fraudulent practices of avoiding city tolls by earlier traders (Braudel 1984). The new boundaries produced a patchwork of larger markets and varying levels of taxes. It is not surprising, therefore, that smugglers have entered the folklore of border areas throughout the world-economy. Diplomats, on the other hand, are to be found in the capital cities of the new states. The inter-state system was an expensive one to survive in. The medieval European practice of moving government with the personage of the king had to give way to a permanent location of government business. Furthermore, the leading states of the system needed access to information on their rivals’ activities and wanted, if possible, to provide input into their decision making. Diplomacy was born as governments despatched permanent representatives to the capital cities of their rivals.

In time, both boundaries and capitals came to be the two locations where the state could be seen to impinge directly on the landscape. Border landscapes with customs houses and associated controls, and varieties of defensive structures, have become distinctive locations in the modern world. Similarly, capital cities have come to represent their states symbolically with a variety of distinctive grand architectures. In boundaries and capitals, we have the two most explicit products of the inter-state system.

We cannot deal with the details of the variety of borders and capitals that have been produced in the making of the world political map. Rather, we describe typologies of this detail as they relate to the workings of the world-economy.

Frontiers and boundaries

Frontiers and boundaries have probably been the most popular topic in political geography. However, as long ago as 1963, Pounds (1963: 93–4) noted a decline of interest in this subject. This reflects the lessening of boundary disputes in the areas where political geography was largely practised – Europe and North America. This contrasts with the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, when boundary issues were central to international politics. Furthermore, many of the early geographers of the twentieth century (for example, Sir Thomas Holdrich) were themselves boundary drawers and surveyors in the imperial division of the periphery. Hence concern for boundaries has waxed and waned with the changing interests of the core countries. Of course, boundary issues continue to be a vital ingredient of politics beyond Europe and North America. Good reviews of the early work on boundaries are available in Jones (1959), Minghi (1963) and Prescott (1965). Here we reinterpret some of this vast quantity of material in world-systems terms.

The usual starting point in this subject area is to distinguish frontiers from boundaries. This is necessary since the terms are commonly used interchangeably. Kristof (1959) uses the etymology of each term to derive their essential difference. Frontier comes from the notion of ‘in front’ as the
‘spearhead of civilization’. Boundary comes from ‘bounds’, implying territorial limits. Frontier is therefore outward-oriented, and boundary is inward-oriented. Whereas a boundary is a definite line of separation, a frontier is a zone of contact.

These definitions fit neatly into our world-systems framework. A frontier zone is the area between two social systems or entities. In the case of world-empires, this can be between other world-empires or their juxtaposition with outside mini-systems. Classic cases are the frontiers of China and Rome. Although in each case they built walls between their ‘civilization’ and barbarians, the walls were part of a wider frontier zone. In Roman Britain, for instance, Hadrian’s Wall was just part of the fortifications of the highland military zone or frontier that separated the civilian south and east from the non-Roman north and west. With the rise of the world-economy, a frontier emerged between this system and the systems it was supplanting. The history of imperialism is about pushing forward the frontiers of this new world-system. It produced the ‘classic’ frontier in the American west, but also other similar frontiers in Australia, southern Africa, north Africa, north-west India and Asiatic Russia. The frontier ended with the closing of the world-system at the beginning of the twentieth century. We now live in a world with one system, so there are no longer any frontiers – they are now phenomena of history.

Frontiers everywhere have been replaced by boundaries, which are a necessary component of the sovereignty of territories. Sovereignty must be bounded: a world of sovereign states is a world divided by boundaries. Boundaries are therefore an essential element of the modern world-economy. But the process of boundary making is very different in the various sections of the world-economy. Jones (1959) identifies five types of boundary concept: natural, national, contractual, geometrical and power-political. These categories are not mutually exclusive; from our perspective, for instance, we would identify all boundaries as reflecting the power politics of their respective producers. Nevertheless, these are useful concepts that, as Jones is able to show, reflect the different ideas of the state in the evolving world-economy. The idea of ‘natural’ boundaries is a product of the strength of the French state in eighteenth-century Europe and its use of the new rationalist philosophy to claim a larger ‘natural’ territory (Pounds 1951, 1954). In contrast, the idea of ‘national’ boundaries is the Germanic reaction to French expansionist ideas. We consider this reaction further in Chapter 5. These two ideas are rationalizations of particular power-political positions in the core and semi-periphery of the world-economy. In the periphery, also, two types of boundary emerged. In non-competitive arenas in the nineteenth century, such as India and Indo-China, the boundaries reflect the expansion of one core state at the expense of weak pre-capitalist social formations. This is where frontiers are extended and then converted to boundaries. The limits are finally achieved when two powers begin to approach one another’s peripheral territory. This may lead to the formation of a buffer state in the periphery, as in the cases of Afghanistan between Russia and British India and of Thailand between French Indo-China and British India. In competitive arenas, the boundaries are usually far more arbitrary as they reflect contractual arrangements between competitors. It is in these areas that ‘clear’ inter-national boundaries are necessary to prevent disputes. Hence such boundaries commonly follow physical features such as rivers or else are simply geometric lines, usually of longitude or latitude. Examples of such ‘contractual’ boundaries are the United States’ western boundaries to north and south along the 49th parallel and the Rio Grande, respectively. The most competitive arena of all, Africa in the late nineteenth century, has the greatest number of ‘contractual international boundaries’. Here the concepts of ‘natural’ or ‘national’ boundaries had no relevance as ethnic groups and river basins were divided up in complete contrast to the boundary processes then evolving in the core. Once again, we find contrasting processes in core and periphery and such contrast is the hallmark of the world-systems approach.

Capital cities as control centres

Many territorial states can trace their origins back to what Pounds and Ball (1964) call their specific ‘core area’, for instance the ‘home counties’ in the
south-east corner of England for Britain and the Île de France for France. One of the features of core areas is that they usually have the capital city of the state located within them. Paris and London are obvious examples of this. This has led some political geographers to identify ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ capital cities, with the former represented by those in core areas. As Spate (1942) pointed out long ago, any such distinction is to misunderstand the nature of politics in our society. London is no more ‘natural’ than Canberra: they are both the result of political decisions, albeit over very different time horizons. Spate rightly dismisses this old dichotomy but retreats into case studies as his own approach to capital cities. Whereas case studies are invaluable for understanding the nature of capital cities, they are not sufficient for a full appreciation of the role of these localities in the territorial state. Capital cities are, after all, the control centre of the territory, the focus of political decision making, the symbolic centre of the state and often very much more. As well as the complexity that Spate identifies, which leads him to emphasize their differences, there are important similarities, which we draw upon here.

Many European observers have remarked that Washington, DC, is an unusual capital in that it is not one of the largest cities in its country. Lowenthal (1958) even calls it an ‘anti-capital’, reflecting as it does initial American ‘anti-metropolitan’ revolutionary politics. Henrikson (1983) has reviewed this literature and concludes, not surprisingly, that it manifests a Eurocentric bias. Like Spate before him, Henrikson can find no justification for treating Paris and London as ‘ideal models’ that the rest of the world should follow. Instead, Henrikson identifies two models of the capital city: the European concept of the capital as the opinion-forming centre of the state, dominant in political, cultural and economic spheres; and the American concept of a responsive centre that specializes in politics. Fifer (1981), for instance, refers to Washington, DC, as ‘a company town’. Henrikson is more poetic – ‘a small, cozy town, global in scope’. However, this is no longer the case. The growth of the US government and its attraction of multiple professional services has resulted in Washington, DC, developing into one of the country’s major metropolitan areas, a ‘global metropolis’ according to Abbott (1999). Nevertheless, the city still lags far behind New York, Chicago and Los Angeles in importance and there are no other specialized political capital cities (not even Canberra, Ottawa or Brasilia) that have grown as Washington, DC, has done.

These two concepts do not cover all cases, however. In a famous paper, Mark Jefferson (1939) described a ‘law of the primate city’ in which he propounded the ‘law’ that a country’s capital city is always ‘disproportionately large’. This law ‘fits’ the European concept but is obviously at variance with the American concept. The reason why this ‘law’ is still quoted is because it fits so many countries in the periphery. In most Latin American, African and Asian states the capital city is truly primate – Buenos Aires, Lima, Dar es Salaam, Dakar, Jakarta and Manila, to name just two from each continent. This should not be read as meaning that they employ a ‘European concept’ in the definition of their capitals, since their position is very different.

We can reconcile these problems of definition and add to our analysis of capital cities by employing the world-systems approach. There are three types of capital city: one the result of core processes, one the result of peripheral processes and a third reflecting semi-peripheral political strategies. We describe each type in turn.

The capital cities resulting from core processes are what Henrikson (1983) terms the European concept. The rise of the classic examples of this type is part of the initial economic processes that led to Europe becoming the core of the world-economy. The mercantilist competition of the logistic wave involved the development of vastly increased political involvement centred on the historical capital city. The new bureaucracies were located there and these cities grew rapidly to dominate their territories. They became the political control centres that were attempting to steer the emerging world-economy in directions beneficial to their particular territory.

In contrast, in the periphery new cities emerged or particular old cities grew where they were useful to the exploitative core-periphery relationship: they were central to Frank’s ‘development of
underdevelopment’ outlined in Chapter 1. Most commonly, these were ports directly linked to the core. They were the product of peripheral processes and have often been likened to ‘plugholes’ sucking out, as it were, the wealth of the periphery. In formal imperialism, political control was associated directly with this process, so these ‘parasitic cities’ became ‘colonial capitals’. Many of them retained their political status following independence and they remain the most extreme examples of Jefferson’s primate cities.

But not all colonial administrative centres have remained as capital cities. Some governments have recognized the imperialist basis of their inherited capital city and have relocated their ‘control centre’. This is part of a conscious semi-peripheral strategy to break the core-periphery links symbolized and practised through the old capital. Often it is expressed as a ‘nationalist’ reaction as capitals are moved from the coast inland to the old ‘core’ of a pre-world-economy social formation. A good example of this can be found in the relocation of the Russian capital. In the original incorporation of Russia into the world-economy, the capital was moved from Moscow to a virgin site on the Baltic Sea, where St Petersburg was built as ‘a window on the West’. After the Revolution, the capital returned to Moscow as the new Soviet regime retreated from this outward stance in its attempt to break with the peripheralizing processes of the past. Other similar examples of relocation are from Istanbul to Ankara in the centre of Turkey’s territory, from Karachi inland to Islamabad in Pakistan, and from Rio de Janeiro inland to Brasilia in central Brazil; Nigeria moved its capital from the colonial port of Lagos inland to a new site at Abuja in central Nigeria. Such policies of capital relocation have been quite common in Africa (Best 1970; Hoyle 1979; Potts 1985). In all of these cases, we can interpret the relocation as part of a semi-peripheral strategy that is attempting to lessen peripheral processes operating in the country.

The semi-peripheral strategy tends to produce what Henrikson (1983) terms the American concept of a capital city, in effect a political ‘company town’. The case of Washington, DC, is also the result of an attempt to prevent peripheralization in the creation of the United States. It represents the dominance of ‘national politics’ over the needs of the world-economy and has been the model for other federal capitals, some of which we have already mentioned. As a compromise between the sectional interests of North and South, its closest parallels are the cases of Ottawa (between French-speaking (Quebec) and English-speaking (Ontario) Canada) and Canberra (between the two largest cities in Australia, Sydney and Melbourne). Washington, DC, Ottawa and Canberra all represent part of a strategy to mobilize a new territory for competition in the world-economy.

In summary, therefore, we can identify three types of capital city reflecting world-economy processes: the initial core processes in Europe and the peripheral processes in Latin America, Africa and Asia, both of which generate ‘primate cities’; and capital cities that have developed as part of a conscious semi-peripheral strategy and that tend to be located in past and current semi-peripheral states.

Before we leave the topic of cities and states, we can allude briefly to our future treatment of world cities in Chapter 7. The latter are cities with a major trans-state role under current conditions of globalization. The processes we have described above produce very different potentials for world city status among capital cities. The old imperial primate cities like London and Paris have emerged as leading world cities, whereas semi-peripheral strategies have left other capital cities as secondary in world city terms: the leading world cities of the United States, Canada and Australia are New York, Toronto and Sydney, respectively. Obviously, the latter cities must not be neglected in a world-systems political geography just because they are not formally centres of state power.

**Dividing up the state**

Capital cities may be the control centres of the world political map, but the territorial states are certainly not the equivalent of the city-states of the past. The territory between capital city and state boundary has never been controlled wholly from the centre. Quite simply, the territories of the inter-state system have been too large for such elementary central organization. Rather, the territories have had to be divided up, with authority delegated to agents of the
state in the communities and regions beyond the capital.

In Europe, the states inherited local and regional divisions from their medieval predecessors. In England, for instance, the shires, or counties, were originally the areas controlled by sheriffs (shire = ‘sheriffdom’). In France, the accretions of the medieval period produced a wide range of sub-state units with many different degrees of central authority. Political revolution has provided opportunities to eliminate traditional divisions and to reconstruct the structure of the state in the image of the new rulers. Typically, the new boundaries had two purposes: to provide for more rational units; and to undermine traditional loyalties. In 1789, for instance, the Abbé Sieyès drew up a completely new spatial structure for the French state – the current departments – which wiped away all the traditional provincial institutions. A series of regularly shaped spatial units of equal area were created that cut through old social patterns of life. The delineation of these departments was an exercise in spatial–social engineering to break loyalties to the old provinces. To reduce local identification further, the names of the departments avoided any reference to historical, social or economic patterns of life. Instead, the departments were named after ‘neutral’ physical features such as rivers and mountains. This strategy has become quite common. Poulsen (1971: 228) describes how the Yugoslav government established nine regions in 1931, ‘neutrally named after river basins in order to weaken the nationalisms of the major ethnic groups’.

Probably the best example of this is King Carol’s reorganization of Romania in 1938 into ten completely new districts. These were specifically designed to cut across the traditional ethnic and historical provinces so as not to provide rallying points for sectionalism (Helin 1967: 492–3). Once again, these were named after rivers, mountains and seas to avoid the emergence of new regional identities. This is another example of local government units contributing to the Napoleonic ethos of a ‘unified and indivisible nation-state’. Clearly, dividing up the state is not a neutral technical exercise but an essential political policy for all territorial states.

Originally, state territories were divided for administrative and defence purposes. This association continues to obtain. The ‘standard regions’ of England, for instance, originally devised as civil defence regions in the event of invasion, remain the basis for the administrative regions of British government departments today while retaining their original purpose. In the event of a nuclear attack on Britain that destroys communications to and from London, these regions would have become new sovereign units whose ‘capitals’ would be underground control centres.

With the increase in activities of the states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, divisions of the territories have been required for more than just administration and defence. With the state taking on additional economic and social responsibilities, for example, special policy regions have been designated. Perhaps the two most famous are those associated with the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States and the regional policy of Britain. The economic regionalization of the state was also integral to the state planning of the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

One of the original major pressures for the increased state activity in the social and economic spheres is to be found in the extensions to the franchise for electing governments. With the gradual moves towards ‘one person, one vote’ in Europe and North America, there was a concomitant need to update the electoral divisions or districts. We deal with this topic in Chapter 6. At the same time, democratizing local government produced another tier of divisions that were independent of the state’s administration and defence. We deal with this topic in Chapter 7.

Policy regions, electoral districts and local government areas all share one property: they are divisions of the state’s territory that do not impinge in any manner on the state’s sovereignty. This is not the case with all divisions of the state. Federal divisions of the state and partitions of the state are different in kind from other divisions. The former involves a ‘vertical’ split in sovereignty, so that it is ‘shared’ between different geographical scales. The latter is a ‘horizontal’ or geographical split in sovereignty that
produces two or more states where there was one. Federalism and partition are both central processes in the making of the modern world map and were identified as such by traditional political geographers in their concern for state integration. We conclude this section of the chapter, therefore, by concentrating on these two topics.

**Federalism and partition**

In terms of political integration, we can identify four levels of sovereignty. The first is the unitary state, where sovereignty is undivided. Britain and France are usually considered to be the archetypal unitary states. In Britain, for instance, sovereignty is traditionally held by ‘the crown in parliament’, providing for the pre-eminence of the latter. With the creation of the European Union, Britain and France are no longer such ‘ideal’ examples of unitary states; the British vote in 2016 to leave the European Union is a political move to reconstitute this particular unitary state. Second, federal states have sovereignty split between two levels of government, as we have seen. Hence in the United States the 50 states and the federal level share sovereignty. In federal states, the constitution is the enabling document that divides power between the two levels. Third, in confederal associations states are legally bound in a much looser arrangement. The key difference with federalism is probably to be found in the lack of opportunity in the latter for states to leave the union. Britain’s decision to leave the European Union confirms the latter as a confederation of states rather than a European federation that its current name, the ‘European Union’, implies. In confederal arrangements, states give up some of their sovereignty to a supranational authority. In the European Union, for instance, the executive Commission routinely takes decisions that are binding on the member states of the Union. However, the European Union is far from being the ‘United States of Europe’ that its founding fathers wished for. The key limitation of its sovereign powers has been in the field of defence – the constituent states retain the basic function of defending their territories. Finally, partition represents a situation where it is not possible to maintain sovereignty over a territory. The recent break-ups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into multiple new states, in the wake of the post-Cold War geopolitical transition, are classical examples of this process.

**Federalism: opportunity and diversity**

A federation is, according to K. W. Robinson (1961: 3), 'the most geographically expressive of all political systems'. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it has attracted much political geography research (Dikshit 1975; Paddison 1983; Smith 1995). Generally, federalism is interpreted as the most practical of Hartshorne’s centripetal forces in that it has to be consciously designed to fit a particular situation of diversity. A sensitive and carefully designed constitution that is perceived as fair and evenly balanced can contribute to the viability of the state and may even become part of the state-idea, as has been the case for the United States. The problem with this application of the Hartshorne model is that the internal diversity of territories has been emphasized at the expense of the external pressures for producing federations. Historically, it has been the latter pressures that have been the major stimulus to federation. For instance, whereas France and England exemplify the development of unitary states in the early world-economy, Switzerland and the Netherlands represent pioneer experiments in federal structures. Both were defensive combinations of cantons and counties to resist larger neighbours in the era of mercantilist rivalry. Hence we can reasonably argue that we need a more balanced discussion of the internal and external factors behind federalism.

Geographers and political scientists have attempted to specify the conditions under which federalism is the chosen state structure; Paddison (1983: 105) lists four sets of such ideas. Obviously, the reasons are many and various given the many examples of federated states. But one thing does emerge. There must be a powerful group of state builders who are able to convince the members of the territorial sub-units of the benefits of union over separation. The basis of such arguments returns to our original discussion concerning territories in the world-economy. It must be shown that security and
Territorial states

opportunity are greater in the larger territory than for separate, smaller territories. This requires an alliance between the state builders and the economic groups that will benefit from the larger territorial arrangement. This is very clearly seen in the American case, as Beard (1914) has argued and Libby (1894) has illustrated. In the initial period between the revolution and the constitution the freed states could be said to constitute a confederation. Drawing up a new constitution and winning public support for it changed the situation. Both Fifer (1976) and Archer and Taylor (1981) use Libby’s maps of support for the American federal constitution in 1789 to show distinct differences between different parts of the new colonies. It is not a north–south sectionalism that emerges but a commercial versus frontier cleavage that dominates. In the urban areas and commercial farming areas, which were firmly linked into the world-economy, support for federation was very strong. In the more isolated areas, with their more self-sufficient economies, the advantages of federation were far less obvious. Suspicion of centralization prevailed, and these areas tended to reject the federal constitution. The popular majority who were linked into the world-economy finally prevailed, and the United States was formed on a constitutional basis for its economic groups to challenge the world-economic order using mercantilist policies through the federal government. Although the nature and balance of American federalism has changed over time, the original constitution has contributed to the survival and rise of the state and is now very much part of the American ‘state-idea’.

To contrast with the successful example of the United States, we can consider the case of Colombia in the nineteenth century. In Chapter 3, we noted the competition between ‘American’ parties and ‘European’ parties in Latin America; in Colombia, this translated into Conservatives and Liberals (Delpar 1981). The latter claimed to represent a cluster of ‘modern’ and ‘rational’ ideas. Hence their preference for a federal system of government was accompanied by a secular anti-clerical outlook and support for economic laissez-faire. Centralism was equated with despotism (ibid.: 67). By the 1850s, the Liberals were able to begin to implement federal ideas and after a civil war they created a federal constitution in 1863. Parallel with these constitutional moves, this ‘European’ party implemented an economic policy of laissez-faire. But federalism was to become a victim of its association with this economic strategy. As Delpar (ibid.: 71) points out, in Colombia ‘private enterprise could not manage without state help’. Quite simply, by the 1880s, economic openness had not delivered the goods. After another civil war, a Conservative victory in 1886 produced higher tariffs and a new constitution. A ‘unitary republic’ was created, with the federal states being converted into administrative departments. The demise of federalism in Colombia, therefore, contrasts with the success of the US federation after the victory of its ‘American’ (protectionist) party (the Republicans) in the civil war of 1861–65. What these two examples clearly show is that federation can never be considered in isolation from the other political issues that affect the success of the state in the world-economy.

Since 1945, federalism has been associated with the larger countries of the world, such as the United States, the former Soviet Union, India, Nigeria, Brazil, Canada and Australia. (China is the major exception.) It is considered the appropriate constitutional arrangement to cope with the inevitable social and economic differences that large size brings. But this is not the only reason for modern federations. After the Second World War, both Britain and France insisted that the constitution for West Germany should be federal, because this was thought to produce a weaker state that would be less of a threat in the future. This seems to be the centralization–despotism link hypothesis again.

Outside the core of the world-economy, federalism is associated with states that often have acute problems of cultural diversity. In India, for example, 1,652 ‘mother tongues’ have been recorded by the official census. The Indian case shows how federalism has had to be modified to cope with pressures emanating from such cultural complexity. At independence, India was divided into twenty-seven states in a federal constitution that carefully separated powers between the different levels of sovereignty. The new states were combinations of pre-independence units and had no specific
relation to the underlying cultural geography of India. As late as 1945, the Congress Party had called for the creation of boundaries based on language, but now that it was in power it changed its policy (Hardgrave 1974). A special commission was set up to investigate the matter and warned that defining states by language would be a threat to national unity. ‘Arbitrary’ states were favoured because they provided no constitutional platform for language-based separatists. But this political strategy of the central state builders was a dangerous one, for the states also provided no basis for a popular politics that could aid in the political integration of the country. The constitution was not generally accepted as fair and balanced, since it produced a situation where nearly every cultural group had a grievance against the federal state. Change was not long in coming. In 1955, a States Reorganization Commission conceded the need for the states to match more closely the cultural geography of the country and produced a new federal structure of 14 language-based states. This structure has been further refined, so that today India is a federation of 22 states that broadly reflect the cultural diversity of its territory. The original fears for the national unity of the state have been found to be largely unsubstantiated: Indian federalism has operated as a centripetal force. For a recent assessment, see Corbridge (1997), who places this centripetal force into the wider context of governability to understand why this ethnically diverse state has endured and is likely to survive into the future.

One particular feature of the Indian case is the ease with which the boundaries of the states could be altered: the 1955 reforms required only a majority vote of the federal parliament. This contrasts with federal arrangements in core states, where the constituent units of the federation cannot be so easily changed. This obviously reflects a balance of power in the Indian situation that is biased towards the centre. On some definitions of federalism, this would rule out India as a federal state – Corbridge (1997) refers to India’s ‘federal mythology’. But this ease of producing constituent units in a federation is shared by other peripheral states. In Nigeria, for instance, it has been developed into a strategy for economic development (Ikporekpo 1986; Dent 1995). The ‘peculiarity’ of Nigeria is that it inherited three administrative units on independence but is now divided into 30 states (Dent 1995: 129). And this tenfold increase does not represent the whole pressure for new state formation: Ikporekpo (1986) reports 29 states in existence, with another 48 outstanding proposals in 1983. Today there are 36 states that constitute the Nigerian federal state. The key point is that each state is a ‘forum for development’ and each new state capital a potential economic growth centre. This seems to have been a unique experiment in the use of a federal constitutional framework to try to produce an even spatial pattern of development, with every area having the opportunity to implement its own development plan. However, the profound differences in circumstances between core and periphery have undermined this political initiative, with Nigerian economic development stymied by political corruptions and religious conflict.

Generally, federalism is as popular as at any time in its history – one observer has even referred to ‘a federal revolution sweeping the world’ (Smith 1995: 1). This is in part the result of political reactions to globalization being expressed as local ethnic mobilizations. In such circumstances, federalism is being used as a means of managing new ethnic conflicts – Smith (ibid.) provides several useful contemporary case studies of this process. However, in the former communist world, notably the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, federations have been the victim of political reforms that have led to state partition.

Creating new states by partition

Not all federal arrangements have been successes. In the final stages of the dismantling of their empire, the British colonial administrators tried to produce several federations by combining colonies to produce larger and possibly more viable independent states, but by and large this did not work. The West Indian, Central African and East African federations collapsed, and Singapore seceded from Malaysia. In traditional political geography terms, there was no state-idea to build upon, so centrifugal forces overwhelmed the new creations. Put another way,
if you remove ‘rule’ from the British imperial tradition of ‘divide and rule’, all you are left with is ‘divide’. This process was to be seen in its most spectacular form in British India, where the partition of 1947 produced Pakistan and India after the loss of 1 million lives and the transfer of 12 million people.

Since 1989, with the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe, new partitions have taken place. Beginning with the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), the old federation of the Soviet Union has been dismantled into its constituent parts: the world political map has lost one state and 14 new states have been added. And this is not the only revisions that cartographers are having to implement. The federation of Yugoslavia has shed all of its units, creating another six sovereign states, and Czechoslovakia is now two states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The lesson of these changes is that federation must be based upon consent, not coercion. Without the former, partition will occur when the opportunity arises.

The partitions of the recent past have taken advantage of the political fluidity that is a feature of any geopolitical transition. In more stable periods represented by geopolitical world orders, partitions are generally a much rarer phenomenon. This is because every state partition represents a severe threat to the status quo. It is for this reason that separatist movements usually command very little support in the international community, as we noted in the case of Biafra. In contrast, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 was quickly accepted by the international community after its creation in the Pakistan civil war by Indian armed intervention.

There had always been doubts about the territorial viability of Pakistan when it consisted of two units, West and East Pakistan, separated by several thousand miles of territory of a hostile neighbour. But the key factor in international acceptance of the partition in 1971 was the failure of the old Pakistani state to accept an election result that put the reins of government in the hands of a political party from the more populous East Pakistan. This brought to a head grievances concerning the way in which the old Pakistani state had favoured West Pakistan at the expense of East Pakistan. This brought to a head grievances concerning the way in which the old Pakistani state had favoured West Pakistan at the expense of East Pakistan. Figure 4.1 shows how the state apparatus, both military and civilian, was firmly in the hands of just one part of the country. The state promoted centrifugal forces when it needed to develop very strong centripetal forces to survive as two separated territorial units. When partition came, therefore, it was not interpreted as the result of a typical separatist movement but as a particular and necessary correction of post-colonial boundaries: Bangladesh was an exception that would not affect the status quo. Within three years, the new Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan) recognized the new state of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan).

In political geography, Waterman (1984, 1987) has considered the processes of partition in some
Partition as a result of unequal power relations

Israel has built a wall around the occupied territories, the land conquered by the Israeli army in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. The Israelis claimed that the wall was necessary to prevent suicide bomber attacks on Israeli citizens. The Palestinians claimed that the wall was a unilateral delimitation of a potential Palestinian state, and that the Hamas-declared ceasefire was the cause for the near cessation of suicide bombings. The role of the wall in delimiting the territorial limits of a future Palestinian state illustrates the role of power in the practice of partition. Israel, as a recognized sovereign state with greater financial and military resources, was able to impose its vision of the geographical route of the wall; making detours to include some Israeli settlements while literally cutting some Palestinian villages in half. The Palestinians mustered protest, but were unable to prevent the construction of the wall or even to bring about minor adjustments in its course. Politically divided and denied any military force, the Palestinians resorted to a strategy of changing the geographical scope of the conflict by taking the issue to the International Court of Justice. Despite the 2004 Court ruling that the wall was a violation of international law and that the parts already erected should be razed, the construction of the wall continued. The wall is a concrete manifestation that any future Palestinian state will be the product of partition: Palestinians have had little say in the geographical limits of the state, or control over their own borders and airspace. Partition remains a sign of enduring and complex conflicts in which a geographical ‘solution’ is imposed by a stronger power. Partition attempts to fix injustices and enmities into a territorial expression that corrals the diversity of an existing political entity into more homogeneous zones. However, in the case of Israel–Palestine the unilateral manner of the partition and the power imbalance are unlikely to catalyse a long-term and peaceful solution.

detail. Following Henderson and Lebow (1974), he identifies two very different processes in operation, which are termed divided nations and partitioned states. In the former, the state has a cultural and linguistic unity before partition. Examples are Germany (1949–90), Korea, Mongolia, China and Vietnam (1955–74). These partitions were the result of outside forces and were not considered permanent by their populations. Hence Vietnam and Germany have been reunified, and in the other cases there remains the concept of one nation despite the two states.

Partitioned states, on the other hand, are usually considered to be permanently separated. Here partition is the result of internal pressures. It is a way of solving a destructive diversity within a country. The two classic examples are the India–Pakistan partition from the last geopolitical transition and the moves towards a Palestine–Israel partition at the present time. The post-1989 partitions in Eastern Europe are clearly of this type. Historically, the main period of success for this type of partition came at the end of the First World War, when national self-determination was accepted as a criterion for state formation, leading to the partition of the old multinational empires. Austria-Hungary, for instance, was partitioned into seven new ‘nation-states’ (or parts thereof). We deal with this question of nation and state in detail in Chapter 5.

Summary

In this section we have introduced the historical processes and geographical features that have constructed the modern territorial state. In particular, we have emphasized:

- the role of territory in grounding the power of the state;
- the concept of territory and its relationship to domestic politics and the inter-state system;
- the role of boundaries in defining the extent of state power;
- the role of capital cities and their relationship to the form of the state;
- the political practices of federalism and partition.
The nature of the states

Our discussion of the make-up of the world political map has been descriptive in nature. That is to say, we have been more concerned with how the map came about than with why there was a need for such a map in the first place. In this section of the chapter, we shall be more theoretical in orientation as we explore the underlying reasons for the creation of the interstate system.

The link between this section and the last is made through the topological model of the state. Hence, beyond the usual relations between empirical material and theory, we have a simple model that tells us what a theory to understand states should encompass. In fact, we shall find that from our political geography position most theories of the state are only partial explanations of what states are. There has been a strong tendency in developing theory to concentrate upon internal relations or ‘stateness’ at the expense of external relations or ‘inter-stateness’. In terms of our topological model, the theories look one way only. One of the greatest advantages of world-systems analysis of states is that it looks both ways.

Looking one way only: theories of the state

The notion of sovereignty assumes the existence of the state. But this is a two-way relationship. At the simplest level, the state is defined by its possession of sovereignty. This distinguishes it from all other forms of human organization. As Laski (1935: 21–2) points out, this sovereignty amounts to nothing less than supreme coercive power within a territory – the state ‘gives orders to all and receives orders from none’ inside its recognized boundaries. Invasion by a foreign power or internal insurgency aiming at creating a new state is a violation of a state’s sovereignty. If the invasion or insurgency is not defeated, the state no longer has a monopoly of coercion in its territory and faces extinction. The partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 is an example of extinction by external violation of sovereignty. Since 1945, there has been no such elimination of states, although this would have been Kuwait’s fate had Iraqi aggression prevailed in the first Gulf War.

It is important to distinguish between state and government at the outset of this discussion. Again using Laski (1935: 23), government can be interpreted as the major agent of the state and exists to carry out the day-to-day business of the state. Governments are short-term mechanisms for administering the long-term purposes of the state. Hence every state is served by a continuous succession of governments. But governments only represent the state; they cannot replace it. A government is not a sovereign body: opposition to the government is a vital activity at the very heart of liberal democracy; opposition to the state is treason. Governments may try to define themselves as the state and hence condemn their opponents as ‘traitors’, but this is a very dangerous game. If this strategy fails, the state may find itself challenged within its boundaries by what McColl (1969) termed the insurgent state – one with its own core area, territory and claims to sovereignty. In this case, the fall of the government can precipitate overthrow of the state, as happened, for instance, in South Vietnam in 1975. Contemporary politics in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an example how an ideologically based movement, the Taliban, has a goal of transforming the very nature of the state and not merely overthrowing the government.

It has been suggested that this distinction between state and government is not of practical interest, because all state action must involve some specific government operation acting in its name (Laski 1935: 25). The important point, however, is that this distinction is a theoretical one and it is at this level that this section is pitched. One of the major problems of much political science and political geography is that they have considered government action without understanding the wider context in which it occurs. That framework can be provided only by developing a theory of the state separate from the particular actions of particular governments. That is the purpose of this section; we return to a consideration of governments in Chapter 6.

Skinner (1978: 352–8) has described the origins of the modern concept of the state and, once again, we find that a basic concept in our modern world first
appears at the same time as the emergence of the world-economy itself. The word ‘state’ comes from the Latin status and its medieval usage is related to either the ‘state’ or condition of a ruler or the ‘state’ of the realm. The idea of a public power separate from ruler and ruled that is the supreme political authority in a given territory does not occur in medieval or early modern periods. The modern concept develops from this medieval usage in the sixteenth century, first in France and then in England. Skinner argues that this is because these two countries provided early examples of the properties that make up the modern state: a centralized regime based on a bureaucracy operating within well-established boundaries. By the end of the sixteenth century, Skinner claims, the modern concept of the state is well established in these two countries and modern political analysis focusing on the nature of the state can be said to begin at this time.

Theories of the state and capitalism
Clark and Dear (1984) catalyzed political geography’s theoretical engagement with the state. They identified two modes of analysis: theories of the state in capitalism and theories of the capitalist state. The former mode treats capitalism as a given and concentrates on the functions of the state. These are generally described as liberal or conservative theories of the state. Identification of the ‘capitalist state’ in the second mode of analysis indicates that the economic relationships of capitalism are brought into the political analysis. These are Marxist theories of the state. Politically, the distinction is that in the former the state is seen as a neutral entity above
society, whereas for Marxists the state is a very partisan instrument within the workings of society. Theories of the state in capitalism emphasize the providing, regulating and facilitating roles of the state. Tietz (1968) provides a brief catalogue of our uses of the state from birth to death, showing how much our modern way of life is dependent on public goods – schools, hospitals, police, fire prevention, waste disposal, postal services and so forth. Equally important to our modern way of life is the state as a regulator and facilitator whereby the state operates macroeconomic and other policies to support the economy within its territory. Johnston (1982: 13) adds the role of the state in producing the physical infrastructure for the smooth running of the economy – roads, railways, power transmission lines and so on. Political geographers have been concerned with these processes as they relate to spatial integration.

One reason why parties of the left have accepted theories of the state in capitalism is because they have been relatively successful in putting many of their policies into practice. Clark and Dear (1984: 20) call this the state as social engineer. This concerns the role of the state in ensuring some degree of distributional justice within its territory. The product is usually termed the welfare state and, as we have seen, the process of its creation can be social imperialism from the top as well as social pressure from below. In addition, Johnston (1982: 12) adds a category of the state as protector, which is an explicit reference to the ‘police function’. This is of interest because theories of the state in capitalism generally ignore or underplay the coercive function of the state. However, as we have previously noted, it is precisely this function that distinguishes the state from other social institutions. In the states of the periphery, this particular function is far more obvious as the state is commonly involved in activities of repression.

This highlights an important limitation of these theories: their implicit bias towards the activities of states in the core. Furthermore, this is symptomatic of a more fundamental criticism. Theories of the state in capitalism are relatively superficial descriptions of state functions. It is not that these functions are not real but rather that their enumeration does not advance our understanding very far. In Marxist terms, they remain at the level of appearances without engaging with the social reality underlying those appearances (Clark and Dear 1984: 18). All this boils down to the fact that to see the state as merely neutral is naive. The state as a locus of power cannot be outside politics, whether we view it as acting for good or for ill.

A more productive and exciting turn, and one that launched a lot of political geographic research, was the development of theories of the capitalist state. These theories stem from a Marxist perspective on the world and build upon the critique that challenges the neutrality of the state. Rather than looking at the state as neutral, theories of the capitalist state provide a conflict model of society in which the state is fundamentally implicated. In other words, the state plays a role to maintain the dominant position of the bourgeoisie and facilitate the continued operation of capitalism and the ongoing accumulation of capital. According to these theories the state is there to protect capitalism from the threat of political challenge. This is done through a combination of coercion and consensus building.

It is well known that Marx himself never developed a theory of the state. It was a project that he set himself but never completed. Hence Marxist theories of the state are products of his many followers and this has inevitably led to alternative interpretations of what such a theory should say: there is not a Marxist theory of the state, but many Marxist theories of the state. There is much raw material in Marx’s voluminous political writings for his followers to use to construct theories of the state. Two ideas have dominated Marxist political thinking. The first, from The Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848, dismissed the state as nothing more than ‘a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’. The second, which can be found in several writings, consists of a ‘base–superstructure model’ of society where this engineering analogy is used to depict a foundation of economic relationships upon which the ideological and political superstructure is constructed. These two simple ideas are difficult to accommodate to the complexities of the modern state. If they are taken at face value, they lead to a reduction of all politics and the state to a mere reflection of economic forces. Such crude reductionism is termed ‘economism’. Most modern
Marxist writers distance themselves from such simplistic analyses (Hunt 1980). Nevertheless, this is the heritage for modern Marxist theories of the state; the key issue for contemporary social scientists has been how to challenge economism without losing the essential material basis in Marx’s thinking.

The direct opposite theory to economism is pluralism. Pluralism sees modern society consisting of many overlapping interests – labour, farmers, business, home owners, consumers, and so on – no one group is ever able to dominate society. In this situation, the role of the state is to act as an umpire adjudicating between competing interests. The balance of interests served will vary as governments change, but the state will remain pluralist in nature and able to respond to a wide range of interests. This is quite obviously the opposite of the Marxist class theory, and was critiqued as such by Marxist theoretician Ralph Miliband (1969).

Economism and pluralist theory can be seen as opposite ends of a scale measuring the autonomy of the political from the economic. At the economism end there is no autonomy. At the political science end there is absolute autonomy. In between, we can identify different degrees of ‘relative autonomy’ where politics is not determined by economic processes but is not independent of them either. Most modern Marxist analyses have located themselves in the relative autonomy sector of this scale and it is from just such a position that Miliband (1969) launched his attack on the pluralist theory.

Dear and Clark (1978, following Gold et al. 1975) introduced a further Marxist approach to the state, which they term ‘ideological’. All Marxist theories incorporate some notion of ideology in their formulation, but Gold et al. refer in this context to theories that specifically emphasize the state as a form of mystification whereby class conflicts are hidden behind a national consensus. This is very close to the concept of the state as the scale of ideology that we introduced in Chapter 1. In Marxist literature it is most closely associated with the work of Gramsci and his followers (Jessop 1982). Gramsci is most well-known today for his concept of hegemony. This derives from Marx’s original argument that the ruling ideas in a society are the ideas of the ruling class. In Gramsci’s work, hegemony is the political, intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant class, which results in the dominated class actively consenting to their own domination (Jessop 1982: 17). Hence alongside the coercive state apparatus (police, army, judiciary, and so forth) there is the ideological state apparatus (education, mass media, popular entertainment) through which consent is generated. Notice that these ideological functions need not be carried out by public agencies – in this theory, the state is much more than just the public sector. Historically, the vital battle for state sovereignty involved subjugation of other authority within the state’s territory, both local magnates and the universal ideas of the Church. In the latter case, the issue centred on education and the state’s attempts to ‘nationalize’ its population by converting religious education into a state ideological apparatus. The successful combination of coercion and hegemony will produce an ‘integral state’. Here we have a parallel with the territorial integration theory and the concept of state idea and iconography. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, however, is much more pervasive and directly derives from the class basis of the state. In this argument, Marx’s original ‘committee’ assertion of 1848 remains broadly true: the difference between then and now merely relates to the changing relative balance between coercive and ideological means of control.

It is difficult to summarize such a vigorous and expanding field of inquiry as Marxist theories of the state in just a few pages. For key updates on developments in this field the reader is referred to Jessop (2002); for coverage of a range of political geographies of the state, see Brenner et al. (2003), Kuus and Agnew (2008) and Corbridge (2008). Within political geography feminist approaches to the state are important and we continue this review of state ideas by focusing on this work.

**Feminist understandings of the state**

The feminist approach to the state began with the identification of the state as the public sphere, a political arena that was dominated by men. The key ideology was not capitalism but patriarchy: the ‘system of social structures and practices through which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’ (Johnston et al. 2000). The feminist empirical project of ‘counting women’ in positions of power and noting
their absence was soon replaced by more sophisticated theoretical debates. By considering patriarchy an adjective rather than a noun (Butler 1990; Johnston et al. 2000), feminist scholarship identified multiple and overlapping patriarchies and, therefore, spaces of women’s oppression. In Chapter 8 we shall discuss the household as a site of heteronormative gender relations. In this section we illustrate the manner in which the state is an agent of gender relations through its codifying of difference between groups and how racial and gender relations are exploited by the state to maintain power relationships (economic, political and racial).

Chouinard (2004) describes the changes in feminist approaches to the state. In some ways the debate mirrors that of the previous section, with a challenge to the idea that the state is neutral. Instead, the state was seen as playing a key, even causal, role in perpetuating patriarchal and class relations. Either states were ‘embedded within and captives of particular sociospatial orders’ (Chouinard 2004: 230), including patriarchy, or states were the institutional means to perpetuate men’s violent sexual oppression (MacKinnon 1989; Chouinard 2004). Initial theoretical attempts to connect the patriarchal and capitalist forms and functions of the state were the foundations for contributions that emphasized the conjunctural and geographically contingent nature of the state: class and gender relations came together in different ways in different states (Chouinard 2004).

Contemporary feminist scholarship focuses on the manner in which the ‘state regulates, governs, and changes lives’ (Chouinard 2004: 231). In some ways, this is a discursive relationship as the state empowers some groups and marginalizes others via its use of language and rhetoric: for example, the manner in which government census categorization inscribes racial identity and heteronormative conceptions of the family and marriage. But the role of the state in empowering some groups and disempowering others is also material. Examples include welfare laws, employment laws, and laws that restrict abortion and contraception. The combination of state laws and discourse of belonging and exclusion have led feminist scholars into analysis of citizenship, a topic to which we return in Chapters 6 and 8.

**Seeing the state as negotiated outcome**

Theories of the state in capitalism, the capitalist state, and the attention feminists drew to the patriarchal nature of the state, all begin with the view of the state as a bureaucratic entity with a particular territorial expression. Recent political geographic approaches, including some from a feminist viewpoint, have challenged this starting point. Instead of seeing the state as something pre-given (or a set of institutions that are concrete and can be identified) the state is increasingly seen as a strategic outcome that is forever changing (Kuus and Agnew 2008). The focus here is one that the state is a means of societal control that is the product of interaction between what can be identified as state bureaucracies and non-state organizations. We introduced this idea in the discussion of Gramsci’s theory, but the current emphasis is upon contingency.

It can be a challenge to see that a state is ‘not a thing-in-itself but is constituted out of the representations and practices that are associated with it’ (Kuus and Agnew: 98). This requires seeing the state as an outcome of negotiation between different political actors. The state is certainly something that exists in a material sense; territory, constitutions, armed forces, police forces, etc. However, the form and purpose of these material expressions of the state are a result of ongoing negotiation between political actors. For example, the size of the United States’ nuclear arsenal and the related strategic posture have been changed by the actions of the Obama administration. This change is not just a result of the actions of the president but is an outcome of a negotiated process between government and private scientists, the input of think-tanks and lobbyists and citizens groups etc. Another example is the decision of the Swiss state to ban the construction of new minarets from November 2009. The policy is one enacted by the sitting government and is, hence, a manifestation of the state, but it is more fruitfully seen as an outcome of pressure from anti-immigrant groups in civil society and their ability to influence politicians.

Such negotiation can be understood as an interaction that produces different power relations between capital cities and other parts of a country.
We discussed this earlier in the chapter when talking about the process of state formation. The emphasis upon the ongoing nature of the state, or that it is continually changing as the result of political negotiation, suggests that varying degrees of centralization vary between states and may not be static.

Seeing the state as an outcome also raises a challenge to the assumptions about state sovereignty. Rather than taking the territorial state sovereignty as a basis for definition, and something to be taken for granted, recent inquiry sees a history of the violation of state sovereignty by outside powers. The degree of violation varies from state to state. For example, North Korea is a very contained or bounded state. On the other hand, the countries of the European Union are open to immigration from other EU states, as well as having to negotiate European laws and mandates with national laws.

The intersection of dynamics of centralized control and the degree to which they are penetrated by networks of finance, trade, migration and even military intervention leads to a schema of four idealized sovereignty regimes (Agnew 2005). Of course, this is a simplified model and should be used as a way of considering how particular states are a negotiated outcome of political processes that can be identified as 1) centralization of state authority and 2) the degree of penetration or violation of state territoriality. The resultant four-way schema categorizes states as one of four ideal types (Figure 4.2). Classic states fit the mainstream model of bounded and complete state sovereignty. Going across the diagonal of the table takes us to imperialist states. Agnew (2005) sees these as the opposite to classic states, as they are penetrated by outside political entities and display no strong state apparatus. Globalist states are also implicated in global networks, but from a position of state strength, rather than the weakness of the imperialist states. Integrative states are a particular form of federalism. Kuus and Agnew (2008: 103) argue that the European Union is the obvious current example, as national power is surrendered in an integrated supra-national political entity.

The four sovereignty regimes identified by Agnew are helpful in seeing how the contingent negotiated and process view of the state actually creates forms of the state that we can identify: North Korea, the European Union etc. Agnew’s schema also takes us away from the atheoretical understanding of the state in capitalism and the economism of theories of the capitalist state. The particular nature of any one state at any given moment is contingent upon the coming together of different institutions and behaviours that make and remake state practices (Mountz 2003). Though we can see contingency in the form of the state at any given instant, the general form and purpose of the state is continually remade in to a particular institution within the general framework of our topological model. A good example is the way diplomats behave to ensure the norms and practices of states within an inter-state system (Dittmer 2017; Jones and Clark 2015; Kuus 2014). Also, the way the state is continually negotiated helps us incorporate the contribution of feminist views of the state (Staeheli et al. 2012).

Despite these contributions, we can see a key deficiency in all these theories from the point of view of world-systems analysis. They all, implicitly or explicitly, fail to situate the state within the
core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy. Theories of the state in capitalism and theories of the capitalist state operate on the assumption that economic processes are bounded within the geographic expression of the state. Agnew’s (2005) sovereignty regimes requires an implicit understanding of power inequality between globalist and imperialist states, but offers no theory through which this hierarchy can be understood. In the next section, we use some of the ideas from Marxist theories but apply them, in terms of our topological model, looking outwards as well as inwards.

Looking both ways: theory of the states

The political sphere that we deal with in this study is not the single state but the whole inter-state system. Hence we need a theory of states – of inter-stateness – where the multiplicity of states is a fundamental property of the theory (Taylor 1995). Clearly, none of the above offers this type of theory. Looking inwards to understand state–civil society relationships is vital, but it is also partial. Hence we can build upon themes elaborated above, but we will need to add the inter-state system to the argument. In fact, we will find that by looking outwards from the state our approach does clarify some of the contentious issues in state theory. In this discussion we begin, in a preliminary way, the bringing together of theories of the state and world-systems analysis. For further discussion see Taylor (1993b, 1994).

One economy, many states

The basic empirical problem confronting the Marxist theories of the state is that the same economic system (capitalism) in a territory was capable of producing very different state forms. Although the United States and Italy are both capitalist states, for instance, they exhibit very different politics. It is this variety of politics that was chosen as the subject matter of modern Marxist political analysis (Miliband 1977; Scase 1980). The break with economism was obviously necessary, and the postulate of relative autonomy of politics from economics seemed to be the way forward for these new analyses. As we have seen, the derivationists have cast severe doubt on the validity of this position, but they have not replaced it with another means of accounting for the variety of politics under capitalism. World-systems analysis provides an alternative interpretation of this political variety that makes the concept of relative autonomy unnecessary. The crucial step is to return to considering states as a key institution within the world-economy. As an institution the state, any state, is available to be manoeuvred to favour some social groups – classes, peoples – over others within the world-system. In short, we replace relative autonomy by manoeuvrability.

The notion of relative autonomy is based implicitly upon the idea that both state and economy cover the same territory. In Scase (1980), for instance, the issue of the relationship between economics and politics is treated on a state-by-state basis for Western Europe. When viewed in this manner, it is easy to see how the problem of relating one ‘national economy’ to one state polity emerges. But what if there is no such thing as an autonomous ‘national economy’? Then the problem simply disappears as a theoretical issue. Instead of a one-to-one relationship there is a one-to-many situation – one world-economy and many states (Figure 4.3). Hence, we do not have to appeal to a relative autonomy argument to explain the variety of political forms that states take under capitalism. Instead, there are numerous fragments of the world-economy, each related to its particular sovereign states. Since these ‘fragments of capitalism’ differ from one another, there is no reason to suppose that the forms that the states take should not differ from one another. Quite simply, different fragments of capitalism are associated with different state forms. The variety of politics remains to be understood, but there is no need to resort to relative autonomy between economics and politics for explanation.

Dismissal of relative autonomy brings us into line with the state derivation position. But we soon find that there are problems in applying this theory to our framework. In its initial form, we have seen that the state is derived to overcome the anarchic consequences of a ‘free’ capitalism. If we translate this to a world-economy, then this theory predicts a world government to compensate for global anarchy.
Rape and state terror in Guatemala
For decades the United States has supported the government of Guatemala in its brutal campaign of maintaining a polarized social order. In late 1997 the Guatemalan government signed peace accords with the URNG, an umbrella organization of Guatemalan guerrilla groups (Nolin Hanlon and Shankar 2000: 271). Shortly after, reports authored by the United Nations and the Catholic Church detailed the scale of the government abuses. General figures claim that between 1962 and 1996 over 200,000 individuals were killed or ‘disappeared’: an all too common euphemism showing the power of the state in some contexts to erase individual life. The population of Guatemala is approximately 50 per cent women and 60 per cent indigenous. Of the 200,000 victims, 83 per cent were indigenous Mayas. The UN report claimed that approximately 25 per cent of the victims were women. The type of state violence suffered by the victims varied by gender. ‘Men outnumbered women approximately four to one in the categories of arbitrary executions, torture, forced disappearance, detention, and the category “other”. Women and men were found in equal numbers in the statistics of death by forced disappearance, while 99 per cent of sexual violations were experienced by women’ (Nolin Hanlon and Shankar 2000: 275).

Nolin Hanlon and Shankar eschew a theoretically informed research and see their work as a form of activism: ‘we have chosen to give space and authority to women’s voices in the form of testimonio [testimony in the UN and Catholic Church reports] as a way to walk with those who have the courage to speak out’ (Nolin Hanlon and Shankar 2000: 265). Such testimonios allow us not only to witness the ability of the state to exercise violence, but also to consider its political geography by following Nolin Hanlon and Shankar’s discussion of the different scales of state terror. First, a testimonio:

The 15th of September of 1982 we returned with my father from the market of Rabinal . . . we were detained by the soldiers close to the detachment and they locked us up separately . . . they pulled off my clothes, all mounted, the captain first, eight more soldiers . . . the rest touched me, they treated me badly and between themselves they said to the one on top to hurry up, they told me to move and they were hitting me to make me move. Suddenly I saw that they entered with my dad, he was beaten up, they supported him between two [soldiers]. I was naked on the table, and the captain said to my father that if he didn’t talk it was going to get bad. So he made the men that he had there start to rape me again . . . I don’t believe that my dad was a guerrilla, I didn’t know what they wanted. Suddenly the captain asked for a machete and cut off my dad’s penis and he put it between my legs. My father lost a lot of blood, he suffered a lot, after they took him away. They gave me my clothing, other clothing, of perhaps another woman and they told me to go. I told my husband what had happened, he answered that the Army had power, that one couldn’t protest, that if I hadn’t gone to the market nothing would have happened to me. A month later they killed my husband, but deep down I felt relieved. After everything that had happened to me I no longer wanted a man at my side, but they didn’t have to die in this way. That is all.


The Guatemalan Army is one branch of a particular state. The testimonio and the preceding statistics illustrate the horrors that result when state power is unleashed and unrestrained. The example shows the ability of the state to forcibly enter different spaces and scales; the community, the home and the body. Rape by soldiers has painfully and dramatically altered the woman’s body and mind and her ability to be a wife or sexual partner. Her family and home have been destroyed. The resignation felt by her husband illustrates that while it is easy for the state to enter other scales and spaces, resistance to the state – through exercise of the body, household practices and community activity – is harder.

Sources: CEH (1999); Nolin Hanlon and Shankar (2000).
This is quite the opposite to the capitalist world-economy as conceived by Wallerstein. As we have seen, multiple states are necessary for manoeuvre by economic actors on the world stage. Production of a world government would therefore signal the end of capitalism as a mode of production. It is manoeuvrability that separates our position from the derivationists and forms the basis of our theory of the states.

**State manoeuvrability: deriving a new instrumentalism**

Our theory should derive the nature of the state from the nature of the world-economy. Hence we will replace the relative autonomy of the state as a separate entity by the manoeuvrability of states as institutions within the world-economy. These are the particular institutions of the system that wield formal power; they make the rules, and they police them. States as the repositories of this power are, therefore, instruments of groups who are able to use the power for their own interests. Hence, we can derive an instrumental theory of states from the inter-group conflicts within the capitalist world-economy (Figure 4.4).

Let us start with the prime logic of the modern world-system, ceaseless capital accumulation. From Chapter 1, we know that this is organized through class institutions, with the controllers of capital attempting to maximize their particular shares of the world surplus. This surplus is ultimately realized as profits on the world market. Controllers have two basic strategies for increasing their profits: they can either raise prices or lower costs. In political terms, the former requires some degree of pseudo-monopoly to lessen commodity competition, the latter requires the opposite policy with respect to the direct producers, an ‘anti-unionism’ that enhances competition for jobs by labour. In both strategies, controllers of capital have used states as important instruments in their struggle for the world surplus.

States can be used first and foremost to control flows across their borders. It is through such restrictions on commodities and finance that pseudo-monopolies can be created and prices manipulated. As we saw in Chapter 3, the limiting cases are autarky (or closed national economy) and pure free trade (or open national economy), but, in reality, states have always pursued policies between these extremes. Whatever policy is adopted, it will favour some controllers of capital both inside and outside the state at the expense of others. For instance, in the late nineteenth century state politics was dominated by the free trade versus protection issue. Today, this conflict continues in many realms of policy, including repatriation of capital and ‘hidden protectionism’. A good example of this politics in the 1990s and today is the breakdown of, first, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) talks, and, second the WTO (World Trade Organization) negotiations on trade over the degree of freedom in the world market for agricultural commodities. Farmers (typically now in corporate form) in the United States, Japan and the European Union are using their
governments in different strategies to maintain or raise their profits. Generally, this use of the state in external relations is integral to intra-class competition within the strata that control capital.

States are used in a second crucial way to set the legal rules that govern the social relations of production within territories. It is through this means that costs of production can be kept to a minimum. Laws covering wage bargaining, corporation responsibilities for employee welfare and rights to trade union membership are all examples of how state actions can directly affect production costs. Laws restricting or banning trade union activities are common in peripheral states and constitute a key part of the informal imperialism mechanism. A good example of this politics in the 1990s is the British government’s refusal to sign the Social Chapter of the 1992 European Community agreement on further economic integration. The motive is that firms producing commodities in Britain will have more power over labour and incur lower labour costs. Generally, this use of the state is integral to inter-class conflict between controllers of capital and direct producers.

Hence we can derive two politics from the two strategies of controllers of capital: raising prices produces an intra-class, inter-state politics looking outwards, and reducing costs produces an inter-class, intra-state politics looking inwards (see Figure 4.4). It is not suggested that these are the only politics operating in the world-economy, but they are the most crucial because they go right to the heart of the system, the capital accumulation process.

These two forms of politics are endemic to the capitalist world-economy, but they become particularly transparent in periods of economic restructuring. It is during Kondratieff B-phases that economic pressures induce different classes to intensify their efforts to use their state to protect their position. We shall illustrate state manoeuvrability with two examples drawn from political reactions to restructuring consequent upon the economic depression of the 1930s, with implications for the economic globalization of the 1990s.
The overthrow of the Weimar Republic in Germany in 1933 and its replacement by a new state, Adolph Hitler’s Third Reich, illustrates a very raw case of state manoeuvrability. The Weimar Republic was set up in the aftermath of First World War defeat and survived an immediate revolutionary civil war. The scars of these events were never lost, since the neutrality of the state was continually challenged. Association with the Peace Treaty of Versailles was seen widely on the right as a betrayal of the German nation, which meant that many reactionary forces, especially in the army, hardly hid their contempt for the constitutional politicians and their parties. One result was the rise of the Nazi Party as an electoral force in the early 1930s. On the left, defeat in the civil war produced a parallel mistrust of the state, leading to the rise in electoral support for the Communist Party in the early 1930s. Tarred simultaneously as national betrayer and class oppressor, the new state needed to build and consolidate a centre politics to be successful, but a period of economic restructuring is not a time for such a middle way. Without the legitimation of neutrality, the Weimar Republic was a political disaster waiting to happen.

The often violent turmoil in Weimar Germany is a reflection of our two basic forms of politics operating in a situation of necessity: the defeated German state required critical manoeuvring within the capitalist world-economy. The intra-class politics of the economic elites centred on disputes between different sectors of the economy and their relations to the wider world. The outward-oriented industries were those engaged in new core-like activities (such as chemicals and electronics), which were competitive on the world market. On the other hand, the inward-looking industries (such as the large Prussian agricultural estates) were seeking protection to stave off competition from the world market. Thus, the intra-class struggles within Germany were a classic expression of the quest of semi-peripheral states to increase the presence of core processes and prevent peripheralization within their jurisdiction. However, in this case the situation was crucially complicated by the inter-class politics that derived from the civil war. The failed revolution transmuted into bitter political struggles over wage levels and other social benefits, thus continuing to threaten capital accumulation. In this situation, the intra-class politics intersected with the inter-class politics: the interests of the economic elites were split between core-like industries willing to make concessions towards social policy and wage increases and traditional domestic industries, which wished to maintain the old social order. The result was the rise and fall of coalition governments, which ultimately produced a politically impotent state (Abraham 1986). The Nazi Party exploited the failure to manoeuvre the Weimar state adequately in these difficult times and was thus able to overthrow it. The result was a new state: a reordering of the state apparatus that eliminated the inter-class politics and created an all-encompassing state for internal restructuring through state planning and an aggressive foreign policy to right the ‘wrongs’ of Versailles. Ultimately, these manoeuvrings were to spell disaster for Germany and the rest of the world, but for a period in the 1930s they were popular among Germans and widely seen as preferable to its weak Weimar predecessor.

We can conclude that, in general, the actual nature and outcome of the politics of state manoeuvrability are a product of both the structural imperatives of accumulation and restructuring and the manipulation of these conditions by politicians. Like the world political map, the world market is never simply a given constituent of the world-economy. It is forever being fought over and remade to favour some groups over others, and states are central to this process. Contemporary globalization, for all its anti-state biases, is no exception. We are now in a position to generalize about the variety of state forms by treating them as instruments in the struggle for the world’s surplus.

State manoeuvrability and contemporary economic restructuring

The Kondratieff model of economic restructuring we presented in Chapter 1 defines economic restructuring as a recurring set of processes within the longue durée of the capitalist world-economy. The different periods of restructuring are given different labels to illustrate their uniqueness. The current period has attracted the label ‘neo-liberalism’, the process and practice that have created today’s corporate
globalization. We shall discuss neo-liberalism as a particular moment of the capitalist world-economy, a moment in which the role of the state has come under intense scrutiny. Neo-liberalist polices illustrate how state manoeuvrability is partially constrained by the broader dynamics of the capitalist world-economy, but that states still have the ability and desire to adopt policies that they think will increase economic growth within their borders.

The central belief of neo-liberalism is that ‘open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 350). The philosophical roots of neo-liberalism can be found in the essays of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, but they gained political currency in the 1970s and 1980s, most visibly in the programmes of Thatcherism and Reaganism. However, given the world-systems identification of a global period of economic restructuring, Kondratieff IVB, it is not surprising that neo-liberalism became a global phenomenon. The World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were institutional agents aimed at disseminating neo-liberal policies across the globe, hugely facilitating the corporate worldwide strategies. Global economic restructuring created a global context for neo-liberal policies and enhanced corporate power, but this was not a blanket process: the policies were enacted differently by different states (Brenner and Theodore 2002).

Marxist scholars have approached neo-liberalism as a form of economic restructuring, but without placing it in the longue durée of the capitalist world-economy. Moreover, Marxists will remain interested in the role of the state in the singular, and the manner in which neo-liberal policies are both the product of state policies and constraints upon the ability of the state to regulate, or intervene in, economic activity. The state is seen as regulating economic activity within its boundaries in six ways:

• Regulating wages – of course not totally, but by enacting employment laws and setting the institutional context within which workers and owners can negotiate.

### Table 4.1 Dimensions of capitalism in Fordism and neo-liberalism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Fordism</th>
<th>Neo-liberalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage relations</td>
<td>Organized labour</td>
<td>Local and atomized negotiation of wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective bargaining</td>
<td>Lower wages and new gender division of labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercapitalist competition</td>
<td>State support for ‘nationalized’ industries</td>
<td>Selective state support for industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National control of foreign investment</td>
<td>Free trade zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global capital markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial and monetary regulation</td>
<td>Bretton Woods agreement</td>
<td>Speculation-driven currency markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State control of exchange rates</td>
<td>Offshore financial centres and tax havens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the state</td>
<td>State regulation</td>
<td>Monetarist supply-side economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keynesian demand management</td>
<td>Public–private partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare provision</td>
<td>Privatization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public sector employment</td>
<td>Reduced welfare support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic oversight</td>
<td>Less public accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International configuration and</td>
<td>National regulation</td>
<td>Capital mobility within trade blocs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uneven development</td>
<td>State economic aid for struggling regions</td>
<td>Market-mediated competition between states, regions and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and localities</td>
<td>localities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• The form of intercapitalist competition – how firms interact.
• Forms of monetary and financial regulation – how capital investment is regulated.
• The state and other forms of governance – the institutional arrangements.
• The international dimension – defining state relations with the world-economy.
• The regulation of uneven development – how regional inequalities are managed.

These dimensions are an additional step in the Marxist theory of the state; they recognize the international arena or ‘the mechanisms through which national and subnational economic relations are articulated with worldwide processes of capital accumulation’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 354). However, the form of the ‘articulation’ and the nature of the global economy are under-theorized because of adherence to ‘the state’ as key concept. The world-systems approach interprets neo-liberalism as a general ideology within a period of global economic restructuring, but one that is adopted and utilized by different states in different ways.

In the period we identified as Kondratieff IVA, or the post-Second World War economic boom, the dominant form of state–market interaction was labelled Fordism. Summarizing a fuller table in Brenner and Theodore (2002), we can compare and contrast the form of the six dimensions of capitalism under Fordism and neo-liberalism (Table 4.1). The dominant theme is the erosion of states’ willingness and ability to intervene in economic activity. States have enacted laws weakening the power of trade unions, have withdrawn financial support of some industries through denationalization, lost the power to define the value of currency to global financial markets, and promoted policies to make poorer regions attractive locations for the investment of globally mobile capital rather than the destination of government aid. Table 4.1 illustrates the dramatic change in the role of states. States have reduced their involvement in the market in some ways (such as welfare provision) while maintaining roles in others (underwriting private investment in large projects, such as high-speed rail networks in Britain, for example). China’s One Belt, One Road project is a different example, given the primary role of the state in that grand infrastructure project. However, even in that project there is a mixture of public and private investment.

These changes have also altered the relationships between different geographical scales of government. We discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 7, but suffice to say here that as states’ involvements have decreased then so has the concentration upon the national scale. In its place, businesses and non-governmental organizations have become involved in regulating and defining economic and political behaviour (known as governance) and have directed their attention to localities and the global economy. Cities have become a key scale in this new form of governance as we discuss at the end of this chapter (also see Chapter 7).

Paradoxically, states have attempted to increase their abilities to maximize opportunities for state manoeuvrability in the current period of economic restructuring by reducing some of their roles and functions. Although this is a global phenomenon, we should also expect a geography of actions and implications. It is to the question of the differential form of states in the capitalist world-economy that we now turn.

The variety of state forms: a space–time introduction

The form that states take depends upon the particular combination of economic, social and political forces in their territory in the past and at the present time. Hence, strictly speaking, every state form will be unique. But we can generalize in terms of the space–time structures previously discussed. Particular combinations can be aggregated into a simple $3 \times 2$ matrix, with time represented by A- and B-phases of growth and stagnation, and space apportioned among core, semi-periphery and periphery. We should then be able to discuss the form that states take within each of these six positions, allowing for further variation due to different histories or past positions. In all cases, the states as institutions will have to carry out two basic tasks: 1) provide the conditions
European debt-crisis and state intervention in the economy

The project of inter-state government that is the European Union has faced the challenge posed by the Greek economy since 2010. Greece, an EU-member and adopter of the Euro has faced a severe debt-crisis that has resulted in a constant set of meetings, negotiations and brinkmanship. To prevent Greece defaulting on its debt payments a series of new loan agreements that have imposed severe austerity measures on the country have been invoked. Workers, pensioners, students and others have regularly protested. In the summer of 2017, during a heat wave, strikes by municipal workers led to piles of garbage mounting and posing a health hazard. Though not necessarily fatal to the euro currency, default by Greece would raise questions about the viability of monetary union and certainly decrease the value of the currency. Questions were also being raised about other euro countries with debt problems, namely Portugal and Spain. National, European Union and international politics all played a part in the Greek-debt crisis. Within Greece protests and strikes were catalysed by fears of job losses, benefit reductions and pay cuts that would result from cuts in public expenditure. In Germany, a traditional bastion of European integration and solidarity, the political mood was volatile as politicians and voters became increasingly troubled by their taxes being used to pay for Greek profligacy. The poignant question in Germany was why German taxpayers should pay to enable Greeks to retire in their fifties. Also, the crisis became a vehicle for geopolitical competition between France and the United States. The latter wanted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to play a key role in debt-restructuring, but the French saw this leading to unwanted US influence in European affairs. Some in Germany were willing to see the IMF take the lead if that meant they were off the hook.

The story illustrates the tension between financial markets and states. States may well have plans and policies regarding their public expenditures, but the financial markets are global entities that are constantly evaluating the economic viability of states. If banks and other creditors believe a state is unable to afford its public programs through tax revenues and loans it can alter interest rates and ultimately demand that states reduce public expenditure in order to facilitate debt-repayment. This has been a common story of IMF involvement in African and Latin American countries for decades. It comes as a greater shock when it is a feature of the politics of states at the core of the capitalist world-economy.

In a neo-liberal context the state is concerned about managing flows of investment and debt repayment across its borders while balancing domestic demands for the state provision of particular goods and services. Here we witness the tension of the one economy/many states structure of the capitalist world-economy. A period of economic restructuring requires the ‘creative destruction’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002) of dismantling existing state practices in order to attract investment that maintains the economic viability of the state.


for accumulation of capital; and 2) maintain legitimation of the system. O’Connor (1973) identifies these two basic functions of the state in his study of the fiscal crisis with specific references to the United States. Here we extend his ideas, based as they are on German derivationists, to states generally within our space–time categories of the world-economy. In particular, we consider the legitimation function as a varying balance between forces of coercion and consensus.

Core states are the most stable, and consensus has been far more important than coercion in maintaining control. This is because the controllers of capital in core states are strongly placed in the
world market and can pass on some of their surplus to core labour. This is the process of social imperialism described in the previous chapter. It is much more than simple bribery, however, and involves the incorporation of labour into the system. These are the truly ‘hegemonized’ states. But the strength of this hegemony varies between A- and B-phases. In periods of growth, more resources are available to keep the system stable. These are periods of building hegemony in the wake of union successes, social security advances and finally the welfare state. With the onset of stagnation, pressures to maintain conditions for accumulation lead to cutbacks in public expenditure with resulting dangers in the loss of legitimacy. In core states, however, the class hegemony has coped remarkably well with the current B-phase.

The opposite situation obtains in peripheral states, where instability dominates. Here there is no surplus to buy off labour, which is largely left to fend for itself while being coerced into submission. The result is an ‘overdeveloped superstructure’ relative to the economic base, according to Alavi (1979). But this does not represent strength; it reflects the weakness of peripheral states in the world-economy. As before in our arguments, overtly ‘strong’ states deceive by their appearance. Alavi argues that in post-colonial societies a military–bureaucratic group emerges to oversee the interests of three exploiting classes: 1) the metropolitan core interest, 2) the local urban industrial interest, and 3) the landowning interest. These three ‘capitals’ have a common interest in maintaining order as the basic condition for accumulation, but they compete in terms of the relationship of the state to the world-economy. Generally speaking, metropolitan core interests and local landowners favour an open economy, whereas local industrial interests favour protection. This is the peripheral/semi-peripheral strategy dichotomy discussed in Chapter 3 and illustrated using Frank’s discussion of ‘American’ and ‘European’ parties in nineteenth-century Latin America. To the extent that urban industrial groups are able to have their interests promoted by the military–bureaucratic regime, the state becomes more like a semi-peripheral state. But such promotion can fail and the state will sink even lower into the periphery. The case of Ghana and the failure of Nkrumah’s ‘African socialism’ is an example of this (Osei-Kwame and Taylor 1984). It is a matter of the pattern of opportunity existing to advance in the world-economy, which varies with A- and B-phases. We can see from the current B-phase that in periods of restricted opportunities it is the periphery and its people who suffer the most. In these circumstances, the very word ‘globalization’ seems to be a misnomer. It is hardly global, for example, if economically much of Africa has been largely bypassed by contemporary globalization. Holm and Sorensen’s (1995) phrase ‘uneven globalization’ neatly captures this circumstance.

Finally, we come to the most interesting examples: the semi-peripheral states. As we argued in Chapter 1, this is the dynamic sector of the world-economy where political actions by states can affect the future structure of the system. According to Chase-Dunn (1982), this is where class struggle is greatest, where the balance between coercion and consensus is most critical. State governments in this zone specialize in strategies that emphasize accumulation, as we have previously indicated. Semi-peripheral economic policy is all about ‘catching up’; it is the zone of protection in particular and mercantilism in general. This will make legitimation difficult, so much of the semi-periphery is associated with dictatorial regimes. But coercion itself is an expensive form of control and will stretch resources to the extent of hindering the ‘catching up’. Hence the semi-periphery is also associated with powerful consensus forces, specifically fascism and communism and, generally, nationalism. More recently religion has been used as an integrative force. These are strategies for mobilizing the state’s population behind the dominant classes without the greater material expenses of the social imperialism of the core. The political pressure in the semi-periphery has been dramatically illustrated in the current B-phase. In the late twentieth century, repressive regimes collapsed throughout the semi-periphery – military dictatorships in Latin America and communist governments in Eastern Europe. The subsequent ‘rise of democracy’ is discussed further in Chapter 6. In terms of globalization, the rise of Pacific Asia beyond Japan as a new ‘globalizing arena’ (Taylor
Case study

Theocracy
A theocracy is a state in which the government itself is a religious authority, or is subject to religious authority or doctrines. The term has become central to the lexicon of geopolitics, as it is identified as the mirror image of Western liberal democracy. As a component of the War on Terror, the United States has partially justified its military presence in the Middle East through the rhetoric of democratization. The invasion of Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was initially heralded as an attempt to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. However, it was soon portrayed as a successful liberation of the Afghani people from a strict fundamentalist theocracy imposed by the ruling Taliban. Theocracy has become synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism – though of course the definition applies to any religion.

In March 2006, President George W. Bush released the National Security Strategy of the United States, an annual revision of the country’s geopolitical code. Iran was identified as the most prominent threat to the United States; an Islamic theocracy that was striving to possess the atomic bomb. The identification of Iran as a geopolitical threat to the United States has continued into the Obama administration. However, Iranian politics is more complex than the label theocracy would imply. The Islamic Republic of Iran came into being in 1979 after the pro-Western Shah was overthrown. Although the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the dominant figure of the revolution, the opposition to the Shah consisted of a ‘diverse coalition of secularists, liberals, and fundamentalists uneasily cooperating in the overthrow of the monarchy’ (Takeyh 2003: 42). Since then Iranian politics has involved competition between different centres of power; the theocratic bases of the Spiritual Leader and the Guardian Council on the one hand, and the elected president, parliament and municipal councils on the other. Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 there has been an ebb and flow of attempted democratic secular reforms and resistance by the Islamists (Takeyh 2003; Gresh and Vidal 2004: 135–39).

Iran is illustrative of the politics of theocracies in general and the world-systems interpretation in particular. Far from being the monolithic structures portrayed in certain geopolitical representations, theocracies contain political tensions and dynamics representing the particular cultural and institutional make-up of the society.

Sources: Takeyh (2003); Gresh and Vidal (2004).

Summary
In this section we have discussed the theoretical conceptualization of the state. In particular we have noted:

- theories that view the state as a neutral institution;
- Marxist theories that view the state as an instrument of capitalism;
- feminist views of the state which emphasize the construction of difference;
- the world-systems approach and its situation of the state within the dynamics and structure of the capitalist world-economy;
- the role of the state within contemporary economic restructuring, commonly referred to as neo-liberalism.
Territorial states under conditions of globalization

The idea that the authority of states is being eroded is much older than current debates about globalization. For Deutsch (1981), the entry of the world into the ‘nuclear age’ in 1945 meant that states could no longer even perform their most basic function, the defence of their people. Brown, in his provocatively titled book *World without Borders* (1973), provided an ‘inventory’ of problems for humanity that transcend the territorial state, such as the environmental crisis, the population problem and the widening of the rich–poor gap. He highlighted the growing economic interdependence of the world and claimed that ‘national sovereignty is being gradually but steadily sacrificed for affluence’ (Brown 1973: 187). Like globalization today, these writers asked whether the end of the territorial state and the inter-state system was in sight? Was the demise of the state nigh?

In fact, the message of this chapter is that claims about the demise of the nation-state are overstated. If you still need convincing (and assuming you are not very rich or a corporation), try to avoid paying your taxes! But the power of states is being renegotiated. States have realized that their sovereignty is under attack from the global flows of capital within the world-economy and have elected to transfer some of their power to other institutions. Thus the dilution of state sovereignty has often been the result of processes initiated by the states themselves (Sassen 1996).

One such example of this is the construction of the European Union (EU). There have been two separate views of the role of the EU. Those who wish to retain the maximum amount of state sovereignty have proposed an intergovernmentalist perspective (broadly confederal). They hold a vision of a ‘Europe of Nations’. Intergovernmental-ism sees the EU as being no more than the sum of its parts, with decisions requiring the consensus of all the member states. On the other hand, the supranationalist stance envisions a decline in state sovereignty, with more decisions being made within the institutional framework of the EU (towards federalism). They hold a vision of a ‘United States of Europe’. Initially, the member states retained an intergovernmentalist perspective, but recently more tasks and functions have been passed to the EU. The major battleground between the intergovernmentalists (such as the British position before Brexit but also common to Eastern European members) and the supranationalists (such as the Germans) has been in the voting methods adopted at meetings of ministers from the constituent states. Intergovernmentalist states have argued for the larger countries in the EU to retain veto power over key decisions, whereas the supranationalists are more amenable to decisions being carried by a majority vote.

In practice, these problems have been solved geographically by allowing differential application of EU policies. Hence, while the single economic market covers all EU states, the single currency began in just 11 of the 15 EU countries (Britain being the major absentee). Similarly, the Schengen Agreement, which allows the free flow of people across borders, does not cover all of the EU (again Britain opted out). However, the very existence of these trans-state arrangements over the majority of EU states does suggest that the political momentum lies with the supranationalists, a position obviously strengthened by Brexit. Nevertheless, policies are the product of meetings and agreements between the leaders of individual states. Sovereignty has been released willingly to the EU. To explain this apparent paradox, it must be acknowledged that the countries of Europe had already lost sovereignty to economic processes. As Nugent (1991) argues, the sovereignty of European states was already challenged by flows of capital within multinational companies and in the inter-national financial markets. Also, superpower competition within Europe had undermined military and political independence. Jacques Delors, then president of the Commission of the European Communities, summed it up nicely when he said: ‘our Community is the fruit not only of history and necessity but also of political will’. The EU was seen as a means by which states could combine their power to retain influence over global economic processes. In particular, the aim is to develop the single currency, the euro, to
rival the US dollar as an international currency, thus levering some economic advantage from the United States (Martin and Schumann 1997). Similar to the viability and utility of federal states discussed earlier, the states of Western Europe have acted to deepen and widen the reach of the EU in order to facilitate their interaction with the world-economy.

The contemporary world has sometimes been portrayed as consisting of a great competition in which large private corporations are in the process of undermining the traditional territorial states. One common way of expressing this competition is to rank countries and corporations together in terms of their gross domestic product (GDP) and total sales, respectively. Many years ago, for instance, Brown found that General Motors was economically larger than most states, ranking twenty-third in his combined league table. He concluded enthusiastically that ‘today the sun does set on the British Empire, but not on the scores of global corporate empires’ (Brown 1973: 215–16). If the territorial states are facing demise, therefore, the consensus would seem to be that large corporations will be their replacement.

The argument for the corporations winning this competition is based upon their greater geographical manoeuvrability compared with that of territorial states. With the end of formal imperialism, the state’s economic location policies are internal ones. These can be regional policies to maintain the territorial integrity of the state for legitimation reasons or policies of free-trade enclaves to promote capital accumulation in the state’s territory. In either case, state strategy is limited to operating its economic policies within its own boundaries. Corporations, on the other hand, can develop economic policies across several territories. In their investment decisions, they can play one country off against another. Once production starts, they can control their overall tax bills by the method of transfer pricing. This involves manipulating prices for components being transferred between plants in different countries but within the corporation: the purpose is to ensure that large profits are declared for production in low-tax states and small profits or losses declared in high-tax states. In recent years high tech communication corporations – Google, Facebook, Amazon – have become notorious in this respect. The European Union estimates it loses between $54.5 billion and $76.4 billion a year from tax evasion (Chew 2016). For example, in 2014 Google transferred roughly 10.7 billion euros ($12 billion) from its Dutch arm to a Bermuda-based, Irish-registered affiliate called Google Ireland Holdings. Such a strategy was called ‘double Irish, Dutch sandwich’ and allows Google to benefit from a tax rate of just 6 per cent on its non-US profits, by taking advantage of a much lower Irish corporate tax rate of 12.5 per cent and a Bermudan tax rate of zero (Chew 2016).

It would seem that corporate taxes are becoming a thing of the past as global capitalism becomes the greatest freeloader in history. In fact, we can take the argument even further: it is corporations that are taxing governments (sometimes called a subsidy) for the pleasure of their company within a state’s territory – in 2013, the governor of Washington state in the northwest of the US gave aerospace giant Boeing a tax break of $8.7 billion to entice the company to build its 777 range of aeroplanes in the state (Chokshi 2015). This is a new economic version of the strategy of divide and rule.

Of course, it is not as simple as this. There is one important characteristic that corporations do not possess and that is formal power, the right to make laws. Hence, when a corporate executive suggests that eventually all financial corporations will be ‘headquartered on a ship floating mid-ocean’ (Martin and Schumann 1997: 84) he is missing one vital ingredient: ultimately wealth is material, not virtual. The properties of all corporations are guaranteed in the last instance by the property laws of the states in whose territories their property is located. Thus the notion of competition between state and corporation covers only part of the relationship between them. More generally, state and corporation exist in a sort of symbiotic relationship, with each needing the other. Every state requires capital accumulation within its territory to provide the material basis of its power. Every corporation requires the legal conditions for accumulation that the state provides.

If the corporation is not replacing the state, what does the rise of the large trans-state corporation since 1945 represent? For many Marxists, it represents a
new stage of capitalism: we have reached a new age of
global capitalism where production transcends the
barriers of the state. In world-systems analysis, it
represents a secular trend of increasing concentration
of capital, but it does not mark any fundamental
new structure. In the capitalist world-economy,
production has always transcended state boundaries:
remember that the world-economy is defined in terms
of a system-wide division of labour. The system-wide
organization of capital has been structured in different
ways at different times – charter companies in the
Dutch hegemonic cycle, investment portfolios in the
British cycle and corporations during US hegemony
– but these are each merely alternative means to the
same end: accumulation on a world scale. Thus the
world-economy continues to develop in the same
cyclical manner as before. Despite all the claims of
new powers that the corporations are deemed to
possess (see, for example, Barnett and Muller 1974),
they were powerless to prevent the Kondratieff
downturn of the world-economy in the 1970s. Like
all other actors in the system, they had to react and
adapt to the new circumstances to survive. The fact
that many did so successfully to produce a new
series of even larger corporations (Taylor and Thrift
1982) represents a further deepening of the same
mechanisms of capital concentration, another round
of winners and losers. But it is not at all certain that
the balance between state and capital has tilted
towards the latter. For example, none of today’s
enterprises would seem to be powerful enough to
bankrupt the two leading states, as happened to Spain
and France in 1557.

CITIES AND STATES: DIFFERENT MORALS AND DIFFERENT SPACES

The discussion of states and globalization has been
advanced by bringing in another political entity or
actor into the picture; cities (Taylor 2013). Tradition-
ally cities have been seen simply as parts of states.
In this sense, their political activities have been
subsumed or seen as less important than those of
states. The world-systems approach challenges this
view by taking a broad historical view that identifies
cities as the key sites of commercial practice that have
driven economic activity before and throughout the
history of the capitalist world-economy. Hence, the
previous discussion of multi-national corporations
is given a geographic manifestation; cities are
spatial clusters of commercial activity. For example,
during the period of Dutch hegemony in the 1600s
Amsterdam was the most important commercial city
in the world, the hub of world-trade. However, it also
was just one city within the territorial unit known as
the United Provinces, or what we more commonly
refer to as the Netherlands. The commercial interests
of Amsterdam also had to play a politics of alliance
building with other key cities in the United Provinces
to enact what we would see as ‘matters of state’, i.e.
it did not automatically win: Amsterdam failed to
get to the United Provinces to make a truce with
Spain to enhance trade in 1630 (Taylor 2007: 144). In
contemporary US politics the interests of New York,
and the financial industries it is home to, are often
seen to be at odds with ‘Main Street’, a term referring
to middle America – a combined geographic and
social category. The same tension between London as
a financial city and the rest of Britain, with primarily
a manufacturing base, has been a constant in the
economic trajectory of the United Kingdom (Wiener
2004).

The theoretical challenge is to identify states and
cities as particular types of actors. One way of doing
this is to see cities and states as the manifestation of
different ‘moral syndromes’ (Jacobs 1992), meaning
that they have different values and goals. Simply put,
cities are constellations of commercial practices and
states are the constellations of guardian practices.
These practices boil down to two means of human
survival or, in other words, making a living: taking
or making (Taylor 2007: 136; 2013). The former
refers to jobs such as the police, soldiers, judges,
politicians etc., and the latter to bankers, investors,
manufacturing workers, farmers, business owners etc.
These moral syndromes create clusters of values and
behaviours that can be paired (Table 4.2).

The political geography of the relationship
between the two moral syndromes emerges when the
commercial moral syndrome is mapped onto the
actions of cities and the guardian moral syndrome is mapped on to states. This creates two different political spaces: cities as spaces of flows (networks) and states as spaces of places (territories). Cities see benefit in making linkages across space that will enhance commercial opportunities. States see their purpose as containers of a homogeneous social group (the nation – see Chapter 5) that must be protected from external threats. The space of cities is one that has no demarcated territory, but is a complicated mixture of chains, circuits and networks facilitating the movement of investment, commodities, ideas and people with the goals of making a profit. This is the opposite of how we have described states in this chapter: the space of states is a bounded demarcated territory defined by borders that limit flows and by institutions that control and monitor the population.

As you can see, the potential for conflict of interest between cities and states is high. However, the historical relationship is much more complex than that. Simply, states need cities and vice versa. The commercial activity of cities provides the tax revenue that allows for the construction and maintenance of states. The institutions of the state provide the security and order that cities need to maintain their economic activity. This relationship is similar to those identified by Clark and Dear (1984) and which we have touched upon earlier in this chapter. However, what we have added is a competing geography between cities and states that allows for a world-systems interpretation of globalization.

First, let us talk of the period pre-globalization. This was a time of government regulation and the belief in national economies. In other words, the guardians were increasingly involved in commerce. What is commonly known as globalization is a reassertion of power by cities over states. Various forms of deregulation, which began in earnest in the 1980s under the terms Thatcherism and Reaganomics, are a reduction of the influence of the guardians on the commercial activities that cluster in cities. Globalization is the aggregation of commercial connections between cities (we talk about this in greater detail when introducing world cities in Chapter 7) that have intensified recently as state control over investment and trade flows has decreased. But what of the future? Cities have always needed states to enact some guardian practices to impose social control to facilitate commerce. The outstanding question is whether nation-states are the political geographic entities to provide these guardian practices or whether contemporary globalization is such an intense and global aggregation of flows between cities that new forms of global governance are necessary?

Our discussion of states and cities has illustrated the ambiguous relationship between the territorial states and capital. To use Deutsch’s (1981: 331) phrase, states are ‘both indispensable and inadequate’ today and throughout the history of the world-economy. But the bottom line is that without the territorial states there would be no capitalist system (Chase-Dunn 1989). We should also recognize that the problem with the globalization thesis on the demise of the state is that it confuses state adaptations to new circumstances with the erosion of the state (Taylor 1994, 1995). Changes in the form and behaviour of the state and the changing relationship between cities and states, does not mean the end of the state.

One last thought. The modern state in its multiplicity is not eternal and will one day disappear when the modern world-system reaches its demise. But in the meantime, the inter-state system is integral to the operation of the world-economy. Without multiple states, the economic enterprises would not

| Table 4.2 Differences between the commercial and guardian moral syndromes. |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Commercial syndrome**         | **Guardian syndrome**           |
| Compete                         | Take vengeance                  |
| Collaborate with strangers      | Be exclusive                    |
| Be inventive                    | Adhere to tradition             |
| Respect contracts               | Respect hierarchy               |
| Be efficient                    | Treasure honour                 |
| Use initiative and enterprise   | Be obedient and disciplined      |

Source: Adapted from Taylor (2007) p. 137.
The term ‘kleptocracy’ – literally a regime of thieves – is used to describe states where the political leaders use their power to siphon off state money into their private, foreign bank accounts (conveniently located in countries that provide financial secrecy (notably Switzerland)). Recently the term ‘state capture’ has been coined in South Africa to describe how President Zuma used the state’s coffers for his own private ends (e.g. spectacular house improvements). Private capture of states implies something more sophisticated than simple theft by dictators. Fully implemented, it involves a complex web of connections that integrate state elites into corporate globalization through control of their own state corporations. They use their sovereign power to exploit their country’s resources in conjunction with myriad foreign allies.

According to the Forbes list of the world’s richest people, Isobel dos Santos is the ninth richest person in Africa, with a net worth of $3.3 billion in 2017 (africaranking.com). It is not a coincidence that she is also the daughter of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, president of Angola since 1979 and erstwhile communist hero of the independence struggle against Portugal and of the civil war resisting apartheid South Africa’s intervention. It seems that former communist states with their relatively strong organizational structures make ideal candidates for state capture especially where they encompass a large resource base. And this is the case with Angola, especially with its offshore oil. The brief telling of the story oil dealing in the country illustrates the intricate connections of Angola’s elite into corporate globalization.

It starts with Colbert International Energy, a Houston oil company, backed by New York’s Goldman Sachs finance company for oil exploration in the Atlantic Ocean off Angola. To obtain the rights to do this, Colbert had to concede 60 per cent of the venture to Sonangol, Angola’s state oil company (20 per cent), and to two private companies Nazaki (20 per cent) and Alper (10 per cent). The former was run by Angolan elites, latter two were owned by Angolan elites. All three companies have offices in CIF Luanda One, the Angolan capital city’s symbolic tower building that marks its entrée into contemporary globalization. The ‘CIF’ in the tower’s name stands for China Investment Fund; the top floors house China Sonangol, 30 per cent owned by Sonalgol and 70 per cent by the Queensbury Group of companies based in Hong Kong. The latter’s commonly used name derives from its Hong Kong address but it is in fact a shadowy entity comprising 102 companies (including CIF), 81 registered in Hong Kong and 21 elsewhere across the world. Queensbury is involved in numerous Angolan oil ventures plus other mining, infrastructure and real estate business in Angola and worldwide (including owning the original JP Morgan building in New York). With further connections to Sinopec and Beiya Industrial Group in Beijing plus links to tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands (where Sonangol Sinopec International is incorporated, a vehicle for financing and securing oil contracts). Latterly the Queensbury Group has been using Singapore for its worldwide operations because of its business-friendly environment (i.e. secrecy). And so is Luanda plugged into the world city network to facilitate Angolan elites looting their own country.

This story is an update of a much older tale of Africa in the world-economy. Told in more general terms in Chapter 3 on imperialisms as ‘islands of development’ in sub-Saharan Africa’s incorporation into the modern world, corporate state capture is the latest mechanism for continuing peripheralization of the continent. Although political independence gave hope for economic development, such ‘development plans’ have fallen by the wayside: the economic activities of Angolan elites are hard at work in the ‘development of underdevelopment’ of their country.

have their windows of opportunity from state control that have allowed them to expand and prosper. Whether contemporary globalization is a manifestation in the demise of the state and the capitalist world-economy or just a renegotiation of power between cities and states that will maintain the capitalist world-economy is an open question.

Summary

In this section we have:
- discussed the role and form of the state under conditions of globalization;
- considered the way that the state continues to play an essential role in the capitalist world-economy;
- noted challenges to state sovereignty and the manner in which states have responded.
- discussed the relationship between cities and states and how this provides an interpretation of globalization.

Chapter summary

In this chapter we have:
- illustrated the historical political geography of the formation of states;
- highlighted the key concepts of territory and sovereignty;
- introduced key features of territorial states; boundaries, capital cities and frontiers;
- discussed theories of the state, noting the relationship between capitalism and the state;
- exemplified the feminist geographical understanding of the state and the emphasis upon public and private space and the inscription of difference;
- introduced a way of seeing the state as a negotiated outcome between different political institutions
- introduced the world-systems approach to territorial states by using the term manoeuvrability to situate states within the context of the capitalist world-economy;
- situated the political geography of states within the processes of globalization to illustrate continuity and change in the function and form of the state.
- discussed the relationship between cities and states.

The state is a key geographical scale and actor in our political geography framework, but it can be understood only with reference to its role in the capitalist world-economy and its role (as arena and tool) in political struggles over access to resources and power. The feminist approach to political geography considers how the state apparatus facilitates the maintenance of power by some groups and the marginalization of others. The theory of the state as a negotiated outcome between different institutions sees the state as continually changing as the result of interaction between competing groups. Within the context of globalization, the essential roles of the state have been maintained, though the concept of manoeuvrability has increased its saliency. The meaning of globalization was identified as a particular moment in the continual negotiation of power between cities and states.
### Key glossary terms from Chapter 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>administration</th>
<th>diplomacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>apartheid</td>
<td>economism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aristocracy</td>
<td>elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autarky</td>
<td>empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance of power</td>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boundary</td>
<td>fascism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bourgeoisie</td>
<td>federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital city</td>
<td>First World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism</td>
<td>franchise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalist world-economy</td>
<td>free trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centralization</td>
<td>frontier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centrifugal forces</td>
<td>geopolitical code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centripetal forces</td>
<td>geopolitical transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship</td>
<td>geopolitical world order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society</td>
<td>geopolitics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classes</td>
<td>globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colony</td>
<td>hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communism</td>
<td>home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitution</td>
<td>iconography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core</td>
<td>idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core area of states</td>
<td>ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derivationists</td>
<td>informal imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development of underdevelopment</td>
<td>instrumental theory of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inter-state system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judiciary</td>
<td>Kondratieff cycles (waves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberalism</td>
<td>left-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberal democracy</td>
<td>liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberation movement</td>
<td>liberal democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government</td>
<td>local state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local state</td>
<td>logistic wave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>longue durée</td>
<td>mini-systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mode of production</td>
<td>multi-party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national self-determination</td>
<td>nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national self-determination</td>
<td>neo-liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partition</td>
<td>opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peoples</td>
<td>partition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>periphery</td>
<td>peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place</td>
<td>periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pluralist theories of the state</td>
<td>place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political parties</td>
<td>power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protectionism</td>
<td>relative autonomy of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scope of conflict</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sectionalism</td>
<td>semi-periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social imperialism</td>
<td>social movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialism</td>
<td>space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td>state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignity</td>
<td>state capture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>superpower</td>
<td>transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transnational</td>
<td>Treaty of Versailles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Westphalia</td>
<td>Treaty of Versailles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unitary state</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world cities</td>
<td>world economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world-empire</td>
<td>world market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world-system</td>
<td>world-systems analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world-systems analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Suggested reading


Activities

1. Make a list of all the ways you and members of your household or family have experienced the influence of the state over the past week or two. Sort your experiences by identifying them with the three forms of power we identified in Chapter 1.

2. Consider the notion of state manoeuvrability we introduced in this chapter by reading a policy statement by a state leader or other politician of your choice. In what ways did the speech refer to opportunities offered or constraints imposed by the ‘global economy’? What were the implications for people within the state?

3. States are grounded on their sovereign territory. Use a historical atlas to identify the changing boundaries of your own state (or another of your choosing) and delineate the power politics behind the initial modern boundaries and all subsequent changes.
CHAPTER 5

Nation, nationalism and citizenship

What this chapter covers

The doctrine of nationalism

Synthesis: the power of nationalism
  Beyond the institutional vortex
  Nation-state: the territorial link
  The everydayness of nationalism

Nationalist uses of history: the ‘modern Janus’
  Poetic landscapes and golden ages
  Nationalism as ‘double Janus’

Nationalism in practice
  Varieties of nationalism
  The transformation of nationalism in the nineteenth century

State and nation since 1945
  Nation against state
  The rights of indigenous populations

Renegotiating the nation?
  Is a new European identity emerging?
  Competing collective commitments? Religion, ethnicity and nationalism
  The gendered nation: feminist understandings of the nation

Citizenship: multiscalar politics
  Types of citizenship: formal and substantive
  Citizenship and the state
  Citizenship and scale

Citizenship in the capitalist world-economy: movement and morals
  Geopolitics of mobility
  Transnational migration
  Cities as sites for the new politics of transnational citizenship?
At the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century it is clear that nationalism is undergoing a political revival. Here are some major ongoing national political projects, listed in alphabetical order: President Trump making America great again; President Xi making China great again; Prime Minister Modi making India great again; President Putin making Russia great again, President Erdoğan making Turkey great again and Prime Minister May making the UK great again. These renewal promises are popular as they counter the cosmopolitan tendencies of cities across the world wherein corporate globalization is constructed. Historically nationalism has thrived on uniformity rather than diversity thereby threatening any groups outside the nation, and this can be seen in each of the ‘making great’ programmes above. The last one is of particular interest because Brexit directly opposes the European project to transcend ‘nations’ (the European Union) on the continent where they wreaked such damage in the twentieth century (First and Second World Wars). Furthermore, the Brexit project has a strong materialist basis to its renewal politics, an economic nationalism that requires ‘greatness’ to be found separately from Britain’s European neighbours. Thus this contemporary politics is an ideal way to begin and unravel the contradictions and attractions of nationalism in a globally connected world.

The competing politics of ‘economic nationalism’ and European Union integration juxtaposes two different geographies as the expression of two very different policies. On the one hand is the belief in greater economic efficiency through the continued development of a single European economic space produced to different degrees through policies such as the single market, customs union and currency union (the euro). The other politics is a resistance to that project by the individual states who are still calculating economic and political benefits and risks through the lens of a narrow ‘domestic’ agenda. Thus the currency union that is the Eurozone incorporates only 19 of the 28 in 2017, so that, for instance, the British pound and the Swedish krona have not disappeared whereas the French franc and German mark have each been replaced by the euro. The tension faced by politicians between the European and the domestic demands is enhanced by the fact that their constituents still look at the world predominately through a national lens: the belief that their primary identity is Polish or Spanish, for example. Note that this is irrespective of membership of the currency union – Poland is outside the Eurozone, Spain is inside. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the UK seriously debated whether the join the Eurozone and in this case the decision to keep the pound turned out to be a harbinger for Brexit. More generally national identities honed over centuries continue to have much greater resonance than an attachment to a European identity developed over half a century (the EU was originally formed by six countries in 1956). And this translates globally: although economic processes are challenging established notions of state sovereignty and, in the process, established understandings of national identity, the strength of nationalism has remained strong and is now becoming increasingly important.

Anyone who doubts the power of national identity should stand among the fans watching the World Cup finals, or, more tragically, consider the mass graves of victims of the ethno-nationalist conflict in the former Yugoslavia, a multinational state that violently disintegrated through national conflicts in the 1990s. Anyone who doubts that established notions of national identity are not being challenged should consider the road signs in southern Arizona near the Mexican border, where the distances are reported in kilometres rather than miles, as is the US norm, or, more cogently, how the popularity of mobile phones spread across the world irrespective of nation. Nationalism is a persistent but dynamic political ideology, adaptive to global changes. Politicians across the world are defining a new global context in which nationalism is seen as a viable political challenge to existing geographies of globalization.
Nationalism poses an interesting paradox (Anderson 1983). On the one hand, it is a very powerful ideology that is used to motivate people to fight each other and ‘rally around the flag’. The ideology is pervasive and is a fundamental part of our individual identity. In the modern world it is nigh on impossible to think of someone as not being a member of a nation. The identity of a person is strongly dependent upon their self-identification with a nation, and what particular traits that carries. On the other hand, the content of national identity is, as we shall see, very weak. The stories nations tell about themselves are very idealized histories of great achievements and moral acts in the face of wrongs brought upon them by outside forces. Such stories are partial and sanitized, or what we call ‘national myths’. Hence our first puzzle is how can nationalism be, simultaneously strong and weak?

The heart of the paradox lies in the synthetic role of nationalism, or its ability to tie together the different institutions of the capitalist world-economy. This is a geographical role because of the importance of territory. The ideology of nationalism ties group cultural identity to the construction of a state that has a specific territorial expression. States resist separatist movements because the threat to the territorial extent of the state is seen as an integral challenge to the existence of the nation. After describing this synthetic role we must situate nations within the structure of the capitalist world-economy through the introduction of the concept of ‘double Janus’, the ability to look in two directions at once. Through this concept we see how nationalism plays a key role, in its very different forms, in providing an environment that legitimates the competition and inequalities between states. Nationalism is not the only ideology of group identity though, and we conclude our discussion of nationalism through religious and racial identities that show how nationalism is being renegotiated at the moment.

Nationalism connects individuals, through their membership of a national group, to a particular state. Hence, it legitimates the existence of states and is the mechanism by which people feel loyalty or attachment to the state. It is, therefore, closely connected to the ideas and practice of citizenship in which individuals connect particular rights and responsibilities to their membership in a particular state. The final sections of this chapter explore the political geography of citizenship. Our emphasis is upon how citizenship politics in different countries is related to the flows and structure of the capitalist world-economy; especially the politics of migration. We conclude by talking about the morality of states denying the right of free movement of people, the challenges this poses for states, and the need to consider also a multi-scalar framework of citizenship.

The doctrine of nationalism

Why is the existence of nations taken for granted? Why do nations appear to be as natural as families and kinship groups? We must start with these questions in order to begin to understand why we
live in ‘a world of nations’. We should never underestimate the ideology of nationalism. As A. D. Smith (1979: 1) so rightly says, ‘No other vision has set its stamp so thoroughly on the map of the world and on our sense of identity’. In fact, the idea of ‘nation’ is so embedded in our consciousness that it is even reflected in the use of terms that describe counter-national arrangements: ‘supranational’, ‘multinational’ and ‘transnational’ all assume the prior reality of nations (Tivey 1981: 6). Similarly, the two great liberal organizations of states in the twentieth century have found it unnecessary to mention the states themselves – we have had successively the League of Nations and the United Nations. Of course, ‘nations’ that do not possess states, such as the Kurds, cannot join these organizations, but the many states with a mélange of many ethnicities, such as most post-colonial African states, do join immediately on independence to reinforce their sovereign status. As Seton-Watson (1977: 2) has humorously put it: ‘The United Nations in fact has proved to be little more than the meeting place for representatives of dis-united states’. Both the League and the UN are, or were, special clubs for states, not nations. Their misleading titles merely reflect the strength of the doctrine of nationalism in the twentieth century. The fact that the practice and study of inter-state relations is called ‘international relations’ just shows how ‘nation equals state’ is embedded in both popular and academic language.

But what is this ‘doctrine’, this ideal that all nationalists subscribe to? It is more than a simple theory linking an individual to the nation of his or her birth. It provides a national identity to an individual, but it is premised on a wider acceptance of a world of nations. It provides for much more than a simple ‘them and us’ dichotomy such as between a civilized ‘us’ and a barbarian ‘them’ in the former world-empires. In the world made by nationalism there are multiple ‘thems’. Numerous other nations and nationalisms are recognized as equal to and the equivalent of ‘our’ nation and ‘our’ nationalism. This has been expressed most clearly by a member of the Kach vigilantes, a group of Israeli nationalists who are usually considered to be at the extreme end of Israel’s political spectrum:

I personally have nothing against the Arabs. We in Kach do not hate Arabs. We love the Jews. The Arabs are a danger to us. If they were Chinamen I would fight them too. If I was in the place of the Arabs I would do the same as them. It’s only natural that they support the PLO, it’s their liberation organization. I understand it. But I won’t let them kill Jews.

This statement of mutual respect from such an unlikely source tells us a lot about the world according to nationalism. We can describe it in terms of the following propositions drawn from Tivey (1981: 5–6) and Smith (1982: 150), and related successively to our three scales of analysis.

A1: The world consists of a mosaic of nations.
A2: World order and harmony depend upon expressing this mosaic in a system of free nation-states.

B1: Nations are the natural units of society.
B2: Nations have a cultural homogeneity based upon common ancestry and/or history.
B3: Every nation requires its own sovereign state for the true expression of its culture.
B4: All nations (rather than states) have an inalienable right to a territory or homeland.

C1: Every individual must belong to a nation.
C2: A person’s primary loyalty is to the nation.
C3: Only through the nation can a person find true freedom.

We can term this list the common doctrine of nationalism. It has justified the following scale effects: the world is politically divided rather than unified; the state as nation-state is the basic arena of politics; the local scale is bypassed as experiences are transcended by ‘higher’ and more remote ideals.

The effects on social relations are no less profound. Other political ideologies have had to adapt to or be crushed by nationalism. According to Smith (1979: 8), liberalism was confronted by nationalism at the time of the 1848 revolutions in Europe. The simple individualism of classical liberalism had to give way to a ‘national’ liberalism in order to survive.
At the other end of the scale, the internationalism of socialism was fundamentally defeated at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Worker fought worker under their different national banners. Like liberalism, the various brands of socialism have had to adapt to the political reality of nationalism in order to survive. Liberal individualism and socialist internationalism counted for little against the doctrine of nationalism. The result is our three-tier scale structure of the world-economy pivoting around the nation-state described in Chapter 1.

This common doctrine is general to all nationalism. But every nationalism is based on particularism. Each has its own character. Nairn (1977) calls the common doctrine nationalism, emphasizing the common and ubiquitous ideology that the world is, and should be, a mosaic of ‘nation-states’. He uses the term nationalism to emphasize the uniqueness of each nation, the qualities that make one confident in identifying with a particular set of flags, symbols and histories, for example that Canada and Canadians represent a distinct cultural identity from the USA and Americans. Since every nation is different, a brief description of just a single example of nationalism will have to suffice to illustrate here.

Watson (1970) quotes approvingly from a letter written in 1782, which lists eight features of American society that were to become American ‘national characteristics’. These are ‘a love of newness’, ‘nearness to nature’, ‘freedom to move’, ‘the mixing of peoples’, ‘individualism’, ‘a sense of destiny’, ‘violence’ and ‘man as a whole’. The first four reflect American history, especially frontier history. The next two features are key ideological props of ‘the American way of life’. Individual competition to achieve personal success – log cabin to White House – is the basis of American liberal ideology. Manifest destiny has set national goals originally continental in scope and latterly global. The final two features are contradictory as they contrast conflicts in US society with the idealism of belief in rational accommodation. Together, these eight features add up to what Watson calls ‘the myth of America’; in our terms, they are the special secondary theory of American nationalism. It is quite remarkable how these descriptions of a very different American world of two centuries ago can have an immediate and obvious contemporary salience. This is nationalism embedded in society.

Clearly, it is at this level of theory that we can identify the various elements that political geographers have studied in the past – raison d’être, iconography, state-idea and so on. It has been the concentration of effort at this level of symbolism that has prevented political geographers breaking through to the general doctrine in understanding nation and nationalism. This is because nationalism is based upon a series of myths embodied in the secondary theories. These myths consist of distorted histories concerning society/ethnic origins, past heroic ages and betrayals and the ‘special’ place of the nation in world history. There may well be only one deity, but he or she has certainly been generous in designating ‘chosen people’!

If the content of each particular nationalism is so weak, how is the ideology of nationalism so strong? We explore this question in the next section that connects the institutions of the capitalist world-economy with the politics of territory.

Summary

In this section we have introduced the nation as a political geographic concept and noted:

- the relationship between nationalism and nationalism;
- the ‘doctrine of nationalism’ as the dominant manner in which the political geography of the modern world is conceptualized.

Synthesis: the power of nationalism

Earlier in the chapter we identified the mismatch between the power of nationalism and its philosophical poverty (Anderson 1983). Hence it is essential that we come to terms with this power. The first point to make is that we do not see nationalism and the nation-state becoming irrelevant in short- or medium-term futures. We agree with A. D. Smith (1995: 153–9), who gives three reasons why the nation
is here to stay. First, nationalism is politically necessary to anchor the multi-state system upon the principle of popular sovereignty. Second, national myths provide social cohesion and the basis of political action. Third, the nation is historically embedded by being the heir to premodern ethnic identity. For Smith, the nation is a functional institution that is unlikely to be replaced, because of its relationship to primordial identities. However, we would also emphasize the territorial link as the crucial hinge in the power of the modern nation-state. Here we attempt a synthesis of theories of the nation and nationalism by returning to the institutional vortex that we introduced in Chapter 1 wherein we located both states and nations. Also, by returning to this framework we provide a chance to take stock of where our argument has led us in terms of the four key institutions introduced in Chapter 1.

**Beyond the institutional vortex**

According to Wallerstein (1984a), the four key institutions of state, class, nation and household exist in an institutional vortex, each supporting and sustaining the other. The image we are presented with is a kaleidoscope of interlocking institutions that define our social world and its politics. This metaphor captures the complexity of the situation but not the concentration of power that has occurred in the last century. As well as the variety of relationships within and between these institutions, there has been a real accretion of power centred on the state as nation-state. In effect, two of the institutions have coalesced in a pooling of power potentials that has come to dominate our contemporary world. That is the real message of the interchangeability of the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ in everyday language.

The crucial period when the state began to harness the political power of nationalism was the later decades of the nineteenth century. This period is also important for the strategic decisions made by non-nationalist movements. Basically, the state began to be seen as an instrument that could be used to achieve radical ends. That is to say that the instrumental theory of the state we presented in the last chapter was extended beyond the manoeuvrings of the political elite and their economic allies. With extensions to the franchise, what had been a dominating state came to look more and more like an enabling state (Taylor 1991a). The women’s movement, with its great campaign for female suffrage, and the socialists, with their organization into political parties to contest state elections, both focused their politics on the state. The state has been at the centre of the vortex sucking in power with the indispensable help of the nation. Once subjects became converted into citizens with rights, then states could be equated with the collective citizenry, the nation. States as nation-states have become our imaginary communities for whom millions of individuals laid down their lives in the twentieth century. Such power is awesome.

**Nation-state: the territorial link**

The concentration of power into the dual institution of nation-state has been a very complex and contradictory process that is ongoing. One crucial feature that brings much of our previous discussion together is territory. Both institutions, state and nation, are distinctive in their relationship to space. Whereas all institutions, major and minor, occupy space and operate within space, only state and nation have a relationship to a particular segment of space, a place. (We discuss this difference between space and place in detail in Chapter 8.) According to Mann (1986), the power of all states has been territory-based; in the modern world-system, the state is defined by possession of its sovereign territory. As Anderson (1986) argues, nationalism is formally a territorial ideology; a nation without its homeland (fatherland or motherland) is unthinkable. It is the equating of these two territorial essences – sovereign territory equals national homeland – that has made possible the dual institution that is the nation-state.

Several geographers have developed political theories of regional class coalitions based upon shared commitment to place. For instance, Harvey (1985) argues that segments of capital that are place-bound, such as local banks and property developers, can make common cause with local labour interests to produce a place politics that transcends traditional political differences. City boosterism in the United States and regional development agencies in Europe...
are often expressions of such politics, and we consider them in Chapter 7. State politics is a place politics related to the above in that its economic policies consist of large-scale boosterism and development based upon implicit class alliance. The implication is that the class alliance reduces labour militancy within a country in order to promote economic competition between countries. The class alliance is qualitatively different from local politics; it is a nation. The place that is the state is also an imagined community, with all that that entails for individual identity.

**The everydayness of nationalism**

Part of the power of nationalism, its ability to act as the synthetic ‘glue’ for the institutions of the capitalist world-economy, is that it is so commonplace or taken for granted that it is not seen as an ideology or a particular way, amongst other options, for organizing politics geographically. Michael Billig (1995) has illustrated this with his concept of ‘banal nationalism’. He shows that nationalism is part of everyday life in all societies. The nation and the nation-state are naturalized as obvious and unquestioned necessities that organize our lives and frame our outlooks. According to Billig, the nation is ‘flagged’ for us every day as we recognize, use and seek comfort from flags, coinage and other national symbols that have commonplace functions. Similarly, ‘we’ and ‘us’ are commonly used in daily newspapers to constantly remind us that we are part of a nation and different from others. All news, in newspapers, on radio or TV, is habitually divided into ‘home news’ and ‘foreign news’. Advertisements often signal their product as associated with, or even part of, the nation of the targeted consumers. Many millions of holidaymakers are now thoroughly familiar with queuing at passport controls as part of their holiday experience. This is a concrete experience of boundaries far more indicative than abstract maps of boundaries hanging on a classroom wall. The continual presence of these reminders in our contemporary lives creates an unquestioned acceptance of the ‘naturalness’ of both nations in general and ours in particular.

It is in these circumstances of latent national identity that politicians in times of war or other crises are able to activate national support for the geopolitical actions of nation-states. In Billig’s words:

> One might think that people today go about their daily lives, carrying with them a piece of psychological machinery called ‘a national identity’. Like a mobile telephone, this piece of psychological equipment lies quiet for most of the time. Then, the crisis occurs; the president calls; bells ring; the citizens answer; and the patriotic identity is connected.

(Billig 1995: 7)

The continual flagging of nationhood is necessary to enable the call to arms whenever it is required to legitimate geopolitical actions – the contemporary ‘making great’ projects with which we began this chapter are each explicit examples of this process.

The concept of banal nationalism shows that, at its very core, the nation-state provides individuals – its citizens, its nationals – with their fundamental space–time identities. From the previous chapter’s topological model we know that spatially the state looks inwards to its civil society and outwards to the inter-state system. Individuals are quite literally located in the world-system in terms of who and where they are and who and where they are not. However, just focusing upon states gives a very instrumental view. What is needed is to connect the powerful ideology of nationalism to our world-systems understanding of the state. In this way we can understand 1) how states legitimate themselves, and their position, within the capitalist world-economy and 2) how national identity is constructed within the competitive interstate system. These connections are made by our discussion of what we may term a ‘double-Janus’ model of the state. With the addition of nation to the state, Nairn’s Janus model includes consideration of looking backwards to past national struggles and forwards to a secure national future. Individuals are given identity in terms of where they have come from and where they are going to. In summary, nation-states define the space–time dimensions of the imagined communities that we all belong to. Herein lies the power of the nation-state, the pivot around which the politics of the modern world-system is conducted – the contemporary ‘making great again’ projects with
which we began this chapter are each explicit examples of this process.

Summary
In this section we have:

- shown the crucial role nationalism plays in connecting the institutions of the capitalist world-economy to territory;
- discussed the everydayness of nationalism by introducing the concept banal nationalism.

Nationalist uses of history: the ‘modern Janus’

History is as important as culture and territory in the make-up of nations. But it is not just any history that is our subject matter here; these are histories with a nationalist purpose, where myth and fact are entangled in complex ways. One authority has even argued that ‘Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 12). Certainly, creating nations has always involved creating new histories.

The entry of the ‘people’ on to the political stage produced a change in the historical requirements of the state. In the absolutist states, legitimation was vested in the sovereign, whose right to rule rested on his or her personal lineage. Like the world-empires of the past, the most important history was the monarch’s family tree. This was hardly appropriate for the new world of nations. The people, and not just a symbolic head, have to have a link with the past.

One of the inventions of the new national histories was the ascribing of special significance to particular dates. Centenaries became celebrated for the first time, for instance (Hobsbawm 1987: 13). The centennials of both the American and the French Revolutions were celebrated with international expositions in 1876 and 1889, respectively. Other nations proclaimed anniversaries of their foundations in a dim and distant past. Hungarian patriots found their nation to have had its origins in the invasion of Magyars in 896 just in time to celebrate the millennium in 1896. Similarly, the Swiss chose 1291 as the date of the foundation of Switzerland for appropriate celebrations in 1891 (Anderson 1983: 117). More recently, in Poland, in the early 1960s, other patriots traced the origins of the Polish nation to its conversion to Christianity in 966, again just in time for a millennial celebration. We can be sure there were no celebrations in Hungary, Switzerland or Poland in 1796, 1791 or 1766, respectively, for the simple reason that this was before the national need for new histories. Quite simply, there was nothing to celebrate then.

The essence of celebrations of such anniversaries is their appeal across the whole national community. The past is shared by everybody in a display of national unity. The meaning for the nation is profound: ‘history is the precondition of destiny, the guarantee of our immortality, the lesson for posterity’ (Smith 1986: 208). Without history, there can be no nation.

Poetic landscapes and golden ages
A. D. Smith (1986: 178) identifies three forms of national history. Where the new nation has had a formal political existence over a long period, there will be more than a sufficiency of historical material. In this case, the history is produced by rediscovery, selecting a new amalgam of facts for the new history. Where the new nation is less well endowed with material, the history has to be created by conjecture in a process of reconstruction. In rare cases, the history may be produced by simple fabrication. All such histories consist of different balances between what Anderson (1986: 130) calls the ‘rich amalgam of fact, folklore and fiction’.

Each historical drama has two major components: a story of continuity that fills in the gap from the origins of the nation to the present; and a small number of symbolic tableaux depicting key events that the whole nation can identify with. The two most famous are probably William Tell shooting the apple off his son’s head and Joan of Arc being burnt at the stake (Smith 1986: 180). Both stories evoke the innocence of a patriot fighting devious and foreign threats to the nation.
National histories both define and direct by providing the space–time coordinates of the nation. In the romantic tradition, they create what Smith (ibid.: 182) terms a poetic space and a golden age. The former defines the place of the nation, its landscape, its sacred sites and historical monuments. This can eulogize both the capital city with its monuments and the ordinary landscape that represents the true habitat of the people – for England both the historical sites of London and the thatched cottage on the village green. We should not doubt the contemporary importance of this process. In recent

**Case study**

**Inventing traditions: Dutch tartans and English kilts**

We have noted that complete fabrications in the creation of national histories are rare. Nevertheless, such exercises do illustrate the lengths to which nationalists may go in order to provide a suitable antiquity for a modern nation. This dubious activity by forgers and confidence tricksters can be amazingly successful when taken up by other innocent nationalists.

The national costume of Scotland is perhaps the most widely known of all European nations. All readers will associate tartan kilts with Scottish clans. The general assumption is that they represent the ancient clothing of Scottish kinship groups. It will come as a surprise to many readers, therefore, to find out that the tartan originates from the Netherlands, that kilts come from England, and that there were no ‘clan tartans’ before 1844. This is a tradition that has been invented as part of a fabricated Scottish history.

Trevor-Roper (1983) has carefully documented this invention. He traces three stages in the making of the new history. In the first stage, a highly distinctive culture for Celtic Scotland was created. This required reversing the cultural dominance of Ireland over Highland Scotland in the medieval period. This was achieved in the eighteenth century by forging an ‘ancient epic poem’, the *Ossian*, which portrayed great Scottish cultural achievements in which the true core of Celtic culture, Ireland, was relegated to a cultural backwater.

The second stage was the creation of new Highland traditions. This centred on the tartan kilt. Tartan designs were imported into England and Scotland from the Netherlands in the sixteenth century. Quite separately, in 1727, a Lancashire weaver invented new clothes designed for tree felling based on the old Saxon smock. At the time of the Scottish Rebellion of 1745 therefore, kilts were a very recent invention for labourers, and clan tartans did not exist in the Highlands. After the defeat of the rebellion, the Highlands became a major source of men for the British army, and tartan kilts gradually became the uniforms differentiating the new regiments. Their transfer from lower-class and soldier wear to upper-class clothes was a subsequent product of the Romantic movement of the late eighteenth century. In 1778, the Highland Society was established in London, and in 1820 the Celtic Society was founded in Edinburgh. In 1819, demand for tartans was so great that the first pattern book was published. By the time George IV paid a state visit to Edinburgh in 1822, the new Highland traditions were an accepted part of Scottish life and the ceremony was dominated by tartans and kilts.

The third stage saw the adoption of the Highland tradition by the lowland region, where the vast majority of the Scottish population lived. This was achieved by another forgery. Two brothers claiming to be descended from the royal Stuart family produced a document, *Vestiarum Scotium*, which purported to show that each medieval clan had its own tartan pattern. This document was published as a historical source in 1842, and two years later the brothers reported its contents in their book *Costume of the Clans*, which was suspiciously similar to an earlier commercial pattern book. This allowed all Scots people to find their clan tartan from their surname. Highland tradition soon became popular in the lowlands, and a new large clothing business was created. Since this time, Scots people across the world have celebrated their Scottishness in the tartan kilts of the Highland tradition.
years, this history has been designated ‘heritage’, and museums have become ‘heritage centres’. Hewison (1987: 9) observed that, with one such centre opening every week in Britain, it was threatening to turn the country into ‘one vast museum’.

This geography of ‘special places’ is interwoven with the national history. Typically, all such histories include what we may term the Sleeping Beauty complex. That is to say, every nation has its golden age of heroes, since when it has suffered decline; but now, like Sleeping Beauty after the kiss, the nation is reawakening to reclaim its former glories. This is the central drama in the series of eight myths that Smith (1986: 192) describes as typical of any national mythology. The whole process is undertaken to generate a vision of the past to shape a direction for the future. Hence Nairn’s (1977) particularly apt phrase which we have used previously describing nationalism as the ‘modern Janus’. Janus was the classical god who faced both forwards and backwards. All nationalisms do the same.

Any selection of historical facts will tend to favour one particular future action over another. For instance, national histories of Greece have two alternative golden ages on which the national mythology may hinge. One looks back to the glories of Byzantium, the preservation of Greek culture in the Orthodox Church and Greece as a major eastern Mediterranean power centred on Constantinople (today’s Istanbul in Turkey) as the ‘second Rome’. The second possible golden age is that of classical Greece, the rationality of the city-states and Greece as a nation-state in the territory of the peninsula. Promoting the former mythology commits the Greek nation-state to a policy of intervention in Turkey. The second mythology treats the Byzantium episode as an alien Roman interlude and promotes a policy of nation building within a much smaller Greek territory. After the defeat by Turkey in 1923, the latter mythology has tended to prevail. However, the point is that different histories suit different presents and imply alternative futures. The modern Janus is a slippery customer: whatever else national histories are primarily about, it is not the past.

**Nationalism as ‘double Janus’**

But why is it useful to expand Nairn’s idea and emphasize that nationalism is a double Janus? Nationalism does not only look backwards and forwards in time, using myths of national history to mobilize a country towards an, apparently, bright new path. It also looks inwards and outwards, possessing a double-spatial face to complement the historic one (Figure 5.1). Nationalism looks inwards in its construction of a national group, a group that is created as being a coherent social entity with a particular territorial expression. This inward gaze’s group engages with the rest of the world, an outward view that sees other nation-states as competitors. The resulting double Janus looks inwards and backwards to create a sense of history for a national group in order for the nation to look forwards and outwards to what is portrayed as a progressive path in the capitalist world-economy. The double Janus is, therefore, closely connected to state manoeuvrability that we discussed in the previous chapter. It is the ideological tool that legitimates a state and its position and role in the capitalist world-economy. Nationalism, as double Janus, is an appendage to the idea of developmentalism – that all states can improve their lot if the nation sticks together and works hard. That is why nationalist myths are constantly reinforced and reinvented in particular countries. But the outward-forward looking part of the double Janus has to face the reality of the structural inequalities of the capitalist world-economy.

![Figure 5.1 The double Janus.](image-url)
In the following section we see how nationalism has been put into practice in the history of the capitalist world-economy as the general idea of the double Janus has been utilized in different contexts.

### Summary
In this section we have discussed:
- the manner in which national identity has been constructed;
- the ideas of nationalism as the modern Janus and the double Janus;
- how nationalism is used in political projects.

### Nationalism in practice
Nationalism is above all a political practice. We need to remember that nationalism has not always been the dominant ideology of the modern world-system. The political use of the idea of nation dates from the French Revolution and no earlier. In the two or three centuries before 1800, the world-economy evolved without a politics based on nationalism. There were states to be sure but, as Wallerstein (1974: 102) points out, the political practice was anti-national where ethnic regional powers stood in the way of the absolute state’s centralization. There was ‘statism’ or mercantilism, but until the nineteenth century no nationalism. Since that time, however, we have experienced a very wide variety of political practices that are nationally based. The first task of our discussion below is to put some order into this diversity by presenting a typology of nationalism. We then consider contrasting interpretations of these particular political practices.

#### Varieties of nationalism
We will begin with a standard typology of nationalisms, loosely based on the work of Orridge (1981). Our listing below is largely drawn from his discussion of the sequence of various nationalisms. We identify five basic types: proto-nationalism, unification nationalism, separation nationalism, liberation nationalism and renewal nationalism. We consider each in turn.

**Proto-nationalism**
This is the nationalism of the original core states, the medium-sized states of Western Europe. This nationalism is the source of much dispute over the timing of the emergence of nation and nationalism. Gottmann (1973: 33–6), for instance, is able to trace the idea of pro patria mori – dying for one’s country – back to about 1300, so that by 1430 Joan of Arc could employ such sentiments freely to mobilize the French knights against English encroachment on French soil. The statements of English ‘nationalism’ to be found in Shakespeare’s plays of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are even more familiar examples of this early ‘patriotism’. But these are both examples of loyalty to monarch or state or even country, not to the collective idea of a people as a nation incorporating all sections and classes. Nevertheless, the centralizing tendencies of these states within relatively stable boundaries did lead to a degree of cultural homogeneity by 1800 that was not found in other areas of comparable size. England and France are the key examples here, but similar nation-states were emerging in Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Spain. In all of these cases, state preceded nation, and it can even be said that state produced nation. The result was what Orridge (1981) terms proto-nation-states. The ‘people’ were entering politics, but nationalism as an ideology was not fully developed until later in the nineteenth century. Hence we can say that nation preceded nationalism.

**Unification nationalism**
For the full development of the ideology of nationalism we have to look elsewhere. In central Europe, middling-sized states had been prevented from evolving under the contradictory pressures of small (city-scale) states and large multi-ethnic empires. In particular, Germany and Italy were a mosaic of small independent states mixed with provinces of larger empires. After 1800, the Napoleonic Wars disrupted this pattern, which had been imposed a century and half earlier at the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
Although the Congress of Vienna in 1815 attempted to reconstitute the old Europe, new forces had been unleashed that were to dominate the rest of the century. Nationalism was the justification for uniting most of the German cultural area under Prussian leadership into a new German nation-state and transforming Italy from a mere ‘geographical expression’ to an Italian nation-state. These are the prime examples of unification nationalism and are generally considered to be the heartlands of the ideology.

**Separation nationalism**

Most successful nationalisms have involved the disintegration of existing sovereign states. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this nationalism lay behind the creation of a large number of new states out of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires. Starting with Greece in 1821, a whole tier of new states was created in Eastern Europe from Bulgaria through the Balkans to Scandinavia. Surviving examples are Norway, Finland, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. Ireland also comes into this category. This type of nationalism was, until recently, considered to be a phenomenon of the past, at least in core countries. However, in the last two decades of the twentieth century further ‘autonomous’ nationalisms became serious political movements in many states. Some of the most well-known are found in Scotland, Wales, the Basque country, Corsica, Quebec and the movement for Uighur nationalism in China. None of these has been successful in establishing its own nation-state, but all except the Uighurs have been granted political concessions within the framework of their existing states. We discuss this ‘new’ nationalism further below.

**Liberation nationalism**

The break-up of European overseas empires was described in Chapter 4 but is of interest here as representing probably the most common form of nationalism. Nearly all such movements for independence have been ‘national liberation movements’. The earliest was the American colonists, whose War of Independence in 1776 finally led to a constitution giving sovereignty to ‘the people’. The Latin American revolutions after the Napoleonic Wars were more explicitly ‘nationalist’ in character. These can be considered liberal nationalist movements. In the twentieth century, such movements were invariably socialist nationalist movements, varying in their socialism from India’s mild version to Vietnam’s revolutionary version. Another way of dividing up liberation nationalism is between those based upon European settler groups and those based upon indigenous peoples. In the former case, we have the United States and Latin America plus the original ‘white’ Commonwealth states of South Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which negotiated independence without liberation movements before 1945. In the latter case, there are the states of Africa and Asia that have become independent since 1945.

**Renewal nationalism**

In some regions beyond the core, ‘ancient’ cultures withstood European political capture for a variety of reasons and were able to emulate the proto-nationalism of the core, often using a politics similar to unification nationalism. These countries each had a long history as ethnic communities which was readily available to build their new nationalism. National renewal to former greatness became the basic cry. Hence Iran could rediscover first its Persian heritage and then, after the 1978 Islamic revolution, its Shia Muslim origins. Turkey, after losing its Ottoman Empire in the First World War, could concentrate on its Turkish ethnicity. The classic cases of this type of nationalism are to be found in twentieth-century Japan and China, two former world-empires that were incorporated into the modern world-system in the nineteenth century largely intact. Israel is a very distinctive case of renewal nationalism, based as it is on reversing a diaspora, which meant ‘renewing’ (conquering) its historic territory as well as its current people.

This form of nationalism can also occur as part of a process of creating a new state identity that attempts to redefine the relations of the state to the world-economy. As such, this renewal is associated with modern revolutions. Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ had many of the trappings of a renewal of the Russian nation, for instance. Other such radical
renewals have occurred in Mexico, Egypt, Vietnam and China.

These five types and their various sub-types seem to provide a reasonable cover of the variety of nationalisms that have existed. The sequence from the early types to their emulation in the later ones illustrates, according to Orridge (1981), the basic process of copying and adaptation that had lain behind the strength of the ideology. Political leaders in a wide range of contexts have been able to appeal to the nationalist doctrine to justify their actions. And this has led to a curious ambivalence in how nationalism is perceived. Hence, although our standard typology does its job as a descriptive tool in outlining the range of nationalisms, it is of less help in interpreting the politics of this ubiquitous though varied practice.

We are used to thinking politically in right–left terms, contrasting conservative with liberal positions or revolutionary activities with reactionary order. Nationalism has been available for use to both sides of the political spectrum. Hence one of the fundamentally confusing things about nationalism is that it has been both a liberating force and a tool of repression. On the one hand, it is a good thing, a positive force in world history, as when it is associated with liberation movements freeing their countries from foreign rule. But it also has an ugly side, the negative force associated with Nazism and fascism in Europe and military dictatorship throughout the semi-periphery and periphery. The resulting ambivalence towards nationalism is most clearly seen in attitudes after the two world wars in the twentieth century. In 1919, the First World War was blamed on the suppression of nationalism; in 1945, the Second World War was blamed on the expression of nationalism (Rustow 1967: 21). We have to look to political practices prior to the twentieth century to see how this unusual situation came about.

**The transformation of nationalism in the nineteenth century**

The defeat of the French in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars did not stem the new ideology and practice of nationalism. The French monarchy was restored, and the Concert of Europe was set up to control political change. But the nationalist genie was out of the bottle. Nationalist revolutions were successful in creating new states where the great powers were not affected (Greece in 1821, Belgium in 1830 and Romania in 1859), but the great nationalist cause for Polish independence failed until 1919. But these few examples do not do justice to the nationalist movement that engulfed Europe in the mid-nineteenth century.

The leader of this movement was the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini. In 1831, he set up the Young Italy society, and three years later Young Europe was organized as a federation of nationalist movements. Within a year, it had hundreds of branches across Europe; Billington (1980) calls it the Mazzinian International. This phrase hints at Mazzini’s theory of nations. As proper ‘organic units’, every nation was distinct and separate and therefore there would be no reason for conflict between them. Force would be required to sweep away the old order, but once the political world of true nations existed, wars would be unnecessary in the new harmonious conditions. This idealism is a long way from the aggressive nationalisms that so scarred the twentieth century, but it represents early faith in what we have described as the doctrine of nationalism.

The irony is that when Italian unification was achieved it was not the result of a national revolution but traditional realpolitik converting the king of Sardinia into the new king of Italy. This was symptomatic of the changes that were happening to nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century. First, nationalism became a tool of the great state builders of the era, notably Bismark and the unification of Germany; and, second, it became integral to the imperialist politics at the end of the century. The politics of nation was shifting to the right, and the term ‘nationalism’ was coined at this time to describe the new aggressive politics (Hobsbawm 1990: 102). It could hardly be further from Mazzini’s peaceful idealism. From a position where nationalism facilitated political self-determination and included diverse social, political and religious attitudes, it began to demand uniformity and primary allegiance as it became a ‘civic religion’, or integral nationalism, that ‘determined how people saw the world and their place in it’ (Mosse 1993: 1).
In order to become a civic religion that was coherent, uniform and worthy of loyalty, the nation created ‘a fully worked out liturgy that, with its symbols and mass actions, would come to direct people’s thought and needs’ (ibid.: 2). The result was that the nation ‘tended to deprive the individual of any space he could call his own’ (ibid.: 3). National anthems, flags, monuments, ceremonies and the worship of a mythical national history came together to form a structure that defined the individual’s space of identity. No wonder Billington (1980: 324) calls this change from revolutionary to reactionary nationalism ‘a dramatic metamorphosis’.

And so the twentieth century inherited two very different nationalisms, one revolutionary, the other a tool of the state, which we shall term national self-determination and national determinism, respectively. In the former case, the emphasis is on choice – people say which nation, and hence which state, they wish to belong to. This idea destroyed empires in the twentieth century. The latter case forces people into the nation as defined by the state, for instance by outlawing minority languages. These two processes were at the forefront of the politics of the construction of new states after the First World War. This period is illustrative for two reasons. First, it represents the apogee of the recognition of nationalism as a legitimate force in world politics. Second, nationalism is easier to define as a doctrine than it is to define on the ground. The negotiators at Paris in 1919 had the task of redrawing the map of Central and Eastern Europe. The difficulties of their task and different means used to achieve their ends illustrate the two sides of nationalism in a very concrete manner. Some boundary drawing merely affirmed territory already militarily gained by national groups. Other boundaries were drawn after plebiscites, people voting for the state they wanted to join.

Summary
In this section we have:
• identified different forms of nationalism;
• shown the major historical shifts in the politics of nationalism.

State and nation since 1945

The reorganization of the world political map after the First World War is generally considered to be the apogee of nationalist politics because it represents the culmination of the nineteenth-century European nationalist movements. But this standard interpretation does not look so clear-cut from the perspective of the twenty-first century. Today, we see the fruits of nationalist movements beyond Europe, which have produced far more states since 1945 than were created in the political reorganization of Europe after the First World War. New national liberation movements throughout the world engineered the collapse of European imperialism. In addition, with the collapse of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations, more states have been created in Europe itself. The result is that by far the majority of states that appear on today’s world political map have been created since 1945: the twenty-first century will be marked by numerous nation-state centenary celebrations. It is clearly time to take a fresh look at state and nation from a global rather than a purely European perspective.

Nationalism as a force for challenging existing states derives from another important change in the nature of this politics that happened in the late nineteenth century. Hobsbawm (1990: 31) calls this the abandonment of the ‘threshold principle of nationality’. Mazzini’s nationalism recognized the existence only of large nations that would make economically viable states. His 1857 map of European nationalities, for instance, included just 12 nations. With the demise of the idea of such a political threshold, the number of nations that can claim a right to statehood increased dramatically. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, a Europe of 27 ‘nation-states’ was constructed. Today, the number is even higher, but the implications of opening the possibility of statehood to all ethnic groupings that may be ‘nations’ has global implications for the stability of the world political map.

Gunnar Nielsson (1985) investigated the question of the relation between today’s states and ethnic groups – ‘nations’ and ‘national minorities’. He produced data for 164 states and 589 ethnic groups.
covering the whole world. The fact that there are three times as many ethnic groups as states does not augur well for finding an ideal world of nation-states, given the way states resist ethno-nationalism and the politics of separatism. In fact, Nielsson produced a typology in which a range of relationships between state and nation are identified.

According to Mikesell (1983), Iceland is the only authentic example of a nation-state in the sense of one people, one state. All other states have a degree of mixed population, which challenges their credentials as nation-states. Nevertheless, lack of ‘cultural purity’ has not prevented most states in the world claiming to be nation-states. Let us investigate the nature of such claims. Nielsson (1985) defines nation-states as those states where over 60 per cent of the population are from one ethnic group: 107 of the 164 states qualify on this very loose definition. These can be divided into two main types. First, there are those where the ethnic group is dispersed across several states. The best example is the Arab nation, which dominates 17 nation-states. We shall term these part-nation-states, and there are 52 such cases. Egypt and Syria are typical examples, along with the ‘divided nations’ that we described in Chapter 5 – the two ‘Koreas’ and still two ‘Germanies’ in Nielsson’s data. Second, there are the single nation-states, where an ethnic group dominates only one state. On a few occasions, the ethnic group contributes more than 95 per cent of a state’s population. These are closest to the nation-state ideal, and there are 23 such cases.

Iceland, Japan and Somalia are typical examples. It is more common where one ethnic group dominates the state, but not to the degree of the ‘ideal’ category of single nation-states. There are 32 such cases. Britain and the United States are examples of this category, along with Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.

Nielsson identifies 57 non-nation-states, where no single ethnic group has 60 per cent of the state’s population. These can be divided into three types. An intermediate non-nation-state type occurs where there is a single dominant ethnic group in a state, but it constitutes only about half the population (40–60 per cent in Nielsson’s definition). There are 17 such states, examples being the former Soviet Union, the Philippines and Sudan. Bi-nation-states are identified by Nielsson where two ethnic groups provide a combined percentage of a state’s population of over 65 per cent. There are 21 cases, and Belgium, Peru and Fiji are typical examples. Finally, there are 19 cases of what Nielsson terms multinational states, with a high degree of ethnic fragmentation, so they do not fall into any of the above groups. India, Malaysia and Nigeria are typical examples.

In Table 5.1 we show how these types of state are distributed across five continents. The geographical pattern is as we would expect. The two continents with the oldest modern states, Europe and the Americas, have the most single nation-states of both categories. Part-nation-states are most common in Asia, which reflects a fragmentation of their large nations. Multinational states and bi-nation-states are

| Table 5.1 Geographical distribution of nation-states and non-nation-states. |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                        | Part-nation-states | Single nation-states | 60–94% one ethnic group | Intermediate non-nation-states | Bi-nation-states | Multinational stat |
| Africa                 | 7                | 4                | 3                | 9                | 9                | 14               |
| Americas               | 7                | 6                | 11               | 1                | 5                | 3                |
| Asia                   | 22               | 2                | 6                | 6                | 3                | 2                |
| Europe                 | 12               | 9                | 9                | 1                | 2                | 0                |
| Oceania                | 4                | 2                | 3                | 0                | 2                | 0                |
| Total                  | 52               | 23               | 32               | 17               | 21               | 19               |
most common in Africa, reflecting the arbitrary boundaries imposed on the continent in the colonial division. But we can also note that most types are found on all continents. The major exception is the dearth of multinational states in Europe, which reflects their dismantling after the First World War. We can conclude, therefore, that nation-states of one sort or another form the majority of the world’s states but that the nation-state ideal as reflected in single nation-states has not managed to dominate even in its ‘heartland’ of Europe. The non-national states are obviously susceptible to nationalist challenges from within their boundaries. Governments in these states have to be very sensitive to the needs of the range of ethnic groups in their territory. In Chapter 4, for instance, we showed how the Indian government conceded a language-based federal structure to contain ethnic discontent. But we should not think that ethnic challenges are limited to the non-nation-states. Our loose definition of the nation-state allows for important minority ethnic groups to reside in the single nation-state category, and it is in these states that some of the main examples of ‘ethnic resurgency’ have been found in recent years.

**Nation against state**

The resurgence of minority nationalisms within Western European states from the 1960s onwards was a surprise to most political scientists. Their developmentalist models predicted a gradual decline in territorially based loyalties as communications within the state brought all the population into a single community (Deutsch 1961). This would be accompanied by modern functional cleavages such as economic class replacing traditional core-periphery ethnic cleavages in elections (Rokkan 1980). And, in any case, this was Europe, the continent whose boundaries had been redrawn after two world wars to produce nation-states. Nevertheless, separatist and autonomist nationalisms have grown and survived just as political scientists were writing their obituaries. In the 1980s, minority national resurgence spread to Eastern Europe, especially the Soviet Union, a state that had long seemed to have safely accommodated its ethnic diversity (Smith 1985). With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the forces of nationalism were released to create new states. In terms of the new nationalism, the East has politically overtaken the West in recent years. Clearly, yet another round of nationalist politics has occurred throughout Europe since the 1990s.

A further surprising feature of the new nationalism is that the oldest states of Europe – Spain, Britain and France – are not immune, in fact quite the opposite. We can use these three states to illustrate the range of political practices to be found in the new nationalism (Williams 1986). The most threatening form of politics is violence against the state and its agents. This political practice dominated the Basque struggle in Spain, the Ulster conflict in Britain and the separatist movement of Corsica in France. Various forms of non-violent resistance dominate the nationalist politics of Catalonia in Spain, of Wales in Britain and of Brittany in France. Finally, party political opposition, including referenda, is the major strategy of the nationalists of Galicia in Spain, of Scotland in Britain and of Alsace in France. The new nationalism is clearly a complex phenomenon expressed in different ways in different places. But they all have in common a challenge to the contemporary ‘nation-state’.

What is the future for these various nationalist groups? In the late twentieth century, both Irish and Basque nationalists declared ceasefires. They put faith in the political process to achieve their goals. However, violent resistance has not been totally eliminated in either case. The nationalist movements are asking for national self-determination, the principle employed to draw new state boundaries after the First World War. Can this new round of nationalism produce a new round of boundary drawing and a new political map? The answer may well be yes, but not in the same manner as in the early twentieth century. The difference is the existence of the European Union and its provision of a higher level of political administration that provides a political filter between smaller political entities and the capitalist world-economy. In other words, the scale of the state is itself multi-scalar, and the construction of a multi-state entity (the EU) has facilitated the belief that nations such as Scotland or the Basque region may, for example, construct their
own state apparatus but within the administrative apparatus of another layer of government. Indeed, the nationalist movement in Scotland has been recently sustained by the exit of Great Britain from the European Union.

The rights of indigenous populations

In Niellson’s (1985: tables 2.2 and 2.3) analysis of ethnic groups, nearly half (289) reside in just one state and constitute less than 10 per cent of that state’s population. Some of the new nationalisms of Europe are included in this category. The indigenous populations of the European-settled states of America and Oceania make up another important example of such ‘minorities’. These peoples occupied the territory before the invasion of Europeans. After defeat, they were generally ignored, neglected and cheated by the new colonial states. The major source of conflict with the settlers was land, and this continues to be the major practical grievance of indigenous peoples today.

Increasingly, indigenous peoples have found a new voice in their struggle for survival. The most striking example was the formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the subsequent activities of the United Nations on their behalf. In 1985 over two hundred representatives of indigenous peoples participated in a meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Knight 1988: 128). In 2014 the UN held the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples General Assembly that built upon a 2013 UN document called Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations Human Rights System. The World Bank estimates that there are approximately 370 million indigenous peoples worldwide in over 90 countries. An earlier study (Burger 1987: 37) estimated their geographic distribution: Canada 800,000; United States 22 million; Latin America 30 million; Australia 200,000; and New Zealand nearly 400,000, plus many millions more in Asia and Africa. In all cases, the indigenous peoples are demanding a similar package of rights. First, they require the right to preserve their cultural identity. This requires, second, a right to their territory, to the land, resources and water of their homeland. Third, they need the right to have responsibility over the fate of their people and their environment. Finally, this leads on to the right to control their own land and people, or what is commonly called, in other circumstances, national self-determination.

The ability of indigenous peoples to employ international law and agreements established by the UN have enabled them to use the notion of rights to make claims over territory that challenge claims of state sovereignty by states (Nicol 2017). While indigenous peoples, such as those in Canada, use UN agreements to make claims for territorial control and political autonomy, the Canadian state has used traditional practices of territorial control to try and maintain its jurisdiction over territory and resources. The conclusion is that the political agency of indigenous peoples is being enabled by international agreements that provide a challenge to traditional understandings of state sovereignty (Nicol 2017).

Court cases and legislation in Australia provide another good example of the difficulties faced by indigenous peoples. Torres Strait Islanders and Aboriginal peoples have made some gains in reclaiming their heritage. For example, it has been government policy to replace the Anglo-Saxon names of mountains and other natural features with Aboriginal nomenclature – Ayers Rock is now Uluru (Mercer 1993). However, the more important fight for Australia’s indigenous peoples is for access and title to land that was once theirs. The Australian legal system denied such title through the principle of terra nullius, the notion based upon the 1889 court case of Cooper v. Stuart, which claimed that the colony of New South Wales was unoccupied at the time of its peaceful annexation by Britain in the eighteenth century (ibid.: 305). This case rests upon two views of history: first that the land was empty prior to European settlement; and, second, that there was no conflict between Aboriginal peoples and European settlers. Recent histories reject both of these propositions. It is now estimated that the continent of Australia was home to 750,000 persons prior to colonization. A current estimate of the Aboriginal population of what is now New South Wales and Victoria is 250,000, four times the estimate made in the 1930s (ibid.). There has also been ample evidence of wars of resistance by Australia’s indigenous
Warlordism, security, and non-national identity

Can nations be built? In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 nation building was adopted as a component of the War on Terror. It was related to two other geopolitical constructs: ‘failed states’ and ‘terrorist havens’, the idea being that constructing democratic nations was a form of counter-terrorism: ‘vibrant’ nations, in the Western model, would not promote extremist political views or harbour terrorists. In the words of then Secretary of State Colin Powell:

But the war on terrorism starts within each of our respective sovereign borders. It will be fought with increased support for democracy programs, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform and health and education programs. All of these together deny the reason for terrorists to exist or to find safe havens within those borders. (Remarks to UN Security Council, Secretary Colin L. Powell, 12 November 2001, www.state.gov, quoted in Flint 2004: 375)

There are, however, two critical problems with this strategy. The first is that the nations were to be ‘built’ within existing state borders. As we have seen from our earlier discussion of ‘nation against state’, state borders, especially those imposed by colonial powers, do not follow patterns of national identity. In Iraq, the desire to create a united Iraqi nation has been violently disrupted by the primacy of other collective identities (Sunni and Shia Muslims) on the one hand, as well as the presence of Kurds, who view themselves as a separate nation, on the other. ‘Building’ an Iraqi nation is not just a matter of providing certain institutions; it also assumes the existence of a homogeneous nation that is coincidental with the state borders.

The second problem is that US practices of nation building can be critiqued as the imposition of empire. In Iraq, for example, the post-Hussein constitution was written by US scholars and politicians and the United States, as an occupying force, enacted harsh anti-labour laws. Nation building is far from being a neutral agenda. It is the attempted construction of a particular form of state. Hence, the nation building of the twenty-first century is a very different form of politics from either national self-determination or national determinism. It does not feature in the taxonomy of nationalisms described previously for the simple reason that it is not a nationalism as such, as an outside intrusion it fails to even create a nation.

Nation building is the attempt of a hegemonic power to assert norms of political behaviour that are calculated to maintain a particular geopolitical world order. The ‘America First’ policy of President Trump leads to expectations that the form of diplomatic and economic engagement that are the foundations of nation building will decline. However, it should be remembered that President George W. Bush came to power criticizing President Clinton’s prior nation building efforts, and was soon forced to change his mind by events.

The persistence of warlordism in Afghanistan show that attempts to build collective identity by an external power using political boundaries imposed by earlier colonial powers is a hubristic exercise that inevitably provokes violent reaction. One result is ‘warlordism,’ based on local circumstances as well as the relative strength of the economic and political relationship between the central government and distant places (Schetter and Glassner 2012). A sense of local or regional identity, often coupled with ethnicity, can create a sense of grievance towards the central government that may be seen as distant, unresponsive, or corrupt. Formation of national identity and loyalty can be dependent upon a sense of a functioning state government that is serving the needs of the people. In the absence of such a state, or the failure of nation building in a state like Afghanistan, local forms of governance under the control of what may be deemed ‘warlords’ can be seen as a real alternative for local populations. Without the existence of a functioning state, or a national identity, the hegemonic power does not have the political materials with which to ‘build’ its preferred...
peoples. Nonetheless, subsequent court cases upheld *Cooper v. Stuart* on the basis that it was the law of the land rather than historical fact.

In 1967, a national referendum supported a change in the constitution that allowed the states and the Commonwealth of Australia to enact special laws regarding Aborigines, extended the franchise to indigenous people and included them in the national census (Mercer 1993). In 1988 (European Australia’s bicentennial year) both the Upper and Lower Houses of parliament acknowledged that Australia was occupied by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and that they had suffered dispossession and discrimination, while avoiding the issue of land ownership. The statements of 1967 and 1988 challenged the notion of *terra nullius*, and in 1992 the case of *Mabo v. Queensland and the Commonwealth of Australia* finally put it to rest. Eddie Koiki Mabo was a Torres Strait Islander who used the courts to stop the Queensland government taking property and fishing rights. The success of this case depended upon proof of an uninterrupted connection with the land via the maintenance of gardens and trespass disputes between Aborigines. However, the necessary weight of evidence required to show Aboriginal claim to the land was unlikely to lead to a mass of other successful land claims (Mercer 1993): the need to show uninterrupted connection with the land was especially problematical given the past policies of forced Aboriginal relocation (Mercer 1997).

The reaction to the *Mabo* case within white and corporate Australia was strong. Within the broad context of globalization, farming and mining interests mounted a campaign that argued that Aboriginal land claims would be obstacles to Australian economic success (Mercer 1997). The outcome of the *Mabo* case was the Native Title Acts of 1993 and 1998, which have been negotiated within a political context of increasing racism and xenophobia among white Australians. Although these Acts reflect the opinion of the *Mabo* court case, and others, that Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders do have rights to the land and the sea, they appear to offer an opportunity for further political and legal wrangling rather than a satisfactory solution. Uncertainties remain about the amount of compensation that Aboriginal peoples will be able to claim. Most significantly, the principle of uninterrupted use, rather than sacred attachment to the land, is likely to hinder any major shift in the balance of Australian land ownership.

* * *

The examples from Australia and Canada show that identity, political autonomy and sovereignty may be negotiated through interpretation of international and national laws. The geography of nation and state is in a continual process of negotiation. However, despite many forms of nationalist struggles, today the world political map in the early twenty first century remains relatively stable. The ideal of the nation-state has not been realized. Rather, any stability reflects the power of the status quo in the inter-state system. It is the realism of power politics and not the idealism of national self-determination that prevails.

**Summary**

In this section we have:

- emphasized the continuing mismatch between the geography of nations and the geography of state borders;
- noted the violence inherent in a geography of multinational states.
Renegotiating the nation?

Just a few years ago there were arguments that the state and the nation were both being challenged by homogenizing processes of globalization. The symbiotic relationship of state and nation suggested that if one was vulnerable so was the other. Today there is far less talk of the end of nationalism but, as we noted at the beginning of the chapter, the conversation has certainly changed. The nation is still seen as a very important feature of political geography. Initially, the experience of nationalist resurgence in the 1990s meant that the typical position is that ‘the nation is here to stay; nationalism has proved enduring, surviving murderous wars as well as the forty-five years of postwar Bolshevik (Soviet) rule in Eastern Europe’ (Mosse 1993: 10). Subsequently, the notion of ‘economic nationalism’ has further energized the relevance of national identity, as a form of perceived resistance to globalization and supra-state institutions such as the EU. However, we must be very sensitive to the changing nature of nationalism over time (Mosse 1993). The ideological nature of the nation has to constantly change in order to survive. As geographers we consider the changing relationship of the nation with other scales and territorial units. We have argued that nationalism underwent a massive metamorphosis in the late nineteenth century. Is there evidence of a second metamorphosis occurring today?

A renegotiation of nation can only mean a departure from nationalism’s monolithic tendencies, from national determinism. The way people identify themselves is far more complex than a singular attachment to what is portrayed as a nation-state. Identities based on religion, race, generational cohort, and other affiliations combine to make for a complex sense of political self (Botterill et al. 2016). At the same time, state based identities are being challenged for being too inclusive. On example is the Scottish rejection of Britishness, Another example of such a challenge comes from the United States, where southern state flags bearing the old Confederate standard are challenged by African-Americans as symbols of past brutalities (Leib 1995). People are no longer willing to accept that the nation and its trimmings are immutable.

In keeping with our world-systems approach, we focus upon the rescaling of national ideas to explain the renegotiation of nationalism, which Paasi (1997) has explored. Is the scale of ideology rupturing? This question is asked in the context of the globalization of economic activity, which has resulted in a decrease in the ability of nation-states to manage their internal affairs. As Wallace (1991: 66–7) argues:

Inward and outward investment, multinational production, migration, mass travel, mass communications, all erode the boundaries that 19th century governments built between the national and the foreign.

Quite simply, through the creation of the nation-state, the challenge to state sovereignty has automatically resulted in a questioning of national identity. But the new identities being constructed are more complex than either a new reactive national identity or a naive embracing of a new cosmopolitan culture, sometimes called multiculturalism. According to Booth (1991: 542):

Sovereignty is disintegrating. States are less able to perform their traditional functions. Global factors increasingly impinge on all decisions made by governments. Identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people assert local loyalties but want to share in global values and lifestyles.

But how does globalization result in a renegotiated nationalism, and what form does that nationalism take? Appadurai (1991) argues that globalization has produced a deterritorialization of identity as ethnic and national groups display interactions that transcend territorial boundaries and also engage other identities. Global media networks and migration patterns have ignited new ‘imaginations’ (Appadurai 1991), which are more complex than Anderson’s (1983) national ‘imagined community’. The imagination of the nation was a grand narrative in the sense that it denied differences within the nation as well as the validity of other identities. The complex global–
local relations that are a feature of globalization have undermined the grand narrative of nationalism and facilitated more complex multiple identities.

Rodriguez (1995) defines three dimensions of change in national and ethnic identity related to the globalization of economic relations. One dimension is the global diasporas created by massive international migration, especially from the periphery to the core. Second is the growing ‘global–urban context of racial and ethnic intergroup relations’ (ibid.: 213). Inter-group relations within urban centres occur within the context of the role played by the city in the global economy. The third dimension of global change is the growth of bi-national communities as rapid communication and transportation allowed for the reproduction of households in two different countries. For example, bus and courier services crisscross the US–Mexican border, and Mexican radio stations have increased the power of their transmitters to reach American cities (ibid.: 215).

It is within the context of global flows and connections and the way in which people experience them in different places that ‘internally fractured and externally multiple’ (Bondi 1993: 97) identities are constructed. These new identities constitute a politics of difference that challenges identities imposed by colonialism and nationalism (Bhabha 1990). Thus collective identities are currently in a state of flux as people try to find shared histories that have meaning and resonance but also facilitate participation in a globalized economy. As the role of the state is being renegotiated then so too must national identity.

On the other hand, territory and the idea of the nation-state remain the dominant form of political identity and means of political organization. Despite the importance of processes of connectivity and flows across the world-economy, the modernist territorial idea still has ‘allure’ Murphy (2013). The idea of the territorial nation-state is still the basis for people’s understanding of the appropriate political geography organization of the world, and the principle of national self-determination is still the world’s dominant political ideology (Murphy 2013: 1213). The tension between national identity and loyalty to the state is further explored in Chapter 8. Here we continue by exploring the way national identity, though still the dominant political geography identity, is being renegotiated and rescaled.

Is a new European identity emerging?
The obvious first place to look for such rescaling of identities is the European Union, initially mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. The idea of Europe can be traced back to classical Greece and its ‘three-continent’ model of the world, but there has never been a modern sense of Europeanness to rival its constituent nationalisms. The political project of the EU has definite state-building goals, as we discussed in the previous chapter; here we consider its more ambitious attempts to capture political and cultural identities.

The question of a contemporary European identity has been investigated thoroughly by A. D. Smith (1995), who defines two competing models for the creation of collective identities (ibid.: 126–7). First, identities may be seen as ‘socially constructed artefacts, which can be brought into being and shaped by active intervention and planning’. Thus, proactive policies by European elites can create a supranational European identity, just as these elites created a supranational institutional framework. The second model sees cultural identities as ‘collective memory’ or ‘the precipitate of generations of shared memories and experiences’. Thus, according to this model, a European identity would evolve in a routine, unplanned, even banal manner as a variety of symbols, myths and traditions from across Europe coalesced into a supranational identity that included all the peoples of Europe.

Current evidence suggests that the possibility of the first model is problematical. For instance, previous popular reactions to the imposition of the EU’s bureaucracy in terms of national referenda aimed at endorsing European policies have often displayed antipathy, or just apathy, towards an increase in the power of the EU and a related decline in national sovereignty. Popular responses to proposed loss of national identity as a supranational identity is imposed make the task of elites in the first of Smith’s models quite problematic.

Evidence for the processes underlying Smith’s second model is equally dubious. The construction
of a transnational identity through the recognition of relevant European myths, symbols and values is difficult precisely because of the content of national identities across the continent. European history is pregnant with internal hatreds, wars, massacres and genocides. As Schlesinger (1992) points out, an important component of memory is forgetting, or collective amnesia. But can Europeans afford the luxury of forgetting the Holocaust, for instance, in light of the rise of neo-Nazism and attacks on immigrants? Because of these bitter memories and their continued salience, a European identity would have to be abstract while simultaneously promoting an embedded solidarity (Smith 1995: 133).

In the clear absence of any ethnic history of a continent-wide European ‘people’ it is the first model that is being deployed: the construction of a European identity created from the top-down by the institutions of the European Union. Since the 1950s the supra-state organizations of what was merely the Common Market and is now proclaimed the European Union have promoted schemes to create a narrative of European integration and unity (Calligaro 2015). However, the ability of the European Union to define its own narrative is weak as it rests upon an array of other actors with their own agendas. For example, the Commission formed a Liaison Committee of Historians to discover the historical roots of European integration, but the academics ended up pursuing a different topic. The difficulty of forming a European wide identity is that the EU is simultaneously pursuing strategies to promote functional integration at regional scales (Keating 2013). The multiscalar presence of the EU is trying to create different outcomes and realities at different scales, meaning that any sense of Europeanness always remains just one level of identity amongst many.

Scholars take a different view. As Patel (2013: 22–23) argues, ‘The precise meaning of Europe . . . has always remained evasive, pluralistic, and vague, and rightly so’. The ‘rightly so’ is important here. Academics believe that identities are negotiated, contingent, and always in a state of partial becoming; rather than something that can be imposed from above by EU institutions. As with all identities, an ‘other’ is useful in creating a sense of one self, in this case being European. Migration may play a role in either creating a sense of connection, though this may be restricted to European elites who travel frequently across the Continent. Alternatively, the presence of migrants and refugees from outside Europe may be used to define an outside ‘them’ that fosters a sense of a European ‘us’ (Patel 2013). In the context of Brexit, Britain is being cast as the European ‘other’ in attempts to provide a united EU front to counter further exits.

Identity in Europe is both dynamic and contested: Do the British become less European on leaving the EU? What about other Europeans that have never been part of the EU such as the Swiss and Norwegians? Analysis of public opinion shows that Europeans are split between those who identify with their nation-state and those who identify with their nation-state and also add a sense of European identity (Risse 2010). Not surprisingly, the latter group is more supportive of policies of European integration. Furthermore, European elites are split between those who have a modern, secular, and progressive view of Europe and those who desire a nationalist and exclusive Europe based on a white Christian identity (Risse 2010). The second attitude is the translation of narrow and reactionary nationalist views from the scale of the nation-state to the supra-state scale of the EU.

The competition between national scale and supra-state scale identities has played out in electoral politics. The Brexit vote was a victory for nationalist views, but what is motivating people to support parties that challenge the EU and assert national identity. In their study of voters supporting the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Ford and Goodwin (2014) identify a body of the population who have been ‘left behind’ within the process of EU integration and globalization. These voters, especially white voters with lower levels of educational attainment, feel marginalized by economic changes, and are unable to identify with socially liberal elites. The voice of those with more parochial and nationalist views was certainly effective in the Brexit vote and has echoes across Europe through the increasing support for the National Front in France and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, as well as
other populist movements across the continent. Across the EU there is support for parties that want to prevent Turkey from ever joining the EU, express different versions of anti-Islamic and pro-Christian views, and promote restrictions on immigration, including refugees. At the moment it seems that the idea of an integrated Europe, and a related sense of Europeanness, is being challenged by a resurgence of nationalist based identities.

**Competing collective commitments? Religion, ethnicity and nationalism**

It is not just secular changes, such as the rescaling of the state, that are driving renegotiations of national identity. Religious identity is also a factor. Religion and national identity are entwined rather than separate or competing identities. Nationalist ideologies are often reinforced by religious identity and the institutions of the state may include a national religion, such as the Church of England. As a contrast, the communist regimes of the Cold War period defined themselves through their secularity. The tension between a secular communist state and the freedom of religious expression continues in China.

The interaction between nationalism and religious identity plays an important role in what has been called an individual’s ‘ontological security’. The term refers to a person’s sense of purpose, continuity and order (Giddens 1991). Ontological insecurity, in contrast, is a sense of living a geographic setting in which the everyday is seen as threatening (Laing 1960). Belonging to a nation can provide such a sense of belonging and purpose, both as a member of a particular nation as well as perceiving one’s position in a world of nation-states. However, to assume that national identity is a form of security for everyone ignores the schisms and exclusions within nationalist politics. The politics of belonging and exclusion is framed around racial, religious and ethnic majorities and minorities. In their study of ethnic and religious minority young in Scotland, Botterill et al. (2016) found that many of their interviewees had responded to the rhetoric of politicians who described a progressive and multi-cultural Scotland. Nuz, a Muslim female, compared Scotland favourably to England: ‘I feel England the folk are more racist. . . . Yeah and Scotland is not so bad because Scotland always promote “No Racism” more than what England do’ (Botterill et al. 2016: 129).

This sentiment was reinforced by Preet, who described herself as a ‘BritAsian Sikh’: ‘I feel Scotland’s more open, like they’re more accepting. They’re not as judgemental as England . . . like anyone from the Scottish Parliament and they’re just so friendly, like they’re accepting of your culture. It’s almost as if they want to like infuse all the cultures together so you’re like helping, which I think is really good’ (Botterill et al. 2016: 129).

Some respondents were more critical of the words of politicians, seeing them as just phrases to secure votes rather than a real commitment to multiculturalism. However, there was a sense that the young ethnic and religious minority people interviewed could look to a multicultural Scottish nationalism to provide a sense of order that is the foundation of ontological security.

The sense of the meaning of Scottish nationalism is not the only element of the young people’s sense of security. Their everyday experiences often jarred with their own positive sense of Scottish nationalism. For example, Guruple, a 12–15-year-old Scottish-Indian Sikh said:

> People think that, like, Muslims are the same as Sikhs and like they’re all together basically in, like, one group, when we’re not. And then they’ll class us as terrorists. . . . When I wear a turban and it was happening then it would really concern me walking down the street . . . I’d be more sketchy and a bit more on alert. Like if someone was to come and attack me I’d be, kind of, almost prepared.

(Botterill et al. 2016: 132)

The overarching ideology of nationalism maintains a sense of a singular national group that is the ‘core’ of a nation, both self-identified by the majority and perceived by minorities. Nationalism creates a sense of difference and otherness that cannot be entirely lost, especially by minorities, even when policymakers define a project of multicultural nationalism. This sense of difference is palpable in the most everyday experiences as Derek, a male Ghanaian international student, said:
When I first came to the gym, I was the only black person going into the room with about thirteen, fourteen like Scottish people. And when you get in there you do feel apprehensive. You wonder what they are thinking about you, what’s going through their mind . . . like sometimes it’s just the slightest expression, in most cases it’s not the choice of words, it’s the words they don’t say that really counts.

(Botterill et al. 2016: 131)

As we can see in some of the quotes above, religion as a form of ‘peoples’ is now addressed within the geopolitical context of the War on Terror. The airwaves and the current affairs sections of bookshops are replete with discussions of religion as a key geopolitical trope. Initiated by Samuel Huntington’s article ‘The clash of civilizations’ in 1993, the trend has been to identify religion as a form of identity replacing the saliency of national identity. Huntington exemplifies the tendency to essentialize religious affiliation, in the sense that all adherents to a particular religion manifest particular behavioural tendencies. Huntington’s article gained notoriety for labelling Islam as a violent religion. Other writers, notably Bernard Lewis (2002) in his book What Went Wrong?, focused upon Islam as a religion that was ‘backward’ or ‘undeveloped’, making these claims in comparison to the Christian West. The term ‘jihad’ perhaps best illustrates the tendency to essentialize Islam and construct it as a geopolitical other. Jihad, or to “strive or struggle” in the way of God’ (Esposito 1998: 93), is a central component of the Islamic faith, and refers to the actions of individuals as well as Muslim communities to realize the will of God. However, the dominant representation in the Western media, facilitated by the underlying tones of a ‘clash of civilizations’, is as holy war – with emphasis upon war, the obverse of ‘crusade’ that the ‘progressive West’ had abandoned centuries ago.

**Burkini politics**

In 2016, French politics was beset by the issue of the display of women’s bodies on the beach. The issue was not how much flesh was being exposed but how little. A number of mayors of French cities banned the burkini, swimwear designed for Muslim women to be able to enjoy the beach and swimming while maintaining the prescribed dress code of their religion. Some non-Muslim women had also worn the burkini, either for protection from the sun or as a choice of how to dress on the beach. In a context of terrorist attacks in the name of the Islamic State (ISIS), some French politicians supported the ban because the burkini was ‘clothing that conveys an allegiance to the terrorist movements that are waging war against us’.

The debate over the burkini rested upon the issue of freedom. France’s women’s rights minister Laurence Rossignol saw the burkini as another example of how the Muslim religion mistreats women: ‘the beach version of the burqa . . . it has the same logic: Hide women’s bodies in order to better control them’. Such an opinion is in direct contrast to the intention of the burkini’s creator, Australian designer Aheda Zanetti, who thought it gave women the freedom to enjoy the beach and water sports without having to expose their bodies for whatever reason. The *New York Times* editorial opined that the motivation behind French politicians banning the burkini rested a sense of the role of the French state as, hypocritically, controlling what women can wear in the name of freedom: ‘French politicians’ paternalistic pronouncements on the republic’s duty to save Muslim women from enslavement – by dictating to them what they can and can’t wear’.

This US perspective came from a particular understanding of the nation and freedom. For the French, the nation has always been seen as being formed by the ideals of the state, rather than a matter of the culture of its population. As France becomes increasingly diverse, the tensions between individual behaviour, religious tenets and a sense of a singular French identity will increase.

Religious and national identities are integrated to produce the particularity of national identities. Such integration facilitates the territorialization of religious identity, such as in the Ku Klux Klan’s ideology America is a Protestant nation. In Europe, Irish and Polish national identities have been closely entwined with Catholicism to counter their Christian ‘other’ oppressors, Protestant Britain in the first case and a combination of Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia in the second. However, that is only one form of the interaction between religious and national identity. Religious national identity may also be a challenge to the ideology of nationhood, in the sense of a territorial and homogeneous collective identity. Tensions over the wearing of traditional Islamic clothing and other customs, especially the practices of veiling and covering hair, in schools in Britain and France are a contemporary case in point. State schools in all countries have played a vital role in establishing a sense of national identity through disseminating a common sense of national history and, hence, common identity. In some cases, British or French citizens wearing Islamic dress are seen by some as a threat to an understanding of commonality in cultural behaviour that defines the particularity of a nation. The 2009 referendum in Switzerland to ban the building of minarets and current debates in France to ban the wearing of the burqa are contemporary cases in point. The implications of these debates and conflicts play out at both the scale of the nation-state and the individual level of ontological security.

New questions about the future of the nation have developed in tandem by new ways of thinking about nationalism. Particularly, feminist scholars have advanced the way we think about the nation. It is to their contribution that we now turn.

The gendered nation: feminist understandings of the nation

According to Mayer (2004), consideration of the nation from a feminist perspective was initiated by non-Western writers. Identification of the role of women in anti-colonialist movements was linked to theoretical developments (under the rubric of post-structuralism) that investigated the sources and nature of power relations. In combination, the differential role of women in constructing nations and nationalism as well as the sexist nature of the nation-state was brought into focus. The feminist critique identified the relative exclusion of women from the public sphere of government and business operations (see Table 5.2). In addition, the way in which women and men are portrayed in nationalist ideology was highlighted. We stress that this is a matter of the banal and the everyday, just as in our discussion of religion and nationalism. However, it is the extreme right that brings such processes into the clearest focus.

Nationalist struggles often include calls for women to fulfil the biological function of sexual reproduction as part of the political project of reproducing the nation (Fluri and Dowler 2004). Such calls could be found, for example, in Nazi Germany, as well as in the statements of the Irish Republican Army and Palestinian nationalist groups. The flip side is programmes of reproductive control restricting the reproduction of racial and ethnic groups that are deemed to threaten the racial purity of the nation. Again, Nazi Germany provides the strongest historical example. Within many historical and contemporary wars rape of women is a weapon, partially undertaken to destroy any sense of national purity (Mayer 2004).

The sexism of the ideology of nationalism revolves around the sentiment that women’s roles should be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mean percentage of women representatives in upper and lower houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic countries</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (non-Nordic)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab states</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

relegated to the private sphere of the household – to give birth to and raise subsequent generations of the nation – while it is the duty of men to manage and defend the nation (Enloe 1989). It will not be hard to think of a war movie that includes the scene of men marching off to war as the tearful women remain at home. Such practice requires an ideological understanding of the household as well as of the nation: the household or home as a haven from external threats and the source of national reproduction.

Fluri and Dowler’s (2004) analysis of white separatist groups in the United States is a vivid illustration of the combination of sexist and racist practices and ideologies in the mutual construction of households and nations. One female white separatist activist, Jane, is quoted as saying:

My children understand the importance of not mixing the races and have agreed to not date other races. It’s not about hating; it’s about the survival of our people. For example, my older sister married a half Mexican, half Japanese man. She had two children. My brother married a Mexican woman and I’m hoping they don’t have children. Now, out of my siblings, there are my three white children when there could be five and possibly more. Do you see how we are a dying race in just this instance? I do not want our people to become extinct. We are the only ones on the planet with blue and green eyes. All the other races are colored basically the same, brown skin, brown eyes, and black hair. Only the Europeans have the genetic traits we do.

(Quoted in Fluri and Dowler 2004: 75)

This quote reveals a number of key points: a belief in biologically pure and distinct races, the political need to racialize nations (Mexico and Japan as non-white), and the political role of a woman to bear racially pure children and socialize them in a manner that ensures the future of a racially pure nation. Jane sees biological reproduction as part of the national project. But the sexism extends beyond the reproductive role. It also requires defining gender roles in which women and men are identified as playing specific roles in the socialization of the next generation. Another white racialist activist is quoted as saying:

Children are an integral part of my culture within the local white racialist community I belong to, and we all help to teach and nurture those children. For example, I am helping and encouraging one young man to build a website for our church. An elder of our church recently took another young man out and successfully taught him to hunt and prepare a deer for meat. We all take great joy in seeing and sharing the accomplishments of our children as they grow and learn from newborn stages into adulthood.

(Quoted in Fluri and Dowler 2004: 80)

The beliefs and practices of white racialists are a stark, and extreme, exemplification of how sexist gender roles are implicated in the mutual construction of a patriarchal household and nation. Another point can be made too, and that is the tenuous relationship between nation and state. White racialists in the United States view the federal government as illegitimate because of its promotion of a diverse multicultural society. One white racist group, the National Alliance, claims:

With the growth of mass democracy (the abolition of poll taxes and other qualifications for voters, the enfranchisement of women and of non-whites), the rise in the influence of the mass media on public opinion, and the insinuation of the Jews into a position of control over the media, the U.S. government was gradually transformed into the malignant monster it is today: the single most dangerous and destructive enemy our race has ever known.

(Quoted in Fluri and Dowler 2004: 74)

Examining the intertwined and simultaneous construction of the household, the nation, the state and race is an illustration of the goal of feminist geopolitics to break down binaries between public and private, and intimate and global (Staeheli 2001; Pain 2015). Feminist analysis of nationalism cautions against creating a false binary between ‘hot’ forms of nationalism (such as war or separatist movements) and ‘banal’ forms of nationalism. Paasi’s (2016) discussion of ‘hot’ and ‘banal’ nationalism emphasized the connection between the two. However, it is through feminist analysis of violence towards women in settings such as the US military or college campuses that we may understand how certain members of the nation ‘may be made more fearful or
less secure by the routine practices designed to protect the larger whole of the nation’ (Christian et al. 2016: 71). The mutual constructions of household, state and nation are pervasive, and such connections maintain a nationalist complex in which the feminine is constructed as part of a masculine national project. Feminist scholarship plays an essential role in identifying not only the multitude of power relations and their interconnections but also the ways in which established notions of the nation and gender relations are being challenged (Christian et al. 2016).

However, although these relations are dynamic, and their complexity now identified, it does not necessarily mean that the nation and the nation-state are being challenged to such a degree that their demise is in sight. One of the reasons for the robustness of nationalism is how deeply embedded it is in the modern sense of self. Another related reason is that national identity has very practical implications; it connects individuals to the state and the benefits, and duties, the state offers and demands. In other words, nationalism is connected to citizenship.

**Summary**

In this section we have discussed contemporary changes in the form of nationalism and noted:

- the manner in which globalization and flows across borders have changed national identity;
- the existence of competing collective identities, and especially the relevance of religious communities;
- how, from a feminist perspective, divisions and inequities within nations may challenge the legitimacy of those nations.

**Citizenship: multiscalar politics**

We have identified nationalism as the institutional vortex connecting state, nation, and territory to form the powerful imagined community of the nation-state. The ideal of the nation-state is a territorially defined community that includes all members of a historical-cultural group that is partially defined by the difference or otherness of the rest of the world. The political geography of nationalism is related to the idea of state manoeuvrability (Chapter 4) that illustrated the importance of seeing the state within the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy. The identification of the nation as a double Janus emphasizes how the process of creating a sense of community that is presented as homogenous and meaningful requires a vision of ‘others’ across the globe. The content of this vision is tied to a state’s position within the capitalist world-economy. In combination, the nation-state is seen as an inclusive community that is defined by its relationship to other nations and states within the structure of the capitalist world-economy. This inclusiveness is expressed in the everyday practice that is understood as citizenship. We use this concept to explore how the narrow geographical scale epitomized by state and nation is constantly challenged from scales above and below – remember that it is the inter-relations of scales that is at the heart of our world-systems political geography.

Individuals with their variable national identities are related to the state through the practice and beliefs of citizenship. For some time, theories of citizenship just assumed a basic overlap between membership within a nation and citizenship rights attached to a state. Such a simple connection was always problematic, but recent scholarship within the context of globalization has exposed the problems fully. Citizenship is a continually negotiated status within the capitalist world-economy because it attempts to solve the contradictions surrounding the tension between the two basic functions of the territorial state: security and opportunity (Gottmann 1973, see Chapter 4). Citizens employ an instrumental theory of the state: the state as a provider of security, including benefits and rights. However, such security is obtained through a state’s interaction with the capitalist world-economy that requires participation in flows through the system. The actual manifestation of citizenship is dynamic as a result of the changing role and position of a state in the world-economy and the politics of demands made by people upon the state. Such politics includes demands of access to rights and benefits of
the state and the related question of political inclusion; or who belongs to the group that has citizenship rights. Clearly, at times of increased flows and dynamism within the capitalist world-economy (periods we identified in Chapter 1 as Kondratieff B-phases) the uncertainty and intensity of citizenship politics of inclusion and exclusion will intensify.

Migration is the key flow within the world-economy that stokes and provokes politics of citizenship. Large-scale patterns of migration provide changes in communities that receive and send migrants. Local and national politics change in response to these flows, including debates about inclusion within the community of citizens and the rights, benefits, and duties of members of the community. The focus on processes of globalization, and the related topic of transnational migrants, has highlighted the utility of using geographic scale to understand contemporary issues of citizenship (Staeheli 1999). The ability to act as a citizen and receive the benefits of citizenship, or not, are defined by circumstances at the local scale, or what Staeheli (1999: 61) calls ‘political opportunity structures’. However, Staeheli shows that citizenship is a status that connects individuals to local, national, and global scales. Hence, citizenship is a political question that requires consideration of geographic scale and flows within the world-economy.

Citizenship can only be understood as a geographic process that creates and is shaped by geographic spaces. We will look at the spaces of global flows, national policies, and local politics. The critical investigation of citizenship necessarily exposes the ‘silences’ that were implicit in mainstream discussions. The definition and practice of citizenship varies across time and space, requiring a consideration of context to gain a full understanding. Exploring the role of context in framing the practice of citizenship, as well as the changing relationship between the state and citizenship, requires thinking about geographic scale and the processes of global politics.

Types of citizenship: formal and substantive

To understand the role of scale in defining contemporary citizenship some basic definitions are necessary. The first is the distinction between formal and substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship refers to the legal category of citizen defined by a state, with related rights and responsibilities. Substantive citizenship refers ‘to the ability to act as a citizen and to be respected as one’ (Staeheli 1999: 64). Both of these terms relate to access to the rights of citizenship and the ability to perform citizenship responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities combine in the important concept of participation in formal and informal politics. Hence, citizenship is not just a legal classification. It is also substantive in that it demands and is a result of certain ways of behaving politically. Paying taxes and participating in jury service, and voting or demonstrating are all practices that are possible or necessary because of citizenship. By doing these practices individuals fulfil the role and identity of being a citizen. The phrase ‘be a good citizen’ is a banal reminder that citizenship is a role manifest in numerous everyday actions.

Despite the rules and norms of formal citizenship the socio-economic conditions experienced by some social groups in a country may exclude them from participating as citizens. The difficulties for some to fully participate as citizens is a reflection of the irony that though in theory all individuals bear the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the ability to participate is extended fully to some social groups and in a more limited fashion to others (Staeheli 1999: 65). The practice of citizenship is, therefore, often discriminatory. Certain social groups are defined and identified and prevented from participating fully in formal and substantive citizenship. Or, to put it another way, citizenship has always been a struggle to obtain. State elites have given full citizenship to other social groups in a piecemeal and reluctant manner and usually only after extensive political struggle. Race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality have also been common bases of exclusion from aspects of citizenship, noting that there is a difference between de jure and de facto citizenship rights. The Women’s Right to Vote movement from the nineteenth century was about an important citizenship right that was still being fought for in some states into this century: women in Saudi Arabia were only first allowed to vote in 2015. In another example, in March 2017 President Rodrigo Duterte
Anonymous heroes, disabled veterans and African citizenship

As the creation and form of the state has been tied, if not driven, by the perceived need to make war, it is not surprising that citizenship has also been closely related to the demands of the military. The rise of national masses, and their claims to a national identity and political sovereignty, led to a profound change in military recruitment. Rather than military forces being comprised traditionally, mainly, of hired bands fighting for feudal elites the nation became available to be mobilized to fight. The example of Napoleon’s levée en masse is the starkest example of how national revolution was turned into a citizen’s obligation to answer a military call-up in the name of the defence of the nation, or the pursuit of its goals across the globe. As Cowen and Gilbert (2008) point out both of the seminal national revolutions, the American (1776) and the French (1789) were based on a connection between the liberty or freedom of the individual and a duty to defend and serve the state. Another way to look at the connection between war and citizenship is to see how demobilized soldiers have used their status as fighters for the state to seek concessions from the state. As we will detail later, in Europe, many welfare gains were demanded as rewards for soldiers returning from the two world wars after 1918 and 1945. This more recent case study looks at veterans of civil war in Angola and their role in promoting substantive citizenship rights for the disabled.

Portugal expended a lot of money and manpower in an attempt to retain its African colonies after the Second World War. Between 1961 and 1974 nearly 1 million Portuguese troops fought in Africa and more than 30,000 were wounded (Borges-Coelho 2002, cited in Power 2008). In Angola the nationalist independence movement emerged from an uprising in 1961. After Angola achieved independence fighting continued between the governing MPLA (the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) which abandoned its Marxist anti-colonial rhetoric and imposed a corrupt regime exploiting the country’s oil and diamond resources, and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), funded by then Apartheid South Africa and the CIA. The civil war cost approximately 500,000 lives and finally ended in 2002 with victory for the MPLA, enabling creation of the corrupt regime exploiting the country’s oil and diamond resources described in the last chapter.

The post-conflict demobilization of veterans, many disabled from wounds suffered in the war, has been used by Marcus Power to investigate citizenship formation in Africa. This case study provides insights into 1) the way wars are a catalyst for citizenship politics and 2) the need to think about citizenship in post-colonial Africa differently than in the ways suggested by the traditional Euro-American centred scholarship of scholars such as Marshall (1949). For instance, Zimbabwe’s former President Robert Mugabe mobilized civil war veterans as citizens in his land reform programme. Angola is recognized as desperately impoverished and poorly governed. Its provisions for people with disabilities are very poor, with organizations to lobby for the disabled only forming in the 1990s after the government allowed the formation of private voluntary organizations (Power 2008: 183). As in other southern African countries, Power claims that the political and social context of Angola actively disabled people who were badly wounded by defining disabled people as excessive to or outside of traditional social circuits of interaction’ (Power 2008: 178). In other words, they were seen as partial rather than full citizens. However, civic groups such as Associação dos Militares e Mutilados de Guerra de Angola (Association of Angolan Soldiers and War Amputees, or AMMIGA) and the League for the Reintegration of Disabled People ((LARDEF) have been working with the government to facilitate the insertion of a clause of non-discrimination on the grounds of disability into Angola’s new constitution.

The presence of a large population of disabled veterans in Angola, and their status as ‘heroes’ helped mobilize civil society organizations to enact
of the Philippines reneged on campaign promises and opposed legislation enabling same-sex marriage. President Duterte justified his decision by connecting Filipino national identity to the state’s role as a bastion of Roman Catholicism in Asia. Citizenship rights for gays in the Philippines were limited because of the president’s sense of the role of the state, and national identity, in relation to a global religion.

The continual politics of citizenship is related to changing geographies of nationalism and the state. Not surprisingly, the political philosophy of citizenship developed in tandem with the rise of nationalism. Citizenship became a way of defining the formal membership within the more amorphous concept of the nation. The Enlightenment thought of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau led the modern idea of citizenship as a social contract. In other words, citizenship became a way to think of the ‘rules’ that ought to be followed to maintain membership in the ‘club’ that was the nation. Of course, in eighteenth-century Europe, membership of the club was initially restricted to male and property-owning elites.

**Citizenship and the state**

The tension between individual freedoms and rights and the needs of the state have been a persistent anxiety. In the nineteenth century membership of the national body became increasingly defined along cultural and ethnic lines (Cowen and Gilbert 2008). Such an approach brought the role of inclusion/exclusion in nationalism and citizenship to the fore. It was epitomized by the equation of race and nationalism in the Nazi politics of anti-Semitism. However, the Holocaust was not an isolated incident in time and space. Rather it was the culmination of racialized nationalist sentiments that had been building throughout the nineteenth century across Europe. The Jews became a racialized group that was seen as a threat to nations. The label of ‘parasite’ commonly placed on Jews was a reflection of their status as a group external to all national groups (Bauman 1989). They were defined as being somehow alien and dangerous because they were not identified as a national group themselves.

The other major trend in the development of states and citizenship was the post-Second World War sense of social citizenship. This idea of citizenship became the mainstream understanding, and was led by the important work of T. H. Marshall (1949), an early and important theorist of citizenship. In the wake of the sacrifices made by citizens in the war, state elites made promises of ‘new worlds’ that would bring peace and prosperity to their citizens. States would provide and ameliorate, if not eliminate, inequalities and suffering. The citizenship of the welfare state was born with entitlements as a component of citizenship. A new social contract was born, in which state benefits would be received as long as citizens performed their ‘duties’ – work, loyalty and, if necessary, the call to arms.
The geopolitics of citizenship

One component of the ongoing War on Terror has been the actions of Western states to promote particular visions of democracy and civil society in the Middle East. The assumption is that the populations of Middle Eastern countries currently lack the values and norms that are required to create and maintain Western-style liberal democracy. As geographers Caroline Nagel and Lynn Staeheli (2015) show, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are geopolitical actors promoting particular forms of citizenship. Their work in Lebanon shows that NGOs promote Western-style democracy, with the assumption that sectarian politics must be countered as a practice and identity that is inimical to liberal democracy. However, Nagel and Staeheli (2015) also show that the very same NGOs tasked to spread a Western idea of citizenship are skeptical of how effective their geopolitical agency is.

NGO employees addressing youth politics in Lebanon generally supported goals, and used language that was aimed at creating connections between sectarian groups: ‘capacity building, conflict resolution/management, coexistence, mutual respect, and dialogue’ (Nagel and Staeheli 2015: 235). For example, one employee, Bechara, is quoted as saying:

When we live in a ghetto area, you build fear. You cannot do anything: you cannot move, live, make a nation, make a future or a common project through fear. Things are much easier when you know the other. One objective is to take people from all regions – from Akkar, the South, Beqa’a, Mt. Lebanon, Beirut – and mix them. Everyone has to know each other, and the walls of prejudice will come down.

(Nagel and Staeheli 2015: 235)

Bechara was promoting a national sense of citizenship that transcended sectarian differences. The actions that would enable such politics were seen as being quite banal and everyday. For example, Dina – who works in an NGO focused upon youth entrepreneurialism and civic engagement – said:

We have to start change at the local level, at the regional level, before thinking about changing this whole system, and I believe, brick after brick, we will be able to have more people who believe in each other, who believe in themselves, and who believe in developing a value system that starts from not littering from your car, from driving well, from appreciating the beauty of being alive in a certain place, and space.

(Nagel and Staeheli 2015: 237)

Such local and everyday actions were identified by Dina as a vital component of citizenship practices that were to be the building blocks of creating a non-sectarian liberal democratic Lebanon. However, despite the geopolitical goal of making Lebanon in to the image of an ideal Western state, some NGO directors were sceptical. For example, Rashid said:

We don't believe in the concept of state because we don't have a state; we have political confessional leaders who have their inner state. Having said that, the problem is that the state in Lebanon has been replaced by civil society. Civil society, due to the generosity of the West, managed to play the role of the state and forgot about its role as being a watchdog.

(Nagel and Staeheli 2015: 239)

The example of NGO activity in Lebanon shows how citizenship politics is contested and multiscalar. Global geopolitical visions, defined by Western states, for a peaceful Middle East rest on the projection of a particular sense of ‘good’ citizenship practices. These practices are meant to transcend sectarian divides while being based on banal everyday activities, such as not throwing litter out of a car. Defining and practising citizenship connects individual actions in particular localities with projects of state building and global geopolitics.
Marshall’s work was very influential in framing post-war understandings of citizenship. He divided citizenship into three components: civil citizenship, referring to civil and legal rights; political citizenship, regarding the right to vote and associate in a group for political purposes; and social citizenship, referring to social entitlements such as education, and health and social benefits. Tracking the development of these three components of citizenship over time, many have noted how civil citizenship is directly tied to the development of property rights and the need for individuals to have the right to contract their labour (Cowen and Gilbert 2008). In other words, the liberalism of Locke is seen as a way in which to oil the wheels of capitalism by replacing the old social relations of feudalism. However, political citizenship is commonly seen as a result of political struggle. In Britain, a series of Reform Acts led to the establishment of (near) universal suffrage in 1918. In the United States women gained the right to vote in 1921. However, some minority groups, such as the Chinese, did not gain suffrage until after the Second World War. Of course, though the legal notion of political citizenship was established the practice lagged behind (Cowen and Gilbert 2008). The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s was necessary to eliminate restrictions upon the ability of African-Americans to express their political voice through the act of voting. Inequities are still not completely erased. The US presidential election of 2000 was replete with allegations of local conflicts that had prevented African-Americans from voting.

Though the established Western democracies have mainly tackled and addressed the issue of universal political citizenship the third component, social citizenship, is still highly contested. The post-Second World War growth of the welfare state was also the result of social struggle. The working classes obtained a voice in politics and secured unprecedented access to social benefits that were provided by state institutions. The welfare state in Britain was to provide ‘from the cradle to the grave’. These elements of social citizenship have come under attack in the context of globalization, and the representation of needing to keep states ‘competitive’ (Peck 1996; Staeheli et al. 1997).

Marshall’s view was both progressive and defensive or cautionary. Social citizenship was not merely a package of benefits but an institutionalized way to tackle what are seen as inherent contradictions between capitalism and democracy (Marston and Mitchell 2004: 97). Social citizenship was, for Marshall, a way in which to minimize class divisions within society and ‘form the necessary buffer between the moral and politically active individual and the amoral nature of social exchange in the marketplace’ (Marston and Mitchell 2004: 98). Using our world-systems framework of state manoeuvrability (Chapter 4) we can place Marshall’s concerns and goals within the tension between the global extent of the economic processes across the spatial extent of the capitalist world-economy and the practice of the state in defining a sovereign space that encapsulates the three components of citizenship. In periods of economic restructuring the tension between demands for social citizenship and the pursuit of state competitiveness, or state manoeuvrability, are likely to intensify.

**Citizenship and scale**

There are three underlying assumptions guiding contemporary political geography scholarship on citizenship (Staeheli 2003). The first is that citizenship itself is multi-scalar. The components of identity, rights, and practices that make a citizen are ‘shaped by conditions, processes, and institutions at the local, national, and international scales’ (Staeheli 2003: 99).

Second, citizenship can only be understood as a relational outcome of interaction between included and excluded groups; or the politics of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Geographers are particularly engaged with how behaviour in, and access to, different spaces; the workplace, public spaces such as parks and streets, and the home. Third, citizenship is more than just a legal classification and a set of roles and practices; it is a political process of continually becoming a particular political subject that carries the title ‘citizen’.

The concept of citizenship should not be equated to just one scale, the state. The role of the state as the scale of ideology frames citizenship as being ‘contained’ within a territorialized politics. However, citizenship is given form and meaning though
networks and institutions that are not tied to particular nation-states. In turn, these extra-territorial connections create daily practices of citizenship that are performed at the local scale (Staeheli et al. 2016). We experience citizenship in particular places, but these practices reinforce a sense of state-based citizenship that is actually promoted by institutions that operate at a global scale. For example, international conferences that promote young citizen-activists, such as the 2014 World Conference on Youth, promote particular visions of what it means to be a citizen that delegates are encouraged to pursue and disseminate in their own countries (Staeheli et al. 2016). Though practices of citizenship vary across localities, and state policies define formal and substantive citizenship rights, a global orthodoxy of what it means to be a citizen has been constructed.

The contemporary focus on globalization and democratization has illustrated that viewing citizenship within an uncritical frame of state territoriality is inadequate. We will discuss the geography of contemporary citizenship shortly, but first it is useful to define the theoretical development that has emerged in light of the critique of Marshall’s work. Feminist scholars pointed out that Marshall was blind to the social inequities in the practical and everyday manifestations of scholarship. All three components of citizenship could not be seen as being practically universal. Social inequalities defined by gender, class, race, and sexuality were real and everyday barriers that prevented all citizens participating in a similar manner. This critique requires us to think of citizenship as something that varies across social groups and between geographical and historical contexts. Marston and Mitchell (2004: 101) use the term citizenship formations to note how formal and substantive aspects of citizenship are continually changing, or are dynamic political outcomes. The particularity of citizenship for an individual at a particular place and time is product of economic conditions, the practices of the state, and formal and informal politics. In other words, citizenship is constantly negotiated, and can be seen as a dynamic and context specific process related to the sovereignty regimes discussed in the previous chapter (Kuus and Agnew 2008).

Summary

In this section we have introduced the political geography of citizenship by:

- defining formal and substantive citizenship;
- describing the changing history of citizenship;
- introducing a multiscalar political geography framework to understand contemporary citizenship issues.

Citizenship in the capitalist world-economy: movement and morals

When discussing the relationship between states and citizens we noted the importance of the establishment of the modern democratic state and the emergence of capitalism in driving the development of modern citizenship. But if the move from feudalism to capitalism and the nation-state was the starting place for the discussion it is odd that the following quote has contemporary resonance:

> Citizenship in the modern world is a lot like feudal status in the medieval world. It is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to change by the individual’s will and efforts; and it has a major impact upon that person’s life chances. To be born a citizen of an affluent country like Canada is like being born into the nobility. . . . To be born a citizen of a poor country like Bangladesh is (for most) like being born into the peasantry in the Middle Ages. In this context, limiting entry to countries like Canada is a way of protecting a birthright privilege.

(Carens 1992: 26, quoted in Smith 2004: 118)

From our world-systems perspective, the inequalities that Carens refers to are the geographical manifestations of the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy. Recognition of how life chances are mainly a matter of the luck of being born into one set of national citizenship relations rather than another (Baker 1987: 60, quoted in Smith 2004: 117) is a
matter of moral debate that centres upon the right of movement across the globe; or in other words the processes of transnational migration that is the focus of much contemporary political geography.

Geographer David M. Smith (2004) argues that a system in which life-chances are pretty much determined by a geographic happenstance of where one is born is immoral. He argues that there is a case for an ethical right to the freedom of movement. His starting point is an essay written over 40 years ago by Roger Nett in which he described the free movement of people across the planet as ‘the civil right we are not ready for’. Nett argued:

> At some future point in world civilization, it may well be discovered that the right to free and open movement of people on the surface of the earth is fundamental to the structure of human opportunity and is therefore basic in the same sense as free religion, speech, and the franchise. Such a conclusion will surprise some, coming at a time when territorial boundaries are guarded more tightly than ever against individual penetration.

(Nett 1971: 218, quoted in Smith 2004: 113)

Nett based his argument on the idea that rights are *discovered*. Rights are not fixed or pre-given but come about through political struggle and negotiation in particular space-time contexts. This idea rests on the same assumption of politics as being a continual and contingent process that Marston and Mitchell (2004) introduced with their idea of citizen formations. For Nett (1971), at the time of his writing, the development of such a right had some basis in the political context. During the Cold War, Western democracies were chastising the Soviet bloc for restricting the movement of their citizens and preventing their migration to the West (Smith 2004). Dissidents from Communist countries who had been able to ‘escape’, a particular form of migration, were feted in the West. The inability of citizens of Communist countries to migrate was seen as a violation of their human rights. However, Smith points out the irony that the attitude changed quickly once the restrictions to movement were removed. As soon as the Hungarians removed the barbed wire keeping their citizens in the Austrians deployed guards and barriers to keep them from crossing the border (Smith: 114, citing Dummett 1992). Since then the general tone and practice has been to prevent the movement of refugees and asylum-seekers. This issue is a contentious and salient one across the globe with debates and various degrees of restrictive practices evident in Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia for example.

The moral case for the freedom of movement has not disappeared. It will exist as long as there are broad and global inequalities in life-chances. From a world-systems perspective these inequalities are a necessary part of the capitalist world-economy. In light of this structural reality, states are openly contradictory in the way they see their role in facilitating citizenship rights within their territorial borders:

> [M]any of the societies which seem most fully committed to liberal egalitarian ideas (the welfare states of Western and Northern Europe, including particularly the Scandinavian countries) have quite restrictive immigration and citizenship policies. . . . Unlike other widely acknowledged basic human rights . . . claims of an unrestricted right of free movement across borders are rarely, if ever, found in standard enumerations of rights in the constitutions or legal systems of liberal egalitarian countries.


Smith’s conclusion is pessimistic and realistic. He foresees ‘increasing extremes of rich and poor juxtaposed at different geographical scales’ (Smith 2004: 126). As a result he sees a trend in which the interface between rich and poor, or privileged and marginalized, ‘will be policed more assiduously than ever, from penetration by asylum seekers, economic migrants and potential terrorists’ (Smith 2004: 126). In a recognition that access to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship varies significantly across states and for different social groups (especially women and ethnic minorities) there have been calls for internationally defined norms that would trump national and culturally defined practices and beliefs. At the moment these discussions are more a matter of commentary and ideas than immediate practical likelihoods.
Geopolitics of mobility

Political geographers have built upon Smith’s (2004) identification of the morality of movement to explore the geopolitics of mobility (Hyndman 2012). The movement of refugees and documented and undocumented migrants seeking better economic conditions reflects the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy; broadly speaking, violence or poor life opportunities in the periphery forces movement towards the core. The result is a ‘geopolitics of mobility’ (Hyndman 2012) that imposes state power on the bodies of those wanting to, or being forced to be, mobile. States have constructed a sense of geopolitical crisis stemming from the movements of refugees and migrants that have enabled them to enact policies aimed at restricting movement (Mountz and Hiemstra 2013). These policies limit movement and impose state power upon people far beyond the immediate time and place of a border crossing (Amilhat-Szary and Giraut 2015).

The expression of state power restricting movement may have a clear territorial expression and geographic location. For example, there has been a proliferation in the building walls or other forms of violent control as a political strategy, and an identification of the general inefficacy of such politics (Jones 2013, 2016). However, barriers are not just physical constructs located at the territorial limits of a state. The geopolitics of mobility involves multiple strategies of control that categorize people and allow them varying degrees of movement (Hyndman 2012). The ability to move across the globe is a matter of racial, national, religious and gendered labels that securitize different people in different ways. Being able to get on a plane and fly from one country to another is not just a matter of whether you have the money to buy a ticket or not, but the way in which individuals are labelled depending upon the way group affiliations are seen as a security risk or not (Mountz and Hiemstra 2013).

Contemporary geographic thinking that no longer sees borders as simply a linear and territorial concept has produced the term ‘borderities’: a mobile set of practices and policies that occur in different geographic and temporal settings (Amilhat-Szary and Giraut 2015). The idea is that the border is as mobile as the people trying to cross them; a person can be subject to border control long before and long after they have actually crossed ‘the line in the sand’. The border becomes a matter of the everyday social control of mobile labour in the capitalist world-economy (Jones and Johnson 2016), ‘in which working poor, noncitizen, mostly non-white populations are being made objects of state security practice while labouring within the most privileged state spaces of global capitalism’ (Coleman 2012: 402).

Such social control polices movement of people within the geographical expressions of the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy. The control upon people is not just a matter of physical constraint but also the language used in political debates in core countries that label migrants in ways that see them as a threat to be excluded or restricted (Cresswell 1997; Mamadouh 2012). In addition, state policies are able to adjust to make refugees and other forms of migration a legal status that is open to manipulation and interpretation to limit entry to, and hence the responsibility of, core states (Gorman 2017).

Smith’s (2004) compelling analysis, and the many scholars engaged in the geopolitics of mobility, emphasize the structural constraints and the actions of states in restricting movement. However, there are more optimistic scenarios than intensified policing of boundaries. First, we will examine the clash between global flows of people and territorialized policies of citizenship defined by the state. This requires a discussion of transnational citizenship. The second, and related issue, is a focus on the viability of thinking of citizenship at the urban scale rather than as purely a product of state politics. This requires a discussion of cities and citizenship.

Transnational migration

The first thing to stress is that a transnational approach to citizenship does not mean an exclusive concentration upon the global scale. Rather, citizenship formation (Marston and Mitchell 2004) requires a connection between multiple sites within which practices of citizenship formation occur (Staeheli...
Currently, the world is experiencing the greatest amount of displaced people ever recorded. The movement of refugees from the Syrian civil war and ongoing violence in Iraq has become a political crisis for the European Union (Vaughan-Williams 2015). In the Western hemisphere, gang violence in Central America has catalyzed a movement of people northwards in to Mexico and the United States (Gorman 2017). In South Asia Rohingya people residing in Myanmar have experienced state sponsored violence and fled to Bangladesh. In 2017 the United Nations estimated that there were 65.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, 21.3 million of whom were defined as refugees. Fifty-three per cent of the refugee population came from just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia. The issues of refugee movement became a crucial political issue in Europe and the United States, though Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia and Jordan were the world’s top hosting countries.

One outcome of the growth of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants has been the growth in political calls for violent and physical border controls, or walls (Jones 2013, 2016). Operating in conjunction with such calls are a host of state practices aimed at controlling movement. In the case of the European Union the agency tasked with securing borders is called FRONTEX, created in 2004 to enable EU states to cooperate with regard to the Union’s external borders (Léonard 2010). While free movement of people within the EU is a key ideal of the organization, the flip-side is a policy of ‘integrated border management’ to maintain a set of secure external borders within a geopolitical context of increased migration and the War on Terror (Léonard 2010). FRONTEX has six main tasks:

- coordinating cooperation between member states with regard to external borders
- helping EU states train border guards
- conducting risk analysis
- conducting research on border security and implementing the findings
- assisting member states when increased capacity is necessary
- coordinating joint operations between states.

The way these tasks have been practiced has led to the securitization of migrants and refugees, meaning that mobile people are labelled as risks or threats and are approached by the EU states and FRONTEX as a matter of security (Léonard 2010). The policy of the securitization of EU borders also involves cooperation with neighbouring states in what was called the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The policy evolved from one in which neighbours were seen to benefit from economic interaction with the EU to a situation in which they would be co-opted as a buffer zone around the EU to protect against a series of perceived threats. In the words of geographer Luiza Bialasiewicz (2012: 847), ‘Europe’s neighbours are becoming Europe’s policemen’.

The co-option of the EU’s neighbours within the ENP, including migration control policies, was also seen as a project of geopolitical transformation, aimed at changing neighbouring states to become more like the EU states themselves:

embedded within the ‘combat’ against illegal immigration is a political imagination in which Europe is cast as a bounded, self-contained region distinct from and confronted by an external world of similarly bounded but far less well-governed political entities. Illegal immigration is at once a major symptom of this asymmetry in governance capacity, and a source of justification for Europe to involve itself in attempts to remake the world beyond it in the image of the well-governed, territorial state. In short, anti-illegal immigration activity is more than a branch of migration management. It is nothing less than state-making in a new form.

(Walters 2010: 75, quoted in Bialasiewicz 2012: 847)

Creating refugees and migrants as a security risk not only increases the security capacities of EU states; it also allows them to project their power and transform neighbouring states through creating norms and practices, a form of power as ‘agenda-setting’ that we introduced in Chapter 1.
et al. 2016). A political geography of transnational citizenship highlights the need for migrants to negotiate between their place of origin, the receiving site, their home and new state, as well as supranational institutions (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003). Two important processes in the move towards a transnational sense of citizenship are the increasing acceptance of dual nationality and an argument that citizenship rights are universal human rights. States have begun to move away from the assumption that an individual can be citizen of just one country. Growing acceptance of dual-citizenship has been driven by supranational organizations. However, Ehrkamp and Leitner (2003) point out that the definition of an EU citizen is someone who holds the citizenship of an EU member state. In other words, citizenship in the multinational EU is based upon being the citizen of a single state. Hence, the calls for a transnational and universal sense of citizenship have yet to undermine its state-centric foundation.

In a crude classification scheme, we can think of transnational migrants as highly skilled and low- or unskilled. The former are seen to be a new class of cosmopolitans (Held 1995) who are likely to be assisted in their ability to travel across the globe and reside in different countries by the companies they work for (Sassen 1996). They frequent the world cities that underpin contemporary globalization. On the other hand, low-skilled transnational migrants often receive none of the benefits provided to highly skilled migrants, and hence they are much more dependent upon the local scale (Staeheli 1999: 70). They are commonly found in the fields that produce the food for said world cities. Both groups of migrants are moving within the capitalist world-economy and responding to differentials in economic conditions between their country of origin and their destination. However, the decreasing provision of state benefits in a context of global competition (Staeheli et al. 1997) means that low-skilled transnational migrants are increasingly dependent upon the local scale for the provision of substantive aspects of citizenship. In some cases, states have reacted to the movement of transnational migrants by changing the rules of formal citizenship. For example, Mexico has enacted constitutional changes to allow dual citizenship for migrants who have left the country (Staeheli 1999: 71). Despite these changes in some national policies, it is within the particular contexts of localities that unskilled transnational migrants have engaged in politics aimed at making their substantive sense of citizenship as full as possible. Hence, the geographies of flows between different places in different countries in the world-economy interact with the nation-state and local scales to generate different citizenship experiences for particular social groups in specific local settings. It is these varied local conditions, within the context of global flows and changing national politics, that Staeheli (1999: 61) calls the political opportunity structures of citizenships. Such place-specific conditions are territorialized or localized practices that emerge within the context of globalization.

Moving away from a discussion of state-policy, political geographers have focused their attention upon the everyday practices of migrants and how they negotiate citizenship formation. In the European Union citizenship practices are a recurring issue. An example is the way immigrants from outside the EU negotiate the meaning and form of citizenship on a daily basis. For example, the industrial German city of Duisburg-Marxloh has, since the 1960s, experienced in-migration of guest workers. In 2001, 75 per cent of the immigrant population was from Turkey and 35 per cent of the residents did not hold a German passport (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003). The Turkish immigrants have built a local sense of citizenship in three interacting ways. First, they have created local immigrant institutions, such as mosques and cultural associations. Second, immigrants have exercised the right to demonstrate in a process of what Ehrkamp and Leitner call ‘appropriating spaces for citizenship’ (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003: 140). In other words, they have undertaken political actions deemed appropriate for citizens, or substantive citizenship, and so staked a claim for recognition of formal citizenship rights. Third, immigrants have exercised the right to demonstrate in a process of what Ehrkamp and Leitner call ‘appropriating spaces for citizenship’ (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003: 140). In other words, they have undertaken political actions deemed appropriate for citizens, or substantive citizenship, and so staked a claim for recognition of formal citizenship rights. Third, immigrants have exercised the right to demonstrate in a process of what Ehrkamp and Leitner call ‘appropriating spaces for citizenship’ (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003: 140). In other words, they have undertaken political actions deemed appropriate for citizens, or substantive citizenship, and so staked a claim for recognition of formal citizenship rights.
form of citizenship within Germany, but are based upon cultural identities that are very much Turkish and Kurdish.

Focus upon transnational citizenship, refugees, and immigration emphasizes geographies of flows, scales, territory and connection between places as sources and destinations of migration. People who are mobile pause or stop in particular places. Hence, our multiscalar approach is complemented by discussions of the feasibility of the city as the prime scale of citizenship politics.

Cities as sites for the new politics of transnational citizenship?

As doubts arise about the ability of states to act as containers of citizenship it is not surprising that increasing attention has turned to the city as a new scale of democratic politics and the venue for the practice of citizenship. Murray Low (2004) points out that the city has a key role in our historic understanding of how democracy is practised. Visions of Aristotle and other debating Greeks in a public square epitomize the ideal version of the roots of democracy. Furthermore, Low argues that the proximity of human interaction, and the diversity of their populations, can be seen as a basis for the give-and-take of opinions and goals that is another foundation of how democracy is seen to work. Citizens as residents of vibrant cities are then seen as the ideal agents of democracy. Interestingly, this view of cities as the new scale of citizenship and democracy dovetails with our discussion of state-city relations at the end of the previous chapter.

However, Low (2004) asks us to reflect upon the arguments about the role of cities in democracies and gives three reasons why we should be wary about forecasting a shift in the prime venue of citizenship from states to cities. First, Low engages the idea of complexity and social interaction that is often seen as a basis for city-based democracy (Boden and Molotch 1994). The micro-sociological interaction within a diverse city-population is seen as a basis for political communication between individuals that allows them to exercise their citizenship. However, Low cautions that such a view rests upon a simplistic version of the city as a geographic space. In reality cities are very complex social spaces which often compartmentalize and separate different social groups rather than promote their interaction.

Second, the relationship between cities and states is a complex one, as we discussed in Chapter 4. Greater political autonomy for cities requires states to ‘give up’ some of their powers, and cities may not be willing and able to take on functions that have become associated with state institutions. The tension between cities and states over citizenship rights is evident in the debate in the US regarding ‘sanctuary cities’. The term refers to the request by federal immigration authorities for local police to hold people arrested on other charges in jail if they are undocumented or in violation of visa stipulations. The federal courts have said that complying with such requests is voluntary rather than mandated. In January 2017, a Washington Post analysis of the 168 counties in which most of the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US live found 69 ‘sanctuary counties’ refusing to comply with federal requests to detain arrestees, with 99 complying (Cameron 2017). The state of California contained a concentration of non-complying counties, with areas around Miami forming another cluster. The suburbs of New York City formed an area of compliance with federal requests.

As Low (2004) points out, greater city autonomy from state rules does not necessarily mean greater democracy or the extension of the components of citizenship. Some cities in the American South proclaim for an autonomy that others argue is intended to maintain privilege for whites and Christians, for example. Third, the form of politics within cities is not necessarily one that opens up opportunities for citizenship. Governance (discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8) of cities often involves a host of institutions that are not open to public scrutiny and involvement. The management of a city can lead to a suite or cluster of institutions that are distant or inaccessible to citizens rather than facilitating practices of citizenship. In other words, cities may provide spaces for citizenship, but the nature of the spaces and citizenship is a matter of politics that is always ongoing.
Summary

Low (2004) concludes his cautionary essay with a call to recognize that the spaces and scales of citizenship are multiple. In this sense he echoes the framework proposed by Staeheli (1999) and the work of Ehrkamp and Leitner (2003). However, the questions Low (2004) highlights show that the politics of citizenship, especially transnational citizenship, are continually problematic and contested. Citizenship, as a political opportunity structure, is best thought of as context specific formation that involves individuals defining themselves as members of particular groups that may, simultaneously, be defined in negative ways by the rest of society (Staeheli 1999; Staeheli et al. 2016). The struggle for access to the institutions and benefits of the state that is citizenship politics is a very individual and local manifestation of the flows and structures of the capitalist world-economy. In the next chapter we discuss two particular forms of politics by which individuals try to achieve their goals; elections and social movements.

Chapter summary

In this chapter we have:

• illustrated the power of the ideology, or doctrine, of nationalism;
• emphasized the historical and geographical components of nationalism via the term ‘double Janus’;
• discussed the role of nationalism and the nation-state within the institutions of the capitalist world-economy;
• highlighted the different forms that the politics of nationalism takes;
• exemplified the contentious and often violent politics between nation and state;
• noted the role that the politics of nationalism plays within the politics of economic and racial difference in the capitalist world-economy;
• discussed the changing form of national identity within the context of globalization;
• illustrated the relationship between the nation and the politics of religion;
• shown the gendered nature of nationalism;
• described the connection between nationalism and citizenship;
• introduced a multiscalar framework to understand contemporary citizenship;
• focused upon the political geography of transnational migration and the politics of citizenship;
• introduced the geopolitics of mobility.
The nation is the dominant form of political identity in the capitalist world-economy, ensuring widespread loyalty to the state and a general acceptance that politics is organized within a mosaic of sovereign states. The politics of nationalism is intertwined with the politics of gender, race and class in what we have introduced as the institutional vortex. The context of war is likely to promote nationalist allegiance, whereas, on the other hand, the economic links of globalization and the universalism of religious beliefs may disrupt and transcend national identity. The politics of nationalism is also susceptible to the politics of marginalization within national groups. The ideology of nationalism connects individuals to states, and this is formalized through the politics of citizenship. We have seen that citizenship has always been contested and the key role transnational migration plays in the contemporary politics of citizenship.

Key glossary terms from Chapter 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>administration</th>
<th>empire</th>
<th>instrumental theory of</th>
<th>racism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>'empire'</td>
<td>the state</td>
<td>realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>inter-state system</td>
<td>refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boundary</td>
<td>fascism</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>right-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bourgeoisie</td>
<td>federation</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>secession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital city</td>
<td>First World War</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism</td>
<td>formal imperialism</td>
<td>liberation movement</td>
<td>semi-periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalist world-economy</td>
<td>franchise</td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>social movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centralization</td>
<td>free trade</td>
<td>militarism</td>
<td>socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship</td>
<td>frontier</td>
<td>minorities</td>
<td>sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society</td>
<td>fundamentalism</td>
<td>Napoleonic Wars</td>
<td>space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classes</td>
<td>geopolitical world order</td>
<td>nation</td>
<td>state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>geopolitics</td>
<td>national determinism</td>
<td>suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colonialism</td>
<td>globalization</td>
<td>national self-determination</td>
<td>territoriality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colony</td>
<td>government</td>
<td>nationalism</td>
<td>third world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>hegemony</td>
<td>nation-state</td>
<td>transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communism</td>
<td>home</td>
<td>opposition</td>
<td>Treaty of Westphalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>households</td>
<td>peoples</td>
<td>undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitution</td>
<td>iconography</td>
<td>periphery</td>
<td>migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>containment</td>
<td>idealism</td>
<td>place</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core</td>
<td>ideology</td>
<td>plebiscite</td>
<td>world-economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decentralization</td>
<td>imperialism</td>
<td>pluralism</td>
<td>world-empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>power</td>
<td>political parties</td>
<td>world-system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>world-systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Suggested reading


Activities

1. Consider the national myths of your own country, or any other of your choosing. What are the popular historical characters and legends? What are seen as key historical events? Then, taking a feminist perspective, consider the gender roles that are exemplified by the common understanding of these legends and characters. In what way do the male characters occupy and define public spaces and the female characters private spaces? Do contemporary representations of these gendered roles differ from traditional ones?

2. Write down three or four attributes of what could be classified as the ‘national values’ of your country. Then ask family members, especially older generations, to do the same. In what way do the values, and attachment to them, differ from generation to generation? If you are in a class, do you see the values identified vary by gender and cultural identity?

3. Consider your national homeland (or another of your choosing). What are the revered landscapes? Are there places that have especial national meaning? Does the capital city ‘represent the nation’ in its architecture and monuments? What groups are missing or underrepresented in the way the national homeland is depicted? (Hint: a good place to start are official national tourist websites and commercial guidebooks and their websites.) Note how official and commercial information might differ in emphasis.

4. Consider the ways you behave or act as a citizen. Categorize these acts as ones you do almost every day, about once a month, and more rarely (say just a few times a year or less). Are these examples of formal or substantive citizenship?

5. Think of the acts you listed from the previous activity and think about different social groups in your hometown would experience or do these acts differently. Use examples from local newspaper stories to see how different groups (especially minorities) see or represent their citizenship status and what they do to express their substantive citizenship.
CHAPTER 6

Political geography of democracy

What this chapter covers

Where in the world is liberal democracy?
Two interpretations of a relationship
A new geography of democratization?

A world-systems interpretation of elections
Liberal democracy and social democracy
Theoretical corollary: the paradox of democratization
Electoral geography contrasts between core and periphery

Liberal democracy in the core
The dialectics of electoral geography
Organization and mobilization
The development of political parties
Two politics and two geographies in every election
Three types of electoral politics

The making of liberal democracies
Non-congruent electoral politics: section and party in the United States before the New Deal

Villagers vote for town chief in Chongqing. Source: China Photos/Getty Images
The discussion of states and citizenship in the previous chapters demonstrated that states are powerful political institutions in the capitalist world-economy and individuals and groups exercise politics to gain access to, and benefits from, the state. Political geography traditionally engaged the questions of access to the state by study of elections. Indeed, electoral geography has been a prolific component of political geography. However, focusing upon elections as the primary process of democratic politics creates a number of problems. First, elections are only partially successful in connecting individuals to the state. The agendas offered by political parties represent only a fraction of political options and ideology, and voters’ concerns are often mangled through the wheeling and dealing of the legislative process. Second, elections have been limited to particular geographical-historical contexts in the capitalist world-economy. They are predominately features of the core and other forms of politics are more likely in the semi-periphery and periphery. Third, by focusing upon elections as the primary process of democratic politics creates a number of problems. Election results are not only reinforce a core-centric focus but also gone along with the assumptions that states equal society. What is needed is placing state-based elections within the structure of the world-economy. Finally, an exclusive focus on elections ignores other forms of democratic behaviour, namely the right to protest, demonstrate and affect change through social organization. Hence, attention needs to be given to the political geography of social movements.

At a time when the spread of democratic practices across the world provides some hope for humanizing globalization, political geography can contribute to debates on democratization and to act as an empirical vehicle to make ‘theoretical connections between the actions of voters within localities and global flows and structures’ (Flint 2002: 395). However, such processes are strongly tied to practices of war (military invasion is justified by the dubious claim that it aids in the diffusion of democracy) and the structure of the capitalist world-economy. Hence, the need for some serious rethinking of electoral geography. A renaming of the topic is, perhaps, necessary. Rather than the restrictive focus of electoral geography we need to study the geography of the ‘politics of democracy’ (Low 2008). In this chapter we offer one way in addressing the political geography of democracy through, primarily, a world-systems framework. We begin by noting the geography of elections and their tendency to be features of the core of the capitalist world-economy, and address how this leads to acutary approach to current proclamations of a new wave of democratization. We then offer a world-systems explanation of the core-periphery geography of elections, a framework that explains the different political geography of elections in both core and periphery. We treat liberal democracy as a particular political process that developed through conflicts specifically in core countries from the nineteenth century to the present. In contrast, we define elections in the periphery as ‘the politics of failure’. Parties in the periphery are unable to construct lasting and viable constituencies of support because of the lack of resources that parties in power can award to supporters.
Our analysis of elections in the core and the periphery illustrate that elections and democratization are by no means a perfect mechanism for offering representation to citizens. Rather they are a negotiated form of politics that offers better representation and access to the state for some groups relative to others. Elections are a form of politics that, though still an expression of power, tend to provide a better politics of democracy in the core than the periphery. Hence, it is not surprising that other types of politics are mobilized as part of citizenship, or democratic, rights. In the last section of the chapter we introduce a political geography of social movements. Social movements provide interesting political geographies as they are not so tied to the territorial limits of states. Though built within particular place-specific contexts, social movements engage in a politics of scale that has the potential to engage the scale of reality rather than being trapped in the state, the scale of ideology.

Chapter framework

The chapter relates the empirical analysis of elections to the following components of political geography that we introduced in the Prologue:

- voting is conceptualized within a model of liberal social democracy;
- the geography of liberal social democracy is understood within the persistent and spatial differences of the capitalist world-economy;
- the individual act of voting is understood within the related scales of local context, nation-state political systems, and the capitalist world-economy;
- the politics of democracy is situated within the larger whole of global politics;
- social movements are situated within the politics of place and the larger whole of the capitalist world-economy.

Democracy, nationalism and representation

In an electoral democracy, voting is seen as a fundamental right for citizens. Voting is the individual act that sets in motion a political process which, at least ideally, gives each citizen representation through elected officials in law-making. However, in some states the question of citizenship is complicated by questions over national identity. Citizenship in a liberal democracy is seen as a matter of inclusion (all citizens can vote) while nationalism is a matter of exclusion (defining people outside the national group). This is the dilemma that has faced the state of Israel since its inception. As Israeli political geographer David Newman (2009) puts it, this is ‘one of the basic dilemmas facing Israel as a sovereign state – namely how to be a Jewish and democratic state’. If nationalism and democracy do not mix in general the problem is particularly acute in Israel. The Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel (a minority) identify themselves within the wider regional conflict and are (unsurprisingly) prone to side with the neighbouring Arab states rather than with Israel, the state of which they are citizens.

Though having the right to vote, as part of their formal citizenship rights, the ability to participate and fulfil their substantive citizenship rights (see previous chapter for a discussion of these terms) is compromised by the discrimination faced by Arab-Israeli citizens and the lack of investment in their towns. As Newman says, Arab-Israelis have ‘undergone separate processes of development, but they remain part and parcel of a single national entity’. The ability of an Arab-Israeli politician to stand up in the Knesset (parliament) and make a speech questioning the legitimacy of the very existence of the state they represent is a testament to the free speech rights of Israeli democracy. Newman believes that it is possible for Israeli to maintain its raison d’être of providing a state that secures Jewish culture and the Jewish people while also providing protection and rights to the minority.

However, his warning ‘that democracies are judged by their policies toward their minorities and those groups that do not have power, far more than by the simple technicality of whether or not they are able to vote’ gives us reason to consider that elections are not just about voting, but are a means of distributing power unequally between different social groups in a state.
Where in the world is liberal democracy?

Democratization, as an ideal and a practice, continues to dominate contemporary geopolitics. The purpose of military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan has been promoted as creating the circumstances for democracy to flourish. On the other hand, states such as North Korea are identified as being dangerous partly because of their lack of democracy. Underlying all these representations is an implicit belief that all states can, if they so wish, become democratic – perhaps with a little assistance from the military might of the United States. In this sense, democracy and democratization are conceptualised through the dominant lens of social science: processes of democracy are seen to operate simply within state boundaries and there is a developmental path that states may follow to become democratic. From a world-systems perspective this state-society and developmentalist approach is false. The geography of democracy is not a function of will or ability of particular states, rather it is their situation within the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy that is crucial.

Over 30 years ago, Coulter (1975) endeavoured to analyse the broad pattern or existence of liberal democracy in the world by measuring degrees of liberal democracy across 85 states. He identified three aspects of liberal democracy – political competitiveness, political participation and public liberties – and combined them into a single index (Coulter 1975: 1–3). Multi-party elections, voter participation and freedom of group oppositions were all elements of this index, so it effectively measured the variations in the degree of importance of elections in determining governments. Variations in liberal democracy for the period 1946–66 are shown in Figure 6.1.

But what explains whether a country is liberal democratic or not? Coulter used existing explanations that made a connection between social mobilization and democracy (Deutsch 1961). Deutsch thought that the mobilization of people out of traditional patterns of life and into new values and behaviours enabled the development of democracy. This occurs to the extent that a population is urbanized, is literate, is exposed to mass media, is employed in non-primary occupations and is relatively affluent. We can see that even though this approach is about 50 years old the assumptions remain very strong, and are at the heart of US rhetoric in the War on Terror. Using these ideas Coulter carried out a statistical analysis to see if there was a strong relationship between social mobilization and liberal democracy (Figure 6.2a). In this way Coulter has been able to show that liberal democracy can be statistically accounted for, in large measure, by the indices of social mobilization. The linear analysis posits that the more social mobilization, or more generally modernization, there was in a country the greater the level of liberal democracy.
Two interpretations of a relationship

However, such analysis is a classic use of the state-society and developmentalist assumptions we challenged in Chapter 2. For Coulter, and Deutsch, the scope of the processes that they analysed were trapped or restricted within the borders of individual states. Hence, each dot in Figure 6.2 represents one country, treated in isolation, that has either high or low levels of social mobilization and that is seen to influence the level of democracy. Figure 6.2(a) shows the basic trend line, whereby an increase in social mobilization is associated with an increase in liberal democracy, and also Coulter’s interpretation of his results. All countries that lie close to the trend line are termed optimally democratized. By this he means that the level of liberal democracy in these countries is about as high as would be expected on the basis of their social mobilization. By using the term ‘optimal’, he implies that politics in these countries is correctly adjusted to their social situation. Among this group we find all the Western European states, as we might expect, but Haiti and South Africa are also designated optimally democratized, despite their repressive regimes at this time. Countries that lie below the optimally democratized band in Figure 6.2(a) are designated under-democratized, indicating a lower level of liberal democracy than would be expected on the basis of social mobilization. Such countries include Spain and Portugal, so we might be tempted to argue that the democratic revolutions in these two countries after 1966 represent a move to conform with Deutsch’s model of political development. Countries lying above the middle band are designated over-democratized, since they have ‘more’ liberal democracy than their social mobilization would warrant. These include Greece, Uganda and Chile, and we may interpret moves against liberal democracy after 1966 by the Greek colonels, Idi Amin and General Augusto Pinochet to produce murderous regimes as similarly contributing to their countries’ conforming to Deutsch’s model.

Perhaps the most surprising result of this analysis is that Coulter (1975) finds – in 1966, remember, in the middle of the Cold War – the Soviet Union to be optimally democratized and the United States to be under-democratized. This is counter to our expectations, although it does not mean that the Soviet Union was more liberal than the United States but simply that, relative to their respective levels of social mobilization, the Soviet Union scored higher on liberal democracy. However, these results must make us wonder about the model. Either the measurements are unsatisfactory or the structure of the model is incorrect. We argue here that both are at fault. In Figure 6.2(b), the same scatter of points is presented in a completely different way. Instead of concentrating on a trend line, we identify two clusters of points, one defined by a vertical oval and the other by a horizontal oval. They represent separate, non-overlapping levels of social mobilization. But as we have seen, the most important component of social mobilization is economic development. We shall, therefore, interpret these two distinct levels of ‘social mobilization’ as

Figure 6.2 Liberal democracy and social mobilization: (a) as a trend line; (b) as two clusters.
representing economic core and peripheral processes. Now the scatter of points begins to make some sense. All core countries experience liberal democracy. In peripheral countries there is a wide range of political systems, showing many different levels of liberal democracy. This will depend upon the nature of the peripheral state, as discussed in Chapter 5.

This interpretation makes much more sense than Coulter’s global model. It is entirely consistent with our world-systems framework in its emphasis upon two different sets of processes operating in the world-economy. The world-systems interpretation is, again, more insightful than a developmental model, that in this case sees countries on an ‘optimal path to political development’. Quite simply, politics do not develop separately country by country but are all part of a larger unfolding system of political economy.

Coulter’s analysis was conducted in the middle of a geopolitical world order that no longer exists, the Cold War. Hence, it is necessary to see if the broad patterns of liberal democracy identified then remain. The post-Cold War period was seen as a geopolitical moment that was the culmination of competition between different political ideologies. Simply put, the end of the Cold War was interpreted as the victory of liberal democracy over all other forms of political organization (Communism and fascism, primarily (Fukuyama 1992)). But was this simply geopolitical grand-standing by the victors, or was a new era of democratization fundamentally altering the core-periphery geography we identified in our interpretation of Figure 6.2?

A new geography of democratization?

There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War has given a world-political stimulus to ‘democracy’ in regions beyond the core. This has been both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’: there have been genuine uprisings of peoples in the third world demanding ‘people power’ as well as core governments imposing the condition of multi-party democracy before dispensing economic aid. Both of these factors have led to a spread of competitive electoral politics, especially in Africa. From our world-systems interpretation it will be understood that we expect these to be transient, democratic interludes only.

Empirical analysis tends to confirm our theoretical scepticism. O’Loughlin et al. (1998) conducted a broad study of the diffusion of democracy from 1946 to 1994 and found that about 60 per cent of countries can now be classified as democracies, compared with 28 per cent in 1950. However, these aggregate statistics do not represent a smooth and uniform trend towards the democratization of the globe. There is a distinct regionalization of democracies and autocracies, with similar political systems clustering next to each other. Also, there have been spurts of democratization followed by periods of reversal as some of the newly democratic countries reverted to autocracy (Huntington 1991; O’Loughlin et al. 1998). The clustering of democratization in time and space is consistent with our materialist explanation of the geography of democracy. The structure and dynamics of the world-system provide limited opportunity for the expansion of democracy. However, we should

Table 6.1 Mean global democracy scores, 1946–94.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean democracy score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>−1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>−1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>−2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>−2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>−1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>−1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>−0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O’Loughlin et al. (1998).
not thereby simply disregard the slow spread of elections, rather we need to examine whether this is actually an expansion of democratic practices.

Figure 6.3 maps the distribution of democracies for three snapshots since 1946 (O’Loughlin et al. 1998). These maps illustrate the instances of decolonization during Kondratieff IVA, spurred on by the hegemonic ideology of the United States, and the increase in the number of countries classified as strongly democratic. However, the existence of reversals towards autocracy should also be noted: India and Venezuela between 1972 and 1994; Egypt, Turkey and Brazil between 1950 and 1972; and Indonesia between 1950 and 1972, for example. The recent trend towards an increase in the level of democracy in the world-system is further illustrated by calculating the mean democracy score for all the years since 1946 (Table 6.1). Although the number of countries changes for each year (O’Loughlin et al. did not include colonies in their calculations), it is clear that the level of democracy fell to a low of −2.40 in 1977 and then increased to a high of 2.98 in 1994. The fall in the 1960s is a function of the inclusion of newly independent African countries and their turn towards autocracy after independence – what we identify as the politics of failure below.
Despite the overarching picture of a trend towards democracy, further analysis raises doubts about the sustainability of some democratic countries. Figure 6.4 maps the regionalization of democracies and autocracies. For each country, a statistic is calculated that measures the extent to which it is surrounded by countries with similar democracy scores. For example, a high positive score is obtained if a democratic country has other democracies as neighbours, while a country obtains a high negative score if it is an autocracy surrounded by other autocracies. Low scores are given to countries if they are democracies surrounded by autocracies or autocracies surrounded by democracies. Figure 6.4 clearly shows the extent to which democracies and autocracies have been clustered into particular regions. In 1950, only North America, Australasia and north-western Europe can be treated as democratic regions, while the autocratic region was centred in communist Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In 1972, the democratic

Figure 6.4 The geographical clustering of democratic and autocratic states, 1950, 1972 and 1994. Source: O’Loughlin et al. (1998).
What is democratization?

In the contemporary rhetoric of foreign policy democracy is portrayed as an unquestionably good thing. Even wars, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be justified in that they usher in democracy; bullets are OK if they bring ballots, apparently. The language of ‘waves’ of democracy portrays it as a natural process that creates nation-state entities and expunges inequalities between citizens and social groups (Staeheli 2008). Driving these ideas is a procedural definition of democracy – democracy as simply a set of institutions and practices. However, another way of looking at democracy is the outcomes it produces, or whether the ideals of democracy are actually realized.

The establishment of democracy is, therefore, more than a rewriting of constitutions; rather it is the outcome of political struggles that occur within places and within and between communities around social cleavages of class, gender and race (Staeheli 2008). If democracy is a just outcome then it rests upon the idea of representation. This is a very slippery concept that seeks a goal in which the voter’s beliefs and intentions are heard and translated, through the political machinery, into policy. And yet, the idea of representation rests upon a more fundamental question of the ‘demos’ in democracy: who are ‘the people’? The political geography of nationalism, and inclusion–exclusion, that we saw playing a key role in the politics of citizenship is fundamental to the operation and justness of democracy.

Political geographers have addressed representation through analyses of ‘gerrymandering’, or specifically the politics of drawing the boundaries of electoral districts in a way that manipulates the voting outcome. In the US, the politics of gerrymandering has been primarily based on race, and the assumption that districts of primarily African-American voters can be drawn that will ensure the election of Democrats, or the process of ‘cracking’ or spreading minority voters across a number of districts so their vote is diluted (Forest 2008: 379). Another politics of representation is the construction of voting systems that ensure different regional, religious and ethnic groups are ‘represented’ in the national legislature. Such politics was evident in the discussion of the form of the 2005 UN-sponsored elections in Iraq. The goal was to have an election that made clear the emergence of an ‘Iraqi people,’ and reduced ethnic tensions and regional splits. Ironically, the results could be interpreted as achieving the very opposite (Forest 2008: 385).

So what is democracy and democratization? It is more than particular forms of institutions and their diffusion across the globe. It is an ongoing politics that is always imperfect as different politics of representation are promoted and challenged by different social groups.

region had not changed, but the autocratic region now encompassed most of Africa. The communist countries and most of South America were regions of moderate autocracy. By 1994, the democratic region had spread to include all the Americas and Western and Southern Europe. The autocratic region extends from southern Africa through the Middle East to central Asia and China.

O’Loughlin et al.’s mapping of the limited diffusion of democracy needs to be accompanied by consideration of what is actually spreading: is the world becoming more democratic because more countries are holding elections? Paul Collier (2009) certainly believes that more elections have not led to a diffusion of democracy. Instead he claims that autocratic dictators have displayed the ‘visible trappings of democracy’ (Collier 2009: 5) rather than making substantial and lasting change. Many elections that are held in the poorer countries of the world cannot be considered to be democracy as rules of conduct are not adhered to and no constitutional system of checks and balances is established (Collier 2009: 15). Succinctly, Collier argues against a positive or transformative view of democratization:

The great political sea change may superficially have looked like the spread of democracy, but it was actually the spread of elections. If there are no limits on the power of the winner, the election becomes a matter of life and death.

(Collier 2009: 15)
Or more simply Collier defines the outcome as ‘democrazy’ (Collier 2009) rather than democracy. Collier’s claims are more than a definitional challenge to democratization. They are based upon analysis of the relationship between elections and political violence since 1960 (Collier 2009: 20). In richer countries the general trend has been one in which elections lead to less violence because of broader political changes that have increased accountability of leaders. On the other hand, in poor countries elections have led to an increase in political violence over the same time period, because they are not accompanied by institutional changes that embed representational democracy. The conclusion is an indictment of democratization; ‘democracy makes poor societies more dangerous’ (Collier 2009: 21).

So how do established autocrats manage elections to ensure victory? In other words, what does democrazy look like? Collier (2009: 29–36) identifies six common strategies:

1. **Lie to electors** – through control of the media.
2. **Scapegoat a minority** – establish a politics of hatred against a minority or foreigners.
3. **Bribery** – plays to a key advantage of autocrats because of money amassed through corruption,
but it is unreliable as opponents may also employ this tactic.

4. **Intimidation** – although you may not be able to know how people vote, you do know whether they vote; in identity/hate politics this is all that is needed to purposively unleash thugs targeting particular communities. However, violence breeds violence and so this is a risky strategy as it may prevent even sham elections being held.

5. **Restrict the field to exclude the strongest candidates** – accuse key opponents of corruption (since it will probably be true) and hence prevent any viable challenge.

6. **Miscount the votes** – this is reliable, unless international observers are present and effective, and the international community shows enough interest.

In combination, overt violence, intimidation, corruption and misuse of state institutions are, sadly, readily mobilized to prevent a meaningful demonstration of representative democracy.

So, where in the world is democracy and what do we actually mean by the term? The Cold War-era analysis of Coulter and the more recent mapping of democratization have shown a persistent global pattern of elections. In addition, Collier’s analysis demonstrates that what is labelled as ‘democracy’ is a very different beast depending on a state’s position in the capitalist world-economy. In our world-systems perspective we can see a strong tendency for elections to be a feature of the core of the capitalist world-economy. We now move on to an explanation of that pattern, and to make sense of the difference between core practices of democracy and peripheral practices of ‘democrazy’.

**A world-systems interpretation of elections**

Of all modern social institutions, elections would seem to be a set of activities that have to be understood at the scale of the individual state. Elections

---

**‘Elections should have been peaceful’**

In April 2017, a by-election in the Indian-administered portion of the disputed territory of Kashmir produced an abysmally low turnout of 7 per cent as well the deaths of eight people. Kashmir is a divided and disputed region with a majority Muslim population that has been the source of decades of conflict between India and Pakistan. Both countries control a portion of Kashmir while claiming the whole territory. There is also a movement for independence that India alleges is being fuelled by Pakistan to destabilize the situation.

The failure of this election, in terms of the delegitimizing turnout and the associated violence lies in the politics of defining the group of ‘people’ to be represented in electoral politics. The by-election was sparked by the resignation of a politician who had claimed the Indian government was promoting an ‘anti-people’ agenda. The very questioning of the political geography of nation and state in Kashmir challenges the meaning of elections that are assumed to give a voice to the citizens of a nation and a chance to influence the politics of the state. When the geography of nation and state are unresolved then the act of voting has little meaning, while deciding not to vote is a way to challenge the geography of nation and state India would like to be accepted.

Farooq Abdullah, former chief minister for Indian-administered Kashmir, was quoted as saying ‘Elections should have been peaceful. This government has failed in giving a peaceful atmosphere for people to come and vote’. When questions of nation and state are unresolved elections become a vehicle for nationalist politics that can create violence but also allow people to make a statement by not voting.

occur separately on a country-by-country basis and are strictly organized within one state at a time. The geography of elections therefore presents a particular challenge to world-systems political geography with its one-society assumption. Surely, here we have a case where we need a multiple-society view of the world to make sense of national elections. In fact, it is relatively easy to show that the activities surrounding elections are in no way insulated from the world-economy.

We provide a framework for looking at elections in the core that does not show them as unproblematic, as smoothly working systems allowing representation for citizens. Rather we show that elections are a means of exercising power, and that through the interaction of elite politics (the politics of power) with electoral politics (the politics of support) there are moments when elections are used to maintain the power status quo and other moments when elites can be challenged. Hence, elections in the core are not systems ensuring representation for citizens but mechanisms of social struggle. Elections in the periphery are very different, and as noted above, are often marked by high levels of violence, unstable or despotic regimes after the elections, and levels of social dissatisfaction that result in either the suppression of elections or another round of equally problematic voting. We call this situation the politics of failure, an idea that relates the practice of voting to position within the capitalist world-economy.

A world-systems approach to electoral geography is able to generate an explanation for the variations in the use and meaning of elections in different zones of the world-economy. We consider this topic in length before concluding the chapter with a discussion of social movements.

**Liberal democracy and social democracy**

The idea of liberal democracy is an even more recent phenomenon in the world-economy than nationalism. For most of the nineteenth century, for instance, liberals faced what they saw as the dilemma of democracy. A fully democratized state represented ‘the great fear’ that the lower classes would take control of the state and use it to attack property and privilege (Arblaster 1984). This ‘liberals versus democracy’ phase is the very antithesis of liberal democracy and is often forgotten in simple developmental theories about democracy. These evolutionary arguments were a product of the optimistic era of social science in the post-1945 period, when liberal democracy was viewed as the natural result of political progress. But as late as 1939, about half of the European liberal democracies of the 1950s were under authoritarian rule. The 1930s were a time when pessimism about democracy reigned. We have to transcend these phases of pessimism and optimism about liberal democracy. What they tell us in world-systems terms is that liberal democracy is concentrated in time as well as place – in the core.

As usual, hegemonic processes give us a limiting case, but in general we can conclude that all electoral politics occurs within the overall political processes of the world-economy.

When I enter the Chamber [of deputies] I am entirely under the influence of English liberalism, as if I were working under orders of Gladstone . . . I am an English liberal . . . in the Brazilian Parliament.

(Smith 1981: 34)
zone after 1945. But to understand this world-systems location, we have to return to the nineteenth century.

In Chapter 5 we concentrated on one particular problem confronting politicians in the nineteenth century: the national question. This was in reality just one of many new political questions that was competing to join the political agenda at this time. Three important questions relate to the emergence of liberal democracy (Figure 6.5). First, there was the constitutional problem posed by the liberals. They advocated the replacement of arbitrary (royal) power by constitutional checks and balances. Second, there was the political question posed by the democrats. They argued that the people as a whole should wield power in the new liberal constitutions. Third, there was the social question posed by the socialists. They asked how the new elected governments were going to deal with the new urban poverty. The answer to the first two questions was the liberal democratic state; the answer to the latter two questions was the social democratic state. We shall consider each in turn before we describe their crucial historical coalescence after 1945 (Figure 6.5).

We shall interpret liberal democracy as much more than a label for a party or policy; it is a type of state. Liberal democratic states have three basic properties. First, pluralistic elections, in which there is competition between two or more parties to form the government, are held regularly. Second, all adult citizens are entitled to vote in these elections. Third, there are political freedoms that allow all citizens to associate freely and express their political opinions. These properties are found with only minor blemishes in all core countries at the present time. In addition, these states exhibit a further important property: political stability. Since 1945, countries in the core have experienced continuous liberal democracy. Hence they are liberal democratic states. They can be distinguished from states that have had liberal democratic interludes alternating with illiberal regimes. These more unstable states are typical of much of the world beyond the core. It is central to any world-systems analysis to distinguish between the liberal democratic state and liberal democratic interludes in other states.

In order to understand the space and time concentration of the liberal democratic state we need to consider social democracy. Again, we shall interpret this politics to represent more than a party or a policy; it is a type of state. Social democratic states have three basic properties. First, the state takes responsibility for the basic welfare of its citizens, so a wide range of social services and supports are provided. Second, there is a political consensus among all major party competitors for government that the resulting historically large welfare expenditure is both necessary and proper. Third, the welfare is paid for through progressive taxation, which involves some degree of redistribution of income by the state. These properties are found in all core countries from 1945 to different degrees through to the present time, ranging from New Deal-and Great Society-type programmes in the United States to the more redistributive socialism of Sweden. Some of the origins of this type of state are...
to be found in the social imperialism processes discussed in Chapter 4. Whatever the means, however, by the late 1940s ‘welfare states’ were being created throughout the core, and they have remained a typical characteristic of core political processes despite recent cutbacks.

The three political problems from the nineteenth century had generated two forms of state by the mid-twentieth century. And it is not a coincidence that these forms of state have coalesced: all liberal democracies today are social democracies (see Figure 6.5). We might say that we are looking at the same state from two different angles.

From a world-systems perspective, this ‘liberal–social democratic’ state is the result of two processes, one economic and one political. First, the world-economy location in the core during the fourth Kondratieff cycle enabled this small number of countries to develop a politics of redistribution that was not possible in states at other times and in other places. This means that these states were rich enough to have meaningful competition between parties on the distribution of the national ‘cake’, where all citizens could potentially benefit. Elections matter; the issue of ‘who gets what’ encompasses all strata. Second, in the emerging Cold War geopolitical world order, the liberal–social democratic form of state is easily the most preferable for providing an alternative ‘social progressive’ politics to communism. Hence the new politics of redistribution was encouraged by the United States because it provided a bulwark against communism, especially in Western Europe. But notice that the ideological concept of ‘free world’, first coined to describe non-communist Europe, has not transferred easily to areas beyond the core.

Theoretical corollary: the paradox of democratization

The above argument leads on to an important theoretical corollary. Since the world-economy is inherently polarized, the political benefits of liberal and social democracy can never be wholly transferred to the periphery. Hence the ideal of the liberal–social democratic state that is offered to these countries is beyond their reach. But this is the only modern state form in which liberal democracy has prospered. Why should the vast majority of a state’s people participate in an election if there is little or no politics of redistribution? This means that the simple call for ‘a return to democracy’ in poor countries, which we have heard since the 1960s, is simply not a sustainable goal. As we know, elections have too often turned out to be mini civil wars, with campaign deaths counted as well as votes (Collier 2009). The implications of this US promotion of a ‘free world’ based upon democracy during the Cold War were dangerously debilitating; the subsequent implications for the 1990s post-Cold War spread of democracy are even more worrying.

The contemporary paradox is a simple one. In a world where economic polarization over more than two decades has reversed social democratic tendencies, more and more countries have adopted democratic means of forming governments. From our analysis these two trends are contradictory, implying one of two things. One possibility is that the new democracies, for instance in South Africa and Brazil, will turn out to be very fragile and current ‘democratic gains’ will be soon reversed. In the case of Brazil, the politics of impeachment or threat of impeachment, connected to allegations of widespread political corruption, are the key dynamic of political change, rather than elections. In 2016, President Dilma Rousseff was forced to resign on a technicality amidst allegations of corruption and threats of impeachment. Within a year her successor, Michel Temer, was facing the possibility of impeachment in a new corruption scandal.

The second possibility is the new democracies, or at least some of them, will invent new social arrangements that may make continuing elections and increasing polarization compatible, such as a reversion to, effectively, one-party or non-competitive elections in Russia. This would be a different sort of democracy from that described above. Despite this pessimism one model of democracy stands out. India has been able to sustain a democracy for over half a century in conditions of mass poverty, and may be more of a pointer to the future of the new democracies than past North American and Western European democratic experiences.
The regional pattern of democracy and autocracy identified by O’Loughlin et al. and Collier in the first section of the chapter is consistent with our material framework that we will discuss fully later in this chapter. Simply, democracy is an option only for those countries that are able to extract enough of the global surplus to distribute to their populations. The spread of democracy represents political changes stemming from changes in the capitalist world-economy. But does the increase in democracy challenge the essential core-periphery structure of the world-economy? Without the benefit of foresight, we cannot answer that question. However, our material framework suggests two responses.

First, a further investigation of the temporal dynamics of democratization reminds us that we should not infer a one-way street towards democratization. Figure 6.6 shows the general trend towards democratization since 1815, with the three waves of democratization identified by Huntington (1991): 1828–1926, 1943–62 and 1974 to the present. However, after each of the two previous waves, there has been a reverse trend as some of the newly democratized countries reverted to autocracy. This cyclical pattern suggests that any triumphalist claims about the victory of liberalism and liberal democracy, such as Fukuyama’s (1992) post-Cold War polemic, should be qualified. Although many countries aspire to core status, and receive benefits such as liberal democracy, the structural constraints of the world-economy mean that some of those efforts will be futile. In other words, the short-term agency of social movements and politicians is impeded by the structure of the world-economy. The structural constraints of the world-economy are also illustrated by the regionalization of democracy and autocracy. It is hard for societies to make democracy prosper outside the core.

However, O’Loughlin et al. (1998) do show evidence that democracy has spread into semi-peripheral and peripheral regions. Although it is possible that these trends may be a function of short-term material gains, the world-systems perspective provides another explanation. In Chapter 3, we described the power of hegemons to shape political and economic practices via the dissemination of hegemonic codes. Important components of the hegemonic code of the United States were self-determination, consumerism and democracy. The United States has ordered the globe through the espousal of the belief that all countries could have similar economic and political opportunities to those in the United States. The spread of democracy has been stimulated by the imperatives of current

---

**Figure 6.6** Regime emergence and change, 1815–1994.

Source: O’Loughlin et al. (1998).
US hegemonic practices: were the East European revolutions of 1989 spurred on by the thought of democracy or the promise of consumerism? The answer is both, but we should not underestimate the latter. In fact, our materialist perspective suggests that the diffusion of such core-like political practices is unsustainable without some widespread achievement of the ‘good life’, which is ultimately impossible with increased polarization. The pressing question, therefore, is whether reverse trends towards autocracy will lead to greater social unrest now that US ideology has let the democratic genie out of the bottle.

The economic difficulties of establishing liberal social democracy in the semi-periphery and periphery can be further complicated by geographies of ethnic and religious difference. The geopolitics of democratization, as part of a global hegemonic project, is enacted by a diverse set of political groups within nation-states, each with its own agenda. The hegemonic power’s attempt to catalyse the diffusion of democracy was most evident in the US-sponsored War on Terror. A new region was targeted as being ripe for democratic change, the Middle East and central Asia. Elections were held in Afghanistan after the US-led invasion had overthrown the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime. Iraq was next on the agenda and dominated the news. However, the call for elections in the first Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 caused a diplomatic problem. The winners were Hamas, whose political agenda included outright hostility to Israel as well as the promotion of religious law; this was not the sort of party that the United States was hoping would emerge from a bout of democratization. Post-war elections in Iraq have failed to produce a stable and democratic government. Hence, there is an interesting paradox emerging in the geopolitics of democratization. Democracy is being diffused by the United States in its role as hegemonic power in an attempt to secure political influence in the Middle East and other regions, but the process is bringing parties to power that are antagonistic to US goals. Perhaps, a reverse-wave of democratic failure in the Middle East will leave anti-US parties even more emboldened within their nation-states?

Electoral geography contrasts between core and periphery

Our theory implies that elections will be substantially different in different zones of the world-economy. This will be reflected in contrasting electoral geographies. Consider the situation in the core where a viable politics of redistribution allows parties to build stable support bases as they implement policies that favour their supporters. In Britain, for instance, Labour does better in working-class districts, and the Conservatives obtain more support from middle-class districts. In contrast, in non-core areas without a viable politics of redistribution, this basic mechanism of keeping voter loyalty is missing. A party is far less able to reward the mass of its supporters and sustain its votes. Hence we expect less stable bases for party support, which will be reflected in unstable geographies of voting. We can test this basic hypothesis with a simple empirical analysis of contrasting geographies of election.

The degree of geographical stability of a party’s vote can be measured by factor analysing the geographical pattern of the vote over a series of elections. If the pattern is exactly the same in every election, the first factor in the analysis will account for 100 per cent of the variance. The less geographically stable the vote over time the further the first factor will be from the 100 per cent limit. Hence the ‘importance’ of the first factor provides a sort of percentage geographical stability score. Such measures are reported from the major parties of ten countries in Table 6.2, covering elections between 1950 and 1980.

The countries in Table 6.2 are divided into seven core states and three peripheral states to highlight the differences in the electoral politics of the two zones. In all the European core countries the geographical stability is very high. The major parties in these countries are able to successfully ‘renew their clienteles’ over time (Rokkan 1970). In contrast, in the three peripheral states the degree of clientele renewal is very low. At this time Jamaica seemed to come closest to a level of geographical stability consistent with a viable politics of redistribution, but even in this case the percentage levels are well below European states, with their more fully developed
politics of redistribution. What this means is that in these peripheral states the geographical pattern of support changes appreciably from one election to the next. Parties are unable to maintain the support of those who have voted for them in the past. In short, there seems to be a very different political process going on. Even though the Jamaican, Ghanaian and Indian elections upon which this analysis is based may be as fair and as open as the European elections, this fundamentally different electoral geography is indicative of something other than a ‘liberal–social democratic’ state.

We must conclude, therefore, that in order to study elections worldwide we will need to bear in mind the very different politics resulting from huge differences in material well-being between countries in the core and in the periphery. In the next section, living in the core and voting in the periphery

Table 6.2 Geographical stability of voting patterns c.1950-80 by major parties in selected countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core countries</th>
<th>Peripheral countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from data in Johnston et al. (1987). For all countries except Ghana and India the scores for stability are the average for the two main parties in the country. For Ghana the scores are for the pro-Nkrumah party at each election and for India the Congress Party.

Perhaps more than any topic in political geography, electoral geography has followed the multiple society assumption of social science. The voter has been identified as the citizen of a particular state, and the geographical extent of the political system has been assumed to be delimited by the borders of the state. However, these assumptions do not hold. Indeed, it is estimated that 175 million people live outside their country of citizenship, about 3 per cent of the world’s population (Collyer 2006). Initial investigation into these topics promises an interesting geography of electoral behaviour that is not constrained by state borders. Such analysis would integrate electoral geography into the broader project of analysing and understanding globalization, while retaining the interest in the contextual influence of geographical location upon the voter.

Theoretically, two categories of voters are of interest: residents who are able to vote in the elections of their host state but are not citizens, and citizens of a state who have migrated abroad but may still vote in their ‘home’ elections. For example, the first round of elections in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was conducted across the globe as the Iraqi diaspora was deemed eligible to vote. Different countries have different attitudes to and laws governing the voting rights of non-resident citizens (Collyer 2006). For example, in the Republic of Ireland non-residents are prevented from voting, but Italian non-resident citizens may return to vote (and, if they meet the financial criteria, receive monetary aid to do so), and the US and the UK allow non-resident citizens to vote from abroad. In an interesting case, the Cook Islands residents and non-residents vote on separate slates of representatives.

Why the current interest in non-resident voting? One of the arguments rests on the importance of financial remittances sent by migrants – an increasingly significant source of income for peripheral countries as foreign direct investment has declined (Itzigsohn 2000). However, Collyer (2006) concludes that the reasons behind states’ facilitating non-resident citizen voting vary by region: the explanations found for Latin America were different from those for the Maghreb region of North Africa. Morocco is a good example, in which those advocating allowing non-resident citizens to vote to maintain the flow of remittances are faced by a counter-argument that such voting would weaken existing and well-established bases of power (Collyer 2006).
we deal with electoral geography in the core, and in the final section we consider the role of elections in the far harsher politics beyond the core.

## Summary

In the previous sections we have introduced a world-systems interpretation of the geography of elections. In doing so we have:

- introduced the concept liberal social democracy;
- built upon this concept to argue that we will see different politics, including different electoral politics, in the core and periphery of the world-economy;
- considered that democratization is likely to be constrained by the structure of the world-economy.

## Liberal democracy in the core

In traditional electoral geography, political parties have been viewed as either reflections of social cleavages (Taylor and Johnston 1979) or simple vote-buying mechanisms (Johnston 1979). Parties may carry out either or both of these roles, but they are much more than this. The concept conspicuous by its absence in such analysis is power. The main purpose of political parties is to gain power – to take control of a state apparatus. By adding power to our analysis we create a critical model of elections. This is described in the first part of this section. We then apply the model to the making of liberal democracy in the core. We concentrate on the specific relationships between parties and governments and the dynamic nature of the capitalist world-economy.

The dialectics of electoral geography

A dialectical process is one that unfolds through history from two opposites to a resolution of the opposition. These are termed thesis, antithesis and synthesis, respectively. It will be argued here that this process has occurred in the electoral politics of states. This model of political change is laid out in Figure 6.7. In the discussions that follow, we draw on some ideas introduced previously and link them with new concepts for dealing with elections.

We begin with the key logic of the capitalist world-economy that we discussed in Chapter 1, the process of the ceaseless accumulation of capital. The initial basic opposition is between this relentless pursuit of accumulation and the need to legitimate this pursuit. Since accumulation concentrates capital in the hands of the few, it acts against its own legitimation in the eyes of the many. The pursuit of capital produces social polarization, or a very small and very wealthy elite. The inequality of this situation is likely to result in political unrest unless there is a way to legitimate different life opportunities and outcomes. In other words, a stable political system requires a sense, or ideology, that the system is fair and that all people, not just the elites, have a voice. Both thesis and antithesis are necessary if the system is going to advance beyond simple coercion of the many by the few. Political parties have been key actors in the movement from this situation of opposition to today’s resolution in the liberal–social democratic state. Let us briefly trace the steps:

1. **The first need of capital is order to counter the full implications of the anarchy of production.** Parties have provided what has been called the ‘great act of organization’ – from the myriad of possible packages of policies, parties simplify the choices down to just a few, often just two, options (for example Republican versus Democrat policies in the United States).

2. **But parties also carry out what we shall call the ‘great act of mobilization’ whereby the population is brought into the political process.** This is to legitimate the politics.

3. **Different types of party were associated originally with these two processes – we define them as cadre and mass parties below – but their coming together after 1945 as a new form of representation party provides the key step in
synthesizing the needs of accumulation and legitimation in the political system.

4 The cadre party’s emphasis on external policies (such as trade) and the mass party’s emphasis on internal policies (such as welfare) comes together in the liberal–social democratic state.

5 From this, we define alternative politics concerned with power and support, which since 1945 define a congruent politics that is at the heart of contemporary politics in the core.

6 It is the combination of representation party, liberal–social democratic state and congruent politics that forms the synthesis that has resolved the initial oppositions.

Let us now consider the ideas and concepts contained in this model in more detail.

Organization and mobilization

Political parties carry out two basic tasks. First, they set, or at least influence, the political agenda. Second, they appeal for support among the population. These two activities are closely related, since success or failure in one is likely to produce success or failure in the other. For instance, the demise of the Liberal Party in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century was the result of its failure to continue to dominate the political agenda as it had in the nineteenth century, with a resulting loss of popular support. It was quite literally being seen as irrelevant to the needs of many newly enfranchised voters. The Labour Party, on the other hand, was much more successful in producing a new agenda with which it was able to capture much former Liberal support as well as new voters. Eventually, Labour replaced the Liberal Party as a party of government. A significant transfer of power had taken place. The question for the contemporary Labour Party is how to retain its relevance in a social and economic context (i.e. identity politics and globalization) that does not seem to favour the ideology it created to become one of the two main parties.

From the point of view of the state, these two activities by political parties are highly functional. Parties first organize the politics of the state and then they mobilize the population behind that politics. But parties cannot do this singly; such a useful outcome depends on the creation of a competitive party system.

A party system depends upon opposition groups being perceived as alternative governments rather than as threats to the state. From the nineteenth century onwards, state-building groups in core countries and some peripheral countries have come to accept this position, so that elections become the means of selecting governments. In the United States, this fundamental position was reached in the second party system of Democrats versus Whigs, which developed in the 1830s. In the first party system a generation earlier, each party fought elections with the intent of eliminating their rivals from the
political scene – eventually, the Democrat–Republicans succeeded in reducing the Federalists to political impotence. In contrast, the Democrats and Whigs fought elections merely with a view to securing the presidency for their candidate (Archer and Taylor 1981: 54–61). The election of President Donald Trump in 2016 resulted in the twenty-third transfer of executive power in the United States by election.

This transfer of government office is not as open as the above discussion implies. Government formation is not a free-for-all but is a carefully controlled process. And this is where parties come in. In many countries, there is a duopoly of power to form governments. In the United States, for instance, all presidents since the Civil War have been the nominees of the Republican or Democratic Party. In Britain, the Conservative and Liberal Parties until the 1920s, and then the Conservative and Labour parties, have had a similar duopoly of power. Even in multi-party systems, there remain severe constraints on voter choice, with relatively few effective votes available. But this is the whole point of a party system. From the vast range of positions on a large number of topics, voters are asked to support just one of a limited number of ‘manifestos’ or ‘platforms’. This is what Schattschneider (1960: 59) has termed ‘the great act of organization’, with political alternatives reduced ‘to the extreme limit of simplification’. The power of parties is simply that electors can vote for or against particular party candidates, but they cannot vote for or against a party system (Jahnige 1971: 473).

Electoral politics as constrained by political parties is, therefore, an important control mechanism in liberal democracies. The actual organization operating at any particular election, however, is not normally designed for that election. As we have seen, parties and party systems are the product of the specific histories of their countries. The manipulation of the political agenda is not a conspiracy of ruling elites but rather reflects the relative power of different interests in the evolution of a party system.

For Schattschneider (1960), this power over choice enables parties to define the politics of a country. There are an infinite number of potential conflicts in any complex modern society. By controlling alternatives offered to voters, parties decide which conflicts are organized into a country’s politics and which conflicts are organized out. Hence electoral politics is defined by the party system, producing massive constraints on the nature of the political agenda.

In some ways, this integrating role of parties is paradoxical. ‘Party’ comes from the same root as ‘part’ and indicates a division within a political system. Political parties, therefore, have the second role of accommodating differences within a state. Hence the social conflicts and resulting cleavages that Rokkan (1970) identifies do not ultimately pull the state apart but rather become part of the state. Parties can therefore convert even potentially rebellious subjects into mere voters. The rise of Christian Democratic parties throughout Europe, but especially in Italy, represents a victory of the state over the transnational pretensions of the Catholic Church. Devout Catholics became mobilized into state politics via their Church parties. More generally, we may term this process the party system’s ‘great act of mobilization’. Today throughout the core it is difficult to conceive of state politics without political parties.

The development of political parties

Liberal democracies may have been created by political parties, but how did they come to be so important? It is a complex story in every country, but in general terms it can be simplified by reference to mobilization and organization. These two tasks have their origins in the development of two very different sorts of party in the nineteenth century.

The acceptance of legitimate oppositions within states was reflected initially in the formal organization of parliamentary factions, or ‘parties’. These loose groupings of politicians represented different special interests within the dominant class. In the mid-nineteenth century, a distinction began to be drawn between factions serving particular interests and parties organized by principles and claiming to represent the public interest from different perspectives. In Britain, Whigs and Tories were replaced by Liberals and Conservatives, for instance. These parties were originally organized only in parliament and did not constitute modern political parties, according to Duverger (1954). They became
proper parties only when the parliamentary organizations were forced to mobilize support in the country in the wake of suffrage extensions and competition from new parties. The formation of ‘electoral committees’ in electoral districts to organize campaigns converted these ‘traditional parties’ into fully fledged modern parties. They became what Blondel (1978) terms cadre parties, since their organization is merely to find supporters, and power continues to reside at the centre.

As suffrage reforms began to reach down to the direct producers, another very different sort of political party was created outside parliament. These extra-parliamentary parties had only one source of resources: their members. Hence they were forced to mobilize voters and potential voters into mass parties. The most successful were the socialist parties, which in 1889 created the Second International as an alliance of socialist parties from numerous countries. Populist agrarian parties and some Christian parties also developed as mass parties in selected countries or regions.

Hence, at the beginning of the twentieth century there were two very different types of party in most of today’s liberal democracies: mass parties emphasizing mobilization and cadre parties emphasizing organization. But between them they have defined, for the most part, the party systems that exist today. According to Rokkan (1970), European party systems were ‘frozen’ into their basic structure in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Hence elections today take place between political parties, most of which were competing with one another before the First World War. But we should not let the similarity in party labels lead us to assume that electoral politics has not changed fundamentally between these two periods. Blondel (1978) has pointed out that the party systems in Europe before the First World War were much less stable than they seem in hindsight. The mix of unresponsive cadre parties and mobilizing mass parties was a recipe for conflict rather than consensus. The latter in particular were potentially divisive, since they developed political ideologies that were inclusive. Socialist ideology, for instance, looked forward to mobilizing all the working class in a country, which would eventually provide the party with a permanent parliamentary majority. There was little room for pluralism here. The most extreme case was in Germany, where the Social Democrats seem to have created an alternative ‘class nation’. The question is, therefore, how did this unstable and potent mix of dissimilar political parties become converted into the stable liberal democracies of today?

We begin to answer this question by considering the US case, which was the major exception to the party development described above, since both agrarian (Populist) and socialist mobilizations failed to produce major political parties to compete for government. According to Burnham (1967), this is the decisive step where the American party system diverges from the European experience. Hence US elections remained competitions between cadre parties well into the twentieth century. But they were forced to shed the unresponsiveness typical of cadre parties by the economic collapse after 1929. With the coming of the New Deal in the 1930s, we find the generation of a new form of party, which Blondel (1978) terms a representation party. This new type of party developed as a synthesis of elements of the cadre and mass types. Representation parties are more responsive than traditional cadre parties in that they make direct concerted appeals to the electorate beyond narrow party channels, but they are not mass parties, since they are not primarily concerned with mobilizing voters to accept a special political cause. Representation parties are pragmatic and eschew ideology. In the age of new mass communications, first radio and then TV, political leaders can appeal to the electorate directly, and we enter the world of policy packaging, image making and the ‘selling’ of the candidate. Elections are about which party and its leader can best represent the public mood of the time. In the new age of nationwide radio, Roosevelt’s New Deal Democrats (1932–45) can claim to be the first representation party.

In Europe between the two world wars, the cadre and mass parties continued to exist side by side in an uneasy politics with strained party systems. After the Second World War, both cadre and mass parties metamorphosed into representation parties. For the cadre parties, this was a relatively easy transition as they extended their electoral campaigning to
incorporate new techniques. At the same time, the mass parties changed fundamentally. The old socialist parties have come to rely on pollsters and advertising agencies just as much as their right-wing rivals. Socialist parties now claim to represent public opinion rather than guide it. The contemporary tensions within the British Labour Party reflect intra-party battles between the vision of Jeremy Corbyn for a politics of representation and others more comfortable with the trappings of a cadre politics. Rokkan (1970) terms this process the ‘domestication of socialist parties’, and during the Cold War this distinguished socialist parties from communist parties in Western Europe. But since Rokkan’s analysis, the ‘Eurocommunist’ tendency produced new ‘respectable’ western European communist parties even before the end of the Cold War. This was the final act in the conversion of mobilizing mass parties into representation parties. The elimination of mass mobilizing parties can be interpreted as a sort of ‘Americanization’ of European party systems. The key point is that representation parties are a necessary step in the political resolution of the accumulation/legitimation dialectic in the core of the world-economy (Figure 6.7).

Two politics and two geographies in every election

In Chapter 4 we derived two politics in an instrumental theory of the state. Since elections are about competition for formal control over the state apparatus, it follows that political parties should reflect these two politics: inter-state, intra-class and intra-state, inter-class. In fact, this is the case. Generally, the distinguishing feature of cadre parties was in terms of different policies towards the rest of the world-economy. Each party represented economic interests within the dominant class within a state favouring either free trade or protection. For instance, in the United States the Republicans were protectionist and the Democrats were the free traders, whereas in Britain these roles were taken by the Conservatives (tariff reform) and the Liberals, respectively. In contrast, the new mass parties based their mobilizations on domestic distribution politics: more for small farmers in the case of the US Populist Party and agrarian peasant parties in Europe; more for working people in the case of socialist parties.

At the beginning of the twentieth century these two politics, promoted by their respective parties, operated side by side in elections. In a contemporary study of the British general election of January 1910, Hobson (1968) noted that the country could be divided between north and south in terms of economic interests. The industrial north he termed ‘Producer’s England’, and the residential south became ‘Consumer’s England’. This division was reflected heavily in the voting returns, with the Liberals polling strongly in the north and the Conservatives likewise in the south. The interesting point, however, is that this voting pattern is inconsistent with each region’s economic interests. Both parties inherited nineteenth-century traditions based upon the old urban–rural cleavage, so Liberals maintained their free-trade stance and Conservatives campaigned on a policy of tariff reform (protectionism). The paradox is that Consumer’s England voted for protection and hence increased prices, whereas Producer’s England voted for free trade, exposing its industries to American and German competition.

The source of this confusion is the evolving politics of political parties (Blondel 1978). Basically, a cadre politics (free trade versus tariff reform) was mixed up with a new mobilization of class politics (urban/north versus rural/south), leading to a mismatch between interests and voting. We can extrapolate from this example to argue that in every election two distinct processes will be operating. First, there is the politics of power, which can be traced back to accumulation. It is about winning elections to promote policies favouring particular interests in the pursuit of capital accumulation. All governing parties of whatever political hue must promote accumulation of some form within their state’s territory. But equally, a party cannot govern until it wins an election. Hence there is a politics of support that parties develop and nurture. These two politics operate together: every policy is advantageous to some interest group, which may fund the party that introduces it, while the overall package of policies that a party presents is designed to appeal generally to voters. But they remain separate processes and can produce quite paradoxical election
results, as the 1910 British election example illustrates. Representation parties since 1945 have blurred the distinction in their claims to reflect the public good, and it is our job in electoral studies to unravel this plausible appearance.

The lesson we can draw is that these two processes will have two electoral geographies associated with them. There are the familiar studies in the 'geography of voting' that we described above and that here becomes the geography of support. Second, there is the much less familiar geography of power, of interest-group funding and policy outcomes. With two electoral geographies to deal with, we are now in a position to introduce our model (Figure 6.8).

Most of electoral geography has been concerned with the geography of support, partly as a simple result of data availability. Elections must be very public exercises to function as legitimizing forces, so voting returns are readily available to produce geographies of support. As we pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, this has been the basis of the spectacular rise in electoral geography in recent years. But data availability for the politics of power is much more likely to be limited. Where the politics is based upon covert actions we may never know about it. CIA funding of 'friendly' foreign parties or destabilization of 'unfriendly' foreign governments is part of the geography of power in some states that we are only just beginning to learn about. Of course, there is no inventory of foreign funding of political parties across the world for us to consult on such matters. Certainly, we cannot expect simple official tabulations to produce geographies of power in the way that we can produce geographies of support. In addition, the study of the geography of policy outputs has not been systematically developed. In short, the geography of power in elections has been relatively neglected. And yet the politics of both support and power are equally essential to the smooth operation of liberal democracy. We should not neglect one merely because it is more difficult to investigate. The major lesson of our reformed model is to redirect electoral geography towards its neglected half, the geography of power.

Three types of electoral politics

This new model for electoral geography enables us to identify different types of electoral politics. We can define three basic relationships between the two geographies: an inverse relationship, no relationship and a positive relationship. These are termed contradictory, disconnected and congruent politics, respectively, in Figure 6.9. This diagram illustrates these politics in simple abstract terms. For the geography of support, we identify just a simple cleavage dividing the electorate into two halves. For the geography of power, the sum of all interested groups is divided into two clusters of policy interests. Shading indicates compatibility between policy
US intervention and the dirty politics of power

Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in February 1999 with 59 per cent of the vote. From the outset of his tenure he was targeted by the United States as a ‘threat’ to the region. The essence of the United States’ displeasure was Chávez’s domestic policies of economic redistribution that ran counter to a regional agenda to integrate the whole of South and Central America into a free-market zone dominated by the United States. In addition, Venezuela is an important oil exporter, and the United States was wary of Chávez’s control of this vital resource. As soon as Chávez came to power, as a result of a politics of support, he faced a particular politics of power: aggressive external interference by a powerful state.

Back in 1983, President Ronald Reagan established the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (LPD). The purpose was ‘Psypsos’ (Psychological Operations), or promoting stories within the US media that would justify US actions in Central America. In 1987, the US General Accounting Office, the government’s own watchdog, claimed that the LPD had conducted illegal and unethical practices in violation of government regulations. However, the institutional basis for monitoring, and interfering in, the internal politics of Latin American and Caribbean countries had been established.

The most blatant example of recent interference is Venezuela. The US campaign against Chávez began, in a form that is evident in other countries across the globe, by the funding of opposition parties. In other words, the players in the politics of power were partially created by, and mainly funded by, the United States. Two government agencies are involved: the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (James 2006). In 2000 these two agencies were allocated a total of US$200,000 for activities in Venezuela. The amount leapt to around US$4 million in 2002. One of the institutions receiving money from NED was the International Republican Institute (IRI). It was given money for Venezuela to ‘train national and/or local branches of existing and/or newly created political parties on such topics as party structure, management, and organization; internal and external party communications; and coalition building’ (www.venezuelafolio.info, quoted in James 2006): in other words, to build a landscape of the politics of power that would embolden pro-US parties. However, this form of the politics of power was not deemed successful enough by the financial backers.

In April 2002, Chávez was briefly deposed in a coup d'état. Government documents, obtained through the US Freedom of Information Act, show the close connections between the coup leaders and the United States. CIA briefs show knowledge of the impending coup just five days before it happened. Pedro Carmona was established as the new president. He had recently visited the United States and met with government officials. Carmona immediately dissolved the national assembly and other branches of government, with the exception of the executive branch. It was claimed that Chávez had ‘resigned’, but when it became clear to lower-ranking military officers and the general population that he had been removed by force he was reinstated on a wave of public outrage. Public statements by the US government claiming ignorance of the impending coup, as well as involvement with the instigators, are challenged by the US government’s own documents and communications immediately preceding the coup.

Despite this failure to remove Chávez as democratically elected president, the US campaign to oust him continued. After the attempted coup USAID and NED pumped even more money into oppositional politics. Tactics have changed annually, ranging from the support of strikes in 2003, funding a referendum opposing Chávez in 2004 and rigging exit polls to claim he had been defeated (monitoring groups classified the referendum ‘free and fair’ and support for Chávez remained at 59 per cent), and, in 2006, the new tactic of diplomatic isolation. As the presidential elections of December 2006 approached, the United States continued using...
interests and voting segment. The three forms of electoral politics are then clear to see.

The confusion of the 1910 British election can now be identified in our model as a case of contradictory politics: Producers’ England votes for free trade, Consumers’ England votes for tariffs. Disconnected politics can be illustrated by countries using a proportional representation (PR) system of voting. This is because the voting and the government formation are distinct processes. Normally, no one party is able to form a government, so negotiations between parties over policy after an election are necessary in order to construct a coalition government. This highlights the two political processes as separate mechanisms allowing for the illustration of disconnected politics.

Finally, we come to congruent politics. Here parties pursue policies that broadly reflect the interests taxpayers’ money to mould the politics of power within Venezuela to the liking of President George W. Bush’s administration.

As another round of presidential elections approached in September 2010 further allegations of US attempts to influence the election were made. Mark Weisbrot, reporting for The Guardian, noted how in March 2010 Senator John McCain, a past presidential candidate, attempted to get General Doug Fraser, commander of US South Command, to identify a linkage between Venezuela and terrorism activities. He said none existed but soon recanted, saying that the State Department had set him straight. Weisbrot alleged that he did so under pressure, and the evidence for Venezuelan support for terrorism was weak. In addition to anti-Chavez press reports and resolutions in the house discrediting him and the electoral process, Weisbrot pointed out that the US government paid millions of dollars into undisclosed groups in Venezuela.

After the death of President Chavez in 2013, his successor Nicolas Maduro has continued to face US intervention in Venezuelan politics. Early in the presidency of Donald Trump the US Senate introduced a bill (S-1018) that used the language of humanitarian assistance. Critics allege that it is just another example of the US practice of interference to support opposition parties and usher in a government friendly to the regional agenda of the United States. The bill is being put forward in a context of on-going sanctions that, critics allege, will ‘make the economy scream’ – to coin a phrase from Henry Kissinger and his role in regime change in Latin America in the Cold War.

In sum, the electoral politics of Venezuela remain part of the geopolitical code of the United States that requires political grandstanding, feeding false stories to the media, and funding opposition groups.

Sources:

Figure 6.9 Three types of electoral geography.
of the people who support them. These are the typical
elections fought by representation parties since 1945.
Generally speaking, parties of the right produce
policies that favour the upper–middle end of the class
spectrum and base their support on this group,
whereas parties of the left produce policies favouring
the lower–middle end of the spectrum and gain their
support accordingly. To be sure, there are many
complications country by country, but in essence this
is the congruent politics that we experience today in
the core. Such a politics is a crucial element of the
political synthesis that we have explored in this
discussion (see Figure 6.7). It produces the politics of
distribution, which as we have seen is the hallmark of
liberal–social democratic states. This trio of party,
politics and state complemented one another to
resolve the accumulation/legitimation dialectic in
the core of the world-economy after 1945 (see
Figure 6.7).

The making of liberal
democracies

With three types of electoral politics, we are in a far
ter better position to understand the making of liberal
democracies than we were with the one electoral
politics underlying the linear systems model. In
the latter case, an evolutionary history is typically
produced whereby liberal democracy is a ‘natural’
outcome of democratizing trends over the past
century or so. But from our previous introduction to
a world-systems analysis of elections we know that
there was no such smooth transition to democracy.
Therborn (1977) in particular has recorded the
extent of the political opposition to democracy in
all countries that are now liberal democracies and
promote democracy worldwide. Our simple typology
of three types of electoral politics enables us to address
both the ‘dilemma of democracy’ in the nineteenth
century and the ‘triumph of democracy’ in the
twentieth century.

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the
model that we have developed in terms of concrete
examples of geographies of elections. We begin with
the cadre parties of the United States before the New
Deal, since they provide the best continuous example
of non-congruent politics to have existed. We then
consider the nature of the congruent politics that
developed after 1945 before finally looking in some
detail at the British case.

Non-congruent electoral politics: section
and party in the United States before
the New Deal

The United States has the longest continuous record
of competitive elections based upon a broad franchise.
As early as 1828, presidential elections were based
upon white male suffrage involving millions of voters.
Hence, while politicians in Europe were worrying
about the dilemma of democracy, the United States
was practising a politics that incorporated direct
producers but without their influence intruding
too much on government. It is at this time that
the designation of somebody as a ‘politician’ comes
to have a derogatory meaning (Caesar 1979). This is
a direct result of the non-congruent electoral politics
that was developed. This highly successful experiment
in democracy warrants further investigation.

Here we report briefly on a part of Archer and
Taylor’s (1981) factor analyses of American presi-
dential elections from 1828 to 1980, updated by
Shelley and Archer (1994). Using the percentage vote
for all Democratic candidates, Archer and Taylor
derive different patterns of party support across
states. When several elections show the same pattern,
these are defined as ‘normal votes’ in the sense that a
tradition of voting has been established. For the
analysis of eastern states from 1828 to 1920, two such
patterns dominate the analysis, and we report on this
finding and its relation to our previous discussion.

In Figure 6.10, we show the strength of these two
patterns over time. They clearly represent pre-Civil
War and post-Civil War normal vote patterns, the
first being important from 1836 to 1852 and the
second from 1876 onwards. In Figure 6.11, their
distributions across states are shown, and from
this we have derived their names – the non-sectional
normal vote and the sectional normal vote, respec-
itively. The latter represents what was the usual
pattern of voting in the United States for much of
the twentieth century: solid Democratic South, less
solid Democratic ‘border states’ and a slightly
pro-Republican North, with Vermont and Michigan particularly so. This is the sectional voting for which America was once famous. It contrasts strikingly with what went before. In the non-sectional normal vote pattern, strong Democrat states are found both North and South. The distribution seems haphazard, even random. Northerners and Southerners supported both Whigs and Democrats with relatively little sectional favour. This is best illustrated by identifying the most pro-Whig and pro-Democrat states of
this era. Interestingly enough, they turn out to be contiguous – Vermont and New Hampshire, which are as similar a pair of states in social, economic and ethnic terms as you could expect to find in the period prior to the US Civil War. This is non-sectional voting par excellence.

There are several important aspects of this finding. First, political developmental models that assume a decline in the territorial basis of voting over time are exposed here. In the United States the extreme sectional voting follows non-sectional voting and not vice versa. It seems that the United States was highly ‘integrated’ before the Civil War. This interpretation is consistent with an emphasis on the voting pattern but must be laid aside as soon as we consider the party system. What the non-sectional voting pattern represents is merely a conglomeration of local alliances that come together on the national stage to support a selected presidential candidate. The forums for this national activity are the two political parties: Democrats and Whigs. This local agglomeration produced ‘national’ parties for the only time in American history (McCormick 1967: 109).

There is a huge paradox here. Just as the country was undergoing the strains of sectional competition, which was to erupt in the Civil War, elections show no sectional bias. This means that the North versus South cleavage was being kept off the political agenda. Quite simply, there was no ‘North’ party or ‘South’ party to vote for until the 1850s. Hence the tensions developing in the country were organized off the political agenda by a non-sectional party system. The parties acted as an integrating force in a politics of sectional compromise. Martin Van Buren, president from 1837 to 1841, is usually credited as the architect of this highly successful control of a political agenda (Archer and Taylor 1981: 81–4). This was party versus section and, for a generation, party won. It was, in Caesar’s (1979: 138) words, ‘a complete antidote for sectional prejudices’. This remains a classic example of electoral politics being diverted from a major issue by political parties in a disconnected politics.

The system did not survive, and in 1856 the Republicans replaced the Whigs and the Democrats split into Northern and Southern factions. The upheavals of the Civil War and subsequent reconstruction produced no normal vote pattern for nearly two decades. By the late 1870s, however, a new politics was arising based upon the sectional normal vote. This politics of sectional dominance coincides with the establishment of the Northern section as the economic core of the state. The state’s territory becomes integrated as one large functional region serving the manufacturing belt. And here we have a second paradox: economic integration is accompanied by political separation. In effect, North and South become two separate political systems, the former dominated by the Republicans, the latter even more so by the Democrats. This arrangement suited the industrial leaders of the country, since Northern states were able to outvote Southern states. The presidency, therefore, became virtually a Republican fiefdom, with only two Democratic presidents between the Civil War and 1932. Hence one party was able to control the political agenda by relegating its opponents to a peripheral region.

What about the electors? What were they voting for while this control was going on? Fortunately, historians have attempted to answer this question by using correlation and regression methods on voting and census data. Their findings are fascinating. The major determinants of voting in this period are always cultural variables (McCormick 1974; Kleppner 1979). Hence voters were expressing religious and ethnic identification in elections. And yet in this whole period there are only two ‘cultural’ policies that reach the political agenda: slavery as a moral issue at the beginning of the period, and prohibition at the end. Through the whole of this period, there are only two ‘cultural’ policies that reach the political agenda: slavery as a moral issue at the beginning of the period, and prohibition at the end. Hence voters were expressing religious and ethnic identification in elections. And yet in this whole period there are only two ‘cultural’ policies that reach the political agenda: slavery as a moral issue at the beginning of the period, and prohibition at the end. Through the whole of this period, the major dividing line between the parties was protection (Republicans) versus free trade (Democrats). Hence, while voters were expressing their culture in elections, party elites were competing for economic stakes in terms of US relations to the world-economy. There can be no clearer example of the separation of voters from government by parties in a disconnected politics.

**Congruent electoral politics in the Cold War era, and after?**

So far, we have looked at liberal democracy from the point of view of the parties that created it. But the development of a domestic congruent politics in
the countries of the core of the world-economy is not separate from the international events occurring at the same time. The New Deal provided the programme for internal social peace during US hegemony. And the great economic boom of the fourth Kondratieff cycle enabled the construction of the social democracy that maintained liberal democracy in place. As we have previously argued, social democracy provided the solution to the old dilemma of democracy by buying off the lower strata in the manner that the social imperialists at the turn of the century aspired to but could not achieve. For them, the time was not right. But by mid-century a new politics of redistribution was in place where elections became the choice between alternative baskets of public goods. This was a task for representative parties, not aloof cadre parties or ‘ideological’ mass parties. In this situation, a broadly congruent politics could emerge around the question of more or less public goods. This competitive domestic politics was carried on within a foreign policy consensus. This was important for the development of the Cold War geopolitical world order. In 1945, some circles in the US government were unsure of the nature of the socialist parties that were enjoying electoral success in Europe. They soon realized, however, that they represented the best defence against Soviet-backed communist parties. Hence socialist parties such as the British Labour Party were the first to be ‘domesticated’ and provide a ‘safe’ politics from the point of view of US hegemony. The British Labour government, for instance, played a leading role in forming NATO in 1949 to bring the United States into Western European defence.

The social democratic consensus that produced the congruent politics was always more than just a welfare state. In Western Europe in particular, a corporate state was developed where government brought representatives of both capital and labour into economic decision making. The liberal–social democratic state had something for everybody – while the boom lasted. With the onset of the B-phase of the fourth Kondratieff after 1970, the slowdown in economic growth led to intense pressures on the public expenditure that sustained the corporate state. In the 1980s, this led to a major political attack on many of the programmes that constituted the social democratic consensus and the inclusion of labour in the corporate state. These new policies have been associated with the right-wing leaders of the United States and Britain at this time – President Reagan and Reaganomics, Mrs Thatcher and Thatcherism – but we should not conclude that the change was limited to these two hegemonic states. The new emphasis on market forces was a corollary to the necessity to cut government expenditure in times of economic difficulty. This was a general policy across all core countries irrespective of the colour of the party in power, and preceded the wave of budget cuts imposed by many states in 2010. The new politics was closer in content to the previous right-wing position in the social democratic consensus (less government) and so generally favoured right-wing parties to ‘represent’ the public’s ‘new realism’, but this was not the case everywhere. In fact, some of the most severe policy changes occurred where there were left-wing governments. In New Zealand, a Labour government probably made the most severe cuts in public expenditure in the 1980s, and in Spain it was a socialist government that provided possibly the biggest attack on the trade union movement in the 1980s. In both cases, these are classic representation parties appealing to a general public that there is no alternative, the slogan of all such parties in recession. But what of the victims of this process?

In these affluent societies of the core created in the post-1945 boom there has developed what Galbraith (1992) calls the new politics of contentment. This is a situation where for the majority of the population the good life continues and they no longer need the state social provisions that were part of the social democratic consensus. This is the ultimate world of representation parties as they compete to serve the contented. With society becoming more polarized economically and with no one representing the lower end of the class spectrum, the parties are gradually losing their legitimation function. They are no longer accommodating differences but are exacerbating them. We can see the synthesis unravelling in elections across core countries in 2016 and 2017. The insurgent candidacy of Donald Trump initially disrupted the Republican Party establishment during
the nomination process and then the political system itself in the defeat of the Democrat Party’s candidate Hillary Clinton (an established member of the political elite). Donald Trump ran on an anti-Washington ticket that has a long tradition in American politics. This time his call to ‘drain the swamp’ had greater political resonance and allowed him to gain power. In 2016 the British electorate voted for Brexit in a mobilization of anti-establishment sentiments (Ford and Goodwin 2014). In France, neither of the two candidates left standing in the final round of the 2017 presidential election was affiliated with the established governing parties. Ultimately, the anti-immigrant and anti-globalization politics of the Front National were defeated by the Emmanuel Macron, who led La République En Marche, a new political movement, with the promise of ushering in a ‘new’ politics while retaining liberal values.

In the core of the world-economy, the dominant political discourse promotes elections as the major, if not the only, legitimate means of conducting politics. The effectiveness and appropriateness of demonstrations and strikes, for example, are commonly questioned in terms of their democratic credentials. The basic political rhetoric employed in liberal democracies promotes elections as the legitimate means of addressing issues emanating at the global scale but experienced at the local scale. Furthermore, these experiences lead to demands for ameliorative actions by the state. However, following Schattschneider (1960), we note that electoral choices reflect the agenda-setting practices of political elites. The electoral cycle is, then, driven by elites, and some of their concerns will include the relationship of their particular state with the rest of the world-economy. On the other hand, elections are the opportunity for voters, or non-elites, to express their opinions over how well the state and the national economy have met their needs. Again, such concerns will be partially determined by the state’s relative success in the world-economy.

In order to make theoretical sense of the linkages between elections, the state and the world-economy, we will use Jürgen Habermas’s (1975) typology of crises. Habermas argues that capitalism is always prone to crisis. Two crises are of particular interest to us since they relate to the two electoral politics we have identified. First, in the politics of power, a rationality crisis occurs when the state does not succeed in managing the economy to the satisfaction and needs of the owners of capital and the business elite. In other words, in the opinion of the business elite, the state fails to manage the economy correctly either by being too involved in what are perceived as market decisions or by making poor decisions over taxes and trade, for example. Second, in the politics of support, a legitimation crisis occurs when the state does not manage to meet the social and economic needs of the masses while simultaneously meeting the imperatives set by the business elite. In other words, the economic or social conditions of the majority of the population become intolerable, even though the economy continues to produce at levels acceptable to business owners and managers.

The construction of liberal social democracy in the core of the world-economy illustrates the dual role of rationality and legitimation crises. The liberal imperative – the perceived imperative to maintain control of the political agenda and apparatus – reflects the dominance of the elites in creating the political system. The purpose of cadre parties was to manage the economy to their own ends. On the other hand, the extension of the franchise and the redistribution of economic benefits reflect the need to legitimate both the economic and political systems, hence representation parties.

Our world-systems framework should also allow us to predict the timing of the two types of crisis. In the A-phase of a Kondratieff cycle we would not anticipate a legitimation crisis, since we expect governments to be able to afford to meet their supporters’ wishes. However, this will mean more government activity in the economy, which is likely to create a rationality crisis for business as voter demands grow and the economic boom begins to falter. Once the B-phase begins, governments will no longer be able to satisfy voter demands and a legitimation crisis is likely. This may result in a dangerous period of double crisis, rationality and legitimation. It was in just such a period that the democratic Weimar Republic in Germany collapsed...
The geography of the politics of support is easier to identify and analyse than that of the politics of power. In territorially based electoral systems, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, the spatial pattern of voting tendencies is matched, with varying degrees of sophistication, to the geography of socio-economic attributes and conditions. The geography of power is harder to map. It is a matter of interconnection between political and economic elites, much of which takes place in informal settings rather than public spaces.

_Rolling Stone_ magazine cast a critical eye over the power-plays that drive the US political scene. The conviction of Jack Abramoff for fraud and charges of illegally pocketing lobbyist fees focused attention upon the side of Washington politics that is not as visible as the party political jockeying for votes. Lobbyists in Washington are paid to represent interests to politicians and ‘encourage’ them to vote along particular issues central to the operation of those interests. Interests include political pressure groups across the political spectrum, businesses and trade unions, and foreign countries. It is regulated to operate within certain limits of how much money politicians can receive, from whom they can receive it, and what they can and cannot spend it on. Even legal lobbying is viewed by many as a corruption of the political system, and the case of Jack Abramoff only heightens the invective. For example,

To most Americans, Jack Abramoff is the bloodsucking bogeyman with a wad of bills in his teeth who came through the window in the middle of the night and stole their voice in government. (Taibbi 2006a: 38)

In our theoretical, and more sober, language, Abramoff represents the secrecy and unjustness of the politics of power. Deals are cut between politicians and other elites with no democratic oversight, quite often illegally, and with no concern for the opinions of voters that politicians are deemed to represent.

To illustrate the process further, _Rolling Stone_ ran an exposé of lobbyists at work (Taibbi 2006b). Their journalist, Matt Taibbi, invited himself to a birthday party for Montana Senator Conrad Burns, costing US$1,000 for organizations and US$500 for individuals to enter and schmooze with the senator. Despite the presence of professional lobbyists at the party, Taibbi was able to talk with one of the senator’s staffers and pitch himself as a lobbyist for a bogus Russian energy company (given a fake Russian-sounding name that more or less translated to FartOilGas) planning to drill for oil in one of the United States’ most highly regarded National Parks, the Grand Canyon. Despite the absurdity of the pitch, the magic words ‘regulatory relief’ were understood by the staffer and the promise of a meeting and Senator Burns’s interest in ‘talking’ was established. The voters of Arizona, the location of the Grand Canyon, and Montana, the state that elected Senator Burns, were not at the party or in the conversation.

In an era of corporate globalization we should not be surprised that the politics of power, and the role of behind the scenes influence in US politics, has taken on an international dimension. The campaign and first few months of Donald Trump’s presidency were roiled by allegations of ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the campaign Paul Manafort was forced to resign his position of campaign manager over ties to a pro-Russian party in Ukraine and the connotation that he would be sympathetic to Putin’s policies of controlling Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. The problems for President Trump got worse once he was in office as his national security advisor, Michael Flynn, was forced to resign over his connections to Russia, as well as Turkey. In December 2017 Flynn pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his meetings with Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. As 2017 came to an end, at the time of writing, Washington was still embroiled in the intrigue of a president under investigation for alleged ties to Russia.

The election of a global businessman to be president of the hegemonic power has led to questions of a politics of support that transcends any idea of a national economy, the original geography of the politics of support, to a fusion of global geopolitics and favourable business relations. In a time of corporate globalization the geography of the politics of support gets ever murkier.
in the early 1930s. If democracy does survive, forced cutbacks in government expenditure are likely to help to resolve the rationality crisis. It is just this sort of pattern that we can see in the changing nature of British electoral politics.

**World-economy and ‘new politics’: the case of Britain**

Our discussion has brought the concept of power to centre stage in electoral geography, but we must not overemphasize the power of political parties. For all their dominance of government in liberal democracies, they are still constrained by the operation of the world-economy, as we have just seen. Although parties may be powerful within their state’s boundary, there is no guarantee of power beyond the borders. In this final section on core elections, we link the politics we have been discussing with the broader issues that have concerned us in earlier chapters.

The problem for all political parties is that, whereas the politics of support is largely an internal matter within their country, the politics of power inevitably extends beyond the boundary of the state. In the medium term, the crucial matter is the cyclical nature of the world-economy. Every time the world-economy moves from an A-phase to a B-phase, or vice versa, the constraints and opportunities facing every individual state change fundamentally. Political parties operating within these states have to tailor their policies accordingly. The result is a series of ‘new politics’ within each state corresponding to the particular reactions of the political parties to the new world circumstances. ‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’ are recent examples of such new politics in their respective countries.

The most interesting feature of these ‘new politics’ is that they do not necessarily arise out of elections. Usually, there is not an election where voters are asked to choose between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics: this is not a matter for the politics of support, it is an issue for the politics of power. For each new politics, old assumptions are swept away and new items appear on the political agenda. The key point is that all major parties accept the new politics. A new party competition arises but takes place within the new politics, being limited to matters of emphasis and degree. Hence the mobilizing powers of the parties are usually able to bring the voters into line with new economic circumstances. It is for this reason that the stability of voting patterns commonly found in electoral geography in core states is not a good index of the changing politics of the state.

Britain’s long-term economic decline has elicited a variety of political responses. Part of the political reorganization in post-1945 Britain can be seen as a response to a rationality crisis as the British state tried to become more competitive within the world-economy. Other electoral issues reflect the desire for legitimation, such as the rise of nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales. If we consider the period since the First World War, we can identify seven phases of ‘new politics’, each developing as consecutive pairs of responses to the A- and B-phases of the world-economy. These are shown in Table 6.3, and we consider each new politics in turn below.

**Table 6.3 ‘New’ politics in Britain, 1918–2008.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>World-economy</th>
<th>‘New’ politics</th>
<th>Major events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931–40</td>
<td>Stagnation B (ii)</td>
<td>Politics of national interest I</td>
<td>Dominance of National Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940–60</td>
<td>Growth A (i)</td>
<td>Social democratic consensus</td>
<td>Establishment of welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–72</td>
<td>Growth A (ii)</td>
<td>Technocratic politics</td>
<td>Application to join EEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–82</td>
<td>Stagnation B (i)</td>
<td>Politics of crisis II</td>
<td>Conflict/accommodation with unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–2003</td>
<td>Stagnation B (ii)</td>
<td>Politics of national interest II</td>
<td>Falklands War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2003–17     | Growth A (i)   | A diluted social democratic consensus | Rise of ‘New Labour’ (Blairism) and the emergence of ‘Mayism’?
We begin this sequence of politics with the depression following the First World War. The initial reaction was a politics of general crisis. The old party system of Liberals versus Conservatives crumbled and the new Labour versus Conservative system emerged. But two-party politics did not arrive straight away. Since no party was seen to have the answer to the economic problems, every election led to the defeat of the governing party – a classic effect of a legitimation crisis. This process ceased in 1931. The culmination of the political crisis was the fall of the Labour government and its replacement by a coalition National government confirmed by general election, which solved the legitimation crisis. Labour retreated to the political wilderness as the National government maintained support through the 1935 election. This replaced two-party competition as the electors were mobilized to reduce their economic expectations.

The Second World War swept away the assumptions of the 1930s. A new social democratic consensus emerged, and with the return of a Labour government in 1945 a welfare state was created. The revision of the domestic agenda did not extend to foreign affairs. The combination of funding the welfare state and maintaining a global military presence led to dangerous economic cycles: the rationality crisis of the famous ‘stop–go’ sequence in British economic performance. The problem became acute when the relative performance of Britain became a political issue. The ‘reappraisal of 1960’ and the return of a Labour government in 1964 promising ‘a white hot technological revolution’ ushered in a new technocratic politics. This involved widespread reform of state institutions to make Britain as competitive as its rivals. Reorganization became the key word as local government, the welfare state and other central state departments were ‘streamlined’ for ‘efficiency’. In foreign affairs, the retreat from global power to European power was sealed by membership of the European Economic Community – the ultimate technocratic solution to Britain’s rationality crisis.

With the onset of the Kondratieff IVB, it soon became clear that tinkering with the administration of the state was not working. Once again, we enter a politics of general crisis. Haseler (1976) identifies 35 events between 1966 and 1975 that he interprets as signifying the breakdown of the political system. In this new legitimation crisis, again no party was seen as having the answer, and we return to electoral defeats for governing parties and even a period of minority government. The party system was under stress with the rise of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, increased support for the Liberal Party and finally a split in the Labour Party. All this changed with the rise of a new politics of national interest in the 1980s, which resolved the legitimation crisis. The Conservative government was returned to power with a large increased majority as voters learnt to mellow their demands and expectations. In fact, the Conservative electoral victory in the difficult economic circumstances of 1992 has been widely acclaimed as the first clear example of the politics of contentment. But a new rationality crisis soon emerged with the debacle in the currency market in 1993. Although the Major government limped on through its full term, in effect a new politics began in 1993 with the administration consistently recording the lowest poll ratings in history, culminating in the massive Labour landslide victory of 1997.

‘New Labour’ ushered in the next new politics, which proclaimed a modernization revolution not unlike those after 1945 and 1960. This was a very mixed politics continuing Thatcherism in some respects while also pursuing a social democratic agenda in exclusion and poverty elimination based upon full employment and economic growth. However, the Blair government got Britain mired in a failed foreign policy adventure, and Blair’s legacy mirrors that of US President Johnson in the 1960s, who is remembered for the Vietnam War and not his domestic successes. Overall, Blairism does look like the latest growth-based new politics, and much of its ideology continued under Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, until the economic downturn starting in 2008 in the wake of the global credit crunch.

The new economic situation precipitated another new politics of crisis which centred on cutting state budgets in a further dilution of the old social democratic consensus – perhaps marking its death knell. In May 2010, the formation of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat governing coalition, following an election that left no party with an overall majority in
the House of Commons, confirmed this ‘new politics’. The ‘newness’ is a matter of ideological shifting and morphing within and between the two governing parties that promise a new form of government–society relations in Britain: a relationship in which the government (or more accurately state institutions) are to play a declining role in people’s lives.

In the election of 2017 Theresa May introduced yet another ‘new’ politics, a ‘third way’ in which neither ‘untramelled markets’ nor the state was given free reign. In the wake of Brexit, a form of Conservatism with echoes of the 1970s, including an industrial strategy, was promoted. In many ways this compounded, rather than challenged, Blairism. The new combination of a domestic politics aimed at making the Conservative Party attractive to all social classes, including the traditional heartlands of Labour support, was coupled by a global politics of a free-trading state within the global economy, freed from the alleged constraints of the European state. Budget cuts, tax rises, and debates whether ‘austerity’ needed to be reined in reflected the ongoing difficulties of the previous B-phase. An industrial strategy and an ideology of free trade looked towards the opportunities and challenges of a new A-phase. An emphasis on the union of Great Britain was intended to push back the appeal of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. The pact between the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (a party representing pro-crown constituents in Northern Ireland) and resultant anger from Scottish and Welsh nationalists about preferential treatment for one periphery over others, illustrated that Britain’s colonial legacy was alive and well. Even if successful, such politics will create winners and losers, and, inevitably, a new ‘new’ politics.

Further details of the history of twentieth century new politics can be found in Taylor (1991b). For our purpose here, there are just two main points requiring further emphasis. First, the various ‘new politics’ have not emerged at elections. The key example is probably the practice of identifying the new politics of the social democratic consensus with the 1945 Labour victory. This is incorrect. Although the Labour government was responsible for setting up the welfare state, the major policy decisions had been previously agreed by the Conservative-led wartime coalition government. Hence we can date the emergence of this new politics to 1940 with the creation of the new coalition government. Similarly, technocratic politics were not the result of any one election – the appraisal of 1960 came just after a massive government election victory, which presumably endorsed past policies. The Falklands War of 1982 produced a nationalist reaction among voters, represented by a turnaround in Conservative government popularity that was then consolidated in the 1983 election. It can be noted that the ‘New Labour’ politics of Blair were forged before the 1997 election victory, and the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition was a matter of ‘behind closed doors’ political negotiation after an inconclusive election following the 2008 economic debacle. The inability of the Conservative Party to consolidate its power in 2017 stemmed from reaction to Brexit, which had its roots within the economic difficulties of the European Union coupled with the refugee crisis and the related politics of immigration. Hence in all cases new politics have emerged independently of elections. The politics of power precedes the politics of support.

The second main point is that throughout this period of various new politics there was only one major geography of support. Generally speaking, the areas voting Labour and Conservative in the first politics of crisis continued their political biases until the political earthquake of Brexit: Labour maintained a northern, urban pattern of support, while Conservatives were the more southern, rural and suburban party. Despite electoral swings back and forth between the parties, this electoral geography remained remarkably stable. The two major political parties may not always have been able to counteract Britain’s decline in the world-economy, but they did continue to successfully maintain their geographies of support through thick and thin. This fascinating mixture of impotence and strength is the hallmark of political parties of all countries, although the balance will differ greatly between core states and peripheral states. But perhaps the dynamics of the world-economy are ushering in a new period at the global scale, to which electoral politics at the scale of ideology will have to adapt. It is to this intriguing question,
with the potential for a very new electoral geography, that we now turn.

**Liberal democracy, cities and corporate globalization**

As we have seen, international events such as the Cold War provide the context within which particular national electoral dynamics can be understood. But what if we are facing a more fundamental change in the form of the capitalist world-economy: Are we witnessing a new connection between electoral politics and processes operating at the global scale? There has been much commentary and interpretation of the dramatic elections of 2016 and 2017, especially Brexit and the election of President Donald Trump in the former. Pollsters were confounded and much analysis has followed the traditional explanations of voters’ economic interests and their interpretation of how different parties will deliver on their promises.

Our political geography usage of world-systems analysis provides an alternative approach. We connect local political behaviour to processes that are global in scope. In so doing, we suggest that an established way of looking at the electoral politics in the core is becoming redundant with the emergence of a new form of globalization, corporate globalization (Taylor 2017). In so doing, we retain a key aspect of electoral geography – the neighbourhood effect.

Stein Rokkan’s (1970) traditional model of electoral politics was designed with European countries in mind but is applicable to other parts of the world, especially the core. It posited two fundamental cleavages in all countries: one based upon class politics and the other based upon identity that is usually seen as a core-periphery relationship between dominant and marginalized areas of a country. Such a system has been in operation for over a hundred years as political parties mobilize a base of voters based utilizing cleavages. Political geographers point out that the tendency to vote along these cleavages is reinforced by context, or what is known as the neighbourhood effect (Taylor and Johnston 1979: 221–69). This means that working-class individuals, for example, are more likely to vote for a social democratic or communist party if they live in places with a majority working-class population compared to working-class voters in mixed or majority middle-class populations. The same pattern is observed for the tendency of middle-class voters to vote for, say, the Conservative party in Britain or the Christian Democrats in Germany.

The combination of Rokkan’s social cleavages, the neighbourhood effect, and parties mobilizing a core base of support has created relatively stable electoral geographies in the core of the world economy. So what happened in 2016? We suggest that the processes of the capitalist world-economy have changed considerably in a way that has a significant impact on established processes and patterns of electoral politics. The change is the emergence of corporate globalization.

Corporate globalization reflects the shift of power in the capitalist world-economy from states to corporations that has created a ‘pervasive force based upon the powerful global infrastructure’ of networks of cities that route global capitalist transactions (Taylor 2016: 144). There is a geography to corporate globalization, planetary urbanization (Brenner 2014). The amount of demand generated by the clustering of corporate activities in cities now means that all of the earth is somehow or other either an urban area or connected to activities in urban areas; all of the world has become ‘urbanized space’ (Brenner 2014). This may be the case, but not all urban areas are equal. Rather, and as we will see in the next chapter, some cities are centres of the important decision-making functions of the capitalist world-economy. The interests of the corporations they host are at the scope of the capitalist world-economy rather than particular states or places. We identify these cities as metropolitan, meaning that the power and influence of banks and other businesses in these cities is seen as a process of economic power with geographic reach across the world.

How are corporate globalization and metropolitan processes disrupting Rokkan’s electoral model? First, corporate globalization, and its transnational operations such as outsourcing certain tasks and creating a global division of labour, has diminished the power of what is known as the ‘labour aristocracy’, the skilled and privileged labour interests in core countries that were mobilized by social democratic
parties in Rokkan’s class politics. The result is that national growth (measured by aggregate GDP figures) no longer mean that workers will necessarily see higher incomes and an improved standard of living (Alderson and Nielson 2003; Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). Now the political question is: economic growth for whom and where? The simple battle lines of Rokkan’s social cleavages no longer provide an explanation.

Second the unprecedented burst of innovations associated with the period of corporate globalization has intensified the tensions between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ as identified in Table 6.4. By ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ we mean those classes, in Rokkan’s terms’, who are benefitting or losing out from shifts in technology and news forms of unemployment that we connected to Kondratieff waves in Chapter 1. The cyclical nature of this process is that last-cycles ‘winners’ are likely to be present day ‘losers’. Furthermore, because the cycles promote and marginalize particular industries then both their capitalists and workers can ‘win’ and ‘lose’. Political parties established to mobilize society based on Rokkan’s social cleavages are ill-equipped to cope with the fluidity of ever-changing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Third, the role of cities and the process of metropolitanization in corporate globalization mean that we will see a new geography of the neighbourhood effect – one based upon the degree to which voters are connected to metropolitan cities or not. Rokkan’s mobilization of the periphery was viewed as primarily rural. The new electoral geography of corporate globalization expects a geographic core of metropolitan cities and a periphery of those urban areas less integrated into processes of metropolitanization.

The Brexit vote offers an example of these processes in action; a new set of electoral processes with a new political geography that baffled commentators and pollsters. London, central to the metropolitan functions of the capitalist world-economy, was unsurprisingly the ‘hotspot’ of electoral opposition to Brexit. The thesis of an electoral geography of corporate globalization needs to stand the test of electoral patterns across the country. The term metropolitan creates a geography of ‘sophisticated’ urban centres surrounded by an ‘unsophisticated’ urban. Hence, we need to think of the electoral behaviour of cities within the context of their region/nation. Table 6.5 displays the Remain vote (a vote for Britain to continue to be a member of the European Union) for 40 British cities alongside each city’s region/nation Remain vote. The difference between these two votes leads to an ordering of British cities in which the gap between city and its region/nation is an indication of how metropolitan a city is. The more metropolitan cities are the sites of voters who could identify with various regional, national and global elites who warned that Brexit would disrupt transnational processes integral to corporate globalization.

As Taylor notes:

The top three ranked cities – Cambridge, Oxford and Brighton – are in a class of their own in their very high difference results and, in their diverse ways, can be considered outliers of London’s metropolitan process. The clearest tendency in the results is to be found with the ten core cities (originally eight from English regions latterly joined by Cardiff and Glasgow) highlighted in the table and whose voting all show high degrees of metropolitanization; they fill ten of the next 15 rankings. This contrasts with the South East region (enveloping London, the region has no ‘core cities’) italicized in the table, whose cities, after Oxford and Brighton, are arrayed evenly across the whole list (ranks 11, 22, 28, 32 and 36). But the metropolitanization effect is best seen within regions/nations where there are many clear and distinctive differences. For example, within the two nations both Edinburgh and Glasgow rank above Aberdeen and Dundee, as does Cardiff above Swansea. Across England there are many pairs of cities that show a similar pattern. Some obvious English contrasts are between Newcastle and Sunderland, Leeds and Bradford, Sheffield and Hull, Liverpool and Warrington, Manchester and Wigan, Nottingham and Derby, Birmingham and Coventry, Norwich and Ipswich, Bristol and Swindon, Southampton and Portsmouth, and Exeter and Plymouth. In all these pairings the first city has the higher difference score in the table and is generally more central to its region, and larger, than the second city, all key features of metropolitanization.

(Taylor 2017)
The electoral politics of Britain we discussed in the previous section was a process of electoral swings defined by the social landscape of Rokkan’s (1970) cleavages and the geographic expression of the agglomeration of neighbourhood effects across the country (Taylor and Johnston 1979: 221–69). Brexit suggests that this politics has been fundamentally disrupted. Established geographies of traditional radical cities (for instance, ‘Red Glasgow’, ‘Militant Liverpool’, Sheffield’s ‘Socialist Republic’) are now urban centres of metropolitanization, while the British majority marginalized by the processes of corporate globalization in the other urban areas of Britain ‘revolt against elites’.

In Chapter 1 we introduced the nation-state as the socially constructed scale of ideology, the arena of national politics that ameliorated the impact of the processes of the capitalist world-economy for citizens in places. Places are now all, to some degree, urban. The degree to which urban areas or metropolitan or not is the main factor in the nature of an individual’s everyday experience. The consequent politics is urban based with dramatic implications for what is still largely seen as national politics. One clear indication of this is that both major parties in Britain, the Conservatives and Labour, contested the 2017 election with an eye to the national majority of the previous Brexit referendum though both parties

### Table 6.4 Class and dynamics in electoral politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>Capital (national/liberal)</th>
<th>Labour (socialist/ democratic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-market politics: ‘one nation’</td>
<td>Pro-welfare politics: ‘cradle to grave’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continual politics: generic interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.5 Voting in British cities in the EU referendum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Remain%</th>
<th>Region Remain%</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton Keynes</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preston</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrington</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>–0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ipswich</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>–1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>–2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swindon</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>–2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dundee</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>–2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>–2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournemouth</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>–3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>–3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolverhampton</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>–3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterborough</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>–4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>–6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>–7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>–7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>–9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigan</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>–10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>–10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Cities in the South East region are italicized.
2. Core cities are emboldened.
contain Europhobe and Europhile MPs and members. These intra-party tensions regarding Britain’s relationship with Europe continued after the 2017 election; causing some Labour MPs to resign from the shadow cabinet over the leadership’s commitment to withdraw from the EU, for example.

As introduced previously, in his much broader analysis Collier (2009) looks at democracy in the countries that are home to the world’s poorest billion people. He finds that attempts to establish democracy in countries where per capita income is about $2,700 (or $7 per person per day) actually increases levels of political violence. On the other hand, once this threshold has crossed (as China has now done with its per capita annual income up to $3,000) countries become safer or less violent. What are we to make of such events? There is no need to produce a fuller catalogue of electoral violence to make the point that elections beyond the core are qualitatively different political processes from elections in liberal democracies.

This conclusion is hardly surprising given the different historical backgrounds and material circumstances that exist between the liberal democracies and the remainder of the world. Perhaps what is surprising is how often elections are held in such unpromising situations. Even the communist states felt the need to legitimate their government with periodic elections, albeit with choice limited to one party. Nevertheless, this does show the power that the electoral process possesses. Here we concentrate on only genuinely competitive elections beyond the core. In these third world countries, there have been two very different routes to competitive elections. In most countries, elections were a transplanted political process written into constitutions at the time of independence after 1945. Throughout Africa and Asia, these constitutions failed to protect this politics, and military coups soon replaced elections as the most common means of changing government. Where elections did survive they are often traumatic and dangerous events, as we have seen.

In Latin America, however, with its much longer period of independence, the history of elections is very different. For instance, as Wesson (1982: 15) has pointed out:

In 1929 every major Latin American government was civilian with some reason to claim that it was
democratic; it seemed a reasonable assumption that this was the way of ever-improving civilization.

But now we know that this was not to be. Most Latin American countries have experienced military coups that abruptly stopped this trend towards democracy. The most striking feature, therefore, is that despite their contrasting histories both sections of the ‘third world’ have generated a similar outcome of fragile democracy and generals commonly becoming politicians. This provides strong evidence for materialist explanations of the relative failure of democracy, since mass poverty is the one feature shared by all countries in the ‘third world’. What happened in Latin America after 1929 and in other non-core countries soon after their independence was that they were unable to provide the resources to sustain a viable politics of redistribution. Hence liberal democratic political processes failed because it was not possible to link them with a social democracy to produce a viable liberal–social democratic state. Without the consensus of the latter, the state reverts to a coercive mode of control.

How do parties operate in these circumstances? The first point to make is that party competition in elections is just one of several routes to power. Election campaigns and military campaigns can sometimes merge into a single process. Second, party victory in an election provides access to a state apparatus, which gives two important capabilities: opponents can be persecuted and prosecuted through the legitimate agencies of the state; and elite allies can be given access to the spoils of office. This has tended to produce a clientistic type of politics, with parties controlled by ‘strongmen’ in the battles for the spoils. Such parties consist of narrow groupings of people who support the ‘boss’ in return for favours. In some countries, the power of these extreme cadre parties has been undermined by new mass parties of a populist variety (Canovan 1981; Mouzelis 1986). Populist parties have been successful in a few countries in bringing the rural and urban masses into a state’s political system. But this mobilization could not overcome the impossibility of a large-scale politics of redistribution. It is often the ignominious failure of populist policies, such as Peronism in Argentina, that have led to military intervention and coercion of the popular forces. In short, the rural and urban masses are removed from politics once again. In recent years, and especially since the end of the Cold War, multi-party democracy has spread widely in non-core zones of the world-economy. In this section we explain why we think that these political changes represent new ‘liberal democratic interludes’ rather than sustained liberal democracy. We then conclude our discussion of elections with a further consideration of the paradox of increasing democratization under conditions of increased inequalities within globalization.

The politics of failure

We have described the processes outlined above as the politics of failure. Given the world-system location of these countries, they are unable to develop the luxury of a congruent politics. In this situation, all governments in the eyes of most of their population turn out to be failures. This produces the instability of government for which the ‘third world’ countries are notorious. The extreme case of the politics of failure is Bolivia, which has now experienced more than two hundred governments in its less than two hundred years of independence. More generally, where elections continue to be used to produce governments, the politics of failure is reflected in a continuous turnaround in party fortunes.

Democratic musical chairs

Suppose that in the material circumstances beyond the core there is a country that is able to sustain competitive elections over a decade or more. What sort of political system would we expect? Whatever the particular reasons that enable elections to continue, we would predict that given that the material situation produces government ‘failure’, then every party government would have severe difficulties in being re-elected. In short, this is an electoral situation made for opposition parties. Our expectations are, therefore, that one party would rule for one term of office, to be immediately replaced by the opposition party, and so on. This process is the opposite of what we see in the United States and
Britain today; beyond the core, it is the incumbents who have the disadvantage and who are voted out of office.

We can observe this process operating in Latin American states in the post-1945 era. Dix (1984) has investigated what he terms ‘electoral turnover’ in nine states, and his figures have been updated by Werz (1987). The one country with a continuous record of competitive elections is Costa Rica. In ten elections between 1948 and 1986, the government has been swept from office on eight occasions. Chile, Venezuela and Ecuador have each had five elections, for just one returned government in each case. Dix and Werz find only eleven successful government re-elections out of a total of 43 elections.

The best example of this democratic musical chairs comes from outside Latin America, however. Sri Lanka has been governed by elected politicians since independence in 1948. Initially a two-party politics evolved in Sri Lanka, which was remarkable for its extreme changes in party fortune (Figure 6.12). The seven parliamentary elections since 1952 resulted in six changes of government. Subsequently, parliament agreed a new constitution with a presidential electoral system, but the country drifted into civil war.

The geographies of a politics of failure: the case of Ghana

What is the electoral geography of this political instability? This question has been answered in some detail in a case study of Ghana (Osei-Kwame and Taylor 1984). We used a finding from this research in Table 6.2 to show how Ghana as a peripheral country had a low level of geographical stability in its voting patterns. This was based on the analysis of eight elections between 1954 and 1979, which pitted one group of politicians who supported the first president, Kwame Nkrumah, against his opponents centred on his great rival, Busia. The party names changed over time, but these two political groupings can be easily identified. The pro-Nkrumah group are the centralists, who favour a ‘modernizing’ strategy of using cocoa-based export earnings from the central Akan region to develop modern industry. Their early emphasis on planning and protectionism meant that they were sometimes identified as the ‘socialists’ in the party system. The opposition were originally federalists who did not favour exploiting agricultural areas for the benefit of the coastal ports and towns. They have been the free traders, the ‘liberals’ in the party system. The analysis of voting returns concentrated on the pattern of votes for the centralists.

Whereas in the core countries of Table 6.2 there has been one major pattern of votes since the Second World War, for the peripheral countries low geographical stability means several patterns of votes. In the case of Ghana, the eight elections reveal four distinct patterns. In Figure 6.13, the changing geographical bases of support for the centralists are shown. Starting with a pre-independence pattern along the coast and in the south, by 1960 the centralists had spread their support inland around the Akan region, but not as far as either the northern or eastern boundary. They do reach these boundaries in subsequent elections, but at the expense of their original support bases. In 1969, the centralists have an extreme south-eastern bias to their voting map; a decade later, this disappears to be replaced by an extreme northern and south-western bias. Clearly, there is little of Rokkan’s (1970) ‘renewing of clienteles’ here. What is the politics behind this geographical fluidity?

The politics of support in Ghana has been dominated by ethnicity. Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party led the drive to independence but never produced a national movement across the country. Its original support was among the ‘modernizing’ elites of the coastal area and Nkrumah’s home region.
in the south-west. Elsewhere, the party was overwhelmingly rejected. In most of the country, traditional power elites were successful as either independents or candidates for small regional/ethnic parties. After independence in 1957, Nkrumah’s party was able to extend its support further inland but was still firmly resisted in the Akan region (Busia’s home area) and the north and east. When Nkrumah was toppled by a coup in 1966, therefore, he had not managed to become a national leader transcending ethnic rivalries.

With the departure of Nkrumah, the subsequent pattern of centralist support is wholly ethnic in nature. In 1969, the only time the centralists lost an election, they were pushed back to a south-east core, which was the region of origin of their new leader. His demise produced other new leaders in 1978–79 whose northern and south-western origins became yet further new support bases. From 1981 to 1993 Ghana was ruled by Jerry Rawlings, an air force officer who seized power through a coup. He founded the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and initiated elections that he won in 1992 and 1996.

Rawlings’s liberalization in Ghana was just one example of African democratization. In the 1990s there was an increase in the number of elections in African countries, part of the wave of democratization we discussed earlier. However, across the continent there were as many disputed elections as there were unambiguous decisions (Nugent 2007: 253). In Ghana, and with a declaration of a Fourth Republic in 2002, the established political parties have continued to compete in what, despite some violations, is seen as an electoral system that works quite well. Indeed, Nugent (2007) points to the high electoral turnout as an indication of a general sense of confidence in the system. Nugent’s (2007) analysis of recent Ghanaian elections claims that the general issues of what we have identified as the politics of failure still exist in the country, and other African states. African elections are often ‘an extension of the market-place’ (Nugent 2007: 255) in which politics is a matter of access to state resources and the electorate ‘typically trades votes in return for more or less concrete pledges of expenditure’ (Nugent 2007: 255). However, the structural limitations that define the politics of failure remain: ‘Because the financial tank is always running on empty . . . the victors are almost bound to disappoint their constituents’.

In Ghana four political parties dominate the contemporary political scene: the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the People’s National Convention (PNC). Both the CPP and PNC claim to be current manifestation of Nkrumah’s political legacy (Nugent 2007: 259). The NPP also claims to be tied to the post-colonial history of the country, and the traditional support for Busia, while the NDC emerged in the 1980s (Nugent 2007: 259). Interestingly, Nugent points out that there are no meaningful ideological differences between the parties, but that there is pattern of regional support for the parties and regions that are competitive (Nugent 2007: 261). In other words, there are regions where the disappointment in the efforts of one party

![Figure 6.13](image.png)

**Figure 6.13** The changing geography of voting in Ghana.
can be exploited by another. Table 6.2 reflects this fluid pattern and can be seen as the contemporary manifestation of the maps from Osei-Kwame and Taylor’s (1984) analysis. Comparing seats gained by the NDC and NPP in the elections of 1996 and 2000, the Northern and Volta regions show stability, but Brong-Ahafo and Greater Accra exemplify the flip-flop pattern that is expected in the politics of failure.

We can therefore conclude that Ghana presents a classic case of a disconnected politics. Ethnic geographies of support exist alongside a politics of power that is concerned with alternative ways of managing an economy dependent on cocoa export revenues. Only the cocoa-growing Akan region is consistent in resisting the centralists. Otherwise, different regions will support centralist policies, depending on the ethnic origin of the party leader. Hence the Ghanaian political process consists of a cultural geography base that is transformed into different political geographies that provide a capability to produce alternative economic geographies.

The historical case study of Ghana illustrates the tensions and contradictions facing electoral democracy in a peripheral state. However, the processes of establishing a liberal–social democratic state in the core, discussed earlier, suggest that the changing position of a state in the world-economy offers the opportunity for entrenching stable democratic politics. Such a process should be most evident in the semi-periphery, and we conclude our discussion of the geography of elections through a brief analysis of elections in Taiwan.

The politics of power and support in the semi-periphery: the case of Taiwan

The politics of modern Taiwan was initiated by the victory of the Chinese communists and the movement of the defeated Nationalists to the island of Taiwan. The process was violent as more than 10,000 indigenous Taiwanese were massacred in 1947 as the Nationalists seized political control. The emergent Kuomintang (KMT) party created a one-party system that remained in place until the party split, elections were held in the 1990s, and the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a narrow electoral victory in 2000 and re-election in 2004 (see Figure 6.14). The KMT had established power by marginalizing the indigenous ethnic Hoklo society and building an export-oriented economy (Hsu 2009). The DPP gained power by mobilizing the support of the Hoklo and reinforcing the political relationship by providing economic support and development projects to local communities. The DPP did so by continuing a KMT policy of community empowerment or development that was a means to build localized pockets of political support (Hsu 2009). The DPP extended this policy to include the newly established Hakka-people and aboriginal-people affairs, constituencies that had been seen as closely tied to the KMT (see Figure 6.15). In the language we have used in this chapter, the DPP was using its control of public funds to build a politics of support that had a geographic expression based upon the spatial pattern of cultural groups.

On the other hand, the DPP needed to maintain the vitality of the Taiwanese economy, especially in the light of growing economic competition. In particular, the economic growth of China, its long-standing geopolitical competitor, had provided a pool of cheap labour for Taiwanese companies but also provided an alternative site for investment that had the potential to reduce the flow of capital to Taiwan (Hsu 2009). What this meant was that the DPP had to engage business interests to maintain support from sections of the Taiwanese elite. One such manifestation of this policy was the liberalization of the banking industry, especially the establishment of financial holding companies (FHCs) through tax breaks and new business opportunities (Hsu 2009). As part of a series of mergers and acquisitions FHCs established new bank branches in urban areas. In the language we have used in this chapter, the DPP built a politics of power, through the engagement of elites, that had its own geographical expression, the spatial location of bank branches.

The twin challenges faced by the DPP after assuming power, through the ballot box, after years of one-party KMT rule was to maintain the support of the business elite and build and maintain a constituency of electoral support. The consolidation of the DPP’s power required the construction of two different political geographies: a geography of the
Figure 6.14 The geography of the 2004 presidential vote in Taiwan.
Source: Hsu (2009).
politics of support that was based in Taiwan’s cultural geography and a geography of the politics of power that was based on the country’s economic geography of banking custom. The economic growth that Taiwan has achieved allowed it to provide for a constituency of electoral support while at the same time catering to the elites concerned with Taiwan’s position in the world-economy. In other words, states that have the ability to better their position in the core-periphery hierarchy are able to accommodate a politics of democracy that creates electoral constituencies.

**Summary**

We began this chapter by identifying how democratization is a powerful word in justifying contemporary geopolitics, but that participation in elections was a constrained form of politics. Perhaps
The spread of democracy to the Middle East was identified as a key component of the War on Terror. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, US scholars were involved in writing the constitution for post-Hussein Iraq (Feldman 2003). Much political, and military, effort was put into a referendum on the nature of the constitution and subsequent elections. The Arab Spring was seen as a wave of democratization that would emanate from the Arab people themselves and reinforce the desire of the US to create the Middle East as a region of democracies. The hopes of the Arab people who took to the streets of many countries across the region and of US strategists have been betrayed. Instead, dictators, one-party states, civil wars and ongoing insurgencies seem a permanent feature of the region. What of the project of democratizing the Middle East?

The optimism after the geopolitics of military invasion in the name of regime change quickly waned. The political commentator Robert Kaplan, identified as a ‘leading neo-conservative’ by the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, soon had second thoughts about the geopolitical value of extending democracy to the Middle East. In an article in the Washington Post (2 March 2006), he voiced the desirability of a despotic state rather than a democratic one: ‘For the average person who just wants to walk the streets without being brutalized or blown up by criminal gangs, a despotic state that can protect him is more moral and far more useful than a democratic one that cannot’. Clearly, the ability to spread Western-style electoral democracy into Iraq soon floundered and an imperative of ‘stability’ under a non-democratic state took precedence. Interestingly, Kaplan sub-titled his article ‘Creating normality is the real Mideast challenge’, an acknowledgment that 1) the War on Iraq had been a massive disruption and 2) non-democratic politics should be expected in this region.

The questioning of the democratization project was not restricted to Iraq. Al-Ahram reported that then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak believed that conversations with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in March 2006 conveyed a sense that the US was satisfied with the process of democratization in Egypt. Al-Ahram seized on this statement to argue that growing US disgruntlement with the democratization in the Middle East had facilitated the Egyptian government’s repression and persecution of political dissidents, notably the arrest of members of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the Muslim Brotherhood government was ousted with the use of the Egyptian military, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, former head of Egypt’s armed forces, became a new ‘strong leader’. His government led a violent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Western leaders have overlooked his non-democratic ways in the name of ‘stability’.

From the outset the US military had a more pragmatic stance. Rather than seeing, or even wanting, the establishment of liberal democracy, an article published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College applauded the practice of liberalized autocracy in Iraq: ‘a system of rule that allows for a measure of political openness and competition in the electoral, party, and press arenas, while ultimately ensuring that power rests in the hands of ruling regimes’. This system was seen to be good as it gives opposition groups the chance to ‘let off steam’ against ruling elites, hardly a ringing endorsement of pluralistic and open politics. In fact, the report worried that fully fledged democracy could open the door to victory by Islamic fundamentalists opposed to the US presence in Iraq. Such sentiments continue and are applied beyond Iraq and across the Middle East. Though the War on Terror and continuing US foreign policy may be pregnant with the rhetoric of democratization, the perspectives from the ‘boots on the ground’ and the citizens of the countries that are the war’s frontlines are much more problematic.


this is why powerful states are most interested in spreading democracy: it legitimates the institution of the state within the capitalist world-economy without challenging it. The constraint of electoral politics is also manifest in the inability of liberal democracy to flourish outside of a limited historical-geographical context. These twin constraints have, unsurprisingly, given rise to other forms of politics, ones that seek to break out of the constraints of the state and its role as the scale of ideology. It is to the politics of social movements that we now turn to expand our discussion of the geography of democracy to politics other than voting.

Summary

In this section we have discussed electoral politics outside of the core of the world-economy by:

- introducing the concept the politics of failure;
- describing the geography of the politics of failure;
- identifying the processes of democratization in a semi-peripheral state.

Social movements

Social movements are organized groups of individuals and, perhaps, smaller groups, which organize and act to achieve particular social goals. Rethinking forms of power, and refocusing attention away from the state, has led to increased attention of social movements as a form of politics that either eschews or complements electoral behaviour, if it is available, or is the only option available if voting rights are denied. Moreover, while voting rights are defined and geographically delineated by the political geography of states, social movements are more able to enact politics that transcend state boundaries.

Michael Brown starts his call for a geographic approach to social movements by quoting Magnusson’s claim that ‘Politics today is everywhere and nowhere’ (Magnusson 1992: 69). While applauding the awareness that politics is beyond the state (and hence perhaps ungrounded or ‘nowhere’), Brown challenges the notion that the politics is placeless, or nowhere. Indeed, political geographers have been drawn to studying social movements recently but have also pressed for a consideration of geography that can be separated into two related themes: how the specific characteristics of places mediate the politics of social movements and how social movements in different places develop transnational connections.

Social movements and the geography of power

Increased attention upon social movements has developed through a reconsideration of power, especially the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s writings are voluminous and complex and evolved over time, and require a lengthy engagement that we do not have room for here. In summary: the essence of his contribution is to think of power not as something that is possessed purely by the state, but a set of relations and dominant (or hegemonic) beliefs and practices that occur in each and every social setting. The actions of individuals are defined by these dominant practices such that we experience power without even knowing it by acting in a ‘normal’ or society-sanctioned manner that is composed of actual rules and assumed norms. For example, marriage is both a set of rules (a formal state-sanctioned status made tangible through a marriage certificate) and a set of understandings of who should get married and how married couple should behave. The politics of gay marriage and civil unions in the United States is not just a matter of the state changing, or not, its rules as to who can be formally married, but it is also a challenge to the heteronormative norms of society.

From Foucault’s notion of the multifaceted forms of power came the recognition that simply looking at state institutions illuminated just one agent of power, and focused on the formal or institutional manifestations of power. In terms of political representation, the focus on elections prioritized the relevance of the state rather than other forms of politics. One way to approach Foucault’s contribution is to see politics as ‘entanglements’ of power (Sharp...
et al. 2000). For reasons of explanation we can think of two forms of power. Dominating power ‘attempts to control or coerce others, impose its will upon others, or manipulate the consent of others’ (Sharp et al. 2000: 2). On the other hand, resisting power ‘attempts to set up situations, groupings, and actions which resist the impositions of dominating power’ (Sharp et al. 2000: 3). Dominating power can be associated with all sorts of political entities, not just the state, such as businesses and cultural groups that create and maintain inequality along the lines of race, class, gender, caste, age etc. Resisting power can involve small, apparently trivial acts, such as smoking in a non-smoking area, or more developed politics of protest and the pursuit of political goals that will transform the current system (Sharp et al. 2000: 3). The Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, which burst in to life after a series of high-profile shootings of African-Americans by police officers in a number of cities, is an example of how institutionalized racism gives rise to particular expressions of dominating power. Evidence can be found in the disproportionate rates of arrest, incarceration, and victimhood of police violence for young African-American males. The result is a form of resisting power that has led to demonstrations, a few riots and (most importantly) a political voice that attempts to make a wider US public aware of the dire inequities of a racially divided society.

But why is the interaction between dominating and resisting power called an ‘entanglement’? One reason is that movements or groups ostensibly resisting power are likely to display their own forms of dominating power. For example, the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus in southern Mexico struggled against the Mexican state but simultaneously excluded women, committed acts of violence against them and prevented internal

## State of emergency and the crushing of Turkish civil society

Turkey is a member of the NATO military alliance, has fostered ambitions of joining the European Union and in recent years experienced urbanization and a growing economy. It seemed like a candidate for entrenching democracy and nurturing a civil society that gave voice to differing opinions and could serve as a platform for a variety of social movements. Instead, the ballot box and the military have been used in combination to suppress the voices of journalists and groups hostile to the presidency of Recep Erdoğan.

Erdoğan was elected to the position of prime minister in 2003, and after eleven years in that role was elected to president. An attempted coup in 2016 gave President Erdoğan the opportunity to impose a state of emergency that he renewed, seemingly with no end date, in May 2017. This decision came after an April 2017 referendum he initiated and won giving the presidency powers over the courts and giving license to quash political opposition. Since the coup and the emergency decrees it is estimated that more than 40,000 people have been jailed, more than 140,000 people have been suspended or fired from their jobs (including many academics), 1,500 civil society groups have been shut down and more than 150 media outlets closed.

The case of Turkey shows the connection between social movements, institutions and the electoral process. Preventing opposition groups from organizing and disseminating their opinions is a contrary politics of democracy. It suggests that no clear binary can be drawn between electoral politics and demonstration and protest, even if it is violent, or even a coup. The state of emergency has become part of trans-Atlantic politics (putting a halt to the already stalled process of EU membership and making NATO cooperation problematic. Hence, the case of Turkey shows how events in a particular place (such as the closure of the offices of a civil organization) may have causes and implications across the globe.

democratic practices (Rubin 1998, cited in Sharp et al. 2000). The second reason is that power is ‘relational’: it is a matter of interaction between different actors or groups, each with their own mixture of dominating and resisting power relations. Politics is the multiple interactions, or entanglements of power relations – some institutionalized and some not.

By making power ‘everywhere’ some critics became concerned that the power for transformative politics had been reduced. If power was equated through the state then power could be transformed by electing a new administration or enacting a coup. But if power is nebulous, hard to touch or see, and so complex, what is the hope for political change? One way forward is to see that though power is relational the relations come together in everyday life that is practiced in places, or the scale of experience. Hence, to see the transformative power of social movements we need to see their operation in particular places (Brown 2008; Miller 2000).

**Social movements and places**

We have discussed places as ‘political opportunity structures’ (Staeheli 1999) in the section on citizenship, and how groups are included or excluded. Inclusion is likely to generate close attachment with a place, foster connections with individuals and groups within the place, and build a sense of attachment to the place. Places are not just a matter of identity though; they are also the sites of institutions of the local state (see Chapter 8) that can also facilitate the political activity of some groups while marginalizing others. Positive attachments to places and access to the local state promotes the ability for political mobilization and in turn, these movements can change the collective identity and political institutions of the place. Miller (2000) used this framework to understand the activity of peace movements in the Boston area in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. We can summarize his analysis by looking at the comparison between two nearby towns: Cambridge and Waltham.

One important aspect of the place was the relative openness of the local state. Cambridge elected council persons through proportional representation, which allowed for the election of minorities and those with minority views. In addition, binding referenda could be initiated if a petition gained signatures from eight per cent of registered voters, and non-binding referenda with ten per cent (Miller 2000: 152). In contrast, Waltham was much less open and usually had a conservative local council. Cambridge had a much more diverse social population while Waltham was largely a working-class city. In Cambridge, the usual situation was for some sort of coalition government, and a sense amongst the population that the local state was accessible and responsive to citizens. One more factor was that Cambridge was home to Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), providing a pool of educated locals and what Miller terms ‘institutional allies’.

The openness of the local state coupled with social and institutional resources, and a history of anti-war protest in Cambridge, created a distinctive geography of peace activism in the Boston area that reflected the abilities and characteristics of the two towns. In summary, the local intensity and expression of social movements (even ones that could be located in the same broad category of peace activism) is a function of place-specific characteristics. However, Miller (along with other scholars) is quick to note that it is a mistake to see social movements bounded or restricted within a particular place. An important part of social movement activity is the construction of links with other movements in other places. To understand such activity we must see how social movements construct a political geography of scale.

**Social movements and scale**

Miller’s focus on the ways places act as opportunity structures to facilitate the mobilization of social movements in particular places should not mean that we see social movements as somehow restricted to places. Instead, social movements are constantly negotiating the politics of scale we introduced in Chapter 1. As we saw when discussing the political geography of scale, weaker parties usually see a benefit in increasing the geographical scope of a conflict.
Hence, we would expect, as a rule of thumb, that social movements with transformative, or resisting power, goals would seek to mobilize other groups or reach an audience beyond the place or location of their organization.

The place-specific politics of organization that Miller demonstrated has been defined as the politics of the scale of dependence by Kevin Cox. For Cox (1997), places exist through necessary interactions between different groups and interests that all have a use for the construction of the specific place in a specific way. For example, Cox talks about the interaction of economic interests (real estate agents) and the state (public utility companies) in wanting to facilitate ‘boosterism,’ or local growth politics. They have a mutual interest in making money and maintaining their position and influence within a place. Hence, Cox calls places ‘scales of dependence’ as they are the geographies of the ‘coming together’ of political actors. In other words, the organizational capacity of social movements is grounded in particular places.

However, the politics of scale suggests that social movements may well be ineffective if they remain within the scale of dependence or political opportunity structures that are primarily localized. Cox identifies spaces of engagement that are the extra-local geographic expressions of outreach and mobilization that social movements may engage in to achieve their goals. For example, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States was effective in fighting racial discrimination and injustice experienced in particular places by forming a national political movement, through marches that went from place to place, and ultimately demonstrations in the nation’s capital. Racial discrimination was made a national issue that weakened the political situation of racist actors dominant in local settings.

Transnational social movements

If the particularities of place give a local flavour to social movements and they also seek to achieve their goals by seeking linkages beyond a single place then we should expect to see the development of heterogeneous and global social movements. Indeed, through the late 1990s and continuing to today transnational movements have developed that can be seen to have a general or overarching target of neoliberalism or globalization, with specific institutional foci of protest being the World Trade Organization, meetings of the biggest states (i.e. the G8), as well as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The political content of these movements is seen as:

- bringing together formerly disparate and often conflicting groups, such as trade unionists, environmentalists, indigenous peoples’ movements and non-government organizations. Underpinning such developments is a conceptualization of protest and struggle that respects difference, rather than attempting to develop universalistic and centralizing solutions that deny the diversity of interests and identities that are confronted with neoliberal globalization processes (Routledge 2008: 338).

The challenge for social movements is to make connections across space that do not lose sight of the role of particular places in mobilizing social movements and can also take in to consideration the potential for competing interests between place-based social movements. Routledge (2008) identifies four particular problems:

- Creating a common cause from multiple place-based concerns
- Managing or organizing heterogeneous transnational movements
- Undertaking multiscalar political activity
- The intra-network social relations.

In combination these issues are resolved, to varying degrees, by a conversation across space that translates into a breakout from spaces of dependence and the construction of spaces of engagement that are not only broad in geographic scope but diverse in political content. Scholars have argued that the flux of these movements, their ability to mobilize different groups on a dynamic set of political questions, and the interplay between different groups within the movement are an illustration of Foucault’s thoughts about relational power. In sum, it shows that a broad
target of protest (such as globalization or neoliberalism) can mobilize people into effective action. In other words, it can be possible to escape the particularism of spaces of dependence to create progressive spaces of engagement (Cox 1997).

**Political geography of social movements**

The joint role of places and transnational networks in contemporary social movements illustrates a number of themes in our political geography framework. Miller’s discussion of place-based social movements is an example of the role of the scale of experience in facilitating and constraining political activity. The nature of places can mobilize particular protest groups and, in turn, that mobilization can alter the places in question. However, as Miller and other scholars recognize, the politics of social movements requires ‘breaking out’ of places and engaging allies and political targets at other scales and in other places.

The political geography of social movements is a politics of scale construction that requires engagement, to use Cox’s (1997) term, to build coalitions and effect change at the nation-state and global scales.

---

**Case study**

Paul Routledge’s field work on social movements in India acts as case study of how the four problems facing transnational social movements are addressed, though never fully resolved. Since 1985 the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save Narmada Movement), or NBA, has been organizing against the building of up to 30 mega-dams, 135 medium-sized dams and a staggering 3,000 minor dams as part of the Narmada river valley project. The river is sacred to Hindu and tribal populations in the thousands of communities in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat that are connected through reliance on the river’s resources. The building of the dams became steadily internationalized over time as the project, initially financed by India, gained funds from international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the 1990s the construction project was conveyed to a private company, and received funding from the German state, German banks and utility companies and the US-based Ogden Energy Group.

The NBA, in its resistance to mega-dams and its advocacy of socially just and environmentally sustainable development, has brought together peasants, cash-croppers and rich farmers in the river system. It has also engaged in a politics of scale through creating e-mail listservs and a website (www.narmada.org) that engage activists across India and in other states. The organization is manifest in numerous meetings to bring the diverse groups that make up the NBA together, as well as infrequent meetings in international cities (such as Prague, London, Washington, Bonn and Seattle) to forge relations with other groups as part of a transnational network. As Routledge emphasizes, the NBA relies on communication as diverse as carrying written messages down rivers to organizing sustained e-mail campaigns.

The multi-scale politics of the NBA connects separate village meetings through the river network, to the national scale (with writs to the Supreme Court of India), and internationally through engagement with numerous organization, including Friends of the Earth and the Environmental Defence Fund. Though the NBA has been effective in addressing the specific issue facing the communities of the Narmada it has done so by making this particular concern a component of broader struggles for environmental sustainability and social justice. However, the last issue facing transnational social movements has been evident within the NBA. Charismatic leaders have sometimes overshadowed the roles of village-leaders, and patriarchal relations and caste-politics have limited the voices and participation of some. Overall, though, the NBA is a fine example of a transnational movement that has constructed a progressive multiscale politics.
Such politics of scale is seen to be a progressive politics that requires cooperation and mutual appreciation between different groups with different agendas and based in different places. Though power struggles and differences surely play out in transnational social movements it should also be recognized that they are significant venues of the recomposition of radical politics. In other words, the process of not just making alliances but adopting the causes of other groups (De Angelis 2000: 14, quoted in Routledge 2008: 338).

Our world-systems perspective on political geography can add some important considerations to the new wave of research on the geography of transnational social movements. The implication of the political geographic scale framework is that the state – as the scale of ideology – has played a crucial role in history in preventing scales of engagement that target global process of capitalism. The classic example is the Workers International Movements around the beginning of the twentieth century that aimed to unite the workers of the world but was ultimately unable to break out of the constraints of state-based politics. Transnational social movements, and the role they play in the recomposition of political horizons (De Angelis 2000), have the potential for progressive politics to operate at the scale of reality, the capitalist world-economy. By recognizing that the processes of capital work at a scale beyond the state transnational movements do not operate under the state-society assumption that has trapped previous political movements. Moreover, the heterogeneity of transnational social movements means that the places are used effectively as bases of organizing but the end result is an engagement with the scale at which processes actually operate. Perhaps the optimism that progressives place upon transnational social movements is unrealistic and contemporary movements will become entrapped within the scale of ideology. On the other hand, perhaps processes of globalization have not just exposed the many injustices that are a necessary part of the capitalist world-economy but also the geographic scope of the processes and the falsity of thinking of the world as a collection of multiple state-based societies rather than a single historical social system.

**Summary**

In this section we have discussed the political geography of social movements by:

- identifying geographies of power within the politics of social movements;
- describing the relationship between place and social movements;
- discussing the creation of trans-national political geographies and the role of scale;
- situating the political geography of social movements within the scales of experience, ideology and reality.

**Chapter summary**

In this chapter we have used the world-systems approach to explore the geography of democracy, especially the persistent spatial pattern of democratic elections being restricted to the core of the world-economy and the transnational potential of social movements. The key points we have addressed are:

- describing the diffusion of electoral democracy, or democratization;
- arguing that democratization will be limited spatially and temporally;
- introducing the conceptualization of liberal social democracy;
- using a world-systems approach in conjunction with the concept of liberal social democracy to explain the general pattern of elections being limited to the core of the world-economy;
- focusing upon political parties to explain electoral democracy in the core;
- noting the operation of two politics in the core: the politics of power and the politics of support;
• introducing the concept ‘the politics of failure’ to explain the instability of electoral support in elections held in the periphery;
• showing the operation of power in the politics of social movements;
• focusing upon the role of places in generating social movements;
• identifying the transformative power of social movements through transnationalism.

In sum, our focus on the geography of democracy has exposed the assumptions of mainstream understandings of electoral democracy and democratization. Instead, we have situated electoral politics within the structural power relations of the capitalist world-economy. With this approach we have noted and explained the core-periphery pattern of democratic and non-democratic politics. Looking within the core, we have emphasized the separate but related processes of the politics of power and those of support, while within the periphery we have highlighted the politics of failure. We argue that as long as the core-periphery structure of the world-economy remains, then democratization will be stilted. The identification of the constraints of electoral politics has provoked recent analysis on the political geography of social movements. Especially attention has been paid to the transformative potential of social movements and the scalar politics that connects places and may transcend the scale of ideology, the state.

---

Key glossary terms from Chapter 6

- absolutism
- administration
- anarchy of production
- authoritarian
- bloc
- boundary
- capitalism
- capitalist world-economy
- centre/centrist
- Christian democracy
- citizenship
- civil liberties
- classes
- Cold War
- communism
- congruent politics
- conservative
- constitution
- contradictory politics
- core
- corporate globalization
- decolonization
- democracy
- disconnected politics
- elite
- executive
- faction
- federation
- First World War
- franchise
- free trade
- geopolitical world order
- geopolitics
- gerrymander
- globalization
- government
- hegemony
- ideology
- instrumental theory of the state
- Islam
- isolation
- Kondratieff cycles
- (waves)
- left-wing
- legislature
- liberal
- liberal democracy
- liberal democratic interlude
- local government
- malapportionment
- multi-party system
- nationalism
- nation-state
- neighbourhood effect
- neo-conservative opposition
- peoples
- periphery
- place
- pluralism
- pluralist theories of the state
- political parties
- politics of failure
- politics of power
- politics of support
- power
- proportional representation
- Protectionism
- right-wing
- Second World War
- sectionalism
- semi-periphery
- social democracy
- social movement
- social imperialism
- socialism
- space
- state
- suffrage
- third world
- transnational
- world-economy
- world-systems analysis
Suggested reading


Activities

1. At what scale does the act of voting take place? Consider the manner in which institutions at different geographical scales enable a person to vote. In turn, consider a recent election that you either participated in or are aware of. Were particular issues identified with particular scales? In what way was the designation of issues to particular scales a denial of the connections between scales?

2. Identify a political party of your choice and browse its website. In what way does the party’s manifesto address the three properties of liberal social democracy we identified?

3. Select two countries, one from the core and one from outside the core. Use a search engine to find election stories by typing in the country name with the word ‘election’ (for example German election and then Philippine election). List similarities and differences between the two elections. Do your findings fit our model of different ‘liberal democracies’ across the world?

4. Go to the website of Greenpeace, a transnational environmental organization. In what ways does it integrate politics within particular places with the goal of a transnational politics? In what ways is the scale of the state targeted? Is greater emphasis placed upon the scale of the world-economy than the scale of the state?
CHAPTER 7
Cities as localities

What this chapter covers

Cities making hegemonies
- Holland’s cities and Dutch hegemony
- Northern British cities and British hegemony
- Manufacturing belt (plus California and Texas) cities and American hegemony

Modern territorial states tame cities
- Genoa-Castile before Westphalia
- Venice/Italy after Westphalia
- Salonica/Greece after Westphalia

Using cities to make political globalizations
- Inter-stateness: cities reaffirming Westphalia

Supra-nationalism: cities in global governance
- Transnationalism: cities beyond political boundaries

Citizens and global terrorism
- Urbicide: material and rhetorical destruction of localities
- Targeting the ‘terrorist nest’
- Representing homeland localities

Challenges of the twenty-first century
Localities are places where we experience the effects of the world-economy and nation-state processes described in previous chapters. Obviously growing up in an American suburb in the 1950s is very different from growing up in a Latin American *favela* in the 1980s or a Chinese new city neighbourhood today. This idea of a scale of experience was described in Chapter 1 and we develop what this means further in the final two chapters. Experiencing social change sounds rather static, passive rather than proactive. But this need not be the case. Experience is the starting point of how we become agents and attempt to influence the world we live in and have inherited. Localities are places of action where people begin to try and develop and change their world. Neither world-economy nor nation-states consist of inert localities constituting the larger wholes. Rather activities in localities interact with higher scales of ideology and structure. That localities are more than just local was the key lesson of the 1980s ‘Localities project’ (Cooke 1989), and more recently Swyngedouw (1997) coined the phrase ‘Glocalization’ to affirm the essential unity of local and global processes. The critical influences of localities in an unfolding modern world-system can be best seen through study of the proactive effects of cities.

Localities come in many different forms. Localities are places where there is a sense of sharing a common fate in the economic ups and downs that is the world-economy. They are concretely manifest as settlements with identifiable functions. Rural localities will include villages or stretches of individual farms or plantations. Towns are small urban settlements with relatively simple, and therefore often vulnerable, economies. Market towns service rural hinterlands and link them to wider worlds. Mining towns are linked to a particular mineral raw material resource. Resort towns are typically seasonal in employment because they rely on tourism. Company towns are based upon a single employer, sometimes developed through transplanting ‘old’ industry. In all cases the lack of economic diversity is a recognized problem.

---

**Florence versus Italy: who owns Michelangelo’s David?**

In 1501 Michelangelo won the commission from the Florentine government to carve a marble statue of David preparing for battle with Goliath. This biblical subject was originally intended for the city’s cathedral, but on completion in 1504 it was erected in the public square outside Florence’s governmental palace. As one of the great masterpieces of the Italian Renaissance, it came to represent the resistance of ‘little Florence’ against bigger outside forces, in particular Rome. Today it is one of the most popular tourist attractions, not just in Florence, but in all of Italy.

In 2010, the Italian government in Rome caused an almighty political row by claiming ownership of the statue. Commissioned by Florence, always located in Florence, the very symbol Florentine self-identity, how could this wonderful statue not be the property of Florence’s city government? The dispute over the answer to this question reveals the power of territorial sovereignty in the modern world and the concomitant limitations of the political power of cities.

The argument by lawyers of the Italian government is quite straightforward. The statue was commissioned by a sovereign entity, the Republic of Florence, and it is the contemporary Italian state that is its legal sovereignty successor. The legal wrangling focuses on documents drawn up in 1870–71 at the establishment of a unified Italian kingdom. But the key point is that with the creation of the new state Florence was politically relegated to non-sovereign status; it is now merely a municipal component within the overarching modern state. Florence’s mayor might complain that the Italian government should having more pressing matters to deal with during an economic recession than steal his city’s property, but as the city’s chief citizen he is no longer leader of a Republic; he is just an Italian city mayor among many.

Cities as localities

Feminist geographies of everyday experience in localities

Cities as sites of experience means, in practice, an ongoing politics of the everyday. People must negotiate structures of power and dominant representations of groups that can either empower or marginalize them. This is especially the case for migrants and refugees, either from other states or from marginalized or politically sensitive regions within the state. The politics of ‘belonging’ or not, and the need to modify one’s behaviour to show acceptance of the norm or to dress, speak and act in certain ways to challenge the norms is a political decision. Furthermore, it is a dynamic politics being negotiated on a daily basis.

Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, serves as an example of how norms of behaviour are constructed and resisted in localities. The population of Istanbul is approximately 12 million people, about 60 per cent of whom were born outside the city (Secor 2004: 353). Many of these migrants come from the south-east of Turkey where, since the late 1980s, there has been an ongoing conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) fighting for a separate Kurdish state. Kurdish migrants in Istanbul must negotiate a set of norms and representations that are formed within a context of fear of Kurdish terrorism as well as a process of renegotiating understandings of Turkish citizenship. Following the First World War and the establishment of the modern and secular state of Turkey, a civic notion of Turkish citizenship was created that denied ethnic differences. Kurds were labelled ‘mountain Turks’. However, since the 1980s a Turkish identity recognizing ethnic and regional differences has begun to emerge (Secor 2004). Recently, the situation of Kurds in Turkey has been complicated by the dynamics of the Syrian Civil War, which has involved Kurdish militias. The Turkish government of President Erdogan is concerned about the empowerment of Kurdish groups and their long-standing goal of creating a Kurdish state, Kurdistan.

Secor’s (2004) study of Kurdish women in Istanbul provides insight into the manner in which Kurds living in Istanbul negotiate a dominant understanding of Turkish citizenship and their ethnic identity. The everyday practices of Kurds in Istanbul that Secor’s feminist analysis is able to identify illustrate that some Kurds act on a daily basis to resist ‘assimilation’ and to alter dominant attitudes and norms. In other words, the manner in which a locality socializes, or partially determines, behaviour is fluid and the product of political action.

One such site for renegotiating identity and belonging is schools. As Bahriye, a 21-year-old woman born in Istanbul, identified:

My younger brother was going to first grade in primary school and one time I looked at his notebook. He had written there, ‘The biggest military is our military’, ‘My fatherland is Turkey’ etc. I saw these things and I laughed because these are things you are indoctrinated with. Our little sister started to tease my brother, saying, ‘Oh are you a Turk? Look here what you have written!’ So he said to her, ‘At school I am a Turk, it is when I come home that I start saying I am a Kurd’.

(Quoted in Secor 2004: 361)

Bahriye’s brother articulates the fact that in Istanbul, as other localities, some spaces suggest certain norms of behaviour. This is further exemplified by Esel, a 36-year-old Kurdish woman who had lived in Istanbul for 19 years:

For us to talk about some things comes with a risk. Because of this, people live in two worlds. One is a world that not everyone can enter, a place where you truly belong with the origins of your identity. For example, it is a place where I can unite with other Kurds. But let’s say there is someone whose reaction I can’t predict. I won’t say anything to them on this topic.

(Quoted in Secor 2004: 360)

The politics of negotiating dominant power relations in a locality are not only individual, but a matter of creating groups and organizations. The women in Secor’s study were involved in the Kurdish political party HADEP, as well as being active in neighbourhood cultural centres and...
that defines the nature of the locality and residents experience of it. There is another very different urban locality: cities. As Jane Jacobs (1969) famously tells it, cities are essentially complex entities with diverse divisions of labour that are forever changing and growing. It is their dynamism that creates the economic development that grows national economies and the world-economy. Thus they are very special localities where agents have made and continue to make the modern world-system.

Cities are experienced along numerous dimensions but two are important for us. First, they are places of economic opportunity; in the capitalist world-economy they have been powerful magnets for migrants. So much so that we are the first generation of humans to live in a world where more people live in urban places than rural. Now more than ever, the fate of the modern world-system will be played out in great cities. Therefore, second, cities are places of political conflict; where global processes impinge of myriad local experiences generating potentially new politics that transcend nation-states. Global warming will raise sea-levels and threaten good agricultural land across the world but it is when it is understood as being capable of drowning great cities that political action will become imperative. Notwithstanding their great complexity, cities like London and New York will be experienced as vulnerable just as if they were small towns.

There is a paradox of power when we consider cities in the modern world-system. Their proactive nature reflects their power to mould economies and landscapes to their needs. Economic demand concentrated in cities has led the development of the capitalist world-economy. But there is a second side to the modern world-economy: the inter-state system. Whereas cities operate through a world of flows, as nodes in commercial networks; states are territorial, they have created a world of boundaries. And it is in the latter that formal political power resides, controlling and curtailing flows is the core practice of territoriality. Therefore in the Westphalian process of creating the inter-state system, cities were among the ‘losers’ in the one-scale territorial divisions of sovereignty as described in Chapter 4. One of the more fascinating possibilities of contemporary globalization is that it has begun to rebalance the state/city relation in favour of the latter. But before we discuss this possibility, in this chapter we treat the power paradox historically. The first part shows how cities created the three hegemonies and the second part gives examples of how states ‘tamed’ cities that came into their territories. These are seen as parallel processes that come to a head with contemporary globalization. Cities’ roles in generating these new global processes are assessed in the third part of the chapter. One specific feature of globalization that impinges on cities is global terrorism and this is the
subject matter of the fourth part of the chapter. We conclude with a discussion of how cities will be placed in the challenges facing us in the twenty-first century.

Cities making hegemonies

In Chapter 2 the three hegemonic cycles of the modern world-system were introduced as derived directly from Wallerstein’s (1984b) world-systems analysis. Each cycle was associated with a ‘hegemonic state’, the Dutch Republic, Great Britain and the USA in that order. At the apex of the cycle, ‘high hegemony’, each state had a ‘high tech, high wage’ economy that made them, each in turn, a sort of ‘core within the core’. Although overlap is not ruled out between cycles, they are usually described as a sequence with the Dutch cycle the longest and the American cycle the shortest (the twentieth century as ‘American Century’). However, if cities are the source of economic dynamism, as Jacobs (1969) so cogently argues, then the role of states is somewhat limited: they act as the protectors (in world wars) and the facilitators of hegemony (in providing adequate infrastructure) but not as the economic generators – this is the role of cities. Economic development is primarily the product of what Jacobs calls ‘explosive city growths’ when city economies are transformed through new economic processes.

These relatively short periods of rapid change can be identified using demographic change data. Searching out major cities that averaged at least 1 per cent growth per annum over 50-year periods, one study has identified 184 such urban growths in the modern world-system from 1500 to 2000 (Taylor et al. 2010a). For the data covering the last 50-year period, growth in airline flights (from 1970 to 2000) has been used because the link between demographic and economic growth in cities broke down in the second half of the twentieth century. From these surrogate measures of Jacobs’s economic spurts we can ask when and where did phenomenal economic growth through cities occur? The hypothesis is that they should be strongly related to the three hegemonic cycles.

Holland’s cities and Dutch hegemony

In Table 7.1 Dutch cities are highlighted among economic spurts for the period 1500 to 1700. This early modern period shows relatively few economic spurts and they are concentrated in the sixteenth century. The ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’ is clearly reflected in these results, which culminates with only two economic spurts in the second half of the seventeenth century.

Although only four Dutch cities are featured, they experienced eight examples of explosive city growth between them. Led by Amsterdam with three such spurts, this table confirms that the Dutch Republic was not simply ‘Amsterdam’s city-state’ as has been suggested but was a multi-nodal city-region of several vibrant cities (Taylor 2005). The most intriguing feature of the sequencing of these spurts is that they are evenly divided between the two centuries despite the fact that the Dutch Republic only comes into
being in the last 20 years of the fifteenth century and its hegemonic cycle is usually deemed to begin in 1598 at the earliest. Thus we find Amsterdam’s first explosive city growth well before the creation of the Dutch Republic, and there are three explosive city growths that build up Dutch hegemony (Amsterdam, Haarlem and Leiden) before hegemony begins. In the seventeenth century there is the reverse pattern, with three economic spurts during the period covering high hegemony (1609–48; Amsterdam, Leiden and Rotterdam) but with only the latter city continuing with a final Dutch city spurt in the downside of the cycle. During this period the Dutch went largely without a serious economic rival; France came the closest with four cities (Bordeaux, Paris, Lyon and Marseilles) and five spurts, but all are consistently smaller than the Dutch city growths.

There are three key points to make from these results:

1. High hegemony is represented by a higher proportion of economic spurts in the modern world-system (three out of eight or 37.5 per cent, discounting 1650–1700 when there were only two spurts). In other words, economic spurts correlate with high hegemony.

2. There is a definite front-loading of economic spurts to such a degree that 50 per cent occur before hegemony itself. In other words, half of all Dutch spurts come before hegemony, which is entirely consistent with cities creating the hegemony.

3. All the cities involved are from one of the seven provinces that constituted the Dutch Republic: Holland. In other words, the creation and reproduction of Dutch hegemony is not state-wide: only Holland was the ‘core of the core’ in the modern world-system in the period of Dutch hegemony.

Northern British cities and British hegemony (second)

In Table 7.2 British cities are highlighted among economic spurts for the period 1700 to 1900. The number of spurts remains low in the eighteenth century but there is a rapid expansion in the nineteenth century reflecting the spread of industrialization, which is, of course, British hegemony’s chief contribution to the modern world-system.

In this period seven British cities are featured, with 21 explosive city growths between them. The key feature is the dominance of the four great cities.
of northern Britain: Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester. These four cities dominate the eighteenth century, with eight out of the 13 economic spurts recorded in the modern world-system. These big four cities continue with explosive growth in both nineteenth-century periods, although gradually falling down the ranks. Their clustered position just below four US cities in 1800–1850 reflects the fact that the US cities were starting from a lower population base; that is to say, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow still dominated the world-economy. In both nineteenth-century lists they are joined by Newcastle and London. London was conspicuous by its absence among eighteenth-century city spurts and, although featuring in the nineteenth century, its economic spurts are lowly ranked. Newcastle is somewhat like Rotterdam in the Dutch cycle: it arrives late and has its largest spurt at the end of the hegemonic cycle. France is usually seen as Britain’s main rival during its hegemony but its economic competition was severely weak: in Table 7.2 only two French cities are featured, Paris and Lyon, both with lowly ranked spurts in the nineteenth century. Clearly the French were less of an economic rival to the British than they were to the Dutch in the previous cycle.

There are three key points to make from these results:

1. High hegemony (mid-nineteenth century) is represented by a higher quantity of economic spurts in the modern world-system (although proportions are lower given the large differences in totals between the two centuries). In other words, the most British economic spurts correlate with high hegemony.

2. There is a very strong front-loading of economic spurts to such a degree that the four leading northern cities account for well over half the economic spurts in the eighteenth century.

### Table 7.2 British cities in the British hegemonic cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1700–1750 (n = 7)</th>
<th>1750–1800 (n = 6)</th>
<th>1800–1850 (n = 25)</th>
<th>1850–1900 (n = 39)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIVERPOOL</td>
<td>MANCHESTER</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIRMINGHAM</td>
<td>LIVERPOOL</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadiz</td>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Leipzig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cork</td>
<td>BIRMINGHAM</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANCHESTER</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>LIVERPOOL</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>MANCHESTER</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRISTOL</td>
<td></td>
<td>BIRMINGHAM</td>
<td>NEWCASTLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GLASGOW</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>Boston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NEWCASTLE</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plus</td>
<td>Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LONDON (14)</td>
<td>BIRMINGHAM (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MANCHESTER (18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GLASGOW (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LONDON (28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIVERPOOL (36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from Taylor et al. (2010a)
(eight out of 13 or 61.5 per cent). In other words, multiple spurts come before hegemony, which is entirely consistent with cities creating the hegemony.

3 The four key cities in northern British cities are consistently found in all four periods and are in the top eight ranks for the first three periods. They are joined by another northern city with two spurts in the nineteenth century: Newcastle. London’s economic spurts appear in the nineteenth century but, with one exception, are ranked below the northern cities. In other words, the creation and reproduction of British hegemony is not state-wide; it is largely the work of the great northern British cities and it is here that we find the ‘core of the core’ in the modern world-system in the period of British hegemony.

Manufacturing belt (plus California and Texas) cities and American hegemony

In Table 7.3 American cities are highlighted among economic spurts for the period from 1800 to 2000. There is never any discussion in the literature of the US hegemonic cycle going back as far as 1800 but our results strongly suggest that this is where to start.

In this period, 15 US cities are featured, with 25 explosive city growths between them. This confirms a trend of absolute increases in number of economic spurts in cities of hegemonic states but with a trend of relative decline in the proportion of such economic spurts within the modern world-system. The surprise is the top four rankings in 1800–1850 for the leading east coast cities: New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Boston. These cities continue to feature in the second half of the nineteenth century, albeit with much lower rankings, but next Chicago is ranked first and Pittsburgh ranked fourth showing important inland explosive city growths. US dominance of spurts is greatest in the first half of the twentieth century, with four of the top five places: explosive city growth has now reached the Pacific coast, with Los Angeles ranked first, two Texas cities ranked second and third, Houston and Dallas, and with another inland industrial centre, Detroit, ranked fifth. In addition, San Francisco and Seattle add to the Pacific coast representation and Atlanta to southern representation. Washington also features for the first time and New York, Boston and Philadelphia, but not Baltimore, continue with economic spurts in the new century.

In the 1970–2005 period the US returns to having just four cities in the list. Now it is Washington with the highest ranking (third); Los Angeles and Chicago continue to feature, and Miami makes a first appearance. (Note that the change of criteria makes comparison problematic for the final column in Table 7.3 but the result with relative less economic spurt cities towards the end of hegemonic cycle is consistent with previous results (Tables 7.1 and 7.2)). In this hegemonic cycle the main rival is very clear: Germany has seven cities, with 16 episodes of explosive city growth. Their main challenge was in the second half of the nineteenth century, when there were five German cities near the top of the economic spurts: Leipzig (ranked third), Berlin (sixth), Dresden (eighth), Hamburg (eleventh) and Munich (fourteenth). Unlike the French in the British cycle, Germany was a very credible economic rival to the USA during its cycle.

There are three key points to make from these results:

1 The highest quantity of economic spurts in the modern world-system, featuring 11 US cities, occurs as high hegemony is being reached (1950). In other words, economic spurts correlate with the coming of high hegemony.

2 There is a very unexpected, very early, front-loading of economic spurts featuring east coast cities. In other words, spurts come well before hegemony, which is entirely consistent with cities creating the hegemony.

3 The key cities are largely from what has been called the ‘manufacturing belt’ (east coast plus mid-west cities) with important outliers in California and Texas. In other words, the creation and reproduction of US hegemony is not state-wide; only select parts of the USA can be considered the ‘core of the core’ in the modern world-system in the period of American hegemony.
And there we have it: explosive economic spurts are related to hegemonies in the modern world-system. No surprise but the time and space patterns are particularly informative. If vibrant cities were merely the result of state hegemonic processes then we might expect them to be relatively evenly spread across the territory of the state and across different periods of the cycle. This is not the case in any of the three cases of hegemony. In all three, dynamic cities and their economic spurts are front-loaded in the cycle and they are concentrated in just part of the state’s territory. This is because it is cities and their networks that create and reproduce the economic pre-eminence that is hegemony, not territorial states. These results have important implications for contemporary affairs. We are often aghast and in awe at the urban transformations that have occurred in China over the past two decades, but initially this growth was largely confined to the coastal regions. Perhaps we have been witnessing the early growth spurts of a new ‘core of the core’ and the early stages of a new hegemony?

One final note: although hegemonic cycles are city creations, it should not be thought that the ‘hegemonic states’ are inert in these processes. They provide, protect and enable necessary infrastructure for spaces of flows in transport (canals, railways, road networks) and communications (telegraph, telephone, internet) upon which the economic success of cities is premised. But their main role has been to protect the modern world-system being created by hegemonic processes: as described in Chapter 2, hegemonic states lead the military alliance that prevents conversion to world-empire.

Table 7.3 American cities in the American hegemonic cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>CHICAGO</td>
<td>LOS ANGELES</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTIMORE</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>HOUSTON</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILADELPHIA</td>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>DALLAS</td>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSTON</td>
<td>PITTSBURGH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>DETROIT</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>BOSTON</td>
<td>SEATTLE</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>ATLANTA</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILADELPHIA (22)</td>
<td>WASHINGTON (14)</td>
<td>LOS ANGELES (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTIMORE (25)</td>
<td>SAN FRANCISCO (16)</td>
<td>MIAMI (19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK (24)</td>
<td>CHICAGO (27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSTON (32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILADELPHIA (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the results for this column relate to spurts on scheduled airline flights

Source: derived from Taylor et al. (2010a).
Modern territorial states tame cities

As related in several previous chapters, in the modern world-system political power is concentrated at the level of the nation-state. In the case of cities this includes naming rights, always a good indication of power. Thus in the second half of the twentieth century Saigon became Ho Chi Minh City, Salisbury became Harare, Leningrad became St Petersburg and Bombay became Mumbai. Good for atlas publishers, confusing for the public, these examples of state naming power could be multiplied many times over. The limiting case is probably the capital city of Silesia, which has passed through several state hands, resulting in many name changes: from early Wrotizla, to Bohemian Vretslov, to Habsburg Presslau, to Prussian Breslau, to German Breslau, to today’s Polish Wroclaw (Davies and Moorhouse 2003).

In this section we provide three examples of important cities and their different relations to states. All the cases are from cities on the Mediterranean, a region dominated by empires and cities before the coming of the inter-state system converted the whole littoral into nation-state territories. The first example is from the early modern world-system before Westphalia and illustrates city autonomy; the latter two examples show how drawing new state boundaries can relegate important cities to the outer edge of states with resulting negative effects.

Genoa-Castile before Westphalia

With the contraction of trade in the late Middle Ages, there was incessant war in northern Italy – the ‘Italian hundred years war’ – that only ended with the Treaty of Lodi in 1454. The political geography result was that many smaller cities lost their independence to leave a simple balance of power between the four cities that maintained their independence: Florence, Genoa, Milan and Venice. According to Arrighi (1994), in the period of transition to the modern world-system these cities took two different paths to modernity. Three of them, Florence, Milan and Venice, converted their recent war-making into territorial consolidation or new state-making. Arrighi (1994) argues that the elites of these three cities ‘aristocratized’, meaning that the leading citizens turned away from commercial concerns towards more state-building imperatives. The practical effect was conversion from commercial cities-in-networks to territorial city-states. However, because they held relatively small territories, this move marked the end of these cities as major players on the European scene. Thus when the next large expansion of trade began in the second half of the fifteenth century they were in no position to take advantage. And as territorial states, they were small and vulnerable compared to rivals beyond Italy. This was confirmed by French and Spanish victories in Italy in the 1590s.

But Genoa was different; it took an alternative path to modernity than its former city rivals. It did not use its surplus capital for state-building because it had very little territory; in war-making it had kept its independence from the other cities but had not increased its hinterland. Without territory, a different way forward had to be devised: city elites restructured their trading pattern from the east to the new opportunities arising in the western Mediterranean and complemented this by developing a new financial capitalism based upon ‘sound money’ (Arrighi 1994: 113). But there was still a problem of surplus money requiring further new trade routes and a need for protection. Enter the Spanish kingdom of Castile as political guardian. With its expansion into the Atlantic and its crusader state credentials, Castile provided Genoa with the perfect partner. And the

Summary

In this section we have focused upon the way localities have played an important role in generating the processes driving the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Specifically we:

- saw that city-based economic spurts came at periods of high hegemony;
- also identified how some spurts came at the earliest stage of the emergence of the hegemonic power;
- illustrated how the city-based economic spurts were restricted to specific geographic regions within the hegemonic state.

• saw that city-based economic spurts came at periods of high hegemony;

In this section we have focused upon the way localities have played an important role in generating the processes driving the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Specifically we:

- saw that city-based economic spurts came at periods of high hegemony;
- also identified how some spurts came at the earliest stage of the emergence of the hegemonic power;
- illustrated how the city-based economic spurts were restricted to specific geographic regions within the hegemonic state.
According to Jacobs (1969), cities are very complex settlements with highly diversified divisions of labour. This is the key feature that differentiates them from mere ‘towns’. The political economy of towns is much simpler and can make them vulnerable to both economic change and political monopoly. The limiting case is the ‘company town’, often linked to a single resource such as a metal ore or lumber, where one firm or corporation completely dominates employment and is able to use this power to run the local politics. But single function towns come in many forms, including politics.

In the USA each of the 50 states has its own capital city, the command and control centre for state politics. This is where the local state politics is done, where the state governor and cabinet conduct policy, where the local state administration beavers away, where different state interests come to lobby, and where elected representatives meet together to make state laws and agree the state budget. State capital cities are important; they are America’s ‘political central places’ distributed across the country from Honolulu (Hawaii) in the west to Augusta (Maine) in the east. Note immediately that, whereas all readers will have heard of Honolulu, most probably they will not have heard of Augusta in Maine (as opposed to Augusta, Georgia, home of golf’s US Master’s). And there are many state capitals even more obscure than Maine’s capital. In the list below ten state capitals with city and metropolitan populations below 100,000 are identified. The little towns of Montpellier and Pierre that are also capital cities will be known to very few people outside Vermont and South Dakota. Most of these capital cities are for small states but this does not mean that there are not larger urban centres that might make a more credible capital; Baltimore (Maryland) and Las Vegas (Nevada) are both major cities located in the states listed. In fact, these ten capitals are typical in the sense of all of them not being their state’s largest city: this is the case in 33 of the 50 states.

What is happening in this strange political geography? Certainly this is not a case of multiple historical accidents. There is a real politics behind choosing small places to be politically important. At its most basic this is a territorial politics suspicious of the inequities and corruption of cities. For most of the democratic era in the USA, rural voters counted for more than urban voters because their electoral districts had smaller populations than city districts. This rural bias was only eliminated in the 1960s with the ‘reapportionment revolution’ that created districts of the same population size (Taylor and Johnston 1979). Thus have big city representatives had to go ‘up-state’ (e.g. New York City to Albany) or down-state (e.g. Chicago to Springfield) to plead their case. But there have been other more positive consequences. State politics is played out in relatively neutral arenas, small(er) places without strong home interests. But the result is not necessarily a good thing for these places that have become small state capitals. Many are just a ‘one-trick place’, a political company town. Such a simple economic structure inhibits economic growth and these capital cities have been cut adrift from America’s economic development. Most are not ‘catching up’ their larger city neighbours; they are stuck as small places with little economic potential.

A final thought: what of the 17 states where the biggest city is the state capital? These include five major US metropolitan areas: Atlanta (Georgia), Boston (Massachusetts), Denver (Colorado), Minneapolis/St Paul (Minnesota) and Phoenix (Arizona). These define a very different geography of state politics. What influence does this have – how is the politics in states with small capital cities different from states with large capital cities? We are not sure if this question has ever been researched . . .

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPITAL CITY</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>7,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre</td>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>14,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juneau</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>32,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>37,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annapolis</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>38,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>42,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carson City</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>54,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena</td>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>29,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfort</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>27,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheyenne</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>62,845</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
relationship was of mutual benefit: specializations of Castilian state protection/power and Genoese trade/profit ‘complemented one another’ (Arrighi 1994: 120). Genoa harnessed northern Italian surplus capital to provide for Castile’s permanent financial crisis, while Castile opened new trading spaces culminating in the asientos (contracts for American silver) for Genoa. This created a triangular space of flows in the sixteenth century: silver from America came into Seville, it was transferred to Genoa for conversion into gold and bills of exchange that were sent to Antwerp to pay for Spanish troops fighting the Dutch. Castile/Spain paid with new contracts for silver that were exchanged in Seville and so the process continued. This created what Braudel (1984) proclaimed the ‘age of the Genoese’ through their ‘discrete rule’ of Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Thus he identifies Genoa as the first modern ‘world-city’, by which he means the sole city articulating commercial activities at the centre of a world-economy.

This success of Genoa as world-city a century after the demise of its more martial city rivals was therefore based upon a geographical division of commercial and governance practices. The modern spatial contiguity of politics and economics that began with mercantilism is missing in this pre-Westphalian political economy arrangement. Here was a ‘dichotomous agency’ so alien to our modern sensibilities but supremely successful for a while in early modern Europe. This is city success as commercial power, with extra-mural guardian agents but which could only have happened before Westphalia (see the last section of Chapter 4).

**Venice/Italy after Westphalia**

Despite its small size, the early modern Venetian state maintained its independence until the entry of Napoleon’s armies into Italy in the early nineteenth century. In this it suffered the same fate as the Netherlands but with the defeat of the French in 1815, unlike the latter, Venice did not regain its independence. Instead it was allocated at the Peace of Vienna to one of the victors, Austria. They turned out to be particular bad political masters since they chose neighbouring Trieste as their naval outlet to the Mediterranean, effectively downgrading Venice below its erstwhile minor competitor. Even worse, Venice’s territory (Veneto) was treated as a colony, a food bank for subsiding the rest of the Austrian Empire – it provided one-third of imperial revenue from one-seventh of the state’s population (Keates 2005: 38). The result is predictable: Venice’s population declined by 12 per cent in the first half of the nineteenth century (Keates 2005: 36).

In 1848 new revolutions swept Europe and provided an opportunity to reverse Venice’s situation. But this is the mid-nineteenth century, the so-called ‘springtime of nations’, and the independence of cities is now off the main political agenda. This causes a problem for Venice: is the purpose of their uprising against the Austrians to restore the city republic or to be incorporated into a new Italian nation-state? The leader of the revolution in Venice, Deniele Manin, thought the former – ‘Italian unity mattered less to him than securing a unilateral independence for Venice’ (Keates 2005: 430). During the uprising, power in the city moved between ‘fusionists’ and republicans as events changed the balance of power in the city. After the failure of the revolution in Rome, Italy’s putative capital city, it was republicans who returned to power in Venice, and they became the last hold-out of the revolution. But all in vain: after some weeks of bombardment, Austrian troops re-entered Venice and the city’s brief return to independence was over.

A little more than a decade later the now successful Italian unification included Venice. But for this city this nationalist victory was somewhat pyrrhic – Venice moved from one territorial container, Austria, to a new container, the Kingdom of Italy. Thus it was simply relocated from being on the edge of Austria to the edge of Italy. The contrast with its earlier network power as Europe’s main Mediterranean gateway city could hardly be greater. Even the city’s heroic siege in 1848 has been written out of the mythology of the Italian revolution as a ‘side-show’; city independence was simply the wrong story (Keates 2005: 430–31). Given its former status, Venice is perhaps the saddest urban victim of nationalization within the inter-state system. Today, it is a relatively minor Italian city,
largely surviving through attracting tourists to see its wonderful, pre-Westphalian, heritage.

Salonica/Greece after Westphalia

Thessalonica was another great Mediterranean gateway, this time to the Balkans, which has been a victim of nationalization in the inter-state system. In this case it has had the indignity of having its named changed to Salonica to mark its route from cosmopolitan city to a Greek city that, like Venice, found itself on the edge of its new nation’s territory.

Originally the Byzantine Empire’s second city, Thessalonica was captured by the Ottomans in 1430. This meant that the Orthodox Christian population was joined by Muslim Turks, their new political governors. But, ‘as the sultans knew, it was one thing to conquer a city, another to restore it to life’: city revival was ‘the mightiest war’, compared to conquest as ‘a lesser war’ (Mazower 2004: 31). Thus the city prospered within the dynamic Ottoman world-empire. A policy of resettlement meant that the population doubled between 1500 and 1520. Most of the migrants were Jews and Moslems expelled from Castile (where their economic roles were being taken in part by Genoese). The result was instant connectivity since the migrants brought their commercial links with them: ‘where the crucial Mediterranean triangle with Egypt and Venice was concerned, no one could compete with the extraordinary network of familial and confessional affiliates that made Salonican Jews and (Iberian Moslems) so powerful’ (ibid.: 56). Thessalonica became the third city of the Ottoman Empire in Europe after Constantinople and Adrianople.

By the nineteenth century identities in Thessalonica had become very complex, comprising a mixture of religious, ethnic/national and cosmopolitan/imperial ascriptions (Mazower 2004: 264). Specifically, there were major populations of Bulgarians, Macedonians, Ottomans, Greeks, Turks and Jews; in the nineteenth century Thessalonica housed the largest Jewish community in the world. The rise of the Greek state and the Balkan Wars from 1912 to 1914 began the process of destroying this cosmopolitanism. In the First Balkan War the defeat of the Ottomans led to Greece annexing Thessalonica, which is when it was renamed Salonica. The Second Balkan War effectively eliminated the city’s Bulgarian population (Mazower 2004: 297). But the city was still a mixed community comprising 39 per cent Jews, 29 per cent Muslim and 25 per cent Greek in the 1913 census (Mazower 2004: 303). There was some exodus of Muslims before the First World War but their main movement out of the city came in the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s. Salonica becomes a ‘city of refugees’ (Mazower 2004: 356), Greek refugees from Anatolia. Finally, in the Second World War, the German occupiers deported all the city’s Jews in six weeks in early 1943. Genocide thus completed the Hellenization of the city.

Thus was Salonica nationalized and geographically contained: for most of the twentieth century the city was cut off from its Balkan hinterland and ‘enclosed within the confines of a small country’ (Mazower 2004: 371). The Cold War made this containment particularly severe since the Balkan hinterland (Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) was in the enemy camp. But perhaps the greater tragedy, both human and economic, was the nationalist destruction of the unique cosmopolitan nature of the city. Mazower (2004) notes that the accompanying Hellenization of history means that cosmopolitan Thessalonica has simply been lost to history; it is no one’s heritage. Today it is Greece’s second city but, despite the post-Cold War restoration of its Balkans hinterland, it is part of the periphery of the European Union’s most crisis-ridden state.

The Thessalonica/Salonica story is a classic example of the clash of two forms of space: Thessalonica thrived in a space of flows; Salonica is stagnating in a space of places. It illustrates a limiting case about how a state can tame a city and thereby change it for the worse. But, of course, not all cities have fared badly in the modern world-system. This is the power paradox with which this chapter began. And it is not only the cities within hegemonic states that do well; there are numerous other cities in the right place and right time, particularly ports and capital cities, which have prospered. These are the numerous city economic spurts outside the hegemons reported previously (Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) that have
also contributed greatly to the development of the modern world-system. And contemporary globalization has accentuated this importance of cities. According to Knight and Gabbert (1989: 15, 19), cities, ‘having been eclipsed by nationalization’, ‘are now able to position themselves in a global society’. They argue that this represents a new situation for cities where ‘development is being driven more by globalization than nationalization’ (ibid.: 327). Sassen’s (1991) classic text, The Global City, further supported this thesis. And so it would seem that today the power paradox is being resolved in favour of cities, or at least some cities, as advances in communication technologies enable business, both economic and non-economic, to be conducted relatively freely across many or most boundaries. This is not the ‘end of the state’ or a ‘borderless world’ as has been claimed, but it is a change in the balance of power between states and cities, between spaces of places and spaces of flows (Castells 1996). It is in cities that globalizations have been and are continuing to be constructed (Taylor 2004; Taylor et al. 2010b), and this includes political globalizations (Taylor 2005).

Using cities to make political globalizations

Since Friedmann’s (1986) description of a world city hierarchy and Sassen’s identification of global cities, a very large literature has developed on cities in globalization. This work has been mainly economic in nature and has focused upon cities as corporate headquarters and business service centres for large corporations. In recent years the emphasis has been on how these firms use cities in carrying out their business, with particular reference to large service firms that have created worldwide office networks. From the study of these offices – in which cities they locate, and what their size and functions are in those cities – it is possible to derive a world city network (Taylor 2001; Taylor et al. 2010b; Taylor and Derudder 2015). This network indicates where global business is serviced for its advanced professional needs, such as inter-jurisdictional contracts or global advertising campaigns. Although we know globalization has not created a ‘borderless world’, these advanced business service firms do try and make the trans-border work of their clients as smooth and easy as possible. And in the process they ‘interlock’ cities through flows of information and knowledge that are transferred between their offices in carrying out their daily work. In this way the huge office blocks that can be seen in all major cities across the world are linked into a world city network.

However, business firms are not the only institutions that have globalized through having offices across the world. Although not as large as, say, Citibank or McKinsey consultancy, non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as Oxfam and United Nations (UN) agencies such as the World Health Organization do have a worldwide presence in lots of cities. They use these cities to carry out their functions just as private firms do to make their profits. Thus operating in parallel to development of economic globalization, there has been production of political globalizations. And these can be studied in the same way to find world city networks of political practices. This is what we describe in this section.
Cities as localities

Cooperation or competition between cities? The case of London–Frankfurt relations and the launch of the euro

The general assumption about inter-city relations is that they are competitive. Cities are modelled as hierarchies and hierarchies are there to be climbed; this sets the pattern for a large literature on ‘city competition’. But this writing is specified very narrowly in terms of national urban hierarchies within state territorial containers. Successful cities, however, have never been strong respecters of boundaries since their prosperity depends upon flows (of information, commodities, people). New York built its success not on simply being at the apex of a so-called ‘American urban hierarchy’; its success depended much more on its complex gateway function linking the USA to the rest of the world-economy. This alternative view of inter-city relations interprets them as inherently cooperative: cities operate through networks that are premised upon commercial mutuality. Therefore cities are different from states, which are competitive through their political rivalries. This contrast between cities and states was overtly illustrated when the European Union (EU) launched its new euro currency in 1999.

The EU understood that the new currency would need to be backed by a new European Central Bank. Where should this important institution be located? The problem was that, although London was Europe’s premier financial centre, it was in the UK and this state had chosen not to join the euro. Therefore when the Council of Ministers met to decide the bank’s location, the German government was able to get agreement to set up the bank in Frankfurt, Germany’s financial centre, and not London. This was a simple political decision with the UK government not able to win the argument for London because it was outside the Eurozone. But it was interpreted as something much more important in the financial press: this was going to be the beginning of Frankfurt overtaking London to become Europe’s new premier financial centre. This prediction simply did not happen: today London remains far more important than Frankfurt in the world of finance.

The prediction did not come true for the simple reason that ‘financial competition’ did not determine the relations between London and Frankfurt; rather, the cities complemented each other. Most major financial services firms had offices in both cities and used the cities specifically for what they had best to offer. Deutsche Bank, for instance, used London for its key global operations centre and Frankfurt for its European business. Although headquartered in Frankfurt it would be highly irrational for the bank to ‘support’ Frankfurt against London. It needed both cities for its commercial success and had invested heavily in major offices in both cities. With all other major banks located in both cities, each wanted both of them to be successful financial centres. Thus London remained the global business centre while Frankfurt remained important for central Europe.

The reason why so many contemporary observers got their prediction wrong is because they scripted inter-city relations as if they were inter-state relations. For sure the latter are competitive – Germany won over the UK in the EU Council of Ministers – but cities do not prosper through such zero-sum games; their secret has been to conjure win–win situations. It is this mutuality that was displayed in London–Frankfurt relations irrespective of one political location decision, however seemingly important.

The position of London is again being queried because of Brexit; with the UK leaving the European Union transfers of some financial functions out of London to other European cities are again being suggested. But global cities like London are essentially dynamic; functions are coming and going incessantly. Minor movements that might result from political pressures due to Brexit will not greatly affect London’s pre-eminent role in the global space of flows. Remember the success of cities is precisely their ability to transcend political boundaries. Given the nexus of flows that links Europe into the world-economy through London, a diminution of London would be disastrous for Europe as a power block in relation to core rivals Pacific Asia and North America.

This case study may have a particular resonance beyond European finance. With cities in globalization becoming more important relative to states, does this portend a more cooperative global
But political globalizations are hampered by the strong Westphalian legacy that is the inter-state system. As emphasized throughout this book, modern politics is premised upon a geography of territories and borders not networks and cities. However, states do have capital cities, as described in Chapter 4, where they locate the offices they need (bureaucracies) to manage their territories. States also use capital cities to engage with other states; there will be a foreign affairs office in the capital (such as the US State Department and the UK Foreign Office) and the embassies of all the other states with whom they have regular contact. These capital city offices are the geographical manifestation of diplomatic networks, inter-city networks as old as the inter-state system itself. The work done in these offices has continually reinforced the Westphalian structure of modern politics and continues to do so today. Therefore, although diplomatic networks are worldwide in scope, they are not processes of contemporary globalization. Rather, they represent the much older process of internationalization, or more accurately, inter-stateness.

In what follows we present three political networks of cities that represent three distinctive worldwide inter-city processes. First, we describe diplomatic networks that are inter-state in nature; they describe relations between states. We will use these as a benchmark against which other, possibly ‘post-Westphalian’, networks can be compared. The second networks are supra-state in nature, a globalization that is above the states. This is represented by the networks of United Nations agencies and may be interpreted as incipient ‘global governance’. The third networks are trans-state in nature, a globalization that is across or beyond states and may be interpreted as early traces of ‘global civil society’.

Inter-stateness: cities reaffirming Westphalia

The city network created through state apparatuses can be thought of as the contemporary inter-city expression of Westphalian political organization of sovereign territorial states. This is the political arrangement being confronted by globalization; if the latter is a source of serious challenges to this political order then there will be distinctively different inter-city patterns being created by other political network-makers. Obviously, in order to see whether new global political geographies are being created through globalization, it is necessary to have a Westphalian yardstick for comparison, hence this initial analysis of the inter-state city network.

There is a research tradition for quantitative analyses of the spatial distribution of embassies; Nierop (1994) provides the most thorough example in recent political geography. But such studies always conceptualise the relations described as between states. Of course, there are very good reasons for describing the Westphalia network in this manner, but it is not the only way. We have chosen to provide a city-centred description of these relations to facilitate direct comparison with the supra-state and trans-state inter-city networks; but this is not just a pragmatic decision. As emphasized previously, cities are where the work of political network-making goes on which is why modern states have capital cities. Furthermore, the inter-state world city network actually encompasses more than capital cities: envoys are sent out to missions in other cities. For instance, New York and Geneva are not capitals but as key UN centres they are prominent in diplomatic networks. Also there are many countries where the capital city is not a country’s economic centre, thus additional missions are established in important non-capital cities such as: Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Lagos.
Mumbai, Sao Paulo, Sydney and Toronto. Thus, unlike the usual state-to-state diplomatic analyses, a city-to-city study identifies a more complex network pattern. In the work described below 114 state diplomatic networks are analysed through offices in 170 cities (Taylor 2005).

We describe the geography of these networks through an elementary statistical method (principal components analysis) that searches out groups of diplomatic networks from the whole set of 114. These are subnets of relatively cohesive connections. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7.4. Twelve such subnets were identified and their statistical importance is shown by the percentage figure in the second column. If there were one large totally connected network this would encompass 100 per cent of all links; as can be seen in Table 7.4 the situation here is very different, with lots of small subnets. The number of important nodes (cities) in each subnet is shown in the next column and in the final column two key nodes are listed. Each subnet is named on the basis of the cities included as nodes in the subnet; these labels are stated in the first column.

We interpret the political geography of these results as follows:

1. Diplomatic networks are made up of numerous small subnets most of which are regional in scope.
2. All the subnets encompass a lot of cities, most over 20.
3. The three major (though still small) networks are classically regional in their composition featuring Latin America, Western Europe and south and southeast Asia.
4. Five of the remaining subnets are also regional in content covering East Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa, North Europe and Eurasia.
5. There are four inter-regional subnets, the first two in the list link European cities to other parts of the world, and the third bypasses Europe and links Asian and the American cities.
6. The fourth inter-regional subnet is distinctive for another reason: it links together numerous non-capital cities (especially in the USA) and appears to be concerned for economic/technology issues.

This world city network of diplomatic links is clearly very fragmented. Most links are to neighbours, which should not be a surprise because this is where most state business occurs. But there are some larger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Import of network (%)</th>
<th>Number of nodes</th>
<th>Selected key nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Buenos Aires, Santiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rome, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (SE, south)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bangkok, New Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Beijing, Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Canberra, Copenhagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kiev, Bucharest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Paris, Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Washington, Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Algiers, Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>San Francisco, Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Europe</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Vilnius, Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Baku, Moscow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from Taylor (2005).
subnets, which tend to involve more important cities. Above all, the overall pattern of this benchmarking exercise is inclusion of large numbers of cities indicating a horizontal rather than vertical network structure. This reflects the formal 'equality of states' in the Westphalia arrangement through the international legal acceptance of individual sovereignties.

Supra-nationalism: cities in global governance

We interpret the creation of the United Nations family of institutions at the end of the Second World War as an inter-state process with supra-state implications. The UN was created by states for states and membership has become the accepted symbol of territorial sovereignty (‘equality of states’ is here formally recognized by one seat (vote) per state in the General Assembly of the UN). Looked at in evolutionary terms, the UN is a product of how states handle war and peace in the inter-state system. Starting with the ‘liberty of states’ to wage war in the eighteenth century, this was first curtailed by irregular ‘great power’ Congresses in the nineteenth century, and then was limited to the only legitimate use of force being for ‘defence’ by the permanent organizations of the twentieth century, first the League of Nations and then the United Nations. But there has always been more to the UN than moderating interstate war and peace. Although failing to embark down the path to world government that many of its supporters have advocated (e.g. Barnaby 1991), it has moved beyond purely inter-state agendas. This was made clear very early in its history with the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, which directly allows humanitarian concerns to override territorial sovereignty. This was the justification for armed intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s by the US and its allies during the breakup of Yugoslavia. But it is the practices of the UN across a wider spectrum of activities that has led to the UN having a supra-state presence in contemporary world political geography.

We follow Rosenau (1992: 69) in treating the UN as a potential ‘global service’. Like other global services, the UN family of institutions uses cities to supply a wide range of public goods in the fields of health, food, science, labour rights, development, finance, communications, human rights and refugees. For each field there are UN agencies that operate through cities to make networks of practice. These define a supra-state network of cities, our subject here. We study 34 agencies in 92 cities and search out subnets to describe the supra-state geography (Taylor 2005).

Using the same technique as used previously for diplomatic networks, a very different set of results is shown in Table 7.5. There are four key differences.

1. The UN subnets are functional in nature rather than regional: this is in keeping with their supra-state purposes.
2. There are only six subnets, all of which are more statistically important than the diplomatic subnets. This indicates a much more structured network, again in keeping with its supra-state nature.
3. There are relatively few cities involved in each subnet. This shows a much more limited and concentrated geography than for diplomatic subnets.
4. And the subnets are much more hierarchical. In each case there is one very dominant city and that is why in the final column just single cities are listed for each subnet. These are ‘top-down’ processes creating ‘primate city subnets’.
5. As primate cases they divide into two types: health, finance, women and nuclear issues are dealt with in core zone cities within very small subnets; industrial and development issues are dealt with in non-core zone cities (Bangkok and Addis Ababa) within rather larger subnets.

It is difficult to imagine a more contrasting space of flows to the Westphalian benchmark: the dominance of regional fragmentation has been completely replaced by functional subnets that are typically tightly structured and very hierarchical. This second world political geography is the result of top down processes, which is the nature of supra-state processes. As an element of global governance it is very different from that envisaged by Rosenau (1995: 182) as ‘the
sum of myriad – literally millions – control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures, and processes’. He suggests a more horizontal set of relations for global governance which we consider to be a different global political geography; the trans-state activities of non-governmental organizations.

Transnationalism: cities beyond political boundaries

The growth of non-governmental organizations has been exponential since the mid-nineteenth century and they now make up a formidable number of social agents at all geographical scales. In recent years NGOs with worldwide remits have grown especially fast (Glasius et al. 2002: 322) and these are our focus here. According to Keane (2002: 23) it is these large NGOs that are operating through ‘cross border networks’ as ‘a vast, interconnected, and multilayered social space that comprises many hundreds of self-directing or non-governmental institutions’ to create ‘global civil society’. ‘Global NGOs’ carry out their various activities through offices in cities worldwide and this defines the trans-state political geography we describe here. We repeat the form of analyses that have gone before to search out subnets, on this occasion using

Table 7.5 United Nations organizational networks (supra-nationalism).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Import of network (%)</th>
<th>Number of nodes</th>
<th>Selected key nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from Taylor (2005).

Table 7.6 Non-governmental organization networks (transnationalism).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Import of network (%)</th>
<th>Number of nodes</th>
<th>Selected key nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN linked</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Cairo, New Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Toronto, Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nairobi, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Moscow, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ottawa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from Taylor (2005).
data for 63 NGOs (covering environment, development, human rights and humanitarian issues) in 92 cities (Taylor 2005).

The results of this exercise are presented in Table 7.6 and appear to show a sort of hybrid pattern taking in elements from both inter-state and supra-state geographies. The findings can be summarized as follows.

1. The subnets are functional like UN agencies rather than regional like diplomatic subnets.
2. There are a large number of subnets, 12 like diplomatic subnets, but they tend to be larger than the latter in statistical importance suggesting somewhat less fragmentation.
3. The number of cities in the subnets are generally between the sizes of the UN and diplomatic subnets, still suggesting fragmentation but less than for the inter-state geography.
4. In terms of the selected cities, two thirds are dominated by a single city like UN agencies, but with one third not so. This suggests a hierarchical structure of strongly primate subnets but not at the level of the supra-state geography.
5. The non-primate subnets all feature non-core cities, including Nairobi, the NGO capital of Africa (Simon 1996) twice. They also constitute most of the larger subnets including the largest we have recorded, 25 cities in the technology subnet.
6. One other feature from the final column is that Nairobi is paired with core cities (London and Moscow); this is part of a wider pattern. All the nodes counted in column 3 contain a rich mix of core and non-core zone cities whether primate or not. It is this inter-zonal structure that makes the trans-state geography so interesting.

Despite initial inspection, the NGO networks are not just a mix of the other two networks; they have a crucial specificity in their strong inter-zonal structure. This relates the two forms of organization within NGOs; overall strategic and financial management, and operational practices. It seems that the former tends to be the responsibility of offices in core cities, leaving the latter for a range of local field offices in non-core cities. Hence these subnets do represent a real collaboration between core and non-core in NGO practices: there remains a functional core-periphery type process in the structure of their activities. This trans-state geography may transcend the inter-state system but it does not transcend the modern world-system’s core-periphery structure. But this is certainly not old-style imperialism, formal or informal; funds flow from core to periphery but control remains in the former.

The conclusion of this exercise is that two new political geographies are being constructed through cities that transcend the Westphalian inter-state benchmark. But they are themselves very different: the supra-state geography has a very hierarchical top down structure with primate city subnets; the trans-state geography is more fragmented and its hierarchical tendencies appear to be within the NGOs’ activities use of core-periphery contrasts.

So what do these three sets of findings tell us about new political globalization processes in contrast to long-standing Westphalian processes? We draw four basic conclusions.

1. Supra-state and trans-state processes are indeed creating more globally structured political geographies than is apparent with inter-state processes with their fragmented regionalism.
2. While encompassing some similarities, supra-state and trans-state processes are creating distinctively different political geographies.
3. The chief feature of the supra-state geography is that it has a very hierarchical top down structure consisting wholly of primate city subnets.
4. The chief feature of the trans-state processes is that its relatively fragmented and partially hierarchical tendencies are fundamentally trans-zonal: NGOs’ activities are conditioned by core-periphery contrasts; they simultaneously reproduce and transcend the ‘North-South divide’!

These conclusions suggest the emergence of new political geographies that might be more enduring...
than the geopolitics described in Chapter 2 where changes in inter-state alliances produce rapid alterations in spatial dispositions of power (Taylor 2005).

These several considerations of the political geography of cities suggests that the political organization of the capitalist world-economy is fluid under the influence of different types of political economy processes. States largely compete for political-economic supremacy whereas cities largely interact for mutual benefit. This produces contrasting political geographies as cities cooperate in spaces of flows while states compete through their territorial prerogatives. In this interplay of political geographies it is cities that are the underlying drivers of the key process of social change, the rise and decline of hegemonic powers, but it is states that ultimately protect hegemonic processes from conversion to world-empire. And, through all this, analyses of political world-city networks suggest that the essential core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy remains resilient.

**Summary**

In this section we identified the way world cities are creating the political processes of globalization. Specifically we:

- identified how, contrary to the establishment of the Westphalian system, city-based process may be challenging state-based politics;
- noted the role of inter-, trans- and supra-state relationships between world cities;
- illustrated the different patterns of these three different relationships;
- discussed how inter-city processes are, in some ways, challenging the Westphalian system and, in other ways, reinforcing that system.

**Citizens and global terrorism**

There is another political globalization that pits networks against territorial states. This is the ongoing War on Terror. Al Qaida and, more recently, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) have targeted states by committing terrorist attacks within key cities. Cities were attacked at the beginning of the War on Terror – New York and Washington in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2009 – and more recently with bombings, stabbings and driving vehicles into crowds in Paris, Marseille, London, Manchester and Brussels. Al Qaida and ISIS are elusive networks, not dependent on any given territory but able to move as needs must – for instance, from Sudan to Afghanistan to Yemen depending on circumstances. The USA tried to turn this new form of conflict into a conventional inter-state war by invading Iraq and Afghanistan but without really tackling the problem of how to confront an enemy as network (Flint 2003). We discussed these contemporary geopolitics in depth in Chapter 2.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, localities have been destroyed and constructed in acts of terrorism and the military response of the United States. The attacks of 9/11 dramatically transformed the physical landscape of New York City. The World Trade Center towers were targeted for their symbolic value, representing the economic power and global reach of the United States. However, their destruction had a significant effect upon those familiar with the city’s skyline. Their disappearance was a daily reminder that things were no longer the same. The response, the War on Terror, has resulted in destruction of locations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most advanced military technology, the use of satellites to aim depleted uranium ordinance, has been utilized to ensure the most effective annihilation of buildings, neighbourhoods and, of course, their occupants. In stark contrast to memorialization of the victims of 9/11, it is hard even to count the number of deaths from the War on Terror (Gregory 2004). Moreover, cities in the United States and other countries have seen physical changes in the name of security, including concrete barriers surrounding buildings, road blocks and pervasive security cameras. The newest urban feature is barricades, such as those on London Bridge, by the side of roads to prevent vehicles driving on pavements.
The physical targeting of localities in the War on Terror has required the mobilization of political rhetoric to represent both the places and the geopolitical context as one that requires acts of war and the militarization of everyday spaces. Stephen Graham (2010) has summarized the processes and rhetoric transforming localities on both sides of the War on Terror. We shall first outline the representation of towns and cities identified as ‘terrorist’ places before turning to the way ‘homeland’ cities have been reimagined (Graham 2010).

Urbicide: material and rhetorical destruction of localities

Political geographers’ concern with the War on Terror has been coupled with traditional interest in the shape of urban areas and the more recent focus upon the social dynamics of cities: Graham (2004a: 25) has coined the term ‘urbicide’, defined as ‘the deliberate denial, or killing, of the city’. The targeting of cities has become a central component of the War on Terror. In 2017, 16 years after the terrorist attacks of 2001, the military campaign led by the US is still based upon the seizure of key cities. We have witnessed the ‘Battle for Mosul’ in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and the ‘Battle for Raqqa’ in the complexity of the Syrian civil war. The civil war in Syria has become a conflict made up of a series of urbicides. The Syrian case is an example of how a ‘failed state’ (see Chapter 4) has become a product of the War on Terror, and the combination of a weak regime trying to control rebelling cities, plus a strategy of outside political powers (the US and Russia) seeking advantage without putting ‘boots on the ground’ has created an urban focus. In Afghanistan, ISIS and the Taliban demonstrate their power by planting bombs in the capital city, Kabul, and having outright control of cities in many provinces. Thus the War on Terror has become a series of urban conflicts within a broader geopolitical strategy. Urbicide places localities at the centre of the United States’ contemporary projection of military power across the globe. Such an act of geopolitics requires two simultaneous and related movements: the physical destruction of buildings and neighbourhoods and a series of representations to justify and legitimate the outcome.

Graham (2010) notes that the key rhetorical strategy is to deny a sense of humanity or social life within cities that are being targeted by military actions. Instead of being seen as dynamic and fluid locations of a variety of social groups going about their everyday business, certain localities are portrayed as ‘terrorist places’. The goal is to paint a picture of such localities as nothing but a ‘nest’ of terrorists, both now and throughout history. The richness and diversity of a locality is denied, a cultural urbicide, to legitimate its material destruction.

Targeting the ‘terrorist nest’

Four particular, but interrelated, rhetorical tools have been used to portray localities within the broader rhetoric of the War on Terror (Graham 2010). The first is the use of satellite-based imagery, reprinted in newspapers and utilized in television broadcasts, to portray cities as empty cartographic surfaces. In other words, they are static depopulated representations to deny the existence of a vibrant and diverse social life. As Derek Gregory notes, localities become:

letters on a map or co-ordinates on a visual display.

Then, missiles rain down on K-A-B-U-L, on 34.51861N, 69.15222E, but not on the eviscerated city of Kabul, its buildings already devastated and its population already terrorized by years of grinding war. (Gregory 2004).

Second, if the localities being targeted are seen to be populated then the rhetoric portrays a singular view of the occupants. Arab cities are portrayed as ‘terrorist nests’ (Graham 2010). Numerous examples exist. Par for the course is the observation of General Richard Myers, chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in April 2004 during fighting in the Iraqi city of Fallujah that left six hundred civilians dead. Myers defined the city as a ‘rats’ nest’ or ‘hornets’ nest’, and so dehumanized the occupants, who needed to be ‘dealt with’ (News24.com, quoted in Graham 2010). Such portrayals are emphasized by newspaper commentaries. The disturbing voice of Ralph Peters is not atypical. In an article in the New York Post entitled...
'Kill faster!', Peters (2004) claimed that urban warfare required the rapid and overwhelming use of military technology to wreak havoc before the media arrived, Peters fearing, generously, that the media would offer portrayals of the locality as a location of everyday social life rather than an essentialized ‘terrorist nest’ (Graham 2010).

The third process involves the virtual simulation of localities. A host of computer games have come onto the market allowing players to manoeuvre US forces around the streets of an Arab urban landscape and blast away ‘bad guys’. In popular games such as ‘Full Spectrum Warrior’ or ‘America’s Army’ the streets are depopulated of citizens going about their everyday life. Again, the locality is dehumanized. The only people to appear are the targets, ‘shadowy, subhuman, racialized figures’ (Graham 2010). Both of these computer games began as military training videos, blurring the distinction between military and civilian participation in the War on Terror. The virtual simulation of Arab localities in computer games allows for a sanitized and safe interactive participation in the War on Terror, but in a manner that reinforces a sense of a battle in depopulated locations in the name of ‘good’.

The fourth process is the US military’s physical construction of model Arab cities for training purposes. Though the morphology of Arab street plans is painstakingly reconstructed, those streets are again empty except for the ‘terrorists’ to be targeted. The sense of Arab localities as places devoid of social life other than uncivilized terrorists who must be shot is perpetuated.

The four processes of representation are an essential feature of urbicide within the War on Terror. They combine to deny targeted localities as cities constituted of a diverse population going about its everyday business. Such an image would not sit well with the knowledge that such cities are being bombed from on high and shelled with depleted uranium ordinance.

Representing homeland localities


To live in America now, at least to live in a port city like Seattle – is to be surrounded by the machinery and rhetoric of covert war, in which everyone must be treated as a potential enemy until they can prove themselves a friend. Surveillance and security devices are everywhere: the spreading epidemic of razor wire, the warnings in public libraries that the FBI can demand to know what books you’re borrowing, the Humvee laden with troops in combat fatigues, the Coast Guard gun boats patrolling the bay, the pat-down searches and X-ray machines, the nondescript gray boxes equipped with radar antennae, that are meant to sniff pathogens in the air.

(Raban 2004: 6, quoted in Graham 2010)

Related to the militarization of the scale of experience is a third process, ‘the production of permanent anxiety around everyday urban spaces, systems, and events that were previously banalized, taken for granted or ignored in US urban everyday life’ (Graham 2010, referring to Luke 2004). Everyday experience in the United States is a negotiation of government colour-coded alerts and endless media portrayal of ‘threats’, from terrorism to bird flu and ‘freakish’ weather events. In sum, the scale of experience is the scale of mass anxiety.
Our political geographic conceptualization of localities situates, or contextualizes, them within the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. In the discussion of the War on Terror, declining US hegemony is a defining process, and helps us explore the tensions within the fourth process that Graham identifies: the rhetorical construction of the United States as a spatially delimited, territorially fixed and demographically homogeneous nation. Cosmopolitanism has been identified as risky or even threatening (Gilroy 2003). The actual reality of US localities is denied. Rather than identifying their fluidity and demographic make-up of intertwined migrant groups, they are seen as consisting of distinctive, identifiable and opposed groups – citizens deserving of protection and those who carry a diverse sense of ‘threat’. Ironically, it is the identity of the victims of the 9/11 attacks that illuminate the fiction of cosmopolitanism as risky or threatening.
of this rhetoric. The casualty list consisted of people from 41 different countries, though the rhetoric of remembrance denies the diasporas that suffered in the identification of ‘3,200 American dead’ (Graham 2010).

Graham’s essay is a powerful identification of the War on Terror’s material transformation of the scale of experience in the United States and the representations that are employed to justify such changes. Similar to the everyday actions of Kurdish women in Istanbul that we discussed in a case study earlier in the chapter, individuals in US cities negotiate the physical spaces of localities and the dominant meanings associated with them. The degree of compliance or resistance is a matter of individual choice, and can vary in different settings. Such individual political actions are made within the context of a militarized scale of experience.

However, our world-systems approach requires the consideration of other scales and processes. Returning to the wider context of the capitalist world-economy, the militarization of US localities is one manifestation of the tensions and contradictions facing the United States as hegemonic power. The United States is negotiating a ‘hegemonic dilemma’ (Flint 2004). On the one hand, the role of hegemonic power requires the United States to maintain flows of goods, capital and information across borders. On the other hand, the US government is, to some degree, held accountable by its own citizens; it must create a sense that movements across borders are being restricted in a manner that provides ‘security’. The ‘hegemonic dilemma’ does not deny that the US government is itself active in defining threats that must be acted upon. The purpose of the concept is to show that localities in the United States, and other countries, must balance processes of globalization with political concerns of security. By constructing and achieving legitimacy through the concept of ‘homeland security’ the United States is, to some extent, contradicting its previous role as chief promoter of cross-border flows.

Two questions arise. Is ‘homeland security’ a sign that states are asserting their authority over the flows of globalization? Or are alternative political geographies being created by non-state institutions within a network of localities? It is to the latter question we now turn.

**Summary**

In this section we have discussed the locality politics within the War on Terror by:

- introducing the concept ‘urbicide’;
- illustrating the geopolitical representation of localities targeted by US forces in the War on Terror;
- illustrating the geopolitical representation of homeland localities.

**Challenges of the twenty-first century**

There are numerous challenges that confront citizens of the twenty-first century. As well as the continuing concern about how we seem to be always generating new wars, there are equally intractable problems relating to discriminatory behaviours against whole sections of humanity, the largest being inequitable treatment of women worldwide, but also including ethnic, religious, disability, sexuality and incarcerated minorities. Modernity has provided ideological frameworks for eliminating such discriminations – for instance, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and associated measures – and there are important social movements and NGOs dedicated to this end. These institutions have contemporary resonance (cf. the Syrian and Yemen civil wars and foreign interventions). But, and it is a big but, there appears to be no likelihood of success in any of these endeavours – Amnesty International does a really good job in highlighting torture of prisoners across the world but nobody thinks torture will be eliminated as a common political tool any time soon. And it must be admitted that it is the inter-state system that is one of the major obstacles for tackling all discriminations. Internal sovereignty is jealously guarded and, whatever human rights ideals have been signed up to, governments, their leaders in
particular, still do what they like in many countries. The fact that two former heads of state (Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia) have been indicted at the International Law Courts in The Hague is impressive but still only the tip of a violent political iceberg.

In today’s world of corporate globalization there is a much stronger threat to state sovereignties. The World Trade Organization was formed in 1994 as a stronger version of its GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) predecessor from 1947. As the global rule maker for international trade it has developed a framework that might be called a ‘Declaration of Corporate Rights’ whereby companies can challenge the sovereignty of states through specially constituted courts. Structured in favour of corporations, these private actors can challenge state economic policies by suing states for compensation if those policies impinge on their profits. For example, discussion of a proposed trans-Atlantic trade deal (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership or TTIP) would not only enable US firms to bid for contracts within the British health system, but also allow any private company with a contract to provide services to sue the government if it thought national policies were restricting the ability to maximize profits. Like so much of globalization this has been promoted by the states themselves – the process is commonly incorporated in bi-lateral treaties – through their adherence to neo-liberal ideologies that place profits before people. By mid-2017, with Brexit negotiations and President Trump seemingly hostile to TTIP, the likelihood of the trade agreement faded. However, the negotiations illustrate the ability for corporations to define and challenge state policies.

All the above are important and frustrating but they are overwhelmed by one challenge that is global in a whole new sense: the planetary threat that is anthropogenic climatic change. This is a question of global spaces of physical flows – of water and air – responding to temperature rises creating new patterns of climate. It goes without saying that these flows are no respecter of political boundaries. This point alone makes states unlikely means for finding a sustainable way forward. But there are two very fundamental reasons why states are severely problematic in this policy area.

1. If, in a Machiavellian turn of mind, you wanted to devise a political framework that would make solving the climatic change problem nigh impossible, you would likely come up with deeply entrenched, multiple divisions of humanity. For ‘deeply entrenched’ read territorial sovereignty; for ‘multiple divisions’ read nation-state; and, of course, we have arrived at the modern inter-state system. This has created a political geography that is inherently competitive; consensus seems only possible too late because the global public policies that are required always afford multiple opportunities for free-riding on the sacrifices of others. And this is without factoring in the history of winners and losers to make current amends equitable.

2. There is a more subtle concern about dealing with anthropogenic climate change through states and it concerns the ‘anthropo-’ part of the problem. Modern states have developed to supply services to its citizens starting with security and increasing in time to become welfare states in the twentieth century which are under challenge but still exist. Therefore they bring a supply bias to climate change policy. Internationally this has been dominated by focusing on cutting carbon emissions. But what of the behavioural causes of the rise of such emissions? This consumption side of the process is neglected. It is the incessant push for economic growth to satisfy the consumption expectations of voters that lies behind more and more greenhouse gases being pumped into the atmosphere. Reducing mass consumption as the crucial need to tackle climate change is simply not in states’ DNA. The supply bias in dealing with climate change is illustrated in the case study of the United Nations and climate change.

All this means is that we are left with states being part of the problem rather than contributing to the solution: it is time to turn to cities.
Cities have two fundamental advantages over states.

1. They are not exclusive in the way territorial behaviour is encouraged by states. Successful cities are cosmopolitan; they operate through spaces of flows that abjure boundaries.

2. Cities are inherently cooperative in nature rather than competitive like states. Cities need each other to be successful in the networks they share;

### Case study

**United Nations miscue in climate change policymaking**

If countries are to be brought together to produce a coherent global climate change policy, the key instrument will be the United Nations. And, as we would expect, the UN has been very active in this field. There have been 21 United Nations Climate Change Conferences to which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. The IPCC consists of thousands of scientists nominated by UN member states who have produced five, comprehensive, ‘state of the art’ surveys on climate changes and causes.

These massive ‘Assessment Reports’ show a very strong bias towards supply issues (notably carbon reduction) compared with demand behaviours: the knowledge provided to states as policymakers is strongly skewed in the direction of supply/production over demand/consumption. This is very clearly illustrated in the Table where the search results for selected words are listed from the IPCC’s Assessment Reports. Here ‘production’ beats ‘consumption’ at a ratio of 2:1 but lower down the lists the differences become overwhelming: in terms of economic sectors, references to ‘industry’ and ‘manufacturing’ far outstrip ‘retail’ and ‘shopping’; in terms of policy approaches, technology is out of sight compared to rationing which is effectively off the radar. More generally, it appears that ‘industrialization’ is an accepted part of the texts; ‘consumerism’ simply is not. The latter’s frequency of just two within the hundreds of thousands of words by several thousand IPCC authors is simply astounding to anyone vaguely versed in debates on the human contribution to climate change.

Of course, supply and demand operate together in the world-economy but there is a very clear imbalance in their respective presences in politics and decision making. This reflects the inherent top-down politics of states in contrast to the bottom up possibilities of urban politics. After all mass consumption, the relevant behaviour, overwhelmingly takes place in the world’s cities and their regions.

Sources: Taylor et al. (2016); Taylor (2017).

Word search results from the five IPCC assessment reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPLY: terms largely related to production</th>
<th>DEMAND: terms largely related to consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>49,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>39,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing</td>
<td>6,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producers</td>
<td>5,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>1,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

this mutuality ultimately overrides the local city competitions that are dealt with in the urban literature.

So in order to get our global social networks compatible with global physical networks it would seem that we might have to turn to cities as the places to create the appropriate new politics for a resilient political geography. But this is just theory. Is there any evidence that the increasing importance of cities with globalization has shown any inclination to eschew state prerogatives for global imperative? Unfortunately the answer is no: perhaps it is too soon for such a political process to develop; but also perhaps it is too late to tackle the physical processes that are developing. In the USA there were numerous local and state rejections of the Trump government’s denial of the climatic change problem but without any fundamental political impact resulting. And, of course, cities that have hosted leading state summits have attracted massive ‘anti-globalization’ protests, starting with Seattle in 2001. These are more politically impressive for their scale and commitment but have not generated the wider public support that is necessary to really make a difference. Cities in globalization are available for harnessing to a new politics, for nurturing a new politics, but how and when? Are we waiting for great cities to be imminently flooded before cohesive action happens?

Chapter summary

This chapter has focused upon the scale of experience in our political geography framework: the locality, with a specific focus on world-cities and the role they have played in the capitalist world-economy. We have:

- introduced the concept ‘world city’;
- identified the key role that cities play making certain states hegemonic powers;
- explored the politics that evolved between cities and states at the time of the emergence of the Westphalian state-centric system;
- noted how states subordinated cities in the Westphalian system;
- identified contemporary processes by which cities are challenging this subordination;
- defined three sets of processes (inter-state, supranational, and transnational) by which states are creating new political geographies;
- argued that some of these processes reinforce the Westphalian system while others challenge it;
- explored the representation of localities in the War on Terror;
- identified the concept ‘urbicide’ and the material and rhetorical destruction of localities;
- discussed the role of cities in facing the challenge of climate change.

We have identified the scale of experience as the scale of everyday political activity. However, the possibilities and constraints of such activity can be understood only by situating localities in a wider whole of the capitalist world-economy. One key category of localities is the world city. Studying world cities shows the historic interaction between cities and states, and how states subordinated cities in the Westphalian system, but to what degree is this relationship currently being renegotiated? The role of cities in the context of global terrorism was used to discuss the rhetorical and material destruction of localities. Finally, the role world cities as key localities in the emerging politics of climate change was introduced as a pressing and unresolved political geography.
Key glossary terms from Chapter 7

- administration
- Annales school of history
- autonomy
- capital city
- capitalism
- capitalist world-economy
- Christian democracy
- citizenship
- civil society
- classes
- Cold War
- collective consumption
- congruent politics
- conservative
- constitution
- core
- decentralization
- democracy
- dependency
- elite
- European Union (EU)
- geopolitics
- globalization
- government
- hegemony
- home
- homeland
- households
- human rights
- ideology
- instrumental theory of the state
- inter-state system
- Kondratieff cycles
- (waves)
- liberal democracy
- local government
- local state
- logistic wave
- managerial thesis
- militarization
- nation
- nationalism
- nation-state
- neighbourhood effect
- neo-liberal
- opposition
- periphery
- place
- political parties
- power
- practical politics
- qualitative efficiency
- racism
- Second World War
- socialism
- sovereignty
- space
- state
- structuralist theories of the state
- third world
- transnational
- urbicide
- world cities
- world-economy
- world-system
- world-systems analysis

Suggested reading


Activities

1. Type the phrase ‘world social forum’ into an internet search engine. Note that there is not one central website. How many different localities can you associate with the political network that is the World Social Forum? In what ways is the hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy still evident in this network? In what ways can you see established power hierarchies being challenged?

2. Consider the business section of a quality newspaper. In what way do the articles relate to national policy that is orchestrated by states and in what ways do the articles discuss business activities that are situated in particular cities. Think of ways the state activities and the city-based business activities interact. Do they complement or contradict each other? In what ways are the activities of the city-based businesses linked to other cities across the globe?
3 Using the website(s) of your local government, explore the ways in which the ‘local state’ relates to higher state levels, especially the national state. Which sorts of programmes are due to local initiatives and which are dependent on outside state support? Is there any way in which the policies of your local government contradict or challenge national policies? To what degree has your local government looked to partnerships across the globe, with businesses or other cities? Is there evidence of a growing trend of your local government facilitating international business connections? Can you use these links to identify where your home town is situated in a global hierarchy of cities?
CHAPTER 8

Place and identity politics

What this chapter covers

Theorizing political action in places
- Structuration theory
- Structural definitions of place

Modernity and the politics of identity
- Hegemony and modernity
  - Prime modernities
  - Places of the future
  - Ordinary modernity
- Reflexive modernization
  - The post-traditional condition
  - Social reflexivity and multiple identities

Identity politics and the institutions of the capitalist world-economy
- Fourteen political geographies
  - Politics between institutions
    - State–class politics
    - State–household politics
    - Peoples–class politics
    - Peoples–household politics
    - Class–household politics
    - State–peoples politics

Place–space tensions
As we move towards the conclusion of the book we continue to focus on the scale of experience discussed in the previous chapter. In Chapter 7 we introduced this scale as locality, but in this chapter we look at the same scale in a different way, as place. The same politics and processes are in play. The difference is in perspective to emphasize that places are the setting of the political actions of groups and individuals – it is where politics is made. In the previous chapter we used language that showed the role of world-cities, a particular type of locality, in shaping the political geography of the world-economy. Some examples in that chapter focused upon how cities, as the nodes of networks that guide flows of money, commodities, people etc. across the world-economy, are also the ‘homes’ of people, or the localities in which we live our everyday lives. As we have seen throughout the book, in terms of political geography, localities are where we vote for local representatives, protest about local and global issues, devise our practical politics and experience security or insecurity. In these political practices, everyday environments constitute much more than ‘platforms’ on which politics unfolds. That is to say, the geography in this local political

---

**In the army now**

Who wants to be identified as a killer? Thankfully, only the psychotic minority. Yet armies require people to kill and are faced with the problem of turning recruits into soldiers willing and able to slaughter complete strangers. Army training, therefore, requires the construction of a new identity. The citizen must become a soldier prepared to kill. This has not been easy. A famous and influential study of the Second World War (Marshall 1947) claimed that only 25 per cent of US soldiers returned fire. In the wake of the report, the US Army revamped its training. The results are dramatic. According to an article in *Rolling Stone*, in the Korean War (1950–53) the firing rate had risen to 60 per cent, in the Vietnam War it was 90 per cent, the First Gulf War 98 per cent and in the ongoing conflict in Iraq it is pretty much 100 per cent (Tietz 2006).

The US Army initiated a training programme that reconstructed the identity of recruits to enable them to be soldiers and potential killers. The training programme is called Total Control. Bluntly, it is a ‘carefully crafted hell that hard-wires kids for combat’ (Tietz 2006: 54). In essence, the training programme denies the recruit any identity other than that of soldier under command. Personal autonomy is destroyed. For example, in the canteen when asked what you want to eat by the server the only acceptable reply is ‘Ma’am, I am not allowed to say what I want, ma’am’ (ibid.: 55). Individual personality is annihilated. Tietz (ibid.: 56) quotes a drill sergeant Randy Shorter: ‘The minute you find a private doing his own thing . . . be it tying a knot his own way, having his boots a certain way, shaving the way he shaved back home – its basically an indication that he’s an individual’.

The training programme also constructs the recruit as a member of a new unit to which they owe allegiance. Moreover, if they do not act properly they will endanger the lives of their platoon ‘buddies’. With regard to shooting, the recruits are not urged to ‘Kill the enemy!’ but rather urged to ‘Protect your buddy!’ and ‘Protect the integrity of your unit!’ (Tietz 2006: 55). The individual is changed into a soldier, but their identity is also constructed as being a member of the platoon, the US Army, and a nation acting as hegemonic power. At the end of each day recruits recite the Soldier’s Creed, the Soldier’s Code, the Code of Conduct, the company motto, the seven Army Values, the ‘Infantry Song’ and the ‘Army Song’ (ibid.: 56). The Soldier’s Code includes the statement ‘I am a protector of the greatest nation on Earth’ (ibid.: 56).

The experience of US Army recruits illustrates a number of themes discussed in this chapter. Identity is constructed, by individual actions, by context and by reference to collective identities. This produces a politics of identity that is essentially geographical. It is formed within particular places and spaces and within different geographical scales. Finally, the politics of identity formation has significant implications for future actions – one’s own and those of other political actors.
geography is by no means inert. In this chapter we take this argument a stage further by focusing upon the local scale as a socially constructed place and how the political geography of place is related to the politics of constructing multiple identities.

The ‘daily urban system’ in which we carry out our everyday activities (going to work, school, shopping, cinemas, sports events, gyms etc.) is a place. By calling them ‘systems’ we emphasize their similarities – social scientists have devised generic terms such as central business district, inner city and suburbia for such general comparison. But daily urban systems are each different one from another, singular in their history and geography. Manchester is very different from Liverpool, Charlotte is very different from Atlanta; from such obvious statements many implications follow. Unlike many social scientists, ordinary people understand and value these differences. Most people have an attachment to their birthplace or where they were brought up or where they live today. Such ‘sense’ of place can be expressed as loyalty to a place. In fact, as we showed in Chapter 5, the rise of the nation-state involved political attempts to eliminate such local attachments as potential threats to the nation. Although reduced in importance in the operation of formal politics, local loyalties can never be simply eliminated. As a product of everyday life, they remain regardless of the practices of the state. Alongside attachment to a person’s homeland, there may be equally strong ties to their home town. This is a different politics in our scale of experience, what Cope (1996) calls identity-in-place.

How do we define place and, in particular, how does it differ from space? Part of the problem in answering such questions is that in both common language and social science the two words are used interchangeably. But they can be usefully distinguished, and in what follows we draw on Yi Fu Tuan’s (1977) seminal discussion of relations between place and space. His starting point is that “space” is more abstract than “place” (ibid.: 6). This is consistent with space being treated as general and place as particular. We might say that space is everywhere, place is somewhere. Further, place has content; the idea of an empty place is eerie, an empty space is merely geometrical. Tuan, however, is concerned for their relations: place as ‘humanised space’ (ibid.: 54). In this chapter, we are concerned with this specific distinction between space and place.

Tuan (ibid.: 73) has argued that ‘when space feels thoroughly familiar to us, it has become place’. This statement leaves space as an impersonal realm, while place is constituted by our everyday behaviour. The most basic of all places is, therefore, the home, which Tuan calls ‘an intimate place’ (ibid.: 144), and it is for this reason that other places of attachment use this term, as in homeland and home town, mentioned previously. It is these ‘home places’ to which people feel they belong, and which, therefore, are centrally implicated in the politics of identity.

Our designation of national homeland as place should be noted in terms of scale. Although there is a widespread tendency to equate place with the local scale, places, like spaces, can be designated at several scales. Tuan (ibid.: 149) considers places ranging from a favourite armchair to the whole Earth. There are good reasons why places are often viewed as local relating to the familiarity point above, which is most easily accomplished through micro face-to-face contacts. But there is no need to limit place creation to this one process; as we saw in Chapter 5, the nation is constituted as an ‘imagined community’, and this is what makes the homeland a place. And green campaigners have been trying to convince us for several decades to view the Earth as humanity’s one and only ‘home planet’. Although in this chapter we will focus largely upon places at the scale of experience, different scales of place should be kept in mind, and the politics of scale is all about ‘jumping scales’ and seeing how the ‘global’ is in the ‘local’ and vice versa.

Finally, we follow Tuan in arguing that the same locality can be both place and space. It all depends on the perspective of the person and their practices with respect to a given locality. For instance, for the inhabitants of a city their ‘home town’ is most definitely a place. For a professional urban planner taking a post with the local government as part of a career development, the same city is a space, a locality in which design skills may be used to make the traffic flow more quickly. When the latter practices threaten neighbourhoods with demolition, we have
the familiar ‘place–space tensions’ (Taylor 1998), which politicized planning in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Clearly, treating localities as a place instead of a space or node within economic or terrorist networks will create a very different politics from the one we described in the previous chapter.

It is not only planners who have tried to dismiss politics based on local attachment to place with disdain or even hostility. Such politics is usually attacked as standing in the way of progress, which leaves it open to a much wider critique. The politics of places is often seen as inherently reactionary in nature. By uniting in ‘place coalitions’, a selfish politics of beggar thy neighbour can easily be produced. This is most well known as the NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome, which avoids wider public considerations of equity and justice. But place-based politics need not be of this nature. We can take a much more optimistic view of how local politics can evolve. As briefly introduced in Chapter 1, the idea of a progressive place is derived from Massey’s (1994) work on places and power. Her main point is that viewing local politics as regressive stems from emphasizing the introverted and inward-looking aspects of place. But no place exists in isolation. Places exist in a complex power geometry of flow of people, commodities and information. This is Massey’s (1993: 66) ‘global’ sense of place:

The uniqueness of a place, or a locality . . . is constructed out of particular interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, experiences and understandings, in a situation of co-presence, but where a large proportion of those relations, experiences and understandings are actually constructed on a far larger scale than what we happen to define at that moment as the place itself. . . . Instead, then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings. And this in turn allows a sense of place which is extraverted, which includes a consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the global and the local.

It is in such progressive places that new politics of ethnicity, race, gender and class are being forged and which form the subject matter of this chapter. Debates over the meaning given to particular identities have developed as part of contemporary politics. For example, during the civil rights struggle, ‘negro’ as a label was rejected by political activists, who preferred the perceived dignity given by the term ‘black’. Over time, ‘black’ fell out of favour to be replaced by ‘Afro-American’ and then again by ‘African-American’ (Jackson and Penrose 1993: 16). The importance of the debates over these labels lies in the meaning given to them by both the labelled and the labellers. Defining the term by which one is referred is part of the political struggle to obtain empowerment. In addition, recognition of multiple identities has ignited political debates by problematizing the hegemony of traditional political identities, namely class and nation. The result has been a rise to prominence of identity politics as competition over the meaning and import of particular identities has challenged traditional political practices and structures.

The progressive sense of place now being adopted by political geographers reflects the belief that people can forge their own identities and, to a certain extent, futures through the construction of place. A theoretical framework that engages the interaction of structures and agents was, therefore, a necessary component in the new conceptualizations of place. This has been found in Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory, which provides the starting point for understanding the subject of this chapter.

However, both our materialist theoretical framework and our emphasis upon geographical scales require us to consider processes beyond the immediacy of specific places. What we aim to show in this chapter is the dynamism of a progressive politics of place and its linkages to dynamics at the global scale. First, we link identity politics in places to dynamics at the global scale by recourse to hegemonic cycles (Chapter 2) and the construction of new modernities by each hegemon. The historical cyclical patterns are related to current notions of identity politics via the concept of reflexive modernization – the idea that everyday decisions in contemporary society are much more individualized than in the recent past. This helps us to answer the question: why identity politics now? The next step is to explain
the types of identity politics that are currently
prominent. To do this, we resort to the key institu-
tions of the capitalist world-economy and the politics
defined by the interactions between them. Once we
have laid out our theoretical framework, we shall
exemplify it through discussion of contemporary
political conflicts.

**Summary**

In this opening section we have:

- introduced the concept of ‘place’;
- discussed how place complements the
  previous chapter’s identification of ‘locality’;
- identified how emphasis upon place provides
  a way to investigate the politics of identity.

This framework brings a focus upon the social
construction of places as a key ingredient of all
the political geographies we have discussed in
the book.

**Theorizing political action in places**

We begin with two apparently self-evident observa-
tions, but ones that lead us into the theory of politics
and place. First, political struggles occur in arenas
or, in more formal words, contexts and structures.
Second, political struggles are initiated by groups of
people or, again in formal terms, by human agency.
Influenced by the structuration theory of Anthony
Giddens, political geographers came to view places as
structures that mediated political activity while, in
turn, that political activity continually created and
recreated the place. Political geographers have seized
the opportunity provided by social theorists, such as
Giddens, and have positioned political geography
within the mainstream of social science by empha-
sizing how political actions are shaped by the places
within which they occur and, in turn, continuously
constitute the uniqueness of different places. This
approach has been termed a ‘social constructivist
view’ of place (Staeheli et al. 1997: xxix) as places are
a product of decisions made by managers of capital,
state authorities and members of civil society. We
saw examples of such processes in Chapter 7, as
different cities developed economic roles, migrants
struggled to express their identity, and some places
were constructed as hostile ‘nests’ of terrorists.

**Structuration theory**

Anthony Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory acted
as a catalyst for political geographers wishing to
understand political actions within places. Giddens
developed his structuration theory over time,
developing his own thoughts as well as responding
to critics (1984, 1990). The source of the theory
was Giddens’ frustration with two schools of
sociological thought: humanistic sociology, which
placed too much emphasis on the freedom of human
actions, and Marxist structuralism, which Giddens
felt was too deterministic (Cloke et al. 1991: 97).
Instead, structuration theory treated individuals as
knowledgeable agents while also recognizing the
constraining and enabling possibilities of power
structures and other social institutions. Giddens
developed the notion of social rules to link structures
and agents. Social rules fashion the way that people
interact in a consistent manner so that regularities
and norms of social interaction are established (ibid.:
102). These norms, which are no more than regular
human activities, become established as structures.
However, as these structures are the product of
human actions, they can also be changed in the same
way. A simple example is the regularity of family life,
with its norms of meal times and ‘table manners’.
Although these rules may be interpreted as a con-
straining structure, enterprising adolescents may find
ways of changing them.

In later development of his theory, Giddens placed
further emphasis on the role of time and space.
Following Hägerstrand’s (1982) time geography,
the idea that people had regular paths in their
daily lives was incorporated into structuration
theory. Furthermore, these paths were structured
by resources and institutions. Hägerstrand’s time
geography ignored the role of power relations in
shaping people’s everyday lives, but the addition of
structuration theory rectifies this glaring omission.
For example, poor women in rural areas of the United States are often frustrated in their efforts to find employment because of their needs to find childcare and cheap and convenient public transport. Giddens (1984) also noted that not only is the routine of everyday life influenced by people and institutions that the individual has contact with in immediate time and space, but also that that interconnectivity includes relationships across broader expanses of time and space. With this, we can relate Giddens’ abstract theory to the daily pressures of globalization and Massey’s (1993) notion of progressive places. People’s lives are structured by norms and institutions that are obviously features of the places within which they experience their everyday lives. But social practices are also structured by more distant and intangible relationships. For example, the norms and rules of nationalism are embedded in our everyday lives by structures that are quite abstract and dependent upon a long-term view of history and community. In addition, the nature of our everyday life depends upon whether we are lucky enough to be living in the core rather than in the periphery of the capitalist world-economy. The time spent on leisure activities rather than searching for household fuel is structured by the three-tier hierarchy of the world-economy.

Structural definitions of place

Our discussion of structuration theory emphasizes its compatibility with our treatment of geographical scales. But much more importantly, the introduction of a structure/agency dynamic has fundamentally changed our understanding of human action within places. Structuration theory showed that human actions are structured in everyday and place-specific contexts and how the routinized nature of these actions reproduce these contexts. As a result, context is conceptualized as being ‘structural’ rather than ‘compositional’ (Thrift 1983). That is to say, the influence of places was not a simple effect of their content or composition; rather, the nature of places is integral to social change. For example, in the case of electoral geography, context could no longer be seen as merely the relationship of particular variables (such as, say, the percentage of people in public housing) to a voting pattern. Instead, place was interpreted as a structure, a context that both mediated the voting decision and was a product of that decision. Socialization within place, for instance, predisposed someone to be a supporter of the Conservative or Republican Party and, in turn, the political hue of a place was part of its character, a structure continuously being reproduced, or contested, by predisposed agents. We illustrate this further in a case study of Nazi voting patterns in inter-war Germany below.

John Agnew, in his Place and Politics (1987), identified the components of place that lead to an expectation of place-specific political behaviour. In other words, if places are unique then we should expect different forms of political behaviour in different places. The propensity to strike, or to vote Republican or Conservative, or to participate in local government, is likely to vary because of the institutionalized political history of different places. Agnew saw place as comprising three features: location, locale and sense of place. Location is the role that a place plays in the world-economy, its industrial base or geopolitical role, for example. Locale refers to the institutionalized setting of a place (traditions of unionism or Catholicism, perhaps), which permeates most aspects of life, including politics. Sense of place is the essence of a place-specific identity, which gives coherence and meaning to the actions of its inhabitants.

The combination of identity, local institutions and global linkages is also a feature of Massey’s (1994) notion of place. Place is the setting for a dynamic set of social interrelationships: relationships that extend beyond the particular place but interact within a particular setting. The specific variety of relationships, and the unique way in which they interact, produce the particularity of place. In addition, the dynamism of the social relationships suggests that places change while retaining their uniqueness. Massey (1994) reflects upon her place of home, Kilburn in north London. Looking down the high street, she sees the shops and clubs servicing different waves of immigrants, Irish and south Asian. The migrants illustrate the role of linkages across the space of the world-economy that come together to form a particular place.
Place and identity politics

Nazi social construction of places, 1924–32

Following Agnew and Massey, place is both dynamic and ‘extra-local’ in scope. This is a fertile definition of place in that it can be used as a framework for a variety of political geographic analyses. For example, the task of quantitative electoral geography is to conceptualize these notions of place so that they can be included in the statistical analysis of voting behaviour. Electoral geography becomes a dynamic analysis of place and the activities of social groups. What we should expect to see are patterns of voting behaviour that reflect the components of place put forward by Agnew (1987) and Massey (1994), namely place-specific political behaviour derived from ‘extra-local’ connections.

Analysis of the electoral support for Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party in inter-war Germany exemplifies these points. Initially, the Nazi Party’s electoral support was quite insignificant but then grew rapidly as economic conditions deteriorated within the context of the stagnation associated with Kondratieff IIIB (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). B-phases are periods of economic restructuring when new core economic processes are replacing the once cutting-edge industries being peripheralized (see Chapter 1). Places whose links with the world-economy are established through the new profitable industries will enable better life opportunities than those dominated by the declining and stagnating industries. Kondratieff IIIB was also a period of geopolitical competition (see Chapter 2) during which the United States and Germany were competing with each other to replace Britain as the hegemonic power. In a global context of economic restructuring and political competition, it is not surprising that the Nazi Party became so popular. The full name of the Nazi Party was the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, from which it can be gleaned that nationalism and populist anti-capitalism were important components of its manifesto. Table 8.1 shows the dramatic rise of the party’s electoral support over time. The electoral support for the Nazi party grew rapidly from an insignificant 2.6 per cent of the total vote in 1928 to 37.3 per cent in the election of July 1932. The surge in the party’s popularity reflects the growing economic dislocation being experienced by the German people, while the earlier periods of minimal electoral support occurred during periods of economic optimism. However, this broad context set by the political and economic cycles of the capitalist world-economy only explains the Nazi Party’s support to a limited extent. Despite its extreme nationalist rhetoric, the attraction of the Nazi Party was never evenly spread across the national space. The next step therefore is to explain the place-specific nature of the Nazi Party vote within Germany.

Figure 8.1 maps the electoral support for the Nazi Party in the Reichstag (parliament) election of 1930. The triangles pointing upwards represent clustering of counties that voted strongly for the party. Triangles pointing downwards represent pockets of counties where the vote for the party was exceptionally low. The larger the triangles, the greater the magnitude of the clustering. By reference to Figure 8.2, we can identify regions of strong support for and strict opposition to the Nazi Party. This pattern is explained by both the role that a place plays in the world-economy, or Agnew’s location, and its institutional setting, or locale. First, the regions’ economic linkages to the capitalist world-economy go a long way to explaining the pattern of support. For example, Schleswig-Holstein and Oldenburg were agricultural regions of the north-west, heavily dependent upon livestock farming. The farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Nazi social construction of places, 1924–32

Following Agnew and Massey, place is both dynamic and ‘extra-local’ in scope. This is a fertile definition of place in that it can be used as a framework for a variety of political geographic analyses. For example, the task of quantitative electoral geography is to conceptualize these notions of place so that they can be included in the statistical analysis of voting behaviour. Electoral geography becomes a dynamic analysis of place and the activities of social groups. What we should expect to see are patterns of voting behaviour that reflect the components of place put forward by Agnew (1987) and Massey (1994), namely place-specific political behaviour derived from ‘extra-local’ connections.

Analysis of the electoral support for Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party in inter-war Germany exemplifies these points. Initially, the Nazi Party’s electoral support was quite insignificant but then grew rapidly as economic conditions deteriorated within the context of the stagnation associated with Kondratieff IIIB (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). B-phases are periods of economic restructuring when new core economic processes are replacing the once cutting-edge industries being peripheralized (see Chapter 1). Places whose links with the world-economy are established through the new profitable industries will enable better life opportunities than those dominated by the declining and stagnating industries. Kondratieff IIIB was also a period of geopolitical competition (see Chapter 2) during which the United States and Germany were competing with each other to replace Britain as the hegemonic power. In a global context of economic restructuring and political competition, it is not surprising that the Nazi Party became so popular. The full name of the Nazi Party was the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, from which it can be gleaned that nationalism and populist anti-capitalism were important components of its manifesto. Table 8.1 shows the dramatic rise of the party’s electoral support over time. The electoral support for the Nazi party grew rapidly from an insignificant 2.6 per cent of the total vote in 1928 to 37.3 per cent in the election of July 1932. The surge in the party’s popularity reflects the growing economic dislocation being experienced by the German people, while the earlier periods of minimal electoral support occurred during periods of economic optimism. However, this broad context set by the political and economic cycles of the capitalist world-economy only explains the Nazi Party’s support to a limited extent. Despite its extreme nationalist rhetoric, the attraction of the Nazi Party was never evenly spread across the national space. The next step therefore is to explain the place-specific nature of the Nazi Party vote within Germany.

Figure 8.1 maps the electoral support for the Nazi Party in the Reichstag (parliament) election of 1930. The triangles pointing upwards represent clustering of counties that voted strongly for the party. Triangles pointing downwards represent pockets of counties where the vote for the party was exceptionally low. The larger the triangles, the greater the magnitude of the clustering. By reference to Figure 8.2, we can identify regions of strong support for and strict opposition to the Nazi Party. This pattern is explained by both the role that a place plays in the world-economy, or Agnew’s location, and its institutional setting, or locale. First, the regions’ economic linkages to the capitalist world-economy go a long way to explaining the pattern of support. For example, Schleswig-Holstein and Oldenburg were agricultural regions of the north-west, heavily dependent upon livestock farming. The farmers

**Table 8.1** Percentage change in the Nazi Party vote between consecutive Reichstag elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1924/December 1924</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1924/May 1928</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1928/September 1930</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1930/July 1932</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1932/November 1932</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1932/March 1933</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Hamilton (1982).
perceived themselves to be adversely affected by the pre-Nazi government’s agricultural policy, which advocated the importation of food, especially from Denmark, as well as by high interest rates and the high cost of fertilizers and electricity (Brustein 1993: 179). The Nazis’ agrarian programme addressed these issues and, consequently, generated rural support. The social context of the voter was also of importance in determining their vote. Support for the Nazi Party’s policy of compulsory inheritance of farmland by the oldest son was strong in the north-west because this custom was already practised in the region, and the National Socialists added the promise of resettlement of disinherited farmers’ sons in eastern Germany (ibid.: 69). The intersection of the trade and inheritance issues illustrates how both the material and institutional components of place, and their ‘extra-local’ connections, fostered a context for Nazi Party support in north-west Germany.

A social constructivist (Staeheli et al. 1997) view of place requires more than an understanding of the relevance of the Nazi Party’s manifesto to place-specific concerns. Party supporters had to
generate electoral support, and in doing so they created the geography of the Nazi Party vote (Flint 1998). For example, in Baden the party’s support in the Reichstag elections of 1924 was restricted to the northern part of the province. In the initial period of growth, between 1928 and 1930, the party undertook a saturation campaign, with its members disseminating leaflets from lorries and cars and organizing rallies across the whole of Baden. Its intention was to forge a space of political power across all of the region by attracting supporters from a broad spectrum of social classes. However, the party’s support in the Reichstag election of 1930 was geographically bifurcated. In the north of Baden, the Nazis attracted support from blue-collar workers, but in the south its support was white-collar. By 1932, sustained organizational efforts by Nazi activists accomplished the party’s goal of cross-class support across the whole of Baden (Flint 1998). The activity of the Nazi Party had, over time, constructed a homogeneous electorate within Baden by expanding its social appeal through extending its geographical reach.

The example of the Nazi Party in Baden illustrates a number of points. First, by using social theories about the social construction of place in conjunction with a quantitative analysis of voting data, electoral geography becomes a tool in identifying how contexts and places influence the behaviour of individuals. The purpose is not the mapping and counting of votes but to use the geographical distribution of those votes to investigate how places mediate political behaviour. Second, the politics of identity in place is a dynamic process in which the manufacture of political identity requires the construction of spaces of power. Finally, this particular example offers a word of warning about a progressive sense of place. Although progressive political activists may be able to use extra-local linkages to advance their positions, so also may reactionary politicians to replicate past Nazi uses of geography.

Figure 8.2 Historical–cultural regions of Germany.
Modernity and the politics of identity

Both Massey and Agnew lead us to consider structures at a variety of scales. Human agency is simultaneously mediated by local institutions and norms, state authorized practices and global imperatives. Our multi-scale framework demands a more explicit linkage to the global structure, the capitalist world-economy. Recourse to the space–time matrix introduced in Chapter 1 suggests that the current growth of interest in identity politics may be a product of global dynamics. In other words, can Kondratieff waves and hegemonic cycles help us to understand why identity politics has become of both great political importance and academic interest? To suggest an answer we need to explore further the nature of the hegemonic cycles we introduced in Chapter 2. Following Wallerstein (1984a), we have thus far emphasized the political-economic aspects of world hegemony, but in other contexts the concept of hegemony has a much more cultural meaning. This ‘cultural hegemony’ is no less political, of course. The basis of this conception can be found in the work of the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci in the 1920s and 1930s. His hegemony was about a dominant group providing political and intellectual leadership within a state to enable it to rule largely by consensus rather than coercion. That is to say, the rulers are able not only to set a generally agreed political agenda but also to provide the basic assumptions that define how all others within the state form their politics. Hence the dictum that ‘the ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling class’. In world-systems analysis, this model is transferred to the system level, hence ‘world’ hegemony, so that the ruling ideas of the world-system are the ideas of the hegemonic state, at least during periods of high hegemony. Thus, for instance, it can be said that the twentieth century was the ‘American century’. It is this aspect of world hegemony that we develop at this stage of our argument. In the first section, we introduce the idea of prime modernities as the cultural face of world hegemonies. This historical excursion is a necessary backcloth to an understanding of the contemporary nature of modernity – reflexive modernity – which is directly implicated in the rise of the politics of identity.

Hegemony and modernity

Being and becoming modern has been a major force for change by both societies and individuals. Whether construed as a ‘mass need’ of a people trying to modernize their society (the hallmark of nationalism as we saw in Chapter 5) or a personal need to be seen as ‘up to date’ by wearing the latest fashion, the idea of the modern is almost universally seen in a positive light. Millions of individuals over many decades, and even centuries, have striven to ‘join the modern world’, either by migrating to ‘new’ places – cities or foreign countries – or by changing their home place to make it ‘more modern’. It is the major unexamined concept of our world; taken for granted because that is simply what our world is: modern. Popular faith in the modern is so strong that it is usual to treat particularly unpleasant contemporary events as not modern. For instance, in recent years the mass murders in Bosnia and Rwanda have been labelled ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘ethnic genocide’, respectively, and interpreted as throwbacks to premodern times, presumably on the grounds that modern cannot be ‘barbaric’. But if we live in the modern world, these must be modern events (Taylor 1999).

Place and identity politics

Summary

In this section we have discussed:

- structuration theory and its use by geographers;
- a structural definition of place to explain the role places play in socializing particular identity politics.

The structural definition of place builds upon social theory to identify the elements of places that make them unique and socialize their occupants in unique ways. However, places should not be seen as a separate scale but as situated within a wider whole. It is to the wider whole we now turn.
In recent years, social scientists have come to unveil the popular mask of what is the modern. In path-breaking work, the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1989) has taught us that the Holocaust was a modern policy of a modern state based upon modern planning using modern transport, modern chemistry and modern machinery. Evidently, ‘modern’ incorporates mass murder as well as the latest fashions. It is incredibly ambiguous: ‘a double-edged phenomenon’ in the words of Giddens (1990). This makes definition very difficult, but we can proceed by focusing on the associated concept of modernity. Modernity may be interpreted as the concrete face of being modern; the condition of modernity describes the nature of modern society (Taylor 1999). The ‘double edge’ of this condition is simultaneous tendencies towards rapid change and controlled order. To experience the modern is to live with perpetual structural change, but as modern people we are forever trying to control this change to make life liveable (Berman 1983). In short, we try to tame incessant modern change through projects, both personal and political, to build stability. Such projects come in many forms and sizes, and many are territorial in nature. That is to say, the strategy is to protect people within a defined locale. Two well-known examples are national planning and home making. National planning attempts to create stability through protection from the uncertainties of the world market, and creating a home is to make a haven from the stresses and pressures of the labour market.

How does this relate to hegemonic powers? Quite simply, hegemons are the sources of major economic restructurings of the world-economy, which unleash massive social change and uncertainty into the world-system. As new economic developments associated with the hegemon begin to spread across the world, the hegemon also creates a means of dealing with the consequent social changes. Thus, as well as destroying old lifestyles and jobs, new opportunities arise in the form of a different matrix of lifestyles and jobs. In other words, hegemons are inventors of new modernities in terms of both new social changes and new ways to deal with those changes. Hence there is a cultural contribution; hegemonic states are much more than simply the location of the most efficient economies of their time.

**Prime modernities**

The position we have taken above involves identifying multiple modernities. This is counter to most popular and social science interpretations, which treat modernity as a singular concept: there has been only one modernity, and that is industrial society. In fact, modern society and industrial society have commonly been treated as synonyms. We overturn this legacy here. Modern societies come in many forms, of which industrial society is just one, albeit a very important one. There have been overt state planning exercises to create new modern worlds, such as in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and latterly in the Soviet Union. Less planned but much more influential, the modernities that have emanated from the activities of, and within, hegemonic states have ultimately become system-wide. These are therefore the prime modernities of the modern world-system: Dutch-led mercantile modernity, British-led industrial modernity and US-led consumer modernity.

Notice that the three prime modernities have each emphasized one aspect of the overall process of capital accumulation: exchange in mercantile modernity; production in industrial modernity; and consumption in consumer modernity. This is not to suggest that each modernity involved just the one aspect of the process. That would be impossible – to realize any capital investment there must be production and exchange and consumption. Rather, we identify the cutting edge of the economic restructuring, the process where the key innovations were occurring to make the new modernity a distinctive new form of society. New competences in navigation and trade enabled the Dutch to create mercantile modernity; new competences in machines and engineering enabled the British to create industrial modernity; and new competences in communication and advertising enabled the Americans to create consumer modernity. Of course, these were very complex developments, which involved much more than these processes, but the essence of the changes can be gleaned from this tripartite model of modernities.
The key point about these modernities is that their origins are geographically precise. They are places, locations that come to epitomize how we think of the modern. Thus our images of these different modernities derive concretely from real historical panoramas. For mercantile modernity, the harbour of Amsterdam, full of ships’ masts sticking up into the sky, as represented on many early prints, was the wonder of its age and represents what it was to be modern in the seventeenth century. In Britain, the ‘dark satanic mills’ of the textile industry in northern England, in which new production and new urbanization created the first modern industrial regions, represent how we still view industrial modernity. Finally, the image of consumer modernity is much more wholesome: suburbia was designed as the antithesis of the industrial town, the smoke and grime replaced by houses with gardens and car access to the ubiquitous shopping mall. These three images represent three distinct modern experiences that have dominated lives and lifestyles during successive hegemonic cycles. As such they are the ultimate progressive places of their respective eras.

Places of the future
Defining the hegemonic states as ‘laboratories of modernity’ (Taylor 1996) implies a cultural position with profound political effects. If being modern is widely seen as a positive attribute, then other states will want to copy the new practices being developed within the hegemonic country. Such emulation is how these modernities convert from being local to system-wide, to becoming prime modernities. But this is not a series of simple preferences to become modern; there is an imperative operating at the centre of the process. The economic success of the hegemon illustrates new opportunities, which other states will ignore at their peril. As arch-progressive places, hegemons represent the future, and this means that other states have to emulate or else miss out on the future. Not to emulate is to remain stagnant in a mire of traditionalism, to be old-fashioned and, above all, to be non-competitive. Hence the invention of a prime modernity leads to a procession of other states attempting to ‘catch up’.

Defining the future of others is an immense cultural power. The whole system comes to resemble aspects of the hegemon writ large. As such, it is much more than a political process defined at the state level. Through prime modernities, hegemonic power penetrates the everyday lives of people throughout the world-system. There is a common terminology for the way in which this process operated with each hegemon. Emulating the Dutch has come to be called mercantilism, emulating the British industrialization, and emulating the United States is called, more pedantically, Americanization. Let us look briefly at these three processes.

In response to the Dutch golden age of economic success, both the English and the French devised state policies that attempted to stimulate economic growth in their territories at the expense of the Dutch. For instance, Oliver Cromwell’s government in 1651 passed the Navigation Acts, which limited shipping in English ports to just carriers from the two countries engaged in the trade. This banned intermediate carriers, notably the great Dutch merchant fleet. However, the best example of emulation at this time came from Russia. Tsar Peter the Great actually worked incognito in a Dutch shipyard in the late seventeenth century in order to learn the secrets of the new world that the Dutch had created. When he returned to Russia, he built St Petersburg to act, in part, as a great new mercantile city on the Baltic, a new Amsterdam as Russia’s ‘window on the West’. Berman (1983) identifies this as the first example of a ‘non-western’ country attempting to ‘catch up’ through a state development policy.

With the Industrial Revolution came industrial espionage. Many of the new industrial practices pioneered in Britain had critical military implications. Without the latest military hardware, states had much more to lose than simply failing to catch up. But as the nineteenth century unfolded, emulation became much more open, culminating in the Great Exhibition of 1851, where Britain laid out its industrial wares for the rest of the world to marvel at. This was a period when industrialists from Europe and the United States visited England, specifically northern England, to learn how to manufacture in the new way. They wanted to build ‘new Manchesters’ in their own
countries. Manchester became the ‘shock city’ of the age, ‘the centre of modern life’ (Briggs 1963: 94). According to Arblaster (1984: 260), it came to represent ‘the essence of modernity . . . the place to which people came to see the future’.

In the twentieth century, the United States had taken over as world ‘role model’, but in this case you did not necessarily have to visit the country to see the future. Images of American suburbia were portrayed in, first, Hollywood films, and then American TV programmes to become known the world over. These set the standards to which ordinary people aspire, and suburbs appeared around cities in countries that had long resisted such expansion. When people did visit the United States, they knew exactly what they were seeing. As one Italian immigrant described it:

What interested me in the United States . . . was the ‘modern’ concept, in which all things seemed to be done in a revolutionary ‘modern’ way. Everything was the product of fresh thinking, from the foundations up. Everything had been ‘improved’, and was continually being improved from day to day, almost from hour to hour. The restlessness, mobility, the increased quest for something better impressed me.

(Barzini 1959: 73)

But, alongside this incessant change, there was a new stability. A Swiss observer identified the haven that Americans built for this new modernity:

This America of everyday life is simple and accessible. . . . It is a modern land where technical ingenuity is apparent at every point, in the equipment of the kitchen as well as of the car, but at the same time a land of gardens, of flowers, of home activities, where a man, away from his office or his work-place, enjoys tinkering at his bench, making a piece of furniture, repainting his house, repairing a fence, or mowing his lawn. A land of luxury but also of simple pleasures.

(Freymond 1959: 84)

This was the America of the ‘affluent society, of the good life, the seed and kernel of the future’ (Broughton 1959: 263). It is this ‘American Dream’ as ‘world dream’ that is consumer modernity.

Ordinary modernity

J. K. Galbraith (1958) described the ‘affluent society’ as something unique in the history of humanity. The world pioneered by the United States was creating a society where ordinary men and women not only aspired to the good life but actually lived it. In 1950s United States, high wages meant not only that American families could buy the new consumer durables – washing machines, refrigerators, TVs etc. – but they could also buy the house in which they were to be located. Consumer modernity relied on this congruence between mass production and mass consumption. Although we agree with Galbraith that this was indeed a novel historical situation, the roots of this affluent society are to be found within the two other prime modernities.

We use the term ‘ordinary modernity’ to describe the common everyday features of the prime modernities. We derive this generic term covering all three hegemons by focusing on the cultural similarities between the three modernities. Put simply, the three prime modernities have incorporated in their make-up a specific cultural celebration of ordinariness (Taylor 1996). We can see this when Dutch genre painting is compared with other art in early modern Europe. Whereas the latter portrays the great and celestial – kings, nobility, Bible scenes, angels – Dutch art depicted scenes of ordinary Dutch life – taverns, burghers, homes, streets. Similarly, the English novel represents another cultural art form that celebrates the trials and tribulations of ordinary lives. From Jane Austen to the great Victorian novelists such as Charles Dickens, their stories continue to resonate with us today because they are so ‘modern’ in their concerns. And, of course, America has pioneered popular cinema. Not for Hollywood the ‘arty’ highbrow productions of the European cinema; American films always included a high proportion of images portraying, in a non-patronizing manner, ordinary people living ordinary lives. Their subliminal message was that the good life, suburban living, was possible for all.

Hence we see that the thread of ordinary modernity leads to consumerism. There is a sort of logic to this, but mass consumption is not its final destination. Ordinary modernity was expressed in practice
through individual tastes within the home. Invented as a private family space by the Dutch, it was marked from the beginning by an individuality (Rybczynski 1986). That is to say, every home was different in detail, reflecting a family’s preferences in furniture and decor. This individuality came to a head with the Victorian English love of ‘nick-nacks’ in their homes (Briggs 1988) – we still think of Victorian homes as excessively cluttered. Mass production involves standardized products, and therefore mass consumption did not immediately reflect this individuality. There was some choice between products of different companies, but one suburban home tended to look very much like another. However, consumer modernity has evolved to begin to fully express individuality. Generally, the range of products available to purchase has grown out of all proportion to the recent past, with much niche marketing on top of this. Consumption today is mass in numbers, not in its nature. On the way, it has even generated a ‘consumer movement’ to protect consumers as individuals against the large corporations as producers. This is an indicator of a new reflexive modernity, which is, in part at least, the culmination of ordinary modernity.

**Reflexive modernization**

Reflexive modernity is a concept coined by Ulrich Beck (1994) to represent the uncertainties and fears

---

**Case study**

**Religious fundamentalism as modernity**

For most of the twentieth century there has been a common assumption that religion would continue to decline as society became more and more secular. Thus one of the great surprises of the late twentieth century was the resurgence of religious belief in many parts of the world. Within this resurgence there were some who have come to be called fundamentalists, a militant religiosity which, according to Armstrong (2004: ix), rejects many of the positive values of modernity: ‘democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech or the separation of church and state’. Instead they have ‘gunned down worshippers in a mosque, have killed doctors and nurses who work in abortion clinics, have shot their presidents, and have even toppled a powerful government’, not to mention 9/11. Given their adherence to ‘tradition’ (see the following case study on fundamentalism and globalization), fundamentalists are sometimes seen as a throwback to ‘medieval’ times. Nothing could be further from the truth: they are thoroughly modern.

The spiritual lives of premodern people were distinctively different from those of modern people. Armstrong (2004: xiii) argues that they evolved two ways of thinking and constructing knowledge: *Mythos* and *Logos*. Both were necessary and complemented each other.

*Mythos* was timeless knowledge of values, the foundations of culture, to make sense of day-to-day lives. *Logos* was practical knowledge, how to navigate day-to-day lives. *Mythos* did not demand ‘proof’: it was just how things were. *Logos* was functional and therefore had to be rational. For Armstrong, modernity has lost the sense of *Mythos* and the basis of modern society is *Logos* (ibid.: xiv).

Fundamentalists are modern because they have accepted the scientific rationality of modernity. If the latter provides ‘truth’ then the *Mythos* of faith has to be turned into a contradictory *Logos* of faith. The emphasis on the literalism of holy texts – treating them as *Logos* rather than *Mythos* – is wholly a modern reaction to the assault of modernization on religion. Counting back events to find the exact date of the Creation treats the Bible as a text of modern history. Such activity would not be countenanced in a premodern culture, where history was valued for its meanings, portraying timeless realities not specific real events. Thus creationism or intelligent design is as modern as the theory of evolution – debate is conducted on *Logos* grounds. It is in this sense that religious fundamentalisms are modern and integral to contemporary globalization.

*The interested reader is directed to Armstrong (2004) for more detailed discussion of the issue.*
facing people today, which, in turn, force them to challenge traditional politics and identities. Beck argues that we are currently in a new form of modernity, which he calls the risk society. What sociologists have traditionally called ‘industrial society’ Beck sees as developing in an unplanned manner, thus ultimately threatening the very survival of our planet. Global warming, toxic waste and nuclear catastrophes are all products of the capitalist world-economy that cause us to reflect upon our roles as producers and consumers. Risks, in this context, are challenges and uncertainties created by the imperative of capital accumulation and the growth of industry. The myriad of risks currently facing us (from the decline of the nuclear family, to crime in the city, to fear of terrorism right up through global ecological catastrophe) forces us to challenge the institutions of industrial society. The magnitude of the perceived threats leads to a questioning of the efficacy of the underlying assumptions of industrial society: in business, law and science, for example. As a result of the questioning of established institutions, collective and group meanings based upon the institutions are suffering from exhaustion. For example, questioning the underlying assumptions of business challenges the once universal ideology of progress.

This provocative theory is very relevant to our concerns here. However, it derives from a simpler view of modernity than the one we have advanced. Apart from the contemporary situation, Beck conflates industrial society with modern society. Hence his multiple modernities extend to only two cases: ‘old’ industrial modernity, which includes our consumer modernity, and the ‘new’ reflexive modernity of his risk society. This need not stop us using his ideas, however – as we noted in the previous section, we can derive the reflexivity from developments in consumer modernity as a culmination of ordinary modernity. However, we shall focus on the idea of post-traditional derived from Beck’s co-author Anthony Giddens (Beck et al. 1994).

The post-traditional condition

The challenges to authority that Beck theorizes occur across a wide range of institutions. The professions are particularly vulnerable to this process because their position relies on their claim to specialized knowledge. But this ‘expertise’ is no defence, because the ‘consumer movement’ has extended way beyond retailing: teachers are challenged by parents and pupils, doctors are challenged by patients, lawyers are challenged by their clients, and architects are challenged by everyone. Giddens calls this rise of individual assertion and concomitant decline of traditional authority the ‘post-traditional condition’. One manifestation is the rejection of science of global climate change by government officials in the US. In 2017, key members of President Trump’s administration (especially Rick Perry, secretary of energy, and Scott Pruitt, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency) were ‘climate skeptics’ – meaning that they did not see global climate change as being primarily caused by human actions. Their denial of the Anthropocene, or a geopolitical context driven by human’s ability to alter the environment through, especially, the burning of fossil fuels (Dalby 2013, forthcoming), had a clear policy agenda: protecting the interests of the coal and oil industries. The point is that such a political story could be sold to certain segments of the US electorate because of a challenge to the authority of science and the idea of objective policy based upon scientific analysis.

Individuals are more assertive because they are more reflexive; instead of taking social knowledge for granted, they interrogate it and decide how it relates to their individual needs and concerns before accepting or rejecting an idea. Giddens (1994) calls the resulting social reflexivity ‘a world of clever people’ (italics in the original), by which he means not that contemporary people are more intelligent than their forebears but rather that they are more informed. This means that they are more able to challenge traditional argument, that may, in some cases, include the authority of ‘science’, as in the case of rejecting evidence of human-induced global climate change. This situation is called post-traditional because it is not conducive to the reproduction of tradition of any kind. All tradition relies on acceptance of a taken-for-granted truth as specified by some authority such as custom or experts. Social reflexivity requires each tradition, used to simply asserting its position, to justify it instead.
The best example of the effect of this condition is the rise of so-called fundamentalism. According to Giddens (1994), this term is of recent origin and refers to assertion of traditional truths in a self-reflexive world. Before reflexive modernity, such assertions were either accepted by the faithful or ignored by the rest. Under conditions of globalization, by bringing groups together that were geographically separated, the new reflexivity can be particularly subversive. Centuries of asserting truth may now be

---

**Case study**

**Fundamentalism, globalization and post-traditional society**

We cannot understand contemporary political geography without having some grasp of what fundamentalisms are. Giddens (1994) provides a useful introduction that fits in well with our ideas on globalization in the modern world-system.

For Giddens (ibid.: 100), fundamentalism is simply ‘embattled tradition’. Traditions are the enduring mores and beliefs through which we give meaning to our lives. As ‘collective memories’ they provide integrity and continuity to help cope with ‘the buffeting of change’. Religions are the sacred core of traditional thinking. But in the modern world-system change is especially severe so that modernity has become a great eroder of traditions. This has come to a head in the twenty-first century when the erosion has threatened to become fully global. Thus, according to Giddens, we live not in a ‘postmodern society’ but in a ‘post-traditional society’.

Tradition transmutes into fundamentalism in post-traditional society. In the past, practices relating to traditions constructed spaces of places, ‘holy places’ – Rome, Jerusalem, Mecca – plus the land of the believers – Christendom, the ‘land of Israel’, Islam. There were always some mixture of peoples with different traditions, but by and large religions were able to keep to themselves and reproduce their traditions without too much threat. Globalization has changed all this, especially the current form of corporate globalization. This is a world where spaces of flows are dominant. Multiple diasporas, new media and communications, cultures of consumption and other ‘post-traditional’ practices have enhanced the erosion of tradition to intolerable levels for believers. With the modern world ‘in your face’ as it were, and with nowhere to turn – you cannot get outside globalization – the simplest recourse is a violent reaction against the perpetrators. They show no respect for tradition, so the fundamentalist shows no respect for their modernity: each violates the other.

Note that this is not a ‘clash of civilizations’ argument: Huntington’s (1993) model is a divided world, a space of places. Giddens’ globalization is all about the violation of those traditional places by new spaces of flows. Although post 9/11 associated with Islam, examples of violent fundamentalisms, can be found in all traditions and religions in their reactions to the ‘wrongs’ of modernity. Thus, bombing of abortion clinics by Christian fundamentalists is an example, as is the non-religious attack on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City by ‘patriots’ wanting to return to a simpler traditional life. In gender relations the violent reactions of men against women is another example of violence in a post-traditional society. The demise of the ‘traditional family’ leaves men losing their ‘due respect’ expected from a partner. In this case the traditional hierarchical place that was the home is violated by feminist ideas of gender equality.

Traditions were largely based on religious coda, national myths, and the ability of ruling classes of states to set a political agenda that maintained their authority. The importance of trans-national businesses in a time of corporate globalization means that a new actor, one driven only by profit-margins, is disrupting and manipulating traditions and creating new ways for people to think of themselves in the world. The question is whether the promises of the fictions used in advertising campaigns provide a sense of comfort or confusion compared to the enduring stories spun by religions and nationalisms.

For more on this argument the interested reader is directed to Giddens (1994).
under threat, not just from the outside but also from the inside as new communications penetrate all. In these circumstances, some traditions have reacted by internal purification and external aggression. This reaction seems to be worldwide and is most familiar as ‘religious fundamentalism’: Christian, Hindu, Jewish or Muslim (Juergensmeyer 2000). But it occurs in other contexts, such as the American ‘patriot’ movement and the ‘men’s movement’, which tries to restore the patriarchy of the family. Unable to accommodate to a new world of dialogue, targeting of ordinary people has become acceptable in a politics of hate. Such violence is manifest in terrorism sponsored by religious extremism. It is also evident across social-media platforms that create ‘shock jock’ radio personalities spewing vitriol, as well as interpersonal violence of cyber-bullying. These are examples of the reactive side of the new politics of identity that reflexive modernization ushered in, potentially undermining the fabric of our national communities.

Social reflexivity and multiple identities

The key process in the rise of identity politics for Beck (1994) is individualization, in which the old certainties of ‘industrial society’ are replaced by a desire to find and invent new certainties. Specifically, the once-standard mainstays of identity (class, family, gender) are replaced by a personal biography, which we choose ourselves. Hence identity no longer becomes something given to us by our assigned statuses (class, family, gender) but becomes a more reflexive matter of choice. This is reflexive modernization. The challenges and uncertainties imposed by the risk society lead to a constant evaluation of political and social choices. Choosing a series of multiple identities is one form of politics aimed at charting a course through the risk society.

In this way, we can see how Beck provides a plausible explanation for the current growth of interest in identity politics. His ideas of risk society and reflexive modernization reflect the concerns for globalization and hegemonic change within world-systems theory. But what of the politics of identity-in-place (Cope 1996)? Beck (1994) goes on to talk about how the ‘political vacuity’ of the institutions of industrial society is causing a growth of politics in non-institutional settings. A ‘sub-politics’ is emerging, denoted by the importance of citizens groups and grass-roots organizations whose political activities are extra-parliamentary. Furthermore, these new political groups are not tied to classes or parties. However, the move from mainstream political institutions to ‘extra-parliamentary’ activities is a gradual one. Individuals still participate in the old institutions and forms of politics, but they also engage in new activities based upon new identities.

In other words, people leave their traditional political affiliations in a piecemeal fashion. Hence each individual will possess contradictory and multiple political beliefs and goals. Again, we can see through Beck’s ideas why identity politics has become an imperative component of political geography. It is also a form of politics that has global concerns but is grounded in unique places, for sub-politics means shaping society from below (Beck 1994: 22) as it is driven by agents outside the political system through both individual and collective acts. It seems that now, more than ever, it is politics within places that construct the broader mosaics of state and global politics.

Summary

In this section we have introduced the terms ‘modernity’ and ‘prime modernity’ to situate the politics of identity within the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. We:

- made a connection between hegemony and modernity;
- introduced the concept of prime modernity;
- noted the relationship between the construction and meaning of particular places and prime modernity;
- introduced the concept of reflexive modernization to illustrate that political identity is fluid and often formed in resistance to power structures;
- introduced the concept of the post-traditional condition;
Identity politics and the institutions of the capitalist world-economy

Now that we have established a connection between global trends and the growth of locally based identity politics, we can use our materialist framework to distinguish some of the parameters of the new politics within places. Such a taxonomy is bound to be incomplete because, as Beck argues, politics is being continually defined by the agent. However, we are currently in a transition period in which traditional political attachments still hold some sway. More importantly, the new politics of identity both challenges and cross-cuts older institutions. By identifying the key institutions in the capitalist world-economy, we can uncover some of the initial battlegrounds of new locally based sub-politics.

As we described in Chapter 1, Wallerstein (1984a) has identified four key institutions in the capitalist world-economy: classes, states, ‘peoples’ and households. All of the institutions are ambiguous in that they can be both liberating and repressive. For example, the state can crack down on civil liberties but also provide resources for education and social mobility. Such ambiguity has always characterized these institutions, but we can expect it to be particularly enhanced under conditions of reflexive modernization. Individuals or groups can view the institutions as either enabling or constraining, depending upon the particular ‘risk’ that they are challenging. To make sense of the cacophony of political battle cries and the dynamic mosaic of identities, in the first subsection below we produce a taxonomy of many different political geographies derived from the four institutions (Taylor 1991b). In the second subsection, we use some of these new political geographies to illustrate new politics of identity.

Fourteen political geographies

In many contexts, both popular and academic, politics is conceived of as being limited to practices relating to the state: elections and wars, welfare reform and tax policies; these are the stuff of politics. Such a position was never really tenable, which is why we have adopted the wider view that politics is about power within whatever arena. Today, more than ever, we have to look beyond the state to fully understand the political geography of our times. States still provide much of the ‘stuff of politics’, but there is much more to politics than this single institution. Using Wallerstein’s four key institutions, we can identify 14 different politics.

First, there are four *intra-institutional politics*, or politics within the separate institutions:

1. Intra-state politics, or the competition for government. This is what political science focuses upon.
2. Intra-peoples conflict includes a whole array of disputes but often centres upon goals and objectives (for example independence versus regional autonomy in national politics).
3. Intra-class politics also pertains to strategies and objectives (for example reform versus revolution in early socialist politics).
4. Intra-household politics is dominated by patriarchal and generational disputes brought to the fore through feminist politics.

Second, there are four *inter-institutional politics*, or politics between the institutions:

1. Inter-state politics is the preserve of statesmen and stateswomen and diplomats as studied in international relations.
2. Inter-peoples politics is manifest in racialism, aggressive nationalism and ethnic cleansing.
3 Inter-class politics is the traditional dispute between capital and labour.

4 Inter-household politics involves local struggles for resources and access; neighbour disputes are an example.

So far, these eight politics remain firmly within the traditional parameters of the politics of ‘industrial society’. The complexities of the politics of reflexive modernization are more fully captured by politics between the institutions. As individuals migrate from traditional politics to new strategies there will be tensions as they simultaneously reject some traditions and institutions while clinging on to others. There are six politics between institutions:

1 State–peoples politics has been dominated by the desire to construct nation-states (Chapter 5). This traditional politics has been accentuated rather than lessened in the wake of contemporary globalization. Contemporary conflicts often revolve around language rights, with minorities claiming equal use of their language in state institutions such as courts and schools.

2 State–class politics has been dominated by the incorporation of classes into state politics by political parties (Chapter 6). Globalization and reflexive modernization have raised new issues regarding the protection of workers as capital has become more mobile.

3 State–household politics has centred upon rights and welfare issues. Increasingly, this politics has become more moralistic and rhetorical as the traditional family is both championed and questioned.

4 Peoples–class politics is concerned with the differential material impact of globalization upon ethnic groups and subsequent problems of political mobilization due to the fragmentation of objective (economic) classes into subjective (cultural) group identities.

5 Peoples–household politics has been concerned with the cultural issues defined by the ideology of the family. Globalization and reflexive modernization heighten these tensions by providing both opportunities and risks that traditional family structures cannot accommodate.

6 Class–household politics has been concerned with the feminist critique of the left’s neglect of patriarchy. Globalization intensifies such conflicts through its demand for a feminized labour force and the destruction of traditional work practices.

Notice that we have by no means abandoned the state in this fresh review of politics: states appear in five of the 14 politics. What we have done is open up politics, and with it political geography, to new perspectives. Each of these 14 politics has a consequent political geography that investigates the spaces and places in which the politics occur at different geographical scales. But more than this, the spaces, places and scales are part of the politics we have previously identified throughout the book (Taylor 2000).

Politics between institutions

We have chosen to focus on politics between institutions because it is here that we expect to find new politics. In this section we describe six case studies that cover each of these politics. What becomes clear from the examples described below is the inadequacy of politics and identities centred upon just one kind of institution. Reflexivity has resulted in a questioning of the traditional politics within each of the institutions by reference to the politics within other institutions. The simultaneous use and challenge to the institutions puts an end to simple institutional politics and identity. Instead, we are in a complex and ever-dynamic period of politics defined by the ‘internally fractured and externally multiple’ (Bondi 1993: 97) nature of identity. In other words, the politics of reflexive modernization is a function of the interacting internal and external components of place (Massey 1994). As our examples show, the contemporary situation is one in which new politics progresses by negotiating and, at times, utilizing the institutions and practices of old politics.
For each of our examples, we provide a summary of this juxta-positioning of old and new politics.

**State–class politics**
The space–place tension we defined at the beginning of this chapter is evident in the relationship between people and the power of governments to limit their mobility. This may be the defining tension in a time of corporate globalization. Borders are a crucial geographical manifestation of state control over movement of goods. In addition, the operation and existence of borders are important factors in the way people think of states. Borders may be parts of national identity that define the extent and meaning of ‘homeland’ for some people (Kaplan 2003; Murphy 2005) and, simultaneously, the violent expressions of state power that restrict movement. Borders are, therefore, products and definers of political identity. Traditionally, such an identity has related to membership of a particular nation and a sense of citizenship tied to rights and duties within a particular state. Increasingly, borders define an identity based upon membership in transnational classes: either the mobility of the cosmopolitan business class or the carceral cosmopolitanism of refugees and people identified as ‘security risks’ (Calhoun 2003; Sparke 2006). Examination of the differential access to mobility facing regular business travellers on the one hand, and refugees and undocumented migrants on the other, is an illustration of how membership in classes results in differential relationships with the state. Moreover, this example exemplifies the interaction between the processes of globalization and the continuing anti-terrorist military actions led by the US.

The establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 was a landmark step in a politics of enabling the freedom of movement of commodities across state borders. Since then discussions of global flows has included categories of people who may be given the ability to move or not. The ‘frequent traveller’ has become a label that we now take for granted – it is a status that is recognized by corporations (through airline mileage programmes) as well as states (through schemes that allow someone to pay money and become a ‘known-traveller’, in the US terminology, and gain the privilege of less invasive screening in airports). The corporate and state classifications intersect; it is the wealthy that are most likely to enjoy freedom of movement across state boundaries.

NAFTA created a number of programs to facilitate border crossing for some. (Sparke 2006). The NEXUS program requires a fee of $50 plus screening to enable quick passage through US–Canada border control. The CANPASS program clearly has a certain class in mind. It is designed to make travel using a private jet between the US and Canada easy, according to the programmes website: ‘Private Aircraft program makes clearing the border easier for private aircraft carrying no more than 15 people (including the crew) and travelling to Canada from the United States. This program allows members to access more airports and provides expedited clearances for low-risk, pre-screened travellers’. These programmes specific to US-Canada are an explicit example of a broader US initiative called Global Entry. Participants in these programmes are registered and personal details, including bio-metric information (fingerprint and iris images) are recorded in a database.

More importantly, participants in frequent-crossing programmes are constructed, by the state and their own actions, as members in a particular transnational entrepreneurial class (Sparke 2006). To become a member of the class of people who could pass swiftly across the border was to become what Sparke (2006: 167) calls ‘NEXUS subjects: citizens of nation-states, yes, but with an all important new kind of transnational para-citizenship in a fast lane designed for business class frequent travelers’. Becoming a member of this class did not just entail registering personal and biometric information on a database, it also meant acting as a particular person who would self-regulate their own behaviour in order to ‘fit’ the behavioural patterns deemed normal, or defining, for the class of frequent business travellers. It was, in the terminology of Michel Foucault, an act of governementality: the self-monitoring of behaviour that reflects the needs of dominant power relations. In this case, these power relations relate to the mutual needs of transnational capital and the US and Canadian states.
But what of the flip side? Sparke (2006) is careful to remind us that such fast-lanes are not just a matter of the annoyance that the bulk of us feel standing in queues at airports while others walk briskly to their aeroplane, latte in hand. The asymmetry is felt by the world’s lowest economic strata and those labelled ‘security risks’: those deemed to be members in this class face ‘volatile mixes of movement and immobility’ (ibid.: 169). In 2017, President Trump attempted to restrict travel to the US from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and Iraq (later dropped from the list) in the name of security. The order was labelled by opponents as a ‘Muslim ban’ and challenged in the courts. Statements, often on Twitter, made by Donald Trump in his campaign for the presidency enabled lawyers to argue that he was banning travel based purely on religion rather than targeting specific individuals as security threats. The Trump administration countered the legal challenges by asserting that the president has the authority to define who may, and may not, cross the US border.

The United States is facing the ‘hegemonic dilemma’ (Flint 2004) of needing to promote free movement of goods and people as part of a ‘liberal’ agenda associated with hegemonic powers, while also addressing the security threats that have emerged from challenges to hegemonic authority. In so doing the US state identifies and creates different categories of people based upon their class; though this may also be disguised in different labels, such as the ‘Muslim ban’, when it comes to restricting movement from the periphery of the world-economy.

State–household politics
As we enter Kondratieff wave VA, the lingering effects of the restructuring in Kondratieff IVB are evident in the restructured the politics between households and the state. In the United States, the economic impacts of globalization include stagnation in median household incomes and the redistribution of earnings and wealth from low- and middle-income households to the most affluent (National Poverty Center 2017a). The financial crisis of 2008, which stemmed from a pervasive culture of lending at higher (sub-prime) interest rates to the disadvantaged, had a differential impact upon the poor. The processes of restructuring have led to increased social polarization within the US. According to the National Poverty Center (2017b):

First, wealth inequality has followed a U-shaped pattern since 1913: it was high at the beginning of the 20th century, began falling around 1929, and then began to steadily increase again in the 1980s. Notably, the recent rise of wealth inequality is almost entirely due to the rise of the share of wealth held by the top 0.1% – which went from 7% in 1979 to 22% in 2012. (The top 0.1% is currently made up of 160,000 families with over $20 million in net assets, based on 2012 data.) Second, contrary to widely held perceptions, today’s middle class does not own a significantly greater share of wealth than it did 70 years ago. Rather, the wealth share of the bottom 90% of households has followed an inverted U-shaped pattern: from a low point of 15% of all wealth in the late 1920s it rose to 35% by the mid-1980s (due largely to rising pension and housing wealth), and subsequently dropping to 23% by 2012 (due largely to increased debt, reduced savings, and the housing crash) . . . the top 0.1% actually hold 22% of all wealth – the same proportion as the entire bottom 90%.

Although such statistics focus upon class polarization, restructuring has social dimensions too, defined by race, gender and generation (Kodras 1997a). The conjunction of economic restructuring with gender, age and racial discrimination at a variety of geographical scales has produced a social and geographical mosaic of life-chances. The state has steadily reduced its commitment to welfare programmes aimed at ameliorating these social and geographical differences. Increasingly, place-specific institutional contexts – organizational capacity and experience, financial and social capital, and political power – define the capacity of government and non-governmental organizations to deliver social programmes (Kodras 1997a: 88).

The geography of poverty in the United States illustrates the social and geographical complexity of the problem. In 2014 just under 15 per cent of the US population lived in poverty. Though the poverty rate had fallen between 1993 and 2000, it then slowly increased to the current rate (National Poverty Center 2017a). Disparities across racial groups in the US can
be seen for those living in extreme poverty. In 2011, about 48 per cent of households in extreme poverty were headed by white non-Hispanics, 25 per cent by African-Americans and 22 per cent by Hispanics. When additional lines of fragmentation, based on race and gender, are also considered we see that the disparities across social groups take on a different appearance. The conjunction of global economic restructuring, the subordinate position of women in the workforce and political strategies has pushed many female-headed households into poverty (Kodras 1997a, 1997b). As welfare assistance to children in families in which the father has left the home was being reduced, women were forced into low-paying jobs. The number of children living in poverty rose by over 11 per cent between 2000 and 2005. Such disadvantages were magnified for minority households. Black households had the highest rate of child poverty (36 per cent), followed by Hispanics (32 per cent). In comparison, child poverty rates for white and Asian children were both around 12 per cent (National Poverty Center 2017a).

In addition, some other cultural groups were particularly disadvantaged. For example, Puerto Ricans suffered from the economic restructuring associated with Kondratieff IVB because of their concentration in north-eastern central cities experiencing dramatic economic changes, their over-representation in job sectors hit hardest by job losses, and discrimination in the job market (Tienda 1989). Marc H. Morial, president of the National Urban League, identified the decline of US manufacturing industry as a key process:

The sector has lost 2.7 million jobs since its employment peaked at the end of 2000,' he said, ‘and many African Americans in the Midwest, in the industrial heartland, were employed in manufacturing, in autos, steel, glass, and rubber.

(Quoted in Weisman 2003)

After the national trauma of the Great Depression in the 1930s, the US federal government began welfare programmes aimed at the most marginalized. The programmatic focus upon the household is illustrated by the name of the most prominent welfare package, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which began as a widow’s pension for fatherless families (Cope 1997: 193). However, corporate globalization has changed the post-war contract between the state and the household. Capital has been freed from its national constraints and has become globally mobile. States have restructured in light of this global economic context (see Chapter 4) and so have the relationships between the state and households. The new relationship is between households and localities within the global economy. As the responsibilities of the federal state wane, the well-being of low-income workers and the unemployed becomes a function of the ability of localities to offer social programmes. This new political geography of state support is reflected in broad geographical differences in poverty rates. For example, though more white children are poor than other racial groups, higher percentages of poor children live in minority households. The rates also vary geographically, for black children varying from 29 per cent in California to 47 per cent in Ohio, and for Latino children from 19 per cent in Florida to 35 per cent in Pennsylvania. The differences between states occur within broad regional disparities in which 48 per cent of children in the South live in low-income families compared to 37 per cent in the Northeast (National Center for Children in Poverty 2007, 2017).

Corporate globalization has been accompanied by different political initiatives in the United States to facilitate the mobility of capital by reducing the strength and responsibilities of the state in a three-pronged strategy of devolution, dismantlement and privatization (Staeheli et al. 1997). A key arena in this strategy has been welfare provisions. The attack on ‘big government’ involvement in welfare has been evident in the United States since 1988 (Cope 1997: 194). One key programme in the US is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as Food Stamps. The financial crisis of 2008 led to an increased demand for SNAP, from 8 per cent of the population in 2005 to 10.5 per cent in 2009 (Allard et al. 2012). However, the political rhetoric around SNAP has been framed around the idea of ‘workfare’ in which welfare payments are suspended after a specified period of unemployment. Republican politicians quote a phrase from the Bible,
‘if a man will not work, he shall not eat’, to provide a justification for reducing programmes such as SNAP (Dewey 2017). The word ‘will’ is important as it suggests a choice. Contrary to the rhetoric, 22 per cent of SNAP participants are in work, are caretakers, or are in training. The largest proportion of recipients, (64 per cent) are children, elderly or disabled, leaving 14 per cent of recipients unemployed or working less than 30 hours a week (Dewey 2017).

In a period of corporate globalization and high levels of poverty and inequality, reduced welfare payments have been one means by which the burden of globalization has been placed upon households, notably the poor ones. By reducing federal responsibilities, greater burden is put upon individual states and localities to provide for those marginalized within the capitalist world-economy. However, there is a simultaneous burden upon individual states and localities to become attractive sites for investment. Thus, the new imperative is to reduce taxes, especially on businesses, to ensure a flow of investment. The result is ‘competitive downgrading’ (Peck 1996: 252) or a ‘race to the bottom’ as individual US states cut social programmes to reduce taxes. To make the situation worse, the rhetoric of the fiscal conservatives emphasizes the ability and desirability of charities to provide resources for the poor after government benefits are withdrawn. However, it is far from certain that private charities have the capability for such a large-scale and constant commitment (Allard et al. 2012).

The increasing relevance of the locality in welfare provision is also reflected in the political activity of individuals within their household contexts. In a study of the small town of Pueblo, Colorado, Staeheli (1994) found that changing economic conditions intertwined with household context to define the nature of political activism. For the activists interviewed, political and economic restructuring had created an atmosphere of threat and uncertainty about their own futures, as well as those of their family and community. Political restructuring had reduced the perceived efficacy of political activism directed towards the state. Instead, many of the activists in Pueblo were targeting their employers for the provision of initiatives such as scholarships and after-school programmes. The decision to undertake political activism was made within the household context. Households provide a number of resources to facilitate activism, such as financial support from the income of other household members, emotional support, access to social networks and release time from chores (ibid.: 852). Also, decisions to engage in political activism are often made on the basis of threats to the household, especially regarding educational and work opportunities (ibid.: 865).

The intersection of globalization, the retreat of the state from welfare programmes, and the specificity of place have produced a restructuring of the relationships between households and the state. A uniform and stable commitment to entitlements aimed at supporting marginalized households cannot be assumed. Instead, the burden of provision falls upon the locality. The rhetoric of political conservatism calls upon charities to step in where government once stood. However, as noted, the limitations to this possibility are clear (Wolpert 1997). The political strategies of households must become more flexible as they focus upon the private sector and networks of activists to achieve their goals. The geographical counterpart to Beck’s reflexive modernization is the flexible use of scale and scope (Kodras 1997a: 92) through which connections are made to other political activists in other places and at other geographical scales, depending upon the goal in question. Hence, similar to Herod’s (1997) analysis of trade unions, the construction of scales of activity is an essential part of contemporary political actions.

In summary, although the patriarchal nature of the household remains in both practice and rhetoric, this old politics is being challenged by new feminist politics. Political parties in both the United States and Britain, for example, are reinforcing their rhetoric about the traditional role of the family. Meanwhile, more and more children are being born out of wedlock, and the labour market challenges the traditional role of the ‘stay-at-home’ wife and mother. Feminists, too, are challenging the traditionally restrictive roles of women, and political activists are creating networks of households and contacts with the private sector to further their goals. The flexible use of scale and scope is the geographical strategy of
the new politics, but the terrain that this strategy must navigate is partially composed of the institutions and assumptions of old politics.

**Peoples–class politics**

Politics between 'peoples' and class is a function of competing identities brought to the forefront by socio-economic change and competition. Nagar’s (1997) study of the Hindu community in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, illustrates how caste-based differences fractured ethnic identity and politics. The caste system is much more rigid and formalized than social classes. Despite legal proscriptions aimed at relaxing the constraints of the caste system, movement between the castes is practically impossible, and one’s caste determines life opportunities, including marriage partner, residence and occupation. Although caste and social class are not exactly the same, Nagar’s study is an effective illustration of how socio-economic differences can fragment ethnic identity. The majority of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent arrived in Tanganyika (in 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to become Tanzania) during the time of British colonial rule (1918–61). Although south Asians never comprised more than 1 per cent of the total population, they had greater prominence because of their role in the middle rung of the colonial race–class hierarchy (ibid.: 711). The south Asians were employed as shopkeepers, teachers and civil servants. In 1961, 31,000 south Asians lived in Tanganyika, while in 1993 the south Asian population of Dar es Salaam was estimated to be about 35,000, of whom 10,000 were Hindus.

The Hindu community in Dar es Salaam underwent profound change, beginning in 1960. As the United States achieved hegemonic maturity (see Chapter 2), Britain was forced to grant independence to its colonies. As Tanzania became independent, the country initiated policies against the south Asian community. Many upper- and middle-class Hindus emigrated to Britain because of Africanization and nationalization policies, which made Hindu businesses less viable. The Hindu emigrants included upper-caste Lohana and Jain business families and Brahmin civil servants as well as lower-caste labourers and workers, including those from the vanzaa (tailor), mochi (leather worker), dhobi (washer) and prajapati (potter) castes (Nagar 1996). While the upper- and middle-caste populations declined, emigration by the lower castes was balanced by an influx of Hindu families from Zanzibar after the revolution of 1964, in which south Asians were attacked and victimized (Nagar 1997: 711). Particularly significant was an influx of a variety of manual labourers, who came to constitute the largest castes in Dar es Salaam.

A politics focusing purely upon ethnicity would suggest a unified Hindu identity because of the threats faced by the community. Instead, by considering caste identity, the fragmented nature of politics and identity becomes clear. Social labels became geographical: Hindus from India referred to the Jangbaria (Zanzibaris) and the Bharwala (people from the interior). The term Jangbari Gola became a common derogatory term implying that Zanzibari south Asians are culturally closer to Africans than to mainland south Asians (Nagar 1997: 713). Differences between the newly arriving castes and the established upper and middle castes were heightened as the Hindu manual labourers settled in Kariakoo, denoted as a ‘dangerous African area’ by upper-class Asians (ibid.: 713).

Before 1961, there was a variety of social institutions and buildings representing the different castes, but after independence the Tanzanian government put pressure upon the Hindu community to create an umbrella organization to represent all its members. The Hindu Mandel, established in 1919, was the oldest Hindu organization in Dar es Salaam. It became the Hindus’ umbrella organization, although it was dominated by prosperous and upper-caste Hindu men (ibid.: 717). By overseeing government-mandated tasks, such as the provision of education and the performance of marriage rites, the Hindu Mandel assumed a homogenizing role in its aim to fuse all Hindu castes ‘into one entity’ (ibid.: 717).

Despite the attempts to create a unified Hindu identity, the Hindu Mandel was perceived by the lower castes and Hindu women as a way of preserving male and upper-caste power and influence. Heightened caste awareness because of the emi-
migration of upper- and middle-caste members and the immigration of lower-caste members inflamed the perception of Hindu Mandel paternalism. Instead of nurturing a unified Hindu community and identity, the various life experiences of the castes fostered an increase in religious and social events for the separate castes within their own halls. Intra-caste socializing, which had been restricted to marriages, births and deaths, became regular bi-weekly events (ibid.: 721). Most lower-caste members saw the Hindu Mandel as serving elite interests to the detriment of the broader Hindu community.

In summary, the caste politics within the Hindu community of Dar es Salaam illustrates how identities are internally fragmented but externally constituted (Bondi 1993). The identity of the lower-caste women Hindus is a function of their class, household and ethnic status. In addition, the juxtaposition of these identities is put into motion by migrations initiated by global changes and linkages. Finally, the form that the intra-caste politics takes is a function of the particularity of place, in this case Dar es Salaam. The neighbourhoods of the city help to derive differences within the Hindu community, and the interventions of the Tanzanian state led to a specific institutional context. Again we see that the politics of reflexive modernization (Beck 1994) are particular social relations defined by place-specific institutions (here, the Hindu Mandel) and extra-local connections (migratory flows in and out of Dar es Salaam). The old politics of patriarchy, class and nationalism persist in the dominant role of wealthier Hindu men in forging a unified identity. But the fragmentation of Hindu identity and resistance to powerful male figureheads are seen in the informal networks created by lower-caste women and their own use of public space within the Hindu Mandel (Nagar 1997).

**Peoples–household politics**

Geographers have been very interested in the politics between household and nation because it reflects a tension between private and public space. Feminist geographers have shown how a discourse that attaches women to the private and domestic sphere prevents women’s participation in politics and, therefore, maintains patriarchy. Images and rhetoric used to construct the national ‘imagined community’ are usually the product of masculinized memories and visions (Enloe 1983). Nationalist rhetoric and images promote women as the mothers and nurturers of the nation, a role best accomplished within the household. Alternatively, men are portrayed as warriors and heroes or, in other words, active participants in the public sphere of politics (Dowler 1998). Although nationalism emphasizes the unity of the people’s interests, gendered ideology reinforces gender differences. The result is the continued understanding of civil society as two distinct spheres, with women remaining in the less politically relevant private domain and men maintaining their control of the public sphere.

At times of war, the principles of national identity, including the different gender identities, are heightened (Cock 1993). Looking at the conflict in Northern Ireland, the attitudes of male members of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) illustrate the view that women’s primary role is to produce children for a future generation of pro-nationalist supporters (Dowler 1998). Although women are rhetorically integrated into the unified republican-imagined community through their portrayal as heroes of the struggle with the British, such activity is pictured within the household. For example, Dowler reports one Catholic man, Sean, stating:

> Me ma Annie was the bravest person I knew. Braver than anyone in the Ra [IRA]. When the soldiers would come to round up the men to be interned, Annie would get into the back of the Saracens [armoured cars] and say ‘you’re not taking these boys away today’ and she’d push us out. The soldiers didn’t know what to do. But they never stopped her, they would just leave and round up some other poor bastards.

(Quoted in Dowler 1998: 166)

In a similar vein, another of Dowler’s interviewees, Thomas, reflected:

> Aye, I do, the women were the brave ones. When the soldiers would come up the road all the men would be standing in the background with our guns at our sides ready to use, but the women would go right up to the soldiers and yell at them and spit in their faces.
They had the balls. The men had the guns, but they had the guts. No one talks about how the women carried messages and guns in the baby buggies. They would walk right by the soldiers while we were hiding in the shadows. Aye, they had the balls.

(Quoted in Dowler 1998: 167)

These two quotes illustrate that women were included in the ideology of a nationalist struggle against an occupying force. However, the language in the second quote equates bravery with masculinity. Also, the women’s roles were remembered primarily in relation to their domestic chores. Sean’s quote focuses upon the nurturing role of the mother and her defence of the home. Thomas’s quote begs the question: why weren’t the men pushing the baby buggies?

The women of the republican movement interviewed in Dowler’s study illustrate the attempts to renegotiate these traditional views of the relationship between the household and the nation. One of the key media of nationalist memory is Irish resistance songs. Two of the most popular are ‘Men in the IRA’ and ‘The men behind the wire’. As one republican woman, Peggy, angrily said:

What of the ‘Men in the IRA’, they love to sing that one around here. I was in the IRA but that song is not written about me. I also hate the song ‘The Men Behind the Wire’. I was in prison for four years, there were women behind that wire too!

(Quoted in Dowler 1998: 170)

As these songs are being sung in a republican prisoners’ club, Peggy and her female friends sing loudly to change the words of the song from ‘men’ to ‘women’. Such renegotiation of dominant discourses reflects the efforts to change the relegation of women to the private sphere. Other renegotiations are under way too. The republican women understand the similar trials and tribulations experienced by Protestant women. The possibility of a cross-national identity based upon the politics of the households is witnessed in Maureen’s goal of a written history of the conflict:

I want the women to write their own stories . . . I would want my mother and her friends to tell their stories about trying to keep everything going while their husbands and sons were in prison. . . . I think we should have some of the women from the Shankill [a Protestant neighbourhood] tell their stories too. Look I’m a republican, I went to prison for being a republican but some things just run deeper than that. If some Protestant women wanted to tell their stories I would say do it. The men wouldn’t understand that, they would say we weren’t being good republicans. Oh for shite’s sake they would say we weren’t being good republicans just by writing the book.

(Quoted in Dowler 1998: 170–71)

Maureen’s quote returns us to Beck’s (1994) reflexive modernization and the ensuing politics between the institutions of the capitalist world-economy. The nation has been a dominant institution in the world-economy yet ‘some things just run deeper than that’. The idea that other politics and identities can challenge the ideologies and practices of nationalism suggests that significant changes are afoot. The people of Northern Ireland see challenges other than nationalist struggle.

In summary, there is, therefore, recognition that new politics must be created within the context of old politics. The women of Northern Ireland also wish for patriarchy to be put on the political agenda. A Women’s Coalition was formed in Northern Ireland, and some of its members were elected to the new Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998, a formal participation of women in the public sphere. All members of the Assembly had to declare themselves as ‘Nationalist’, ‘Unionist’ or ‘Other’. The members of the Women’s Coalition chose the label ‘Other’, eschewing national identities for other politics by prioritizing their gender. In this case, the combination of two old political struggles (feminism and nationalism) created a new politics of collaboration across traditional divisions.

Class–household politics

In the four previous examples, we have emphasized that new opportunities coexisted with traditional practices and constraints (Beck 1994). Such inter-institutional tensions are clear in the case of female labour participation. Entry into paid labour may reflect desired changes in the status of women, but it
is also a feature of a globalized economy in which women are sought as cheaper workers. What is clear throughout the world-system is the gender inequalities in the labour market, as women are consistently paid less and face barriers to promotion. For example, in the US there is widespread recognition that a woman’s salary for equivalent work is 80 per cent of a male colleague’s (Brown and Patten, 2017). Efforts, often union-led as in the case of Britain (Lawrence 1994), to equalize pay and opportunity illustrate how once class-based institutions have adapted to include feminist strategies. However, the twin ideologies of patriarchy and capitalism still predominate, and gender inequalities persist. Women’s subordinate status in the household mirrors the difficulties that women face in the labour market. Similar to the discussion of state–household politics, the private domain of the household is a traditional structure that can serve to restrict women’s participation in the public domain.

Social scientists have taken two approaches to explaining women’s inequality within the labour market. First is the argument that inequalities stem from relationships within the household, namely childcare responsibilities. These factors, and the heavier domestic workloads placed upon women, all reflect women’s subordination in the household. However, theorists have yet to agree on how to apportion blame between patriarchy and capitalism for gender discrimination (Hanson and Pratt 1995: 5). The second take on gender discrimination has been to focus upon the segmented nature of labour markets. Labour markets are split between primary and secondary segments. In the primary segment, wages and benefits are determined through institutionalized negotiations, whereas in the secondary segment market forces play a greater role. Not surprisingly, workers in the primary segment usually obtain higher wages, better benefits and greater job security. Patriarchal practices based upon stereotyping and gender discrimination have been blamed for the relative exclusion of women from this primary segment (ibid.: 6).

Clearly, both of these explanations are partial. Geographers have sought to weld them together by emphasizing the role of place in mediating social relationships. Localized social networks ameliorate the constraints of women’s status in the household. Although the nature of everyday contacts and experiences is restricted by commitments to the home, they also provide a means of finding jobs. A longitudinal study of the town of Worcester, Massachusetts (ibid.), shows the linkages between social contacts established through the household and women’s employment. Most people found their jobs through personal contacts or by seeing ‘Help Wanted’ signs during their everyday activities: 77 per cent of men and women in professional and managerial jobs and 70 per cent of skilled manual workers (ibid.: 194). Such social contacts determine work choices in a number of ways. First, socialization within households and related social networks defines the image of what is a possible or desirable work path. What is defined as a ‘good job’ is voiced through conversations around the dinner table. In different households, a professional career for a daughter may either be assumed or be considered beyond the realms of possibility. Particular cultures, such as traditional Hindus and Muslims, may not even consider non-domestic paid work for women. Second, information about jobs is shared through social networks. Professional and managerial classes have greater access to commercial networking that expands their opportunities. However, for women, especially in low-income households, their ties to the household restrict their mobility and, therefore, make them more dependent upon localized contacts structured by their everyday activities (ibid.).

Hanson and Pratt’s study found that women and men find employment through different networks. The contacts through which women find work tended to be more family- and community-related than men’s. In addition, the channelling of job information is gendered, with men finding their work through other men, and women through women. Clearly, these findings have implications for the type and location of jobs found by women. The use of gendered information flows to find jobs perpetuates gender divisions within the job market. In addition, the use of family and community contacts by women increases the likelihood that they will find work close to home, thus reducing their mobility. If a woman
finds news of a job from another woman who is herself working close to home then the chances are that the new job will be local too.

Hanson and Pratt’s study shows how place-based institutions and networks of contacts structure women’s participation in the workforce. Attempts to gain advancement in the public domain are structured by subordination in the household. Patriarchal assumptions regarding women’s roles at home may restrict their job search capabilities to gendered and localized personal contacts. Such a limited, but in its own way enabling and effective, strategy perpetuates discrimination and stereotyping in the workplace with ‘men’s jobs’ remaining a male preserve. However, particular households can also enable women’s participation in the public domain. Households may contain professional women who can act as role models. The ability for households to negotiate domestic responsibilities and income pooling can provide women with the time and financial security to achieve their goals. In other words, households can be enabling instead of constraining.

In summary, the example of class–household politics illustrates many of the geographical components of reflexive modernization. The changes in female employment opportunities stem from globalization and the changing work practices that it demands. Women have greater opportunity to participate in the workforce, but the pressures of globalization demand a cheap and flexible workforce. Therefore, female workforce participation is a double-edged sword. More significantly for our argument, new opportunities for women in the public domain may be restricted by traditional practices in the household. The tools that women must use to counter these constraints are the structured contacts of their everyday experiences. How women take advantage of the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy is a function of their immediate geography.

**State–peoples politics**

We have left this example to last because it covers political relations we have previously devoted a whole chapter to (Chapter 5). States, nations and their association with territory lie at the heart of traditional political geography. Their importance most certainly has not diminished under reflexive modernization; rather, they are contested in new and more complex ways. It is, therefore, in this inter-institutional politics more than any other that we can see how political geography is changing right to its core as both practice and discourse.

Nationalism has been the dominant form of group identity since the end of the eighteenth century. As discussed in Chapter 5, national identity has been constructed over time by recourse to ethnic ties framed by a dominant state discourse. The old politics of nationalism has become a means of legitimating the power of the state by reference to a territorially defined (home)land. Given the importance of the nation for the existence of the state, it is not surprising that state institutions, such as schools and the armed forces, have played an active role in defining the ingredients and referents of national identity. Moreover, states have emphasized particular territorial claims and historical events in order to legitimize inter-state disputes and rivalries (Dijkink 1996). In other words, nationalism as old politics sees the nation as a strategy to obtain, use and legitimate state power (Breuilly 1993). Above all, it simplified politics to a basic dual, us (the nation-state) and them (all foreigners). However, in a context of reflexive modernization (Beck 1994), we expect to see challenges to the authority of singular and imposed national identities issued by the state. Indeed, the geographical counterpart to the myriad of issues being processed by individuals is a complex imagined geography that sees many boundaries and spatial interconnections that do not reflect state borders. The result is a new politics of nationalism that originates from people’s localized social settings and challenges the spatial framework of inter-state disputes.

Globalization is the context for the more complex politics of nationalism. Contemporary levels of flows of capital, goods and people across state borders under the auspices of globalization can create new transactional identities that challenge the old dominance of the state. The political project of the European Union was discussed in Chapter 5 as the construction of new identities initiated by ‘cross-border’ interaction. The following example of
contemporary Ecuador specifically focuses upon the tensions between state-defined nationalist discourse and alternative geographies of identity formulated by citizens who have a different geographical imagination from that promoted by the state.

In January 1995, there was a series of incidents along the disputed border between Ecuador and Peru in which patrols exchanged fire and, allegedly, helicopters attacked border posts (Radcliffe 1998). The precise path of the border had been in dispute for some time. After a conflict in 1941, the United States, Brazil, Chile and Argentina had summoned Ecuador and Peru to Rio de Janeiro to sign an agreement over the location of the border. However, the border was based upon contemporary knowledge of watersheds in a remote area, and when surveys provided new information in 1960, Ecuador declared the 1942 Rio Protocol invalid. The Ecuadorian government had been active in constructing a national identity in which the Peruvian border featured prominently. Via state school texts, geographical institutions, military maps and literary and visual images, the Ecuadorian government constructed a national identity that contained anti-Peruvian sentiments while emphasizing patriotism and ‘sacrifice for the territorial integrity, defense of honour, decorum and national glories’ (García Gónzalez 1992: 212–13, quoted in Radcliffe 1998: 281). The Ecuador/Peru border lies in the area of the Amazon basin, known in Ecuador as the Oriente. The Ecuadorian government imbued the Oriente with a prominent role in national identity by promoting images of the region’s resource and development potential within a discourse of national progress (Radcliffe 1998: 276). The importance of the border and the Oriente in which it lies has been combined in the government’s consistent promotion of a national Amazonian territory ‘“truncated” by an “invalid” border’ (ibid.: 278).

Using the state institutions at its disposal, the government of Ecuador constructed a national identity which promoted the maintenance of state borders and the image of Peru as an evil rival, or in some texts ‘the Cain of the South’ (ibid.: 281). However, alternative images of national identity exist in Peru. The Shuar and Achuar indigenous groups resident in the Oriente region experience a complex relationship with Ecuadorian nationalism. During the 1995 conflict, the recruitment of Shuar–Achuar men into the army increased the ties with both state and nation. The state conspicuously identified indigenous soldiers as national war ‘heroes’. However, simultaneously, the Federation of Shuar–Achuar Centres (FCSA) had been calling on the government for decentralized decision making, collective land rights and recognition of cultural differences (ibid.: 286). These tensions between indigenous identity and Ecuadorian national identity are intimately tied to the designation of the state boundary. While accepting that the boundary defines Ecuadorian citizenship, for the indigenous people it also divides them between Ecuadorians and Peruvians. Catholic missionaries attempted to integrate the Shuar–Achuar into the Ecuadorian nation. However, the FCSA holds a jaundiced view of these efforts: ‘[Missionaries] taught us to respect authorities which were not Shuar, that we were part of a different nation, so we could not visit our brothers who remained on Peruvian territory’ (CONAIE 1989: 89, quoted in Radcliffe 1998: 287). The war brought these differences to a head:

Such was the history of the wars between Ecuador and Peru, we were forced to kill ourselves and they declared victories and each time there are conflicts, the first victims are us, the Shuar–Achuar, and our sons [in their capacity as soldiers] are obliged to build trenches against their other brothers Shuar, Achuar, Awajun, Wampis on the Peruvian side. . . . They call our Federation leaders subversives, enemies of the nation [patria], who threaten the integrity of the state by proposing a parallel state.


There was also a second challenge to the state during the 1995 conflict. Sixteen women’s rights groups from both Ecuador and Peru issued a joint statement calling for a ceasefire (Radcliffe 1998: 228). Rejecting the ‘trap of war’, they promoted a social justice that transcended the space of ‘republican brotherhood’. They referred to women ‘being guided by the love for this tormented Latin America’. This cultural–regional–continental identity directly challenged the state’s basic function as ‘war machine’.
In summary, these two very different challenges are examples of new politics that do not see state imperatives as the most important politics. Here we have a most traditional form of old politics, a border conflict, generating new responses based on identities that challenge nation as defined by state. Places are invoked at different scales, local indigenous cross-border ‘homeland’ and Latin America as a place of identity, but with the same effect of subverting the government’s unitary view of national identity, which was challenged by the indigenous peoples of the Oriente, who see the border as unjust rather than invalid. Different social settings produce different patterns of interactions and transactions, which, in turn, lead to different views of group and national identity. The old politics of state-defined national identity has emphasized identity with the nation-state in the context of inter-state geopolitical rivalries. The new politics of nationalism is more reflexive as transactions across state borders come to define group identity. The coexistence of the old and new politics of nationalism means that new boundaries and identities will be shaped within the context set by old ones. Regional identities within, across and above state borders will be negotiated by challenging and, at times, utilizing the state and the nation-state.

Consistent across these six examples of politics between the institutions is the way that the institutions and practices of old politics provide both opportunities and constraints for new politics. While new politics are forging a new agenda, the arena is still partially defined by old politics. Although new politics may use a flexible strategy of scope and scale (Kodras 1997a: 92), dominant institutions and identities still carry over from the old politics. The difference is that, instead of politics being a matter of who controls the institutions (therefore perpetuating their existence), the new politics is renegotiating the power and role of these institutions by fusing them in new political struggles. This new political strategy has the potential for more fundamental change as the institutions themselves are being challenged. As such changes progress, new political geographies will be created as more efficacious scales, institutions and identities are created.

Summary

In this section we have identified the multiplicity of political identities and agendas in the capitalist world-economy by:

- relating political identity to the institutions of the capitalist world-economy;
- illustrating the tensions and interconnections between the politics of these institutions;
- conceptualizing identity politics in the capitalist world-economy through the identification of fourteen political geographies.

Place–space tensions

The definition of geographical scales and both places and spaces is always a political act. This is the basic premise of our political geography. For example, the state originated as a political space with the related connotations of abstract power. Early modern states administered spaces through medieval legacies of power and tribute, with additional military power. For the majority of its inhabitants, the state deserved no loyalty. As a political space, the state was a remote institution demanding taxes. Over the past two hundred years, the state has been transformed into a place rather than a space. The construction of the nation-state has merged the space of sovereign territory with the sacred place of the homeland. This was a political struggle in that as state space became nation-state place, subjects became citizens. Citizens could put demands towards the state, resulting in the welfare state. To illustrate the ‘homely’ familiarity of this new place, the welfare state was to care for its citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. But in the process, it produced large anonymous state bureaucracies that alienated the very people they were supposed to help. For many, the state became part of the problem rather than the solution.
Place and identity politics

But our political geography is not only about the
state. A similar political story can be told about the
household. In the creation of particular modernities
within the modern world-system by the hegemons,
there were redefinitions of the household. The Dutch
invented the modern home by separating the upper
floors of their town houses for the family (Rybczynski
1986). Women were isolated from the public and
economic spaces of the lower floors while being
portrayed by (male) Dutch artists as being content in
their new domestic places. During the period of
British hegemony, lower-middle- and working-class
women created the Victorian home, which acted
simultaneously as a haven for male workers but an
oppressive workplace for women (Mackenzie and
Rose 1983). More recently, the suburban household
was an essential component of the United States’
redefinition of modernity. Suburbanization increased
the isolation of women by distancing them physically
as well as socially from public space.
The image of the American suburban household
as locus of consumption and bliss was broadcast
across the globe through programmes such as
Bewitched, Leave it to Beaver and The Brady Bunch. As
an interesting aside, contemporary views of the same
period reflect angst rather than security. The current
television imagery of the American family suggests
cynicism and failure rather than optimism and
inevitable success. The world outlook of Family Guy
and The Simpsons is very different from that of the
Brady Bunch. Although the home-place component
of modernity may be challenged during periods of
hegemonic decline and uncertainty, a consistent
feature of the creation of the home has been the
different gender-specific perceptions of the household. For men, the household space has been a haven
from their engagements with public space; for women, it has been an oppressive space designed to
reduce access to the male-dominated public space.
Renegotiations of traditional practices and identities
have been restructuring the household and role norms
within it.
One feature that these two examples encompass is
a basic place–space tension. As state and household,
they can both be defined as delimited spaces with
controlled access. These are their constraining sides,

sometimes expressed through prison imagery: the
bureaucratic state as ‘iron cage’ and housewives as
‘captive’. Simultaneously, but not necessarily for the
same people, as nation and home they can be defined
as secure places, havens from a turbulent world. These
are their enabling sides. Hence there is a ‘haven–cage’
tension in these institutions viewed as places and
spaces. It is such tensions that define the political
geographies within the struggle over the institutions
of the capitalist world-economy and the social
relations that they mediate. The contested nature of
institutions as places and spaces translates into their
capabilities to enable one politics by constraining
another.
Geographical scales are equally contested, as we
emphasized in Chapter 1. Labour politics has always
been interested in geographical scale in recognition
of the limitations of restricting strikes and
negotiations to single factories. Since its inception,
the workers’ movement has realized that the global
scale is the most efficacious arena for its struggle: The
Communist Manifesto of 1848 ends with the ringing
declaration: ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose
but their chains. They have a world to win. Working
men of all countries unite!’ (Marx and Engels 1848:
103; italics added).
Of course, this prescription has always been easier
to declare than to practise, not least when consumer
modernity ensured that workers, male and female,
did indeed have much more to lose than their
‘chains’. The key point is that, since the inception of
the capitalist world-economy, capital has always
been able to move across the world – corporate
globalization is an enhancement of a long-standing
process. Quite simply, the organization of labour at
the local scale can be sidestepped by investment in
other places within the space of the capitalist worldeconomy. On Marx’s prompting, labour’s response
was to construct a scale of cooperation and activity
through the Workers’ Internationals. In 1862,
French and English trade unionists organized the
International Working Men’s Association. One of
the International’s goals was the provision of crossnational support as a strategy against foreign ‘blackleg’, or ‘scab’, labour (Taylor 1987: 293). In other
words, the International was a scale of political activity
331


designed for efficacious labour politics within the space of the capitalist world-economy. However, the history of the International was brief, and its demise can also be explained by a partial repudiation of the initial scale politics. By 1875, the First International was effectively finished, to be finally replaced in 1889 by the Second International. This, however, was a very different type of organization, an umbrella grouping for nationally organized workers’ parties. The initial cross-border (or trans-state) strategy was diverted into an inter-state strategy of national parties turning oppressive state spaces into better places for the working class. Although both trans-state and inter-state dimensions of the organization were destroyed by the First World War, when workers fought against one another on behalf of their nations, domestic success finally arrived with the establishment of welfare states in the core of the world-economy by the mid-twentieth century. It is just these welfare states that have been prime targets of proponents of contemporary globalization. Thus ‘international’ organization is on the labour agenda again. The construction of new capitalist spaces such through corporate globalization has helped to initiate cross-border worker cooperation in a process dubbed ‘(re)politicizing the global economy’ (Rupert 1995). The ‘win–win’ visions of China’s plans for development based on ‘south–south cooperation’ will test whether a new model of mutually beneficial economic interactions is actually possible, or whether it is the similar story of inter-state competition dressed up in new language. As in 1862, today’s international labour movements are an attempt to construct a global place for democratic and equitable politics out of a global capitalist space. The rise of new nationalisms, as we discussed in Chapter 5, suggests that moves towards international cooperation may be under threat, once more in our cyclical history of the capitalist world-economy, from a renewed focus on the scale of the state.

As in the rest of the book, the discussion above treats issues of geographical scale separately from questions of place and space. This is wholly a pedagogical decision, which we can no longer sustain. Political constructions of different scales and political constructions of places and spaces are in no way autonomous. The political stories we have just briefly told are in no sense separate from one another. In the world-systems approach we have adopted, they are both part of the larger story of hegemonies and modernities (Taylor 1996, 1998). However, they do not have to be linked only in this theoretical manner; there are clear connections of a practical nature. For example, the rise of suburbia in the United States was not unrelated to state policies and initiatives. The best example is the Hoover Report of 1931, where government, bankers, manufacturers and builders agreed that suburbanization through single-family dwelling units (home-households) would be a long-term solution to the Depression because it maximized consumption (Hayden 1981: 23). And so it worked out in the ‘post-war boom’ – the 1950s were the decade of greatest suburbanization in the history of the United States. But, as a solution to ‘under-consumption’, it created other more fundamental problems. As countries such as China and India follow the same pathway to ‘development’ as emulated by the United States we can see new strategies to address ‘under-consumption’, such as the One Belt, One Road initiative. Such strategies have little concern for the ecological health of the planet. If hegemony is about emulating the hegemon, the Earth is not big enough for the world to live ‘the American way’.

---

**Summary**

In this section we have challenged the reader to think about the possibilities of political action by introducing the notion of place–space tensions. We noted that different political outcomes and agendas come about by thinking of localities and scales as either spaces or places.
Chapter summary

This chapter has served to understand the politics of place and the connection to identity politics. We have conceptualized the form and practice of identity politics by:

- introducing the concept of prime modernity;
- illustrating the dynamism of identity politics though the concept of reflexive modernization;
- emphasizing the nature of contemporary identity politics by introducing the concept of the post-traditional condition;
- situating identity politics within 14 political geographies related to the institutions of the capitalist world-economy.

We concluded by emphasizing that, although identity politics is framed within the structure, dynamics and institutions of the capitalist world-economy it is also a matter of individual and group agency. We conceptualized politics as space-place tensions, a concept that may be applied to the political geography of the past, present or future.

Key glossary terms from Chapter 8

administration
Annales school of history
autonomy
boundary
capitalism
capitalist world-economy
citizenship
civil liberties
civil society
classes
Cold War
conservative
core
democracy
elite
‘empire’

European Union (EU)
First World War
free trade
fundamentalism
geopolitics
globalization
government
hegemony
home
homeland
households
ideology
inter-state system
Islam
Kondratieff cycles (waves)
local government
local state

minorities
nation
nationalism
nation-state
neo-liberal
patriarchy
peoples
place
place–space tension
pluralism
political parties
politics of identity
post-traditional society
power
practical politics
reflexive modernity
risk society
scope of conflict

Second World War
semi-periphery
social movement
sovereignty
space
spaces of flows
spaces of places
state
structural power
transnational
United Nations
Washington Consensus
world cities
world-economy
world market
world-system
world-systems analysis
Suggested reading


Activities

1. Think about a story that has been in the news for a while. The length and ongoing nature of the story should allow you to access a number of media reports on the topic. Conceptualize the story using the 14 political geographies we identified in the chapter. (Hint: you will have to translate the language used in the media to identify the concepts we have used.) How many of the 14 politics could you see as a component of the current affair you chose? In what ways are they related?

2. Considering a contemporary news story, list three ways in which the world-systems approach helps you explain the event and three ways in which a feminist approach is illuminating. In what ways do the two approaches complement each other to further your understanding of the ‘real-world’ event?

3. Do you live and behave in a post-traditional world? Think of how you relate to ‘authority figures’ (professionals) and discuss this with a member of an older generation. Note the similarities and differences in your use of ‘experts’ – are you a member of ‘the world of clever people’ that Giddens refers to?
The key concepts of our political geography

We have come a long way: the political geography that has been set before you is both theoretically challenging and aspires to contemporary relevance in what appears to be an exciting and dangerous century that lies ahead of us. The purpose of this Epilogue is to refresh memories of the guiding concepts used throughout the book and to emphasize their utility in explaining the complex and dynamic world in which we live; a world that we are remaking and changing every day. We have begun each chapter by reiterating some of the seven components of a conceptual framework for political geography. We restate them here:

- Examine the relationship between the material and the representation of the material.
- Conceptualize politics geographically.
- Challenge long-standing ‘silences’ to bring in the ‘everyday’.
- Contextualize politics in spaces and places.
- Contextualize politics in the rise and fall of great powers.
- Evaluate politics within the larger whole of global politics.
- Use geographical scale as a conceptual tool.

In addition, there are three over-arching contributions of a world-systems approach to political geography:

- Consideration of political actions as simultaneously constructing and being constrained by geographical scale.
- Conceptualizing the core-periphery inequalities of the capitalist world-economy within the related metageographies of networks and territorial states.
- Contextualizing political actions within the temporal dynamics of the capitalist world-economy.

Simply put, the actions of people, individually and in groups, construct different political geographies. For pedagogical reasons we have presented these geographies in a scalar framework from the broad core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy, through the territorial division of the world into nation-states, to cities and local political units. Although we use a scalar framework we have always emphasized that topics dealt with at each scale are entwined with events and actions at other scales: there are no purely ‘local’, ‘global’ or ‘national’ political geographies. For example, the geographical scope of national political actions construct geographies of local state jurisdiction, the global geopolitical reach of the United States, and effect the flows of goods, information and money through cities and the wider networks of the capitalist world-economy. Hence, although we have used world-systems analysis as our theoretical guide, it would be a misinterpretation of our book to think of it as promoting a ‘global’ political geography: the capitalist world-economy is created by the myriad actions of people in particular places, as consumers and producers. But geographical scale still remains central to our project.
We have identified and utilized three geographical scales in our discussion of political geography:

- The scale of reality – the structure of the capitalist world-economy.
- The scale of ideology – the material and ideological construct of the nation-state.
- The scale of experience – the locality as the arena of lived-experience.

In this Epilogue we emphasize the point that the scales we have identified can be understood only by conceptualizing them as dynamic structures: the form of political geographical scale – and the scale at which political activity occurs – is constantly negotiated including the construction of linkages to other scales.

In Chapter 1 we used Schattschneider’s analysis to show that political actors are interested in defining the scope of political action. As a rule of thumb, weaker parties seek to broaden the scope by ‘jumping scale’ to broader levels of political jurisdiction. Stronger parties usually seek to limit the scope of a political struggle. This makes sense in that their power is likely to be diluted if other political actors become involved. This is evident in the legal system, where individuals channel actions against sovereign states up a hierarchy of courts to, for example, the European Court of Justice, which transcends state authority.

Kevin Cox (1997) offers two concepts to help us understand two related processes. First, that the local scale is constructed to facilitate political activity, called the space of dependence. Second, the success of such politics requires a strategic construction of connections to other scales, called spaces of engagement. Cox builds upon his long-standing research interest in the construction of localities as political spaces in which different actors (such as home owners, public utility companies, politicians) have mutual and interlocking interests in the economic growth and social trajectory of a particular locality. They all require realization of long-term investments and/or the generation of a tax base. Cox identifies the geographical expression of such mutual needs as a space of dependence – all actors are dependent on each other to construct and maintain the locality for shared or interlocking needs. The principle of a space of dependence does not apply only to the politics of growth coalitions. For example, protest movements and non-governmental organizations may also cluster in a particular location, such as Geneva, in order to maximize their leverage and utilize shared resources.

But what about strategy to achieve political goals? Cox argues that different political groups faced with different political situations will interact with scales beyond the space of dependence in different ways. These, to some degree, contingent strategies create spaces of engagement. For example, social movements concerned about the environment have constructed networks of connections between localities in a manner that transcends states. Arguably, states would prefer to restrict environmental politics to within their borders. Pollution can then be ‘exported’ so that as long as ‘our’ locality is not being polluted it does not matter if another is. A locality could try to lobby its government to restrict pollution and may be satisfied if the source is moved elsewhere. The space of engagement is then restricted to the local and state scales. On the other hand, environmental movements create a global space of engagement so that one locality’s gain is not another’s loss. Multinational companies would prefer the space of engagement to be restricted to the state scale. If they face protest in one state then they can operate in another. Environmental politics operating in a transnational space of engagement will use the resources of networked local activists to challenge the global operation of capital and its consequences for the planetary ecosystem.

Spaces of engagement and spaces of dependence illustrate that scales are political constructs rather than academic inventions. Three points must be emphasized:

- We can identify geographical scales in a manner that is useful for explaining political geography, but it is political actors that actually create the scales.
• It is incorrect to see the scales as separate: spaces of engagement are contested constructions that connect, or disconnect, scales as part of political strategy.

• The nation-state remains a crucial scale. It is not only a space of dependence and engagement, bringing actors together in the name of territorial sovereignty, but also seen as a key scale of political jurisdiction that may be utilized or must be transcended.

The role of geographical scale is one of the contributions we have emphasized throughout the book. However, the example of environmental movements illustrates that the politics of scale must be understood in relation to other political geographies. Hence, we turn to relational geographies, to spatial networks.

 Networks and the capitalist world-economy

In Chapter 1 we introduced the structure of the capitalist world-economy, including its core-periphery relations. Interest in globalization has resulted in emphasis upon networks that transcend states and facilitate flows of goods, people, information and money across the globe. We incorporated the existence of these networks and the significance of the speed and volume of contemporary flows in our political geography. In addition, our recognition of the capitalist world-economy as a historical social system requires us to see networks as long-standing political constructs. In our political economy approach, networks facilitating investment and trade have created ‘modern’ power relations for over half a millennium.

One of the important reasons for identifying networks is to deny an identification of core and periphery in simple spatial terms, as swathes of territory. This mistake is often seen in equating the global south with the periphery, or identifying different countries as either core or peripheral states. We must always keep in mind that the notion of core and periphery are constituted as different processes. In any country, there will be a mixture of core and peripheral processes – though one type will usually predominate. World cities are locations in which both the core processes of, say, international banking, operate, but often next to low-wage operations, such as sweatshops (Sassen 2006). Networks illustrate that places in the capitalist world economy are connected to maintain the structural relations of core and periphery, but the spatial manifestation of core and periphery processes is differentiated at a finer scale than territorial blocs or states.

Historians of the British Empire have recognized the role of networks in facilitating colonial power, one expression of the core-periphery structure (Lester 2006). For example, Lester identifies three competing colonial projects of the early nineteenth century in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa. Each of the projects was attempting to assert power but required a network of connections to facilitate its actions. First were missionaries who maintained contact with the London Missionary Society and influential sympathizers, such as parliamentary member Thomas Foxwell Buxton. Second, the colonial government transferred information regarding ‘effective’ colonial government by shipping official documents as well as transferring governors from one location to another. Lester (ibid.: 132) notes Laidlaw’s finding that the governance of British colonies relied upon ‘informal contacts, patronage, nepotism, and politicking in London’. Third, settlers created a communication network with other colonies to lobby the British government for greater support. Networks of political and economic connections were made to enable territorial control and a relationship of colonial domination.

The politics of today is also concerned with networks. Terrorist networks continue to be a form of geopolitics that threatens people going about their everyday lives in places across the world. We are all reliant upon networks of economic exchange that transcend state boundaries to consume products that we have become accustomed to. Networks of migration (voluntary and forced) continue to shape the demographics and politics of many countries. Furthermore, the ambitious One Belt, One Road
infrastructure network being constructed by China has the potential to fundamentally affect the level of trade across Eurasia and challenge the political influence of the United States in many regions, particularly the western Pacific and south-east Asia.

Networks are political geographic constructs, and operate in tandem with constructs such as scale and territory. They are useful pedagogical tools because they show that the construction of colonial relationships, and contemporary trade relations, are not simply a ‘core’ project: political actions in the colonies and in the metropolitan centres of colonial control were both important; the One Belt, One Road project involves economic deals between mayors, provincial governors, and national leaders in countries stretching from Africa across the Indian Ocean and Central Asia to China’s neighbours. Thinking of networks also requires considering the nodes of a network, either as localities or places, such as our discussion of world cities in Chapter 7. However, the similarities and differences between the politics of British imperialism and the contemporary world leads on to one further contribution of our political geography approach that requires emphasis.

The temporal–spatial context of political action

Our political geography approach emphasizes that we are studying, and living within, a historical social system, namely the capitalist world-economy. We place political actions within a time–space matrix defined by the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy (see Chapter 1). The matrix helps us to understand that all political actions are situated and that geographical location and historical moment combine to offer possibilities for political reaction and construction. Throughout the book we have emphasized some of the consistent features of the capitalist world-economy: notably the inequality of the core-periphery structure and the dynamism of economic restructuring. We have also shown that political geographic features of the system change as the result of political activity. The respective chapters have shown changes in the form and function of the state, national identity and electoral politics, for example.

We balance, on the one hand, the specific development of new political geographies (the transnational networks formed by institutions in world cities, for example) and, on the other hand, the more general rhythms of Kondratieff waves or the process of hegemonic decline. As with our pedagogical use of geographical scale, the trick is to see the dynamics as products of political action rather than as predetermined patterns. So, although we have identified a process of British hegemonic decline, the current challenges facing the United States are not indications of a predetermined loss of hegemonic status. However, we can also learn from the past, and combine analysis of British hegemony (such as Lester’s work mentioned above) with the new political geographies being generated within the context of persistent challenges to US military power in Afghanistan, and the difficulties in responding to North Korean nuclear proliferation.

The practical usage of our temporal and structural approach is to be able to contextualize current events within broader patterns and processes. In the book we have situated discussion of media stories within the text. The goal has been to illustrate that the daily news media present events in a disconnected or acontextual manner, while the world-systems approach sees them as moments within geohistorical trends. In turn, these trends, or processes, construct political geographies. The events reported in the news are moments of the dynamic political geographies we have introduced throughout the book. All events occur in particular places by people acting within certain institutions and political identities. To conclude the book we emphasize the utility of our framework by explaining and interpreting three incredibly pressing political issues, and perhaps serving as a guide to action.

Corporate globalization

We have identified the contemporary form of global economic processes as corporate globalization to
illustrate the growing relative power of corporations over states. Over the past few years, more and more aspects of our life that were entrusted to the state have entered the realm of private corporations. Our health, education, transport, and security are increasingly in the hands of private corporations. Our personal data is a commodity traded between private companies. Even the wars being fought by the world’s hegemonic power are dependent upon public money being funnelled to ‘contractors’. For others ‘security’ may rest upon the benevolence, or not, of local warlords, militias, or criminal gangs. Access to information is dependent on an individual’s ability to pay for a ‘provider’. State pensions and social security systems that were part of a contract between citizens and states are threatened. The well-being of individuals and the places within which they live are increasingly dependent upon a global corporation deciding to invest in one city over another – a decision that usually involves a low level of taxation, further undermining the ability of the state to perform its traditional functions.

In the language we introduced in Chapter 6, the politics of power is gaining strength over the politics of support. This is corporate power reaching into the heart of political geography in large monetary donations to political parties and candidates and the immense growth in political lobbying in political capital cities such as Washington, DC, and Brussels. Disenfranchisement from the political process is increasing and many established democracies are experiencing a ‘collapse of the middle’ as voices on the left and right outer-reaches of the political spectrum gain traction. These political changes are happening as we increasingly rely on corporations to deliver services necessary for everyday life while also reflecting on the ability of those corporations to gain influence within political systems. A changing sense of the ‘public’, both in terms of who ‘the people’ are and what ‘belongs’ to them, has the potential for growing inequality, discontent and frustration; sentiments that are likely to generate new political geographies.

**War as a systemic phenomenon**

In Chapter 1 we introduced the single-logic of the capitalist world-economy, the interdependence of political military power and processes of accumulation (Chase-Dunn 1982). War, in various forms, has been a constant feature of our world system. The cycle of hegemony (Chapter 2) indicates that major inter-state war, or what we commonly consider ‘world wars’, are a feature of the dynamic of hegemonic rise and fall. However, inter-state wars led by major powers are just one form of war. The dominance of the core over the periphery is a form of violence in and of itself (Galtung 1964; van der Wusten 2005), but it also requires the pervasive use of organized violence to maintain structural relations of imperialism (Chapter 3) and sparks armed resistance. Identification of neatly defined periods of war and peace are a convenient and comforting false binary (Flint 2011; Gerwath 2016). The binary helps us to identify periods and regions of war that separate many of us from processes of conflict. Sadly, it is more accurate to see the capitalist world-economy as a system that generates contexts and reasons for war continually: the form and venue of the war changes within space-time contexts (Dezzani and Flint 2015).

The United States declared a War on Terror in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Actually, this form of conflict had been in place for a number of years as the US and other countries became aware of extreme Islamist groups and their intention to challenge the military, political and cultural power of the West. Even if we take the start date of the War on Terror as late 2001 it is still the longest conflict the United States has ever been engaged with and seemingly has no end and has manifestations ‘everywhere’ (Morrissey 2017; Gregory 2011a). How can there be an end to the war if the enemy is a universal emotion (‘terror’) and the structural logics of inequality and dominance persist? The War on Terror is the contemporary manifestation of persistent violence that results from the dominance-resistance relationship of the core-periphery hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy.
If that realization is not bad enough then our cyclical model of hegemony and space-time contexts suggests that another period of major inter-state war may be on the horizon. We emphasize the word ‘may’ to remind you that our cyclical models are descriptive of the past and not determining for the future. Just because previous hegemonic cycles have ended in a period of global war does not mean that we are heading for a new period of major power conflict. Phew! However, we should try to learn from that history. The cyclical model posits mechanisms and circumstances that have led to war in the past; those mechanisms and circumstances still exist. In fact, our theory suggests that they should come to a head in a space–time context that we are approaching. It is in that context that tensions between China and the United States in the western Pacific, NATO and Russia, seemingly intractable violence in the Middle East in which all major powers are involved, and threats of increased nuclear proliferation stemming from North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear state should be interpreted. In order for our model not to be deterministic about a future period of war it requires sensible agency from national leaders and citizens to recognize the risk and act in a way to minimize the likelihood of a pathway to conflict.

New political geographies of war and conflict are emerging as cities across the world become parts of a battlefield between competing modernities; given expression as interpretations of religious beliefs, or consumerism versus spirituality, or the ‘West versus the rest’ (Huntington 1993). Or perhaps conflict is the inevitable outcome of a world-system that ‘bakes in’ grotesque levels of inequality? Whatever the causes, there is a danger that new political geographies of conflict are emerging, making a political geography of peace increasingly imperative (Megoran 2011; Williams and McConnell 2011; Koopman 2011).

# Climate change: the ‘ultimate’ place–space tension

In the previous edition of this book we identified contemporary globalization as ‘ecological globalization’, the concern that current social trends will outstrip the Earth’s capacity to survive as a living planet. The emergence of ‘corporate globalization’ has not removed the processes and consequences of ‘ecological globalization’. Consideration of ‘ecological globalization’ differs from concentration upon the economic or political manifestations of globalization in two ways. First, ecological concerns predate the rise of globalization theses by two or three decades. Second, and more importantly, from a geographical perspective, ecology is the prime way in which the global is represented as a place. It is our ‘home planet’, the ‘home of humanity’, which we destroy, literally, at our peril. In contrast, economic and political globalizations treat the world as an action space, an abstract platform on which to perform, for instance the 24-hour-a-day financial space of world cities. We ask of a place: how sustaining is it? We ask of a space: how efficient is it? Hence, for instance, there are totally contrasting concerns for saving tropical forest biodiversity and maintaining the competitiveness of, say, London as a world city player.

The facts are quite stark. The United States has secured its hegemonic role through an ideology of consumerism. The good life promised by the United States to the rest of the world is a suburban lifestyle. Can this promise be kept? Some years ago, Watt (1982: 144) estimated that the carrying capacity of the world, assuming an American standard of living, is 600 million people: a figure exceeded in 1675, a century before the United States even existed. Today, the world’s population is about 6 billion and will rise to somewhere between 10 billion and 14 billion in the next century. It is easy to see why people argue that current trends are not ecologically sustainable. It is this unsustainability of secular economic growth that underlies the tensions defined by Beck (1994) as the ‘risk society’. The global ecological crisis is, therefore, the ultimate place–space tension between making planet Earth a habitable home and using it as an exploited resource space.

One example will suffice to show the urgency of the situation: China is falling for the irresistible seductiveness of consumer modernity. Until recently, its cities operated largely through a mixed system of private bicycles and cheap mass public transport.
For very large cities, and there are many in China, this simple mixed transport system is relatively efficient as a low-pollution solution to the traffic problem. In contrast, Western cities with their high car densities are becoming pollution sinks and inefficient at moving traffic. Nevertheless, it is exactly the latter traffic model that the Chinese government is imposing on its cities. In fact, one of the ironies of this example is that most city planners in the West are beginning to promote bicycle travel and predict a necessary return to mass transit in the wake of unacceptable pollution and gridlock. However, contemporary consumer modernity has the motor car at its core, and therefore the ‘modernizing’ Chinese government sees conversion of its many cities into ‘car cities’ as necessary for ‘catching up’ with the West. Thus, the very way in which contemporary Asian cities are being redeveloped makes them tremendous sources of carbon emissions, now and into the future (The Economist 2010). This is the ultimate example of Americanization: adding another billion ordinary shoppers to the great mall that is the world market (Zhao 1997).

President Xi Jinping of China has promoted the production of electronic cars and is aware that air pollution and traffic congestion are sources of public discontent that the one-party state must manage. Also, China sees itself playing an increasing role in inter-state arrangements to combat global climate change and to position China as a leader in sustainable energy technology. However, if the model for ‘development’ is based upon achieving high levels of consumption as seen in the United States, Europe, and Japan, Chinese leaders will not be recreating China as a new progressive place. Instead, in their political failure to see other than an American future, they illustrate the absurdity of contemporary politics for the future of the Earth as a sustainable home for humanity.

Can the countries of the world come up with a plan to combat global climate change? A truly global issue is something that we would expect a hegemonic power to address. Instead, President Trump has denied the very existence of climate change and has withdrawn the United States from the Paris Climate Accords of 2015 that had gone some way to initiating a global agenda to address the issue. Will the reluctance of the United States to engage the issue of global climate change disrupt multilateral cooperation? Or will other states step up to lead on the issue? Or, as with the other two issues we have discussed in the epilogue, perhaps new political geographies are necessary and emerging, with cities and sub-national political units playing an increasing role in combating climate change. It would not be surprising if the ultimate space–place tension results in a dramatic connection between the scales of experience and reality, and bypasses the scale of ideology corrupted by corporate globalization.

The final words:
welcome to political geography

The subtitle of this section is the very same as for the prologue to the book. The prologue welcomed you to exploring a political geography framework; this epilogue welcomes you to a continuing journey of using that framework to understand the contemporary world and interact with it. We are faced with a world of climate change, increasing corporate power, and the pervasiveness of war and organized violence. Two competing political geographies exist to help us understand it and build the future. One compartmentalizes the world into simple spaces with abstract people deemed threats or competitors that need to be beaten, controlled or killed. The same view sees the world as a functional space to be exploited. The other is a political geography of places within the political and economic structures of the capitalist world-economy. It aims to understand the complexity of people and places across the globe and facilitate empathy. It sees the world as a combination of different places, or homes, across the world and at different scales; but all nurturing and requiring care through democratic participatory politics. The latter is the one we recommend.
**Glossary**

**absolutism** A form of rule in which the rulers claim complete power. It is usually applied to the politics of the ‘absolutist states’ that developed in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

**administration** The implementation of government policy by ministers and civil servants.

**anarchy of production** The sum of the investment and disinvestment decisions of many entrepreneurs in a free market or capitalist system. The essence of the process is that there is no overall planning.

**Annales school of history** Named after a journal, the *Annales*, this French school of historians emphasize the day-to-day social and economic processes in opposition to the traditional political history of major events. Its leading recent exponent was Fernand Braudel, one of the originators of world-systems analysis.

**ANZUS** A defence and security pact for the Pacific area comprising Australia, New Zealand and the United States, formed in 1952. In 1985, the United States suspended its defence obligations to New Zealand.

**apartheid** An organization of society that keeps the races apart. It was introduced in South Africa by the National Party after 1948 as a means of ensuring continued white political dominance and was dismantled after 1989.

**Arab League** A political organization formed by eight Arab states in 1945. It now has 21 members.

**aristocracy** The traditional upper class, whose power is based upon land ownership.

**ASEAN** The Association of South East Asian Nations, formed in 1967, is a regional association of non-communist states.

**autarky** A policy of economic self-sufficiency based upon protectionism and the creation of large economic blocs.

**authoritarian** A form of rule where the rulers impose their policies without any effective constraints. Military dictatorships in the ‘third world’ are usually described thus.

**autonomy** The situation when a territory has self-government but not full sovereignty.

**balance of power** A theory of political stability based upon an even distribution of power between the leading states.

**bloc** A group of countries closely bound by economic and/or political ties.

**boundary** The limits of a territory; the boundary of a state defines the scope of its sovereignty.

**bourgeoisie** The urban middle class, the original political foes of the aristocracy. In Marxist analysis, members of the capitalist class, which owns the means of production.

**capital city** The chief site of the most important elements of the state apparatus.

**capitalism** A system of economic organization based upon the primacy of the market, where all the key decisions are to maximize profit. In Marxist analysis, it is defined as a mode of production by the existence of wage labour, the proletariat, exploited by owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie.

**capitalist world-economy** The modern world-system based upon ceaseless capital accumulation.

**centralization** Concentration of power in the hands of the central government at the expense of other levels of government.
centre/centrist A political position between right-wing and left-wing orientations. Centrist politics claims to be non-ideological.

centrifugal forces Political processes that contribute to the disintegration of the state.

centrripetal forces Political processes that contribute to the integration of the state.

Christian democracy A common political label and ideology of right-wing parties in Europe and Latin America. Originally derived from Catholic political movements, today it is associated with a more collectivist approach among conservative parties.

citizenship A political status enabling individuals the right to access benefits from a state and, in turn, bear responsibilities towards the state. Formal citizenship refers to legal rights and responsibilities. Substantive citizenship refers to that actual ability of individuals to access these rights and act upon their responsibilities.

civil liberties The fundamental rights of citizens, typically violated by authoritarian regimes but respected in liberal democracies.

civil society The sum of all the voluntary associations through which a social system operates, it was devised as a concept to represent society outside the activities of the state. Sometimes, it appears as a dual (state/civil society), and sometimes as part of a trilogy including economy (state/civil society/economy).

classes In world-systems analysis, one of the four key social institutions. These are the economic strata of the world defined, as in Marxism, in relation to the mode of production.

Cold War A geopolitical world order that lasted from 1946 to 1989. It pitted the communist world led by the Soviet Union against the United States and its allies.

collective consumption The consumption of public services and goods, especially as associated with urban areas.

colonialism The occupation of foreign territory by a state for the purposes of settlement and economic exploitation. It is another term for formal imperialism.

colony A territory under the sovereignty of a foreign power.

Comecon The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was formed by communist countries in 1949 to promote socialist economic integration and the planned development of the economies of member states. Dissolved in 1990, its members were Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

Commonwealth A loose political grouping of states, most of which are former members of the British Empire.

communism A social system based upon the communal ownership of all property; it is usually used to mean the state-controlled social systems that were set up in former Soviet bloc countries.

congruent politics When the politics of support broadly matches the politics of power. It is the basis of liberal democracies.

conservative Originally a political ideology against social change, now a general term for right-wing politics.

constitution The fundamental statement of laws that define the way in which a country is governed.

containment The name given to the family of geopolitical codes devised by US governments against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

contradictory politics When the politics of support is the opposite of the politics of power; an unstable political situation.

core One of three major zones of the world-economy – the others are periphery and semiperiphery – in world-systems analysis. It is characterized by core processes involving relatively high-wage, high-tech production.

core area of states An area where a state originates and around which it has gradually built up its territory.
coup d'état A change of government by unconstitutional means, usually involving a rebellion by the armed forces.

decentralization Dispersion of power away from central government to other levels of government.

decolonization The transfer of sovereignty from a colonial power to the people of the colony at the time of political independence.

democracy A form of government where policy is made by (direct democracy) or on behalf of (indirect democracy) the people. As indirect democracy, it usually takes the form of competition between political parties at elections.

dependency An economic or political relationship between countries or groups of countries in which one side is not able to control its destiny because of oppressive links with the other side.

derivationists Theorists of the state who attempt to derive the nature of the state from Marx’s writings on capitalism.

détente A phase of the Cold War when accommodation policies were pursued, notably 1969–79.

development of underdevelopment The economic processes that occur in the periphery of the world-economy that are the opposite of the development which occurs in the core. The phrase was coined by Gunder Frank of the Dependency School of Development to show why poor countries were failing to catch up economically.

diplomacy The art of negotiating between countries. Diplomats conduct the foreign policies of states short of war.

disconnected politics When there is no relation between the politics of support and the politics of power.

domino theory A Cold War model of how countries become communist; once one country ‘falls’, it precipitates further communist takeovers among its neighbours.

economism The Marxist theory that all non-economic processes can be traced back to the economic base of society.

elite A small group in a society that has a disproportionate influence on events.

empire A political organization comprising several parts, one of which is the centre of power to which the rest are subordinate.

‘empire’ Hardt and Negri’s (2000) concept of a new form of sovereign power based not on territorial sovereign states but on a number of power relations and institutions, such as racism and multinational companies.

error of developmentalism The idea that all countries follow the same path of development.

European Union (EU) A group of states comprising most of Western Europe that is carrying out a variety of policies ultimately leading to economic and political integration. Formerly known as the European Community (EC).

executive The branch of government that carries out the policies and implements the rules agreed by the legislature. The ‘chief executive’ is usually the prime minister or president.

faction A distinctive political group with its own policy, which preceded modern political parties in legislatures.

fascism An ideology developed by the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. It is associated with the glorification of the state and its leader, militant anti-communism and military expansion.

federation A state where power is shared between two levels of government: a central or ‘federal’ government and a tier of provincial or ‘state’ governments.

feudalism A form of society based upon landlords collecting dues from the agricultural producers or serfs in return for military protection. This hierarchical society of mutual obligations preceded capitalism in Europe.
First World War  A major war (1914–18) pitting Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) against Britain, France and Tsarist Russia, and later the United States.

formal imperialism  The political control of territory beyond a state’s boundary.

franchise  The voting rights in a country, for instance the universal adult franchise used in elections in most modern states.

free trade  The policy of allowing commodities into a country from all other states without prohibitive tariffs, in order to maximize trade.

frontier  The zone at the edge of a historical system where it meets other systems.

functionalism  An argument that you can understand an institution through analysis of what it does, as in functional theories of the state.

fundamentalism  Tradition defending itself within the difficult circumstances of reflexive modernity.

globalization  A contentious term that is used to describe contemporary society. It has two main dimensions: 1) it denotes an up-scaling of human activity to the global scale; and 2) it refers to the expansion of transnational relations in a global space of flows. As such, globalization challenges the primacy of the state in political, economic and social processes.

government  The primary political institution in a state, responsible for making and implementing laws and policies.

heartland–rimland thesis  A development of the heartland theory that allows the sea power to balance the land power’s strategic position by controlling the area between them.

heartland theory  A geostrategic theory devised by Halford Mackinder that gives the land power in control of central Asia ultimate strategic advantage over sea power in competition for control of the world.

hegemony  A position held by a state or a class when it so dominates its sphere of operation that other states or classes are forced to comply with its wishes voluntarily. States are defined as hegemonic at the scale of the world-system, classes at the scale of the state.

home  The locale of the household, it is seen as the epitome of socially constructed place. It is interpreted as both a place of security and of constraint.

homeland  A place of belonging and identity, it is associated with nationalism through the conversion of state territory as space into national homeland as place.

households  One of the four key social institutions in world-systems analysis. These are the ‘atoms’ of the system, where small groups of people share a budget.

human rights  Fundamental rights that all persons should be able to expect, such as humane treatment in prison and a fair trial.

iconography  Symbolic representation, as in nationalist use of images and flags. It is a strong centripetal force in integration theories of the state.
idealis In international relations, an approach to world politics that emphasizes cooperation and believes that the inter-state system can be organized peacefully.

ideology A world view about how societies both do and should work. It is often used as a means of obscuring reality.

imperialism The process whereby one country dominates another country, either politically or economically.

informal imperialism Dominance of a territory outside a state’s borders but without political control; a process inherent in the economic structures of the world-economy.

instrumental theory of the state A theory in which the state apparatus is available for control by competing groups. In the Marxist and world-systems version this competition is hollow, since the dominant class retains control of the state as their political instrument.

inter-state system The political organization of the capitalist world-economy as a multiple set of polities.

intimate geopolitics An emphasis of feminist geopolitics that connects forms of violence within multiple spaces by tracing the form and impact of gender relations.

Islam The community of believers in the Muslim religion.

isolation A policy of keeping a country apart from foreign entanglements such as alliances and wars.

judiciary The branch of government responsible for interpreting the laws.

Kondratieff cycles (waves) The cyclical pattern of the world-economy of about 50 years’ duration and consisting of an A-phase of growth and a B-phase of stagnation.

League of Nations Precursor of the United Nations, established by the Treaty of Versailles as a form of world government to prevent future war, it quickly failed as the US Senate failed to ratify the Covenant of the League.

Lebensraum German word for living space; it became the name given to the policy of expansion of Nazi Germany.

left-wing A general term to denote anti-establishment political views. It is specifically used as a label for socialist or communist parties.

legislature The branch of government responsible for enacting laws.

liberal A political ideology that promotes individual freedom.

liberal democracy A form of state in which relatively fair elections are held regularly to decide the multi-party competition for government.

liberal democratic interlude A period of elected government in a state where government formation is also carried by other means.

liberation movement A political organization aiming at overthrowing a non-representative government, usually foreign.

local government The lowest tier of government, dealing with the particular affairs of individual cities, towns and communities.

local state The state apparatus that deals with localities.

logistic wave Very long cycles of material change (150–300 years) with an A-phase of growth and a B-phase of decline or stagnation.

longue durée Fernand Braudel’s concept of the gradual change through the day-to-day activities by which social systems are continually being reproduced.

malapportionment An electoral abuse where electoral districts are unequal in population size, thus favouring some parties or groups over others.

managerial thesis An argument about the distribution of goods in urban areas that emphasizes the power of urban managers or ‘gatekeepers’ to influence the allocation.
**Marxism** The system of thought derived from Karl Marx in which politics is interpreted as a struggle between economic classes. Since it promotes communal ownership of all property when it is practised, it is frequently termed communism.

**mercantilism** A state policy and economic theory devised and implemented in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It used protectionist measures to control trade, with the ultimate purpose of concentrating bullion within the state.

**militarism** An ideology and practice that believes the armed forces must necessarily play the dominant role in foreign policy and, in turn, sees the military as serving its own needs rather than the state and the needs of the civilian population.

**militarization** Institutionalized process of socialization that embeds militarism within all aspects of society, such as education and national identity.

**mini-systems** Small-scale historical societies that no longer exist and that were based upon a reciprocal-lineage mode of production.

**minorities** A category of the world-systems institution of peoples, it consists of a minority group of persons in a society who view themselves as separate from the rest of society on ethnic, language or religious grounds.

**mode of production** In world-systems analysis, the overall organization of the material processes in a historical system, including production, distribution and consumption.

**Monroe Doctrine** Statement made by US president James Monroe in 1823 that established Latin America within a US sphere of influence and warned European powers against interfering in newly independent Latin American countries.

**multinational corporations** The most common term to describe large companies whose activities straddle state boundaries.

**multi-party system** A situation where several parties compete for votes in an election.

**Napoleonic Wars** Constituted a major war (1795–1815) in which the French drive to European and world leadership was decisively beaten, leaving Britain supreme on the world stage.

**nation** A group of persons who believe that they consist of a single ‘people’ based upon historical and cultural criteria and therefore should have their own sovereign state.

**national determinism** The allocation of persons to a national group on some ascribed basis, usually language and territory.

**national self-determination** The right of all peoples to determine their own government.

**nationalism** An ideology and political practice that assumes all nations should have their own state, a nation-state, in their own territory, the national homeland.

**nation-state** As an ideal state, the situation where all the inhabitants belong to one nation. Although most states claim to be nation-states, in practice almost all of them include sizeable minority groups outside the dominant nation.

**NATO** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance formed in 1949 under US leadership and consisting of North American and West European states. Its prime purpose was to counter the perceived Soviet threat to the latter group of states.

**neighbourhood effect** The tendency for persons to conform to the political norms of the area in which they live, usually illustrated by voting patterns.

**neo-conservative** Political ideology promoting limited state intervention and social spending, and, in the case of the United States, militaristic foreign policy.

**neo-liberal** Political ideology and practice promoting free trade and the free movement of capital, and a limited role of the state.

**neutralism** The policy of refusing to join any military alliances.
non-aligned movement A grouping of third world countries that refused to align themselves with either the United States or Soviet Union during the Cold War.

non-decision making The power to control the political agenda so that there is no challenge to the status quo, i.e. unwanted questions are not allowed to arise, so no decisions have to be made about them.

OAS The Organization of American States, formed in 1948 with its headquarters in Washington, DC, is a political association of American states that is dominated by the United States.

OAU The Organization of African Unity, formed in 1963, is the major political association of African states and has campaigned for decolonization and against apartheid.

opposition Generally a position of disagreement, it is formalized in many liberal democracies as the role and title of the major party not in government, i.e. the government in waiting.

pan-region A large division of the world, relatively self-sufficient and under one dominant state.

partition The division of a state into two or more territories, which constitute new states.

patriarchy A form of gender politics whereby men dominate women.

peoples One of the four key social institutions in world-systems analysis. These are culturally defined status groups, the most politically potent being the nation.

periphery One of three major zones in the world-economy – the others are the core and semi-periphery – in world-systems analysis. It is characterized by peripheral processes consisting of relatively low-wage, low-tech production.

place Often used interchangeably with space, in geography place indicates a more humanized locality through which we live our lives.

place–space tension Although place and space are commonly defined as different categories, since they are social constructs it follows that the same tract of the Earth’s surface can be constructed as a place by one social group (e.g. as homeland) while being treated as a space by a different social group (e.g. as target map for bombing). This is a contingent relation and therefore a tension rather than a dialectic.

plebiscite A vote by an electorate to change its constitutional status, such as for the secession of a territory from a state.

pluralism A viewpoint that political power should be distributed among a wide range of groups and interests in a society.

pluralist theories of the state An argument that contemporary states act as neutral umpires in deciding between the claims of numerous interest groups.

political parties Political organizations whose goal is to win control of the state apparatus through combining a centre organization of political elites with branches of members through all or part of the country.

politics of contentment A phrase coined by J. K. Galbraith to describe the politics of core states when right-wing parties continue to be elected to implement policies of reducing taxes for the rich and cutting services for the poor.

politics of failure A description of unstable politics in the material conditions beyond the core where no government is able to construct a viable support base, so that every government is doomed to failure.

politics of identity A more individualized politics relating to choices of lifestyle within reflexive modernity.

politics of power The party politics associated with interests supporting and funding the party and the policies implemented to favour those interests.

politics of support The party politics of attracting voters, both long-term through socialization and short-term through campaigning.

populism A very loose ideology whose common theme is that the ordinary person is the source of
virtue against the greed of special interests. It is commonly associated with rural protest movements against corrupt 'big city' politics, but in Latin America it has been an ideology of urban-based protest movements.

**post-traditional society**  An interpretation of present social conditions in which individual reflexivity combined with globalization makes the maintenance of old traditions difficult and the creation of new ones potentially impossible.

**power**  The ability to be successful in a conflict; this may be overt through force or the threat of force, or covert through non-decision making or structural advantage.

**practical politics**  The day-to-day politics of survival, which may not always involve the formal politics of the state.

**proportional representation**  A way of organizing elections so that each party’s proportion of legislative seats is approximately the same as its proportion of votes won in the poll.

**protectionism**  A trading policy that discriminates against rival states by placing prohibitive tariffs on their goods entering the country.

**protectorate**  A small state where a foreign power controls its politics, so that it is effectively a colony.

**qualitative efficiency**  A phrase coined by David Gordon to describe capital’s control over the work process, which may be more important than mere quantitative efficiency of costs.

**racism/racialism**  Hostility to persons or groups merely on account of their physical features or cultural traditions.

**realism**  In international relations, a position that believes the inter-state system to be inherently competitive and always threatening to every state.

**reflexive modernity**  An interpretation of current modernity as a new situation in which individuals demand the right to make choices about their own identity and its meaning in the wider world.

**refugee**  Someone forced to flee their country because of persecution, war or violence.

**relative autonomy of the state**  A position that rejects economism and argues that every state has political processes that are partly autonomous with respect to its economy.

**right-wing**  A general term to indicate pro-establishment political views; as a label, it is usually given to the main party in a country, either Christian democrat or conservative, that opposes the socialist party.

**risk society**  Ulrich Beck’s description of the result of reflexive modernization, in which risk replaces production as the measure of society.

**scope of conflict**  The total collection of interests brought into a conflict at the point of its resolution.

**secession**  The act of separating a territory from a state.

**Second World War**  A major war (1939–45) pitting Germany, Italy and Japan against Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.

**sectionalism**  A regional bias in a political party’s support.

**securitization**  The ways in which a variety of social relations and processes are framed as being potential security threats and hence require some sort of violent intervention from the state.

**semi-periphery**  The middle category of the three-zone division of the world in world-systems analysis. It is characterized by a mix of both peripheral and core production processes.

**social Darwinism**  The application of evolution theory, especially the notion of the survival of the fittest, to social situations to justify material inequalities.

**social democracy**  A form of state with historically high state expenditure on services and welfare paid for by progressive taxation.

**social imperialism**  A policy of using state surpluses from imperial ventures to pay for social welfare.
social movement Organized political group seeking political goals outside of the formal institutions of the state. They may operate at a variety of geographic scales.

socialism A political ideology that in theory means the social ownership of economic production but in practice has meant the redistribution of income through state welfare policies.

sovereignty The ultimate power of the state, the legal source of its unique right to physical coercion within its territory. Sovereignty is not just proclaimed; it has to be recognized by other members of the inter-state system.

space In a common interpretation, it is our three-dimensional world abstracted down to its basics (geometry), but in political geography it is a social construction that impinges crucially on our behaviour.

spaces of flows A social construction of space based upon productions of multiple flows in networks and chains. Coined by Castells (1996), he argues that this is the nature of contemporary social space.

spaces of places A social construction of space based upon productions of multiple distinctive places. Coined by Castells (1996), he argues this was the usual form of space before the contemporary era.

state Defined by their possession of sovereignty over a territory and its people, states are the primary political units of the modern world and together constitute the inter-state system.

state capture The use of government leaders to use public funds and their position for personal gain.

structural power Power based upon structural location within the world-economy.

structuralist theories of the state The argument that the modern state is inherently capitalist because it is part of the capitalist system.

suffrage The right to vote.

superpower A term used to describe the United States and Soviet Union, indicating their immense political power relative to that of all other states. After the Cold War, the United States is often referred to as the ‘lone superpower’.

territoriality Behaviour that uses bounded spaces to control activities.

third world A Cold War term used to describe the poorer countries of the world in opposition to the first (Western) world and second (communist) world.

Thirty Years War First major war (1618–48) involving nearly all European powers. It confirmed the decline of Habsburg power, France as the strongest continental power and Dutch sovereignty.

transnational Processes, such as migration or global climate change, that transcend national boundaries so that the issue and potential solutions cannot be addressed within state-centric politics.

Treaty of Tordesillas The division of the non-European world between Spain and Portugal in 1494.

Treaty of Versailles Discussed and signed in 1919 after the conclusion of the First World War. Led to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the establishment of new nation-states. Indicated United States as emerging hegemonic power.

Treaty of Westphalia Brought to an end the Thirty Years War in 1648. It is usually interpreted as the first major agreement in international law.

Truman Doctrine Statement by President Harry Truman in 1947 to oppose communist expansion. It is often interpreted as marking the beginning of the Cold War.

undocumented migrant A foreign-born person who does not have the legal right to be in another country. Preferred to the dehumanizing term illegal immigrant.

unequal exchange A mechanism of the world-economy based upon labour cost differentials between core and periphery reflected in commodity prices. The effect is that core goods are overpriced relative to periphery goods, to the huge advantage of the former.
**Glossary**

**unitary state** A country where there is one prime level of government, the central government.

**United Nations** A world organization of states, formed in 1945, to which nearly every country in the world belongs.

**urbicide** The destruction or denial of the material and cultural aspects of urban spaces.

**Warsaw Pact** A military alliance in Eastern Europe under Soviet leadership; formed in 1955 to counter NATO, dissolved in 1990.

**Washington Consensus** Term coined to describe the neo-liberal policies imposed upon states in the name of globalization and economic growth.

**world cities** Large urban centres with global connections. The term was coined by John Friedmann to describe the major control centres of capital in the contemporary world-economy.

**world-economy** A form of world-system based upon the capitalist mode of production (ceaseless capital accumulation).

**world-empire** A form of world-system based upon a redistributive–tributary mode of production (a small military–bureaucratic ruling class exploiting a large class of agricultural producers).

**world market** The system-wide price-setting mechanism for commodities in the world-economy.

**world-system** A historical social system where the division of labour is larger than any one local production area.

**world-systems analysis** The study of historical systems, especially the modern world-system or capitalist world-economy.


Bibliography


identities and (in)securities in the campaign for an independent Scotland’, Political Geography 55: 124–34.


Dowler, L. (1998) ‘“And they think I’m just a nice old lady”: women and war in Belfast, Northern Ireland’, Gender, Place and Culture 5: 159–76.


Bibliography


Bibliography


Taibbi, M. (2006b) ‘How to be a lobbyist without even trying’, Rolling Stone 6 April.


Tuan, Yi Fu (1977) Space and Place. London: Edward Arnold.


Aboriginal peoples 191–3
academic context see political geography as discipline
actor-network theory 33
Africa: citizenship 203–4; democracy 254; informal imperialism 112; islands of development 105–6, 122, 170; see also individually named countries
agency 310
Agnew, John 8, 155, 306
agricultural capitalism 100
Al-Qaeda, War on Terror 69–70, 79–81
anarchy of production 23, 234
Angola, as territorial state 170
Annales school 13
anthropogenic climate change 296, 297, 340–1
anti-globalization 298
arms trade 56
army, identity of recruits 302
Arrighi, Giovanni 55, 115, 280
art work: Michelangelo’s David 272; and war 81–2
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 71–2
attachment, places 304
Australia, Aboriginal peoples 191–3
autocracy 222–5, 231, 232
autonomy, relative 156–8
Baltimore, as locality 278–9
Bauman, Zygmunt 311
Belt and Road Initiative see One Belt, One Road Initiative
Bergesen, A. 97
Birmingham, as locality 277–8
Bolivia, politics of failure 255
Boston, as locality 278–9
boundaries: mobility 209–13; territorial states 140–5
Bowman, Isaiah 123
Braudel, Fernand 13, 14
Brazil, globalization 62–3
Brexit 252
Britain: cities as localities 276–8; electoral politics 248–51; formal imperialism 97–109; hegemonic cycles 54–6, 58, 59–60; spy agency 151; as territorial state 145
British Empire 104–9
burkinis 198
business see corporations
California, as locality 278–9
capitalism: agricultural 100; citizenship 207–13; communism 65–7; crises 246; hegemonic cycles 55; and labor 42–3; Marxism 42–3, 95–6; political geography as discipline 337–8; territorial states 140, 151–2, 158–9; world economy 15–16, 17–18, 25–6, 38–9; world-systems approach 12–13, 23, 62
capitals: elections 234–5; inter-statelessness 286–8; as political ‘company towns’ 281; territorial states 140–5
Captain America comics 79–81
Castells, Manuel 32, 55
change, world-systems approach 16
Chase-Dunn, C. K. 38–9, 164
Chávez, Hugo 240–1
Chicago, as locality 278–9
China: climate change 341; contemporary geopolitics 70–2; contemporary imperialism 123–5; globalization 62–3; Great Firewall 32
Christianity in Europe 133–4
cities: capitals 140–5; democracy 251–4; globalization 168–71; transnational citizenship 212
cities as localities 271–5; contemporary challenges 295–8; contemporary territorial states 280–4; hegemonic cycles 275–80; political globalizations 284–91; terrorism 291–5
citizenship 175–7; movement and morals 207–13; multiscalar politics 201–7, 213
civil rights 206, 208
civil society: democracy 262–7; feminist scholarship 131; globalization 286, 289; identity 325; nationalism 203–4, 205; territorial states 134, 154–5
class see social class
Claval, Paul 7–8
climate change 296, 297, 340–1
Cold War: democracy 221–2; electoral politics 242–8; world orders 64–8
Collier, Paul 225, 226, 227, 231, 254
colonialism: capitals 143; decolonization 99–100, 109, 112; formal imperialism 97–109; see also imperialisms
computer games, localities 293
conflict resolution, and power 39–41
counterterrorism 313
contemporary context: cities as localities 280–4, 295–8; geopolitical transition 69–78; identity 194–201, 310–18; imperialisms 122–7
continuities, world-systems approach 16
core: capitals 142–3; democracy in 218–27, 230–4, 251; dialectics of electoral geography 234–42; imperialisms 95, 100–1, 109–22; making of liberal democracies
Index

242–54; networks 337; territorial states 163–4; theories of the state 152, 156; world-economies 20–1; world-systems approach 18

corporate globalization: Brexit 252; capitalism 331, 332; cities as localities 296; electoral politics 251–2; fundamentalism 316; households 322–3; imperialisms 110; political geography as discipline 338–9

corporations: capitals as political ‘company towns’ 281; democracy 251–4; global cities 284–6; globalization 166–8

corruption, elections 226–7

cosmopolitanism 294–5

coulter, P. 220–2, 227

cox, Kevin 7–8, 265, 266, 336

crises: capitalism 246; risk society 315

critical geopolitics: and feminist scholarship 83, 86; history of political geography 8; War on Terror 78–82

cultural context: federalism 146–7; identity 310; inequality 322; nationalism 181–4

dallas, as locality 278–9

darwinism 2–3

debt crisis, European Union 163
decolonization 99–100, 109, 112; see also imperialisms
democracy 217–19; dialectics of electoral geography 234–42; elections 227–34; location of 220–7; making of liberal democracies 242–54; periphery 254–62; power 33–5; social movements 262–7; territorial states 164–5
democratization 225, 261
‘democrazy’ 226–7
de-territorialization 132; see also sovereignty
detroit, as locality 278–9
development: imperialism in Africa 105–6; world-systems approach 13–14

developmentalism 16–17, 63, 125, 184

difference, political geography 9
disciplinary context see political geography as discipline
discontinuities, world-systems approach 16
division of labor 118–20
‘double Janus’, nationalism as 184–5

dutch hegemony 109, 136–7, 275–6

economic growth: developmentalism 16–17; kondratieff cycles 22–5
economics, formal imperialism 103–4
economism, theories of the state 153
elections: democracy 227–34; dialectics 234–42; kondratieff cycles 25; universal suffrage 40; violence and corruption 226–7

Emmanuel, A. 113
‘empire’: contemporary context 122–7; formal imperialism 97–109; geopolitics 86; participatory research 84; War on Terror 122–3; world-systems approach 15; see also imperialisms

employment: gender 326–8; world-systems approach 37; see also labour

environmental issues 296, 297, 340–1

ethnicity see racial context

europe: historical territorial states 133–5, 144; identity as European 195–7; imperialisms 93; refugees 210; see also individually named countries

European concept 142

European Union: debt crisis 163; sovereignty 166–7; territorial states 145

Europeanism 176

Europe: historical territorial states 133–5, 144; identity as European 195–7; imperialisms 93; refugees 210; see also individually named countries

european concept 142

European Union: debt crisis 163; sovereignty 166–7; territorial states 145

Europe: historical territorial states 133–5, 144; identity as European 195–7; imperialisms 93; refugees 210; see also individually named countries

European Union: debt crisis 163; sovereignty 166–7; territorial states 145

European Union: debt crisis 163; sovereignty 166–7; territorial states 145

future, places of 312

galbraith, J. K. 313
galtung, John 95
gender: employment 326–8; globalization 120–2; military 31; national identity 325; nationalism 199–201; sexual division of labour 118–20; see also feminist scholarship

genoa, as locality 280–1

gerontology, disciplinary context 1–2; see also political geography as discipline

geopolitical codes: British Empire 107–8; contemporary imperialism 122–6; representation 78; Singapore 73; turmoil and stability 64–8; and world orders 51–63

government: citizenship 205; codes and world orders 51–63; constructs 86–8; contemporary transition 69–78; critical 8, 78–82, 83, 86; current state 50–1; history of
political geography 4–6, 8–9, 50; intimate geopolitics 83–6; mobility 209–13; representations of the War on Terror 78–82; turmoil and stability 64–8

Ghana, politics of failure 256–8

Giddens, Anthony 305–6

Glasgow, as locality 277–8

global cities 284–6

global geopolitical codes 52

global governance 288–9

global warming 296, 297, 340–1

globalization: Brazil, India and China 62–3; cities 284–91; democracy 218, 251–4; fundamentalism 314; gender 120–2; nation state 166–71, 194–201; nationalism 194–201, 328–9; political geography as discipline 10; poverty 321–2; scale 35–6; social movements 265–7; territorial states 166–71; terrorism 291–5; world-systems approach 62–3, 168–71; see also world-systems approach
glocalization 272
Goebbels, Joseph 51
golden ages, nationalism 182–4

Gottman, Jean 134–5

Gramsci, Antonio 153, 310

Great Firewall 32

Greece, cities as localities 283–4
grieving, territorial states 130

Guatemala, guerrilla groups 157

Habermas, Jürgen 246

Hartshorne, Richard 6–7, 145

Haushofer, Richard 6–7, 145

Heartland concept 3–4; see also core hegemonic cycles 53–61; British Empire 104–9; cities as localities 275–80; Cold War 64–8; contemporary geopolitics 69–72, 75–6; contemporary imperialism 122–6; informal imperialism 109–22; United States 54–6, 58, 59–60, 71, 321; War on Terror 79–81, 339–40

hegemonic decline 13, 70–2, 75–7, 123, 331, 338

hegemony: democracy 231–2; free trade 110–11; identity 310; and modernity 310–18; theories of the state 153

Herz, J. H. 135

hierarchy, intimate geopolitics 83–6

Hindu identity 324

historical context: nationalism 182–5; state and nation since 1945 188–93; territorial states 132–40; world-systems approach 18–29

Hitler, Adolf 6, 160, 307

Hobsbawm, Eric 104

Hobson, J. A. 96, 238

Holland, cities as localities 275–6

households: identity 331; informal imperialism 116–20; and nation state 321–4; nationalism and gender 199–201; and peoples 325–6; power 40, 41, 43–4; social class 326–8

Houston, as locality 278–9

human geography, disciplinary context 1

identity 301–5; cities as localities 272–4; Ecuador 329; globalization 194–201; and institutions 318–30; and modernity 310–18, 331; nationalism 182–5

ideology, world-systems approach 35–8

imperialisms 91–5; contemporary context 122–7; formal 94, 97–109; informal 94, 109–22; territorial states 163–4; world-systems approach 95–6

independence see sovereignty
India: federalism 146–7; globalization 62–3; social movements 266

indigenous populations 191–3

individuals, power 39–41

industrial policy 56

Industrial Revolution 312

inequality: citizenship 207–8; informal imperialism 114–16; place 321–2

informal imperialism 94, 109–22

inscribed power 30, 31

institutions: feminist scholarship 84–5; and identity 318–30; power 39–41

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 29

international politics, cycles of 53–4

international relations: informal imperialism 109–10; sovereignty 137; see also supra-nationalism; transnationalism; world-systems approach

inter-stateness 286–8

intimate geopolitics 83–6

Iran, nuclear deal 29

ISIS (Islamic State) 69–70, 79, 139–40, 291, 292

Islam, identity 192–3, 197–8

Islamic extremism: global terrorism 291–5; non-national identity 192–3; territorial states 139–40; War on Terror 69–70

Istanbul, Turkey 273–4

Italy: cities as localities 282–3; Michelangelo’s David 272

Jackson, R. H. 133

Kaplan, Robert 50

Kondratieff cycles 22–8; crises 246; democracy 223–4; hegemonic cycles 54–6; inequality 321, 322; territorial states 160–2

labour: division of 118–20; informal imperialism 113–14; and modernity 331–2; see also employment

Latin America: democracy 254–5, 256; informal imperialism 112; territorial states 146

lebensraum 4, 6, 78

legal context, territorial states 137–8, 159

liberal democracy 228–30, 242–8; see also democracy

liberalism: and democracy 228, 231; hegemonic cycles 53–4; and nationalism 178–9; see also neoliberalism

liberation nationalism 186

Liverpool, as locality 277–8

locality: geopolitical codes 52; imperialisms 104–7, 112, 120; Kondratieff cycles 25; place 302–5; welfare 322–3; world-systems approach 45–6; see also cities as localities
Index

logistics waves 25–8, 53, 100, 142
London, inter-city relations 285–6
longue durée 13, 160–1
Los Angeles, as locality 278–9
Low, Murray 212–13
Mackinder, Halford, Sir 3–4
Manchester: as locality 277–8; modernity 312–13
manufacturing, informal imperialism 115–16
Manufacturing Belt cities 278–9
maps, territorial states 132–3
Marshall, T. H. 204–6, 207
Marxism: capitalism 42–3, 95–6; imperialisms 95–6; power 42–3; theories of the state 151, 152–3, 156, 161–2; world-systems approach 13, 14
Massey, Doreen 304, 306
material issues 8–9
Mazzini, Giuseppe 187
mercantilism: informal imperialism 109, 111; power 115–16
Miami, as locality 278–9
Middle East, democracy 261
migration: citizenship 202, 208–13; freedom of movement 208–13, 320–1
military: arms trade 56; citizenship 203–4; identity of army recruits 302; power 30–1, 38–9; virtual simulation 293
minority nationalism 188–90
mobility 209–13, 320–1
modernity, and identity 310–18, 331; see also contemporary context
morality: cities 168–71; citizenship 207–13
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 92
nation state: citizenship 204–6; globalization 166–71, 194–201; Hartshorne, Richard 6–7; Haushofer, Karl 4–6; and households 321–4; and peoples 328–30; place 303–5, 331; political geography as discipline 9–10; power 41–2, 43–4, 57; Ratzel, Friedrich 2–3; since 1945 188–93; social class 320–1; theories of the state 150–6; world-economies 28; world-systems approach 17–18, 45–6; see also territorial states
national security see security
national security see security
nationalism see security nationalism
nationalism 175–7; democracy 219; doctrine of 177–9; versus Europeanism 176; globalization 194–201, 328–9; historical context 182–5; power of 179–82; in practice 185–8
Nazi Party 160, 307
neoliberalism: as informal imperialism 121–2; Kondratieff cycles 23; nation state 131; territorial states 143–5, 149, 154–5; types of 30–1; world-systems approach 12, 45–6
political citizenship 204–6
political events, world-systems approach 38–44
political geography as discipline 1–2, 341; capitalism 337–8; climate change 340–1; corporate globalization 338–9; geopolitics 50; Hartshorne, Richard 6–7; Haushofer, Karl 4–6; key concepts 1–2, 335; limitations 7–10; Mackinder, Halford, Sir 3–4; networks 337–8; Ratzel, Friedrich 2–3; scale 10, 336–7; temporal-spatial context 338; war 339–40; world-systems approach 12, 45–6
political parties, electoral politics 234–42
post-colonial voices 121
post-traditional society 315–17
poverty 321–2
power: contemporary geopolitics 70–2; electoral politics 247, 248–51, 258–60; geometry 31–3; hegemonic cycles 53–9; nationalism 179–82; political events 38–44; political geography as discipline 9–10; scale 35, 38; social movements 262–4; territorial states 130, 143–5, 149, 154–5; types of 30–1; world-systems approach 29–38, 45–6
prime modernities 311–12
production: Kondratieff cycles 23–4; world-systems approach 14–15
proletarian households 118–20
protectionism 32, 111, 158, 256
proto-nationalism 185
Putin, Vladimir 247
racial context: hegemony 310–18; imperialisms 108–9; nationalism...
188–90, 200–1; people-class politics 324; welfare 322; world-systems approach 18

Ratzel, Friedrich 2–3

reality, world-systems approach 35–8

reflexive modernization 314–15, 319

refugees 210

Regional Comprehensive Economic partnership (RCEP) 72

regional geopolitical codes 52

relative autonomy 156–8

religion: Christianity in Europe 133–4; fundamentalism 314, 316; identity 192–3, 197–9; Islamic identity 192–3, 197–8; see also Islamic extremism

renewal nationalism 186–7

representation: democracy 219; urbicide 293, 294; War on Terror 78–82

resource, power as 30, 31

revolution: imperialisms 95–6; nationalism 187–8; territorial states 144, 146, 160

rhetorical issues 8–9

rights, civil 206, 208

risk society 315, 340

Roberts, S. 121

Rokkan, Stein 251

Rostow’s stages of economic growth 16–17

Routledge, Paul 266

Said, Edward 8

Salonica, as locality 283–4

scale: citizenship 201–7, 206–7, 213; gender 120–2; and modernity 331–2; political geography as discipline 10, 336–7; social movements 264–5, 266–7; structuration theory 306; territorial states 131; world-systems approach 33–8

Schattschneider, E. E. 39–40, 68, 110, 236, 246

Schonberg, R. 97

scope, world-systems approach 33–5

securitization 85–6

security: global terrorism 291–5; intimate geopolitics 83–6; non-national identity 192–3; see also War on Terror

semi-periphery: contemporary geopolitics 75–6; imperialisms 110–11; territorial states 164–5; world-economies 20–1

semi-proletarian households 118–20

separation nationalism 186

Singapore, contemporary geopolitics 73

Smith, A. D. 178, 179–80, 182

Smith, Adam 109

Smith, David M. 208, 209

social citizenship 204–6

social class: households 326–8; and nation states 320–1; peoples 324–5; power 40, 42–3; world-systems approach 18

social constructionism 305, 307–9

social context, world-systems approach 12–13

social democracy 228–30

social imperialism 113

social movements: anti-globalization 298; democracy 262–7

social reflexivity 317

social science, world-systems approach 13–14

sovereignty: boundaries 141; federalism 146–7; globalization 166–71, 194–201, 296; imperialisms 98; relative autonomy 156–8; territorial states 132, 134–40; theories of the state (singular) 150–6; theory of the states (plural) 156–65; world political map 132; see also nation state
territory: de-territorialization 132; geopolitics 86; imperialisms 98; nationalism 195; power 31

terrorism: cities as localities 291–5; Guatemala 157; networks 337–8; new political geographies 73–8; oil in Nigeria 92; see also Islamic extremism; War on Terror

Texas, as locality 278–9

theocracy 165

Thessalonica, as locality 283–4

time: geopolitics 86–7; new political geographies 73–8; political geography as discipline 338; space-time matrix 26–8, 162–3; territorial states 162–3

trade: freedom of movement 320; globalization 296; hegemonic state 110–12; protectionism 32, 111, 158, 256; unequal exchange 114, 118

traditions 183

Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership (TTIP) 296

transformation, world-systems approach 16

Taiwan, electoral politics 258–60

technological change: informal imperialism 114–16; world-economies 23–5

territorial states 129–32; boundaries and capitals 140–5; and cities 297–8; cities as localities 280–4; federalism and partition 145–9; globalization 166–71; nationalism 180–1; origin of 133–4; sovereignty 132, 134–40; theories of the state (singular) 150–6; theory of the states (plural) 156–65; world political map 132; see also nation state

space: cities 286; geopolitics 86–7; new political geographies 73–8; oil in Nigeria 92; see also Islamic extremism; War on Terror

Texas, as locality 278–9

theocracy 165

Thessalonica, as locality 283–4

transformation, world-systems approach 16

strategy, power as 30, 31

structural geography: informal imperialism 112–13; War on Terror 69–70

structural theory of imperialism 95

structuring theory 305–10

substantive citizenship 202–4

suburbanization 331, 332

suffrage see elections

supra-nationalism 288–9

Taiwan, electoral politics 258–60

technological change: informal imperialism 114–16; world-economies 23–5

territorial states 129–32; boundaries and capitals 140–5; and cities 297–8; cities as localities 280–4; federalism and partition 145–9; globalization 166–71; nationalism 180–1; origin of 133–4; sovereignty 132, 134–40; theories of the state (singular) 150–6; theory of the states (plural) 156–65; world political map 132; see also nation state

territory: de-territorialization 132; geopolitics 86; imperialisms 98; nationalism 195; power 31

terrorism: cities as localities 291–5; Guatemala 157; networks 337–8; new political geographies 73–8; oil in Nigeria 92; see also Islamic extremism; War on Terror

Texas, as locality 278–9

theocracy 165

Thessalonica, as locality 283–4

time: geopolitics 86–7; new political geographies 73–8; political geography as discipline 338; space-time matrix 26–8, 162–3; territorial states 162–3

trade: freedom of movement 320; globalization 296; hegemonic state 110–12; protectionism 32, 111, 158, 256; unequal exchange 114, 118

traditions 183

Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership (TTIP) 296

transformation, world-systems approach 16

Index
transition: Cold War 64–8; contemporary geopolitics 69–78; world-systems approach 16
transnationalism: cities 289–91; citizenship 209–13; power 33; social movements 265–6
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 72; geopolitics 73
Trump, Donald: elections 245–6; Kondratieff cycles 25; migration 321
Turkey: cities as localities 273–4; democracy 263
turmoil, geopolitics 64–8
unequal exchange 114, 118
unification nationalism 185–6
unified field theory 7
United Kingdom see Britain
United Nations: climate change 297; and nationalism 178; supranationalism 288
United States: allies and threats 59; Cold War 64–8; contemporary imperialism 122–6; democracy 221–2; electoral politics 242–8; hegemonic cycles 54–6, 58, 59–60, 71, 321; intervention in elections 240–1; Manufacturing Belt cities 278–9; nationalism 179; suburbanization 332; as territorial state 145, 146; War on Terror 69–70, 79–81, 122–3, 261, 294–5, 339–40; Washington, DC as capital 142
universal suffrage 40
urbanicide 292–3, 294
Venezuela, intervention in elections 240–1
Venice, as locality 282–3
vertical geopolitics 77
virtual simulation, localities 293
volume, new political geographies 73–5, 77–8
voting see elections
wages, informal imperialism 113–14
Wallerstein, Immanuel: hegemonic cycles 53, 275; identity 310; informal imperialism 112–13, 118; institutions 40–1; nationalism 180, 185; power 42–3; scale 36; territorial states 135, 137; world-economies 20, 25–6; world-systems approach 12–15, 18
war: army identity 302; and art work 81–2; new political geographies 73–8; political geography as discipline 339–40; territorial states 135–6; urbicide 293, 294; see also Cold War; military
War on Terror: democratization 261; ‘empire’ 122–3; global terrorism 291, 292–3, 295; new political geographies 73–8; representations of 78–82; structural geography 69–70
Warlordism 192–3
Washington, DC: as capital 142; as locality 278–9
waste, informal imperialism 117–18
Weimar Republic 160
welfare, locality 322–3
Westphalia Treaty: cities 274, 280–4, 286; historical context 54; interstateness 286–8; nationalism 185–6; sovereignty 135, 136
world cities 284–6
World Economic Forum (WEF) 22, 32
world orders: geopolitics 51–63; representation 78; turmoil and stability 64–8
world-economies 15–18; dynamics 21–6; spatial structure 19–21
world-empires 15; see also ‘empire’; imperialisms
world-systems approach 11–18; elections 227–34, 251; and feminist scholarship 84–5; global terrorism 295; globalization 62–3, 168–71; hegemonic cycles 53–4, 55, 61; historical systems 18–29; imperialisms 93, 95–6; informal imperialism 109–10, 114–15; nationalism 194; political events 38–44; political geography as discipline 8, 12, 45–6; post-colonial voices 121; power 29–38; Soviet Union 66–7; territorial states 130, 135–6, 141, 155–6